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FOREWORD 
The Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1997-1998 is the fiftieth 
edition in this series. To mark this milestone, a special chapter has been included in this 
edition of the Survey which traces the history of the publication and outlines the way in 
which the economic situation in the region has been viewed during each of the periods 
examined. 
Apart from this innovation, the changes made in 1995 in terms of the Survey's coverage of 
regional economic conditions have been maintained in the 1997-1998 edition. Once again, 
it is published as a single volume consisting of three parts. Part One contains a summary 
which provides an overview of the economy in 1997 and the first half of 1998. This 
summary has also been published as a separate document. The other seven chapters of Part 
One examine the economic performance of the region in 1997 and go on to analyse some 
aspects of the economic situation during the first half of 1998. Part Two presents reports 
on the 20 countries of Latin America and on the situation in the countries of the 
English-speaking Caribbean. The special chapter which reviews the 50 years of the 
Economic Survey is contained in Part Three. 
As in the last two editions of the Survey, this year's edition includes a statistical appendix 
on diskettes which provides ready access to data for recent years and permits the preparation 
of spreadsheets covering a longer time period. The same methodology as the year before 








The year 1997 was a highly successful one for 
many economies in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, thanks to both a strong expansion of 
output and low inflation. As predicted earlier, 
however, external shocks, combined with the 
effects of policies designed to deal with 
incipient disequilibria in several countries, 
have made it impossible to repeat that 
performance this year. 
The region's average growth rate of 5.3% in 
1997 was one of the highest in the past two 
decades; it is notable that this expansion was led 
by the robust growth of both investment and 
exports. At the same time, inflation fell to 10.4%, 
the second-lowest level in the last half century, 
and labour markets showed a moderate 
improvement. Capital inflows reached an 
all-time high of nearly US$ 80 billion, which was 
enough to cover the widening current account 
deficit (US$ 63 billion) and to permit a substantial 
increase in international reserves. Over two 
thirds of these flows consisted of direct 
investment, the most stable kind of foreign 
capital. 
In 1998, by contrast, the region's economies 
are expected to grow only around 3% on average, 
which is slightly lower than the norm for the 
decade. Under these conditions, it is likely that 
unemployment will again begin to increase. 
Inflation, which had been falling rapidly until 
1997, crept back up to 10.9% in the 12 months to 
June 1998, although it may recede in the second 
half of the year, once the food price increases 
caused by natural disasters have abated. The 
current account deficit will widen further to 
around US$ 75 billion (3.7% of GDP, compared 
1 ECLAC, Impact of the Asian Crisis on Latin A, 
to 3.2% the year before), but capital inflows will 
still be more than enough to cover the gap. 
Two types of external shocks have affected 
the region -and much of the rest of the world as 
well- in the current biennium. The first has 
been generated by the climatic phenomenon 
known as El Niño, which, by warming ocean 
currents, has caused both severe floods and 
droughts in different places. In a number of Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, El Niño has 
disrupted agricultural production and fishing, 
wreaked havoc in forestry and ranching 
activities and destroyed infrastructure and 
housing stock. The results include depressed 
growth rates, increased inflation and pressures on 
the balance of payments owing to both lower 
exports and higher imports. 
The other shock has been the financial crisis 
that began in Thailand in June 1997 and 
thereafter expanded to include large 
devaluations, recessions and inflation in many 
of the developing countries of East and 
South-East Asia. The continuing stagnation of 
the Japanese economy has only exacerbated the 
problems of its neighbours. As noted in an earlier 
ECLAC study, the repercussions of the Asian crisis 
have been transmitted to Latin America through 
three channels: trade (a decline in the volume of 
exports to Asia, lower commodity prices, 
competition from cheap Asian exports, negative 
spillovers from intraregional effects in Latin 
America itself); finance (speculative attacks on 
exchange rates, weakening stock markets, scarce 
and/or more expensive foreign capital); and 
policy responses (tighter fiscal and monetary 
policies). 
(LC/G.2026), May 1998. 
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Figure 1.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OVERALL EFFECTS OF THE ASIAN CRISIS 
(In percentage of GDP growth)) 
1997 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
1998 without crisis 1998 with crisis 
These processes have tended to lower the 
countries' growth rates and increase their current 
account deficits, as well as raising the cost of 
financing those deficits. The ECLAC study tried to 
separate out the effects of the Asian crisis per se 
from other phenomena, including El Niño, lower 
oil prices (only partially due to weaker demand 
in Asia) and the fact that some of the countries in 
the region had to take steps to prevent their 
economies from overheating. Thus, a comparison 
was made between projections for 1998 prepared 
in September 1997 (before the Asian crisis hit 
Latin America) and in March 1998 (after serious 
repercussions had begun to be felt). According to 
this analysis, growth would have declined by 
about 1% in 1998 even without the Asian crisis, 
but the crisis will subtract another 1%-1.5% (see 
figure 1.1). Given the negative terms-of-trade 
effect, the rate of increase in gross domestic 
income will slow even more than GDP growth. 
The Latin American and Caribbean Govern-
ments have been quick and decisive in their 
response to these external shocks, and in 
consequence, their impact so far has been 
relatively mild. At the same time, it should be 
pointed out that there has been a clear policy 
bias towards reducing demand rather than 
adjusting relative prices, especially the exchange 
rate. This choice has negative implications for 
growth rates in the region, at least in the short run, 
although it also has a positive impact on inflation. 
The best-known example is Brazil's reaction 
when the real was attacked in October 1997. 
Within days, the Government announced a 
package of measures to defend the currency, 
which is considered to be the linchpin of the 
stabilization programme that brought inflation 
under control. The measures centred around a 
sharp rise in interest rates and cuts in government 
expenditure, which led to a slowdown in growth 
but avoided major financial difficulties of the 
sort that have undermined a number of Asian 
economies. It should be pointed out that Brazil 
was able to undertake these measures because it, 
like many other Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, had substantially strengthened its 
banking system in recent years. 
Although sound economic management and 
other preventive measures have warded off a 
crisis in the region thus far, a cautious attitude 
should be maintained for several reasons. First, 
the recessions in East and South-East Asia now 
appear likely to last longer than originally 
foreseen and could worsen. Second, additional 
problems could emerge, such as a further 
weakening of the banking sector in Japan, a 
devaluation in China, or a spread of the contagion 
to other countries, as ocurred in Russia in August 
1998. Third, the crisis may have repercussions on 
the United States and European economies that 
have not yet been manifested, which in turn 
would have a negative affect on Latin American 
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exports. Finally, further weather problems ("La 
Niña") and the continuation of weak commodity 
As in earlier years, the effort to consolidate the 
ground already won by the stabilization 
programmes in the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries has been the objective that 
has determined the general thrust of 
macroeconomic policy in 1997 and 1998. Within 
this general approach, however, it is possible to 
distinguish two periods characterized by 
differences in the availability of foreign capital 
and by policy-makers' responses to the situation. 
The abrupt change in flows, generated by the 
deepening of the Asian crisis, marked the 
separation of the two periods. 
For much of 1997, in what constituted the 
continuation of a trend that had taken shape in the 
second half of 1996, a plentiful supply of foreign 
resources was placed at the region's disposal, 
allowing it to boost domestic growth above the 
originally projected levels. In response to this 
sharper-than-expected upswing, and with fiscal 
deficits starting to show slight increases, the 
authorities began to modify their monetary 
targets to bring them into line with the increased 
demand for money. 
The countries' external accounts constituted 
the dark side of this otherwise bright picture, as 
the appreciation of the real exchange rate began 
to accelerate and the situation in the current 
account of the balance of payments started to 
deteriorate. Since international reserves were 
rising, however, these trends were not seen as a 
major cause of concern by policy-makers, at least 
until the second half of the year. 
When the prospect of having an ample supply 
of inexpensive external financing vanished in 
October 1997, the question of the volatility of 
external credit flows and of the sustainability of 
the region's growth patterns came to the fore once 
again. From that point onward, macroeconomic 
policy returned to a more restrictive stance. At 
first, the aim of this change was to restore 
investors' confidence in stabilization programmes 
and to prevent capital flight. Later on, when the 
severity of the Asian crisis became apparent, 
prices could be very damaging to certain countries 
in the Latin American and Caribbean region. 
adjustments were directed towards cooling down 
domestic demand and aligning it with the new 
external scenario of increasing uncertainty. 
The reduction in revenues threatens fiscal 
equilibria 
The fiscal sector is perhaps the area of 
macroeconomic policy that, from a regional 
perspective, has undergone the fewest qualitative 
changes during 1997 and 1998. From early 1997 
on, many countries began to have difficulty in 
meeting their revenue targets; this was mainly 
because of decreases in non-tax income, whether 
in the form of capital revenues (especially 
income from privatizations) or of current receipts 
(as a consequence of lower sales volumes in State 
enterprises). All in all, the average decline in 
public-sector revenue amounted to half a 
percentage point of GDP. To make up for this loss 
of income, spending was cut by an average of 0.2 
points of GDP, with most of the reduction being 
made in capital expenditures. Thus, the region's 
average fiscal deficit rose only slightly (from 
1.0% to 1.2% of GDP) and was financed primarily 
with external resources. Although this deficit was 
relatively small, the overall figure for the region 
as a whole masks the existence of fiscal problems 
in a number of countries, particularly Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana and Jamaica. 
As of October 1997, with the worsening of 
the Asian crisis, countries of the region began to 
adopt measures of fiscal adjustment. These steps 
were aimed both at reducing expenditure to deal 
with large fiscal deficits and at counteracting 
declines in revenue. Brazil was the first country 
to react to the change in international conditions. 
While authorities in Brazil had tried earlier to 
apply fiscal adjustment measures without much 
success, they took advantage of the new situation 
to put forward a much more ambitious 
programme with the aim of reducing the deficit 
by more than 2% of GDP. As of mid-1998, 
however, they had not achieved the expected 
2. Macroeconomic policy 
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results; indeed, the deficit had widened even 
further. 
Countries that suffered a decline in government 
revenue because of falling commodity export 
prices also implemented fiscal adjustment 
measures. The oil exporters were aprime example, 
since the price of petroleum on the international 
market was well below the figures used to prepare 
government budgets. Thus, Mexico carried out 
three expenditure cuts in the first half of 1998, 
achieving a saving of nearly 1% of GDP, while in 
Venezuela expenditures were reduced and a sales 
tax was introduced. In Chile, public revenue 
deteriorated because of the sharp fall in the price 
of copper in the second half of 1997; this obliged 
the Government to cut expenditures in 1998. 
With the persistence of the Asian crisis, which 
turned out to be deeper than initially envisaged, 
other countries also perceived the necessity of 
implementing austerity measures. The Argentine 
Government, for example, has recently announced 
budget cuts to reduce the fiscal deficit and 
moderate domestic demand so as to keep the 
external deficit within a range that can be financed. 
The overvaluation of local currencies has 
abated 
Given the voluminous inflows of external 
financing received by the region in 1996 and in 
the first three quarters of 1997, in the great 
majority of the countries exchange rate policy 
focused more on controlling domestic inflation 
than on fostering external competitiveness. 
During this period, the use of the exchange rate 
as a "nominal anchor" to slow price rises had the 
effect of driving up the rate of real appreciation 
of Latin American currencies, but that trend has 
abated in 1998. 
Despite a smaller inflation differential with 
respect to their trading partners outside the 
region, the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, taken as a group, registered a real 
appreciation of their currencies of over 4% in 
1997. The appreciation of the currencies of the 
seven countries with the most active financial 
markets in the region was particularly marked, 
reaching an average annualized rate of 8% in the 
second and third quarters of 1997. The rest of 
the countries recorded a much more moderate 
appreciation -an annualized rate of about 2%-
during those same months. 
As was also true in 1996, the real appreciation 
of the countries' currencies was primarily caused 
by financial factors that bore no apparent 
connection with the fundamentals of the real 
economy, i.e., growth, productivity and the terms 
of trade. The risk involved in a delinkage of 
financial factors from the fundamentals became 
glaringly evident in the wake of the crisis of 
October 1997, when international markets began 
to reassess the external sustainability of the 
growth and stabilization patterns of, initially, the 
most heavily exposed economies and, later, all 
the economies of the region. 
Depending on the policy stance of the country, 
the currency market's behaviour led either to a 
nominal devaluation or to a loss of international 
reserves. In most cases, the nominal devaluation 
rate began to increase in the fourth quarter of 
1997 and the first half of 1998, stopping the real 
appreciation of local currencies for the region as 
a whole. This result at the regional level, however, 
was the average of opposing trends among 
countries. At the two extremes, Venezuela saw a 
real appreciation of 14%, while Paraguay registered 
a real depreciation of nearly 20% (see figure 1.2). 
Monetary policy assumes a reactive stance 
As the growth rates of the Latin American 
economies outpaced the original projections during 
the greater part of 1997, monetary authorities 
adopted a more accomodating stance. Thus, after 
having grown more slowly than GDP in the 
previous two years in most of the countries of the 
region, the supply of base money expanded 
rapidly during the first three quarters of 1997. 
This relaxation of monetary policy prompted a 
reactivation of domestic lending, whose effect on 
the growth of the money supply was even greater 
than the impact of the strong build-up of external 
assets. 
It should be pointed out that this increase in 
the money supply was wholly attributable to 
stronger demand for local currency on the part of 
the general public and business as the volume of 
commercial transactions increased and the 
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Figure 1.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CHANGES IN REAL VALUE 
OF LOCAL CURRENCIES " 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund. 
0 With respect to the United States dollar. 
erosion of purchasing power subsided. Thus, 
rather than diminishing, as it would have in the 
presence of excess liquidity, the real interest rate 
on deposits rose by an average of over one 
percentage point to an annual rate of around 4%. 
Moreover, the increase in the money supply did 
nothing to impede the decline of inflation rates, 
as the surges that did occur were clearly 
attributable to supply factors, especially in the 
case of agricultural products affected by El Niño. 
The Asian crisis put an abrupt end to this 
expansion of the money supply. In the final 
quarter of 1997, the remonetization of the 
region's economies slowed sharply, falling from 
an average annual rate of 15% in real terms to 8% 
between September and December. Brazil was 
the first country to tighten its monetary policy in 
October 1997, but the majority of the region's 
economies followed suit once the severity of the 
external shock and of the deterioration in 
external financial conditions became clear. 
Interest rates were raised sharply to try to prevent 
the loss of international reserves, and steps were 
taken to reduce liquidity on the interbank market 
(see figure 1.3). It is expected that the resulting 
reduction in the money supply will, in conjunction 
with various fiscal adjustments, help check the 
expansion of domestic demand and thus slow 
GDP growth in the second half of 1998. 
The domestic financial markets saw a 
continuation of the consolidation process that 
had begun in the aftermath of the banking crisis 
that overtook the major economies of Latin 
America in 1994 and 1995. The main exceptions 
were Paraguay, where the authorities had to step 
in and eventually liquidate two banks, and 
Jamaica, where much of the cost of a severe crisis 
in that country's banking system had to be 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Short-term annualized rates. 
absorbed into the government budget. Banking 
reforms moved ahead in most of the countries, 
however, as regulatory systems were strengthened 
in order to improve the prudential regulation and 
supervision of financial activities. The 
consolidation of Latin America's banking system 
was reflected in a reduction in the number of 
banking institutions in many countries as well as 
in the increasingly important role of foreign 
banks as stockholders and managers of domestic 
banking institutions. This trend was particularly 
notable in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico 
and Venezuela, but is in evidence in a majority 
of the countries of the region. 
3. Economic performance 
A significant slowdown is expected in GDP 
growth 
The recovery in the level of economic activity 
that had begun in 1996 in Latin America and the 
Caribbean gathered speed in 1997, but in 1998 it 
has slackened considerably. Consequently, the 
5.3% growth rate posted in 1997 -one of the 
highest to be recorded since the late 1970s- is 
expected to drop to about 3% in 1998, thereby 
returning to the more modest trend that prevailed 
at the start of the decade. Per capita GDP is 
expected to rise by only around 1%. 
This uneven performance on the part of the 
region's economies has in large part been a 
reflection of the behaviour of capital flows. 
The huge volume of such inflows in 1997 no 
doubt contributed to the buoyancy exhibited 
that year by the Latin American and Caribbean 
economies. The sudden contraction of those 
flows in October when the Asian crisis 
worsened had a dampening effect on economic 
activity, and a number of Governments were 
forced to implement harsh adjustment measures, 
since this new situation came at a time when 
they had large deficits on their external 
accounts. The severe deterioration in the terms 
of trade, especially for oil- and copper-exporting 
countries, is also playing a role in the poor 
performance of some countries in 1998. 
Almost all the countries of the region shared 
in the expansion of economic activity seen in 
1997; Jamaica was the only country to experience 
a setback in this regard. Five countries (Argentina, 
Chile, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and 
Peru) posted GDP growth of over 6%, and another 
six economies had rates of between 4% and 6%. 
In the rest, GDP expanded by between 1 % and 4% 
(see figure 1.4). 
The rapid growth of the Latin American and 
Caribbean economies in 1997 was largely 
attributable to investment and exports, which 
grew much faster than GDP. Gross capital 
formation expanded particularly sharply in 
Argentina, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and 
Mexico, while exports were an important 
element in promoting growth in the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. Consumption rose 
more slowly, in most cases by less than GDP 
growth. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the 
liberalization policies of recent years and, above 
all, the steady real appreciation in most countries' 
currencies, a considerable portion of domestic 
demand was diverted to imports. Although this 
undermined economic dynamism, it also served 
to alleviate pressure on prices in a context where 
high growth was leading to full use of productive 
capacity. 
GDP growth is expected to decrease 
significantly in most of the region in 1998. Some 
of the Central American and Caribbean countries 
may be an exception, however, since the Asian 
crisis has had less of an impact on them and the 
decline in oil prices has provided some relief in 
terms of their external accounts. Because of its 
Figure 1.4 
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Figure 1.5 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Twelve months to June 1998. 
size, the drop in Brazil's growth rate to just 1.5% 
will drive down the region's overall rate 
considerably, but reductions are also expected in 
Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, all of 
whose economies flourished in 1997. The 
slowdown in GDP growth in 1998 can be traced to 
a slump in domestic demand (especially for capital 
goods), which has been hurt by the adjustment plans 
implemented in response to the adverse impacts of 
the Asian crisis. 
Inflation levels off at an annual rate of slightly 
above 10% 
The slow rate of price increases in recent years 
has been one of the main economic policy 
accomplishments of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. The average rate of 
inflation for the region as a whole fell from 18% 
in 1996 to slightly over 10% in 1997, the second 
lowest figure in the last 50 years. A slight 
increase was seen in the first half of 1998, but this 
did not imply a reversal of the achievements of 
recent years. In addition to the reduction in the 
overall rate, it is notable that low figures were 
registered by a large number of countries in 1997 
and 1998: 10 of the 19 countries for which data 
are available had single-digit inflation in both of 
these years, and another seven had rates of 
between 10% and 20%. The only countries that 
had higher rates -between 30% and 40%- were 
Ecuador and Venezuela (see figure 1.5). 
These results are especially significant in 
view of the fact that they coincided with rapid 
GDP growth in the region in 1997. The 
inflationary pressures generated by the steep 
upswing in domestic demand were neutralized, 
thanks to the existence of idle capacity and a 
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considerable increase in external supply. By the 
same token, the expansion of the workforce 
helped to curb the rise in wages prompted by 
stronger demand for labour. 
The small amount of ground lost in the 12 
months to June 1998 in terms of inflation control 
was a reflection of developments in only a few 
countries. Nicaragua registered a rate of 14%, 
which was double the 1997 figure, and in 
Paraguay inflation jumped by over five 
percentage points to nearly 12%. Colombia's 
inflation rate for the year is expected to be 
slightly higher than in 1997, but it is hoped that 
it will still be below 20%. In contrast, the 
Dominican Republic and Uruguay succeeded in 
bringing its inflation rate down sharply, and 
Chile registered somewhat smaller reductions. In 
the rest of the countries inflation either leveled 
off or rose slightly. 
The increase in inflation rates in some 
countries and the failure of others to achieve any 
further reduction are partially attributable to the 
effects of El Niño, which heavily damaged many 
crops, thereby driving up the prices of some 
widely used staple foods. There were also other 
specific factors at work in some cases, such as 
government-regulated rate adjustments for 
public utilities and the devaluation of a few 
currencies. On the other hand, lower prices for 
some imports, especially oil, have contributed to 
stabilization efforts. 
Labour markets are likely to forfeit recent gains 
Within the context of the high economic 
growth rates achieved in 1997, the labour 
market's performance was fairly good, with 
significant increases in both employment and 
labour productivity, a small decline in 
unemployment and a moderate rise in real wages. 
All this helped to offset part of the deterioration 
witnessed in the preceding two years. However, 
although these improvements were sustained 
during the first half of 1998, it is likely that they 
will be reversed in the second half of the year. 
The favourable results for 1997 were shared 
by the great majority of the countries in the 
region. Improved job opportunities, as reflected 
in a striking increase in employment, stimulated 
the growth of the labour supply, and the decrease 
in open unemployment was therefore only 
moderate. The main exception to this bright 
picture was Brazil, where sluggish job creation 
resulted in higher unemployment even though 
the labour force participation rate declined. 
During the first half of 1998 the situation was 
much the same. In all the countries for which data 
are available except Brazil, employment levels 
were higher than they had been during the first 
half of 1997, and the regional average, weighted 
by the size of the working-age population, 
remained constant (see figure 1.6a). The 
improvement in the employment situation was 
also reflected in average real wages, which 
climbed slightly in most of the few countries that 
have statistics available on this variable. 
As a consequence of the trend in employment 
levels, the rate of unemployment fell during the 
first half of the year in most of the countries for 
which data are available (Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela), but 
rose again in Brazil and Colombia. As had also 
been true in the second half of 1997, in Colombia 
this was due to a sizeable increase in the labour 
supply, but in Brazil it was the result of slack job 
creation. Because of the steep rise in 
unemployment in Brazil and that economy's 
strong influence on weighted regional figures by 
virtue of its size, the average rate of 
unemployment for the eight countries for which 
data are available climbed from 7.5% in the first 
half of 1997 to 8.1% for the corresponding period 
of 1998, whereas the simple average for these 
same countries fell from 10.5% to 10.1% (see 
figure I.6b). 
Hence, as of mid-1998, Brazil's labour market 
was the only one that had been hurt to any 
significant degree by the slowdown in growth. 
Nonetheless, it is expected that during the second 
half of the year the adjustment measures which 
many countries began to implement in late 1997 
or during 1998 may curb job creation and boost 
unemployment. Consequently, after two bad 
years (1995 and 1996) and one year of 
improvements (1997) in terms of the quantity 
of jobs and, to a partial extent, job quality, the 
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The current account deficit continues to widen 
The current account deficit for the Latin 
American and Caribbean region as a whole has 
expanded in both 1997 and 1998, as imports 
continue to rise faster than exports. With the high 
rate of GDP growth registered in 1997, the gap 
widened to US$ 63 billion (3.2% of GDP as 
compared to 2.0% in 1996). In 1998, the deficit 
is projected at around US$ 75 billion (3.7% of 
GDP). Plentiful capital inflows continue to 
provide more than enough funds to cover the 
deficit (see figure 1.7)). 
The expansion of foreign trade in 1997 was 
one of the largest of the last two decades. 
Exports climbed by 11% in volume and by 10% 
in value, while imports rose even more rapidly, 
by 19% in volume and by 18% in value. The 
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The growth of trade volume in 1997 was 
driven by the strength of demand. In the case of 
imports, this was based on internal demand, 
which swelled by 7%, thus stimulating GDP, 
which grew by slightly more than 5%. The 
significant role played by investment in GDP 
growth was reflected in the dynamism shown by 
capital goods imports. Meanwhile, export 
demand was generated by a world economy that 
managed to maintain a high growth rate of 4.1% 
and to boost international trade by 9%; 
intraregional trade also showed considerable 
dynamism. In addition to the income effect on the 
volume of international trade, the real 
appreciation of regional currencies contributed to 
an increase in imports while, at the same time, 
there is no evidence that it hurt exports. 
Commodity price trends were mixed in 1997 
as the net result of two opposing factors: the 
positive influence exerted by the buoyancy of the 
world economy and, in the second half of the 
year, the negative influence of the Asian crisis. 
All in all, for most countries, the unit value of 
exports rose while that of their imports fell, and 
a widespread improvement was consequently 
seen in the terms of trade. 
Taking into account the above trends, it can be 
seen that variations in volume were the major 
factor influencing the value of trade. Nearly all 
the countries registered increases in their trade 
deficits, and trade surpluses narrowed in the few 
countries that had them. As a result, the 1996 
trade surplus for the region as a whole gave way 
to a deficit in 1997. 
In the second half of 1997 and the first half of 
1998, the Asian crisis has affected trade in three 
ways: 
(i) Lower prices for some commodities 
(primarily minerals and agricultural raw 
materials): According to the IMF, the crisis has 
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been the main cause of the downturn in the 
prices of copper, nickel, natural rubber, wool, 
leather and rice; it has also been a significant 
factor in the descent of lead, wood and oil 
prices. Most of the decrease in copper prices 
occurred in the second half of 1997, but the 
slump in oil prices has been concentrated in 1998. 
(ii) Lower export value: Given the lower 
prices of many products exported by the region, 
it is likely that export value will fall in a number 
of countries. During the first half of the year, this 
was the case in Chile, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela. Part of the contraction will be 
accounted for by a reduction in exports to Asia, 
although the impact of such a trend will be 
mitigated by the fact that Asia buys only a small 
fraction of the exports of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, except in the cases of Chile 
and Peru (see figure 1.8). A slowing in the growth 
of intraregional exports, especially within 
Mercosur, is also expected. 
(iii) Reduced import value: Imports may 
slacken as a consequence of the monetary and 
fiscal measures implemented in order to slow 
down spending and support local currencies, 
especially in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela. The 
figures that are available so far, however, indicate 
only that imports were down in Brazil (-2% in 
the first half of 1998). 
The Asian crisis notwithstanding, in 1997 and 
the first half of 1998 foreign capital continued to 
flow into Latin America and the Caribbean, 
providing more than enough funds to cover the 
countries' mounting current account deficits. 
What is more, the trend first seen in 1995, 
whereby the composition of these flows is 
shifting towards an increasing proportion of 
medium- and long-term capital, has been 
strengthening, and the information available as 
of mid-1998 suggests that this trend will hold 
firm during the second half of the year. 
The past 18 months can be divided into two 
different phases in terms of the level and cost of 
the external financing available to the region. 
During the first phase, which covers the period 
from January to September 1997, capital inflows 
were copious and borrowing costs were moving 
downward. The second phase, from October 
Figure 1.8 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Includes Australia, Corea, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan (Province of China) and Thailand. 
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1997 to mid-1998, can be subdivided into two 
parts. In the final quarter of 1997, capital flows 
contracted sharply, while in the first half of 1998, 
the volume of these flows rebounded but the cost 
of external financing rose. 
The hefty capital inflows seen during the first 
of these phases -over US$ 90 billion by September 
1997- benefitted nearly all countries in the 
region. The bulk of the flows was made up of 
long-term capital, particularly foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which reached an all-time high 
of nearly US$ 56 billion for the year as a whole. 
The funds brought into the region in connection 
with privatization operations in Brazil and 
Colombia were an important part of the FDI 
figure. Bond issues (involving significant sums 
in the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) 
also provided medium- and long-term financing; 
the average maturity of the bonds issued by 
regional borrowers in 1997 was approximately 
15 years. The proportion of short-term credit 
remained at around 20% of total capital inflows; 
in most countries these flows consisted mainly of 
trade finance. Another indicator of the boom 
characterizing this phase was the rise of 30% in 
equity values on local stock markets between 
January and September 1997. 
The second phase began when the Asian crisis 
started to worsen in late October 1997, and equity 
prices tumbled on stock exchanges in Asia and, 
to a lesser extent, Latin America (see figure 1.9). 
The slump in stock prices between the beginning 
of October 1997 and the end of June 1998 was 
widespread in the major Latin American 
economies, and the regional average for this 
period reversed its earlier gains and fell by 
30%. In terms of volume during this second 
phase, the most severely affected component of 
capital flows was equity investment. Other 
types of short-term capital also contracted, 
especially in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Venezuela, and much of this reduction was 
reflected in a decline in international reserves in 
these countries. 
Bond financing was down sharply in the 
fourth quarter of 1997, but it rebounded during 
the first half of 1998. The terms of bond issues, 
however, were less favourable in the first half 
of 1998 than in the corresponding period of 
1997 (see figure 1.10). Average maturities 
shortened from 15 years to just half that figure, 
and spreads widened by between 150 and 200 
basis points, with issues by non-financial 
private-sector entities suffering the most. The 
Figure 1.9 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from national sources, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
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terms and conditions of bank loans deteriorated 
less than those of bonds. 
Although foreign direct investment shrank in 
some countries during the first half of 1998, it is 
expected to recover in the second half. The 
privatization of Brazil's telecommunications 
system (Telebras) in July 1998 was the largest 
such operation in Latin America's history and 
constituted a milestone in terms of the level of 
confidence in the region's biggest economy, 
which should have positive repercussions on 
other countries. It is therefore expected that total 
FDI for the region in 1998 will be within the same 
range as the exceedingly high figure registered 
for 1997. 
Foreign saving provides the dynamism for 
investment 
The data for 1997 indicate that economic 
growth and stabilization in the countries of the 
region were coupled with an extraordinary 
degree of dynamism in investment and saving 
(especially external saving). In all the countries 
except Haiti, the expansion of gross fixed 
investment outpaced GDP growth, and this was 
reflected in an across-the-board increase in gross 
fixed investment coefficients. Thus, gross capital 
formation reached 23.5% of GDP in current 
prices, one of the highest levels seen since the 
early 1980s. 
Revenues from this operation amounted to US$ 19 billion, most of which was foreign capital; 40% of this 
sum was to be paid in 1998 and the balance was to be disbursed in the course of the following two years. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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In the closing months of 1997, however, GDP 
growth began to slow down, and this trend has 
grown stronger in 1998. An estimate prepared by 
ECLAC, which is consistent with the fact that 
investment tends to be more volatile than output, 
suggests that the growth rate of investment will 
decrease substantially in 1998 (see figure 1.11). 
Although considerable progress has been 
made in the area of financial liberalization in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, the region's 
domestic savings rates have stabilized at around 
20% of GDP (in current prices). External saving 
therefore continues to be the most dynamic 
component of financing for gross capital formation. 
In 1997 external saving accounted for about 13% 
of gross capital formation, or 3.2% of GDP. 
Foreign direct investment, in turn, is the 
strongest component of external saving, and in 
1997 represented three fourths of the total. 
External saving is expected to continue to expand 
in 1998, although at a slower pace than the year 
before. 
4. Policy lessons from the Asian crisis 
The problems experienced during the past 12 
months, as the Asian crisis began to have an 
impact on the Latin American and Caribbean 
region, point to a number of useful lessons that 
should be borne in mind. In the domestic sphere, 
these lessons relate to macroeconomic, institu-
tional and competitiveness issues. Internationally, 
they include the need for greater coordination 
and regulation. 
The main macroeconomic lesson refers to the 
need to concentrate on managing the economy 
during boom periods, since policy-makers have 
much more manoeuvering room before a crisis 
strikes. In periods of economic expansion, large 
capital inflows tend to result in increased public 
and private expenditure and in the build-up of 
large debts; the reversal of these flows is likely 
to produce a serious crisis. Since Latin American 
fiscal policy has tended to be procyclical in recent 
years, the possibility of using flexible tax and 
spending instruments that could decrease the 
volatility of growth should be explored. With 
respect to monetary policy, greater autonomy can 
be obtained through the use of mechanisms to 
discourage excess capital flows; such measures 
might include reserve requirements (such as 
those used in Chile and Colombia) or taxes (as in 
the case of Brazil). 
In the institutional sphere, even though a great 
deal of progress has been made in the last few 
years, further attention needs to be paid to 
strengthening the region's banks and improving 
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prudential regulation and supervision. This 
includes the training of supervisors as well as the 
formulation of rules and regulations. Given the 
propensity to volatility exhibited by Latin 
America and the Caribbean and the high cost of 
financial crises in developing countries, a 
capital/asset ratio higher than the 8% required by 
the Bank for International Settlements would 
probably be appropriate. Even more important is 
the proper sequencing of financial liberalization 
and the establishment of an adequate regulatory 
framework. If liberalization precedes regulation, 
serious problems are likely to result. 
Since the Asian crisis has not been limited to 
the financial sector but has instead extended into 
the real economy, a number of lessons concerning 
the latter may also be drawn. To judge from the 
Latin American experience in the last year, it is 
obvious that over-reliance on a few primary 
export products is still a dangerous tendency. 
Thus, in the case of several of the region's 
economies, copper and oil exports offered a 
vulnerable flank through which both price and 
quantity shocks could penetrate. From the 
vantage point of Asia, a less obvious lesson 
focuses on more sophisticated "commodities"; 
even computer chips can suffer from volatility. 
Looking beyond the measures to be taken in 
connection with particular types of products, it is 
evident that monitoring markets to detect 
situations of oversupply is a high-priority task. 
Likewise, it is clear that competitiveness should 
be a constant concern and must not be taken for 
granted. 
The current crisis has also focused attention 
on the high degree of instability characterizing 
financial markets at the world level, especially in 
their fastest growing segments, such as mutual 
funds and derivatives. There is a lack of 
coordination among the industrial countries that 
serve as the base of operations for the world's 
main financial firms. No international institution 
exists that has the responsibility for coordinating 
and supervising these firms. The International 
Monetary Fund has insufficient resources for 
this task and no mandate. In the private sphere, 
credit rating agencies have tended to exacerbate 
instability rather than diminish it. This would 
seem to be a good opportunity to rethink 
international institutional arrangements, but a 
bad time to consider further liberalization of 
financial markets. 
Of particular concern is the role played by 
short-term capital flows, since such funds can 
move out of a country just as rapidly as they 
come in. Even if all developing countries were 
to place some kind of restrictions on these flows, 
international supervision would still be needed 
because their volume is so large that they can 
overwhelm local economic policy measures. 
Moreover, the psychology of the market is such 
that the outflows may have little to do with 
economic fundamentals. While the Latin 
American experience of the 1980s and 1990s 
has shown that foreign capital can play a very 
beneficial role in supporting growth, it is 
necessary to design and implement a policy 
framework to reinforce its positive aspects 
while minimizing volatility. This may be the 
most important single lesson of the last 12 
months. 
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IL MACROECONOMIC POLICY 
Stabilization gains were consolidated in a 
context of strong economic growth, 
despite adverse developments on the 
international scene in the closing months 
of 1997. Declining inflation confirmed 
the success of macroeconomic policies 
designed to meet the challenges of 
external openness, policies generally 
based on the management of the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor. This 
strategy was made possible by abundant 
inflows of external capital, which allowed 
demand pressures to be absorbed by 
increased imports. 
Although the exchange rate was the most 
visible instrument of stabilization policy, it was 
not the only factor of success in the period 
considered. Previous experience had shown that 
use of the exchange rate anchor was not a 
sustainable strategy by itself without prudent 
management of other macroeconomic policy 
instruments, particularly in the fiscal and 
monetary spheres, or without a moderate decline 
in the unit costs of production -achieved by tying 
wage hikes to productivity and keeping imported 
inflation low. 
The positive trend in the economy of the 
region during much of 1997 translated into an 
increase in factor incomes. Jobs increased in 
number by 3%, labour productivity improved by 
2% and real wages rose by 2.7%. Labour was not 
the only factor of production to benefit in real 
terms; the year was also a good one on the capital 
1 See ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America and the 
United Nations publication, Sales No. S.97-II.G.2. 
markets. The real interest rate on deposits 
increased from 2.1% to 3.9%, reflecting at first a 
decline in inflation and later a shift in monetary 
policy that resulted in higher nominal yields 
towards the end of the year. It was also an 
excellent year for the region's stock markets, 
even though from October on securities 
exchanges recorded sharp declines because of 
financial turbulence in Asian markets; the trading 
year 1997 closed for investors with average gains 
of close to 20% in dollar terms. 
The chapter will explore similarities and 
differences among the countries of the region in 
the main results obtained through their 
macroeconomic policies and will then take a 
closer look at the fiscal, foreign exchange and 
monetary aspects. It is difficult to identify 
common features or draw general conclusions 
concerning the conduct of macroeconomic 
policy in the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries because of their differences in size, 
location and economic structure. Nevertheless, 
even allowing for these limitations, it has been 
possible for some years now to discern a regional 
consensus regarding the main objectives and 
instruments of macroeconomic policy, a 
consensus which has served as a unifying 
principal in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
For one thing, inflation control has become 
central to the conduct of monetary policy. The 
same applies to foreign exchange policy, despite 
the wide variety of exchange rate systems in use 
-either because the authorities implicitly or 
explicitly use the exchange rate as an anchor in 
their anti-inflation strategy, or because a heavy 
influx of external capital imposes its logic on the 
foreign exchange market. With regard to fiscal 
policy, concern for balance in government 
^ean, 1996-1997 (LC/G.1968-P), Santiago, Chile, 1997, p. 75, 
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finances weighs heavily in the management of 
public-sector spending, which has become 
mildly procyclical, i.e., tending to increase in 
times of expansion and to contract when revenue 
prospects dim. 
In the absence of severe external shocks 
during the last three years, the similarity in the 
macroeconomic policy styles and objectives 
adopted by national authorities has resulted in a 
convergence of results. The events of the last 
quarter of 1997 did not succeed in reversing this 
tendency, and the main indicators of 
macroeconomic performance for the year show 
less regional dispersion, as measured by the 
standard deviation among countries (see table 
II. 1 ). The concurrence in the slowing of inflation, 
for example, is highly significant. Half of the 
Latin American countries recorded price 
increases of less than 7%, and the dispersion of 
inflation rates as measured by standard deviation 
has been reduced, although high inflation persists 
in a few countries. Convergence is also 
observable in the less positive example of larger 
external deficits; both the regional average and 
the regional median have increased, and there is 
less dispersion around these representative 
values. 
The macroeconomic policy measures adopted 
in the first half of 1998 were also very similar 
from one country to the next. Once the prospects 
for ample and affordable external financing 
appeared to be drying up beginning in October 
1997, macroeconomic policy assumed a more 
restrictive stance, at first in order to prevent 
capital flight and later in order to cool down 
domestic demand in an effort to control widening 
external deficits (see chapter I). 
Of course, the very different levels of 
development to be found among the countries of 
the region mean that very different rates of 
growth would be required before convergence in 
macroeconomic results could translate into 
convergence in levels of income and well-being. 
Notwithstanding the slight narrowing observable 
in the last three years in the differential in per 
capita income between the poorest and the richest 
Table II. 1 
LATIN AMERICA: MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Economic growth 
- Average c 
- Median 
- Standard deviation 
Unemployment 
- Average c 
- Median 
- Standard deviation 
Inflation b 
- Average c 
- Median 
- Standard deviation 
Fiscal balance e 
- Average 
- Median 
- Standard deviation 
External deficite 
- Average c 
- Median 

















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Annual rate of variation. cWeighteda 
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30 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
over the course of the decade the gap has actually 
widened. In 1997 the average per capita income 
in dollars of the five poorest countries of the 
region equal led barely 10% of the 
corresponding figure for the five richest 
countries, whereas in 1990 the percentage was 
14%. The gap has widened because per capita 
(a)Foreign exchange policies 
and markets 
Foreign exchange policy underwent no great 
changes in 1997. With a handful of exceptions, 
the countries continued to use the rate of 
exchange de facto as a nominal anchor in the 
service of stabilization. Since the region's 
economies are increasingly opening to both 
foreign trade and international financial flows, 
but lack sufficiently developed and stable 
domestic money markets, the great majority of 
the countries have adopted stabilization policies 
featuring the exchange rate as the most effective 
instrument for achieving inflation targets -both 
for its direct impact on domestic price formation 
and for its value as a signal to guide expectations 
about future prices. 
Despite broad differences in the foreign 
exchange strategies and institutional 
arrangements adopted by the countries of the 
region -from Argentina's convertibility system to 
Mexico's free float-, there were no major 
devaluations of nominal rates during the course 
of the year. As it happened, the pace of nominal 
devaluation slowed noticeably during the first 
three quarters of 1997, averaging an annualized 
rate of 7%, less than half the figure for 1996. 
This slowing of devaluation took place in a 
context of low exchange rate volatility. A number 
of the countries of the region managed to achieve 
virtual exchange rate stability, at least until the 
last quarter of 1997. This was naturally the case 
with countries that have some form of fixed rate 
of exchange with respect to the dollar -Argentina, 
El Salvador, Panama and Barbados- but also 
occurred in others, such as Chile and Jamaica, 
which formally have opted for a currency band 
income has grown twice as fast in the latter group 
of countries (at an average rate of nearly 9% 
annually). However, the de facto harmonization 
of macroeconomic policies observable in the 
region has helped to further economic 
interchange, a development that could facilitate 
a similar convergence in levels of development 
(see chapter VIH). 
system. Even in countries that suffered sharp 
devaluations in the recent past, foreign exchange 
markets were very calm in 1997. The price of the 
Mexican peso, for example, remained quite 
stable in nominal terms over the course of the 
year, and the pace of devaluation of the 
Venezuelan bolivar slowed markedly, from an 
annualized rate of 140% in the fourth quarter 
1996 to under 6% in the same period of 1997. 
The generally calm tone of the region's 
foreign exchange markets, already perceptible in 
the second half of 1996, began to be ruffled in 
October 1997, as the Asian crisis deepened. The 
foreign exchange markets reacted, bringing 
about either nominal devaluation or a loss of 
international reserves, depending on the country. 
The average rate of annual devaluation, 6% in the 
third quarter 1997, rose progressively to 7%, 8% 
and then 9% during the last quarter of 1997 and 
the first two quarters of 1998. Only in a minority 
of the countries, however, did foreign exchange 
markets experience truly pronounced volatility 
during these months. This was notably the case 
in Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela. 
In other countries, tensions in the exchange 
markets resulted instead in a loss of international 
reserves, as the authorities succeeded in 
defending the exchange rate or moderating its 
fluctuations. In the fourth quarter of 1997 and the 
first quarter of 1998, reserve losses exceeded 
US$ 2.5 billion in Chile and Venezuela and US$ 
1 billion in Colombia. Losses in other countries, 
although less in absolute terms (between US$ 80 
million and US$ 100 million), were significant as 
a proportion of existing reserves, particularly in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala and Paraguay. In 
drawing on reserves to defend the exchange rate, 
the authorities were pursuing the twin goals of 
1. Foreign exchange policy 
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controlling the extent of devaluation in order not 
to compromise achievements in stabilization, 
while dampening market oscillations and 
avoiding selling spirals for speculative or 
hedging purposes. 
The region's three largest economies, on the 
other hand, managed to absorb the foreign 
exchange shock more easily, although the effort 
entailed drastic macroeconomic measures in the 
case of Brazil. After a period of uncertainty in the 
closing months of 1997, Brazil's international 
reserves more than recovered, and the increase in 
the first quarter of 1998 was on the order of US$ 
11 billion. Over the same period Argentina's 
reserves increased by US$ 2.5 billion and 
Mexico's by US$ 2.8 billion. According to the 
data so far available, this tendency persisted 
during the second quarter of 1998. 
(b)Trends in real exchange rates 
The trends in real exchange rates were 
primarily related to factors of a financial nature 
and in particular to abundant capital flows, which 
fostered an acceleration in the real appreciation 
of the currencies of the receiving countries. Net 
capital inflows represented, on average, 4% of 
the region's output, but in a number of countries 
exceeded 10% of output (see chapter VIII, 
section 2). In a continuation of a trend already 
observable the year before, capital inflows were 
particularly strong during the earlier quarters of 
1997. Hence, while the average rate of nominal 
devaluation in the region was declining, the 
inflation differential with the region's main 
trading partners fell much more sharply, so that 
local currencies appreciated strongly in real 
terms. 
Except for Ecuador, Haiti and Paraguay, the 
trend was well marked in the region, and the 
countries that experienced the greatest real 
appreciation were those that received the largest 
net influx of external capital in 1996 and 1997, 
relative to the size of their economies. In the three 
countries in which the currency depreciated 
significantly in real terms, the overall balance of 
payments in 1996 and 1997 was in deficit or only 
slightly on the positive side (see table II.2). 
As table II.2 makes clear, financial factors, 
rather than the real fundamentals of the 
economies, set the tone of the foreign exchange 
markets. Apart from the strong influence exerted 
by external capital flows, already discussed, 
another determining factor was financial yield. 
The countries that experienced real appreciation 
of the currency on average offered yields on 
short-term deposits in local currency that were 
higher -after correcting for foreign exchange 
movements with respect to the dollar- than 
reference rates in the international market. On 
the other hand, there was little correlation 
between the extent of real appreciation and real 
interest rates (i.e., corrected for domestic 
inflation), since the countries that experienced 
greater real appreciation of the currency were, in 
general, among the countries with a higher 
inflation rate. 
In contrast, factors related to the real 
economy, such as overall factor productivity 
(represented in table II.2 by growth in GDP) or 
changes in the relative prices of goods and 
services traded (terms of trade), do not appear to 
have influenced the behaviour of the real 
exchange rate as expected. Strong economic 
growth had no perceptible impact, and, contrary 
to what one might expect, countries with 
worsening terms of trade saw their currencies 
appreciate, while some that benefited from an 
improvement in their terms of trade experienced 
real depreciation. The same inverse correlation 
between real appreciation and improved terms of 
trade was observable in 1996 as well, although 
data covering a longer period (the decade to date) 
suggest a positive medium-term correlation. This 
points to possible dangers ahead, since in the 
not-too-distant future real economic factors may 
well determine effective parities, correcting 
fluctuations of purely financial origin. 
2 Bear in mind that the real effective exchange rate, the indicator of the extent of real appreciation, is calculated by comparing 
the variation in the exchange rate with respect to the currencies of the country's main trading partners, corrected for the variations 
in the respective domestic price indices. Thus, a drop in the real effective exchange rate -equivalent to a real appreciation in the 
purchasing power of the local currency- can result either from a drop in the nominal effective exchange rate or from a rise in the 
rate of inflation. 
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Table II.2 
LATIN AMERICA: REAL EXCHANGE RATE AND 
SOME DETERMINING FACTORS, 1997 
Range of variation of 
the real exchange rate " 
Below-5% 


































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and data from the International Monetary Fund. 
a Average value for the respective country. A drop in the real exchange rate signifies a real appreciation of the currency. 
b Percentage of GDP. c Deflated by the nominal devaluation. Deflated by the consumer price index. 
Another indication of the influence of the 
capital account on movements in the exchange 
rate can be seen by comparing the economies that 
have a relatively sizeable securities exchange, by 
Latin America standards, with those that do not 
(see figure 1.1). Beginning in the second quarter 
1996, and at a progressively faster pace until the 
third quarter of 1997, the currencies of the 
region's seven main financial markets showed a 
marked tendency to overvaluation, reaching 
annualized rates of around 8% during the second 
and third quarters of 1997. In the other countries, 
in contrast, the trend was more moderate and 
slowed markedly over the period (average 
appreciation was around 5% in the second quarter 
of 1996 and gradually declined to around 2% in 
the third quarter of 1997). 
As the chart shows, towards the end of 1997 
the downward trend of the real exchange rate was 
reversed in the countries with significant capital 
markets, while for the other countries the overall 
trend continued as before. Although the pace of 
inflation slowed in the second half of the year, 
the break in the pattern of real appreciation was 
primarily due to the shift in the mood of the 
region's foreign exchange markets, related to 
events in world markets. In the fourth quarter of 
1997, Latin American and Caribbean currencies 
underwent a nominal devaluation of 2.2% 
compared to the previous quarter, a substantially 
larger change than the 1.3% and 1.2% variations 
in the two previous quarters. The slide persisted 
throughout the first quarter of 1998. 
Thus, the presence of a relatively large capital 
market appears to have been a major factor in 
determining the trend and degree of stability of 
the real exchange rate in the countries of the 
region, and this circumstance confirms the 
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Figure IL 1 
LATIN AMERICA: QUARTERLY INDEX OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and data supplied by the International Monetary Fund. 
a Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. 
importance of financial factors, at least over the 
short term. However, trends in real exchange 
parities have implications for the real economy, 
especially now, after the process of trade 
liberalization the countries of the region have 
undergone, and a set of dynamics based to a great 
extent on financial factors can have 
consequences for productive sectors and 
investment decisions. One of the most obvious 
short-term effects of real appreciation is to make 
imported products cheaper and thus stimulate 
demand for them in domestic markets. Another 
effect is that a country's exports lose 
competitiveness; this is particularly true for its 
manufactures and other non-traditional exports 
that are not based on natural comparative 
advantages. 
In 1997, relative prices of imported products 
in local currencies fell by 7%, on average, in 
relation to domestic prices in the countries of the 
region. This effect has been the key argument for 
stabilization policies using the exchange rate as 
a nominal anchor, since domestic producers of 
tradable goods and services, in order to compete 
in domestic and external markets, must adjust 
their prices and trim unit costs, chiefly by 
improving productivity. It has been noted that in 
countries experiencing greater real appreciation 
the price index for tradable goods and services 
is generally much lower than for non-tradables, 
since the latter do not have to compete with 
foreign goods. However, this phenomenon, by no 
means exclusive to Latin American economies, 
tends to discourage investment in 
3 Approximated by the implicit GDP deflator for the goods-producing sectors, including agriculture, mining and manufacturing. 
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tradables-producing industries. Costa Rica is one 
of the few countries in the region where the 
national authorities still use the exchange rate as 
an instrument of external competitiveness, and 
where, as a result, relative prices of tradable 
goods and services have remained comparable to 
those of non-tradables. 
In the financial sphere, overvaluation of the 
exchange rate tends to encourage producers and 
financial agents to incur debt in foreign 
currencies in order to reduce financing costs, 
even when they do business entirely within the 
domestic market. As table II.2 shows, 
dollar-equivalent domestic interest rates in 
As was to be expected, since most of the region's 
economies had opened up their capital accounts 
to a great extent, the implementation of monetary 
policy was heavily dependent on foreign 
exchange policy. That monetary management of 
this sort is usually called "passive" does not 
imply that the monetary authorities took a relaxed 
stance. On the contrary, in order to ensure the 
credibility of exchange rate targets, monetary and 
fiscal authorities had to adapt to the imperatives 
of stabilization. 
In the first three quarters of the year, and 
particularly during the first two, plentiful inflows 
of external capital facilitated the defence of fixed 
parities or kept exchange rates close to the floor 
of the pre-set currency bands, obliging central 
banks to purchase foreign exchange to prevent 
greater currency appreciation. Moreover, in the 
majority of the countries, the financing of 
increased fiscal deficits with foreign resources 
injected further liquidity into the domestic 
economies. As a result, international reserves 
built up substantially during that period, and it 
was necessary to sterilize the monetary impact of 
the influx of foreign exchange through open 
market operations and changes in reserve 
requirements. Even the Argentine monetary 
authorities, despite the country's convertibility 
system, which requires that all liabilities of the 
central bank should be covered by external 
assets, had to intervene on two occasions in 1997 
countries with currency appreciation are high 
compared to international market rates. When 
this tendency becomes accentuated, the economy 
becomes more vulnerable to foreign exchange 
risks, and this situation delays and complicates 
the eventual correction to the exchange rate, 
when it becomes necessary. This mechanism is 
often cited as one of the chief causes of the 
financial crisis that struck the main emerging 
economies of Asia. Avoiding this risk is one of 
the most important objectives of the new banking 
supervision measures already in use or in the 
process of adoption in the majority of the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. 
to raise the minimum liquidity requirements for 
commercial banks. 
In general, these monetary measures kept real 
interest rates high, and the high rates, in turn, 
attracted more foreign capital and hence led to 
more pressure on the real exchange rate. Only in 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica were positive financial 
yields insufficient to bring about exchange rate 
appreciation; in both cases, the real interest rate 
on deposits was barely higher than 1.5% per 
annum. In some countries, the real interest rate 
had to be kept high to defend monetary and 
exchange rate targets; this was the case in Brazil 
(20%), Paraguay (9.8%) and El Salvador (9.7%). 
However, quite negative real interest rates did not 
keep Venezuela's currency from appreciating, 
this country being the only one that recorded a 
strong surplus on its current account. 
In Mexico, the free-floating exchange rate 
system allowed for more autonomy in monetary 
management; the real interest rate was slightly 
negative, although yields in dollar terms were 
positive. Even there, however, the monetary 
authorities were obliged to respond to 
copious inflows of foreign capital during 
1997, which brought about an accumulation 
of international reserves nearly eight times 
higher than the minimum anticipated. Banco 
de México therefore reduced its domestic 
credit targets to avoid further slippage of the 
monetary base. 
2. Monetary policy 
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Nevertheless, as most of the region's 
economies grew faster than initially anticipated 
in their macroeconomic planning, the authorities 
relaxed their money supply policies. This was the 
case, for example, in Chile, which reduced the 
interbank interest rate on four occasions between 
February and September, and in Colombia, 
which raised the monetary base growth target in 
May. Increased money creation was in response 
to stronger demand for money, as the volume of 
transactions mounted. As figure II.2 shows, the 
upturn in output in the region was already 
noticeable in the second half of 1996, and the 
shift in monetary policy was observable towards 
the end of that year. It was in the first quarter 
1997, however, that the ratio of the monetary 
base to GDP really began to climb, rising by more 
than 15% compared to the figure 12 months 
earlier. 
In countries where there was uncertainty 
about the trend of economic activity, monetary 
policy assumed a more cautious stance. This was 
notably the case in Brazil, where the process of 
gradually reducing interest rates came to a halt in 
May. In Jamaica, the authorities felt obliged to 
modify their expansive monetary policy when 
depositors withdrew from the local currency and 
took refuge in foreign currency assets. 
In general, the effect of the relaxation of 
monetary policy was to increase the importance 
of domestic credit among the monetary 
expansion factors. Despite the intensification of 
lending activity, however, the percentage of 
broad money represented by external assets 
decreased only from 39.4% to 38.5%, still higher 
than the average for the rest of the decade 
(31.8%) and nine percentage points above the 
figure observed prior to the 1994 crisis. In the 
majority of the countries studied, over 90% of the 
monetary base continued to be backed by 
external assets. 
The ratio of narrow money to output 
(Ml/GDP), which had declined in relative terms 
by 2.1 % in 1995 and 6.7% in 1994, rose again by 
over 11%. Greater demand for money due to an 
increase in transactions does not fully explain the 
liquidity increase, or the reversal of the declining 
trend of the previous two years. The shift can be 
attributed in general to increased confidence in 
the local currencies and the maintenance of their 
purchasing power. In some cases other technical 
factors relating to monetary policy played a role, 
as in Brazil, where the strong expansion of the 
money supply had to do not only with a rise in 
real reserve requirements but also with the 
imposition of a tax on financial transactions. 
Overall, this regional tendency reflected a 
restoration of confidence two years after the 
Mexican peso crisis and its repercussions in Latin 
America's largest economies. It also reflected the 
progress made in controlling inflation, which for 
the region as a whole averaged just a little over 
10% and for the majority of the countries was 
around 7%. It is significant in this regard that 
greater liquidity did not result in a resurgence of 
inflation and that the tensions perceptible at the 
beginning of 1998 were attributable to supply 
shocks associated with El Niño weather patterns 
or the prices of imports, rather than to internal 
imbalances. 
Since the supply of money was in line with 
demand, interest rates did not change 
significantly during the reporting period. The 
median real interest rate on deposits remained at 
around 4.5% in 1996 and 1997, and the increase 
in the regional average was due to Venezuela, 
where the real rate -although still quite negative-
rose by 15 percentage points. Nevertheless, 
towards the end of the year some countries 
adopted emergency measures to offset a greater 
perception of exchange rate risk and deal with the 
turbulence caused by the Asian crisis. This was 
particularly the case in Brazil and Paraguay. 
Other countries -Chile, Colombia, Mexico-
followed suit early in 1998. 
Money markets in most of the region's 
economies did not react drastically to the Asian 
crisis in 1997. As figure II.2 shows, the increase 
in the monetary base eased off towards the end 
of the year, in line with the slowing of output 
growth, but without a return to a highly restrictive 
stance. In the last quarter of 1997, the regional 
average for real growth in the monetary base 
dropped back to the level prevailing in the first 
quarter. In the majority of the countries, the 
slowdown was even greater (the median rate of 
real growth of the monetary base, 5.5% in the first 
quarter and as high as 8.4% in September, fell to 
36 
4% in December). This tendency was accentuated 
in the first quarter of 1998, when there occurred a 
slight contraction of the monetary base (a monthly 
average of -0.8%), which in most countries went 
beyond the expected seasonal variation. 
In the financial sphere, Governments 
continued to work towards better banking 
supervision in the light of the experience of the 
1994-1995 crises, and no major problems arose, 
except in Paraguay and El Salvador. The banking 
sector was strengthened by an infusion of capital 
as international banking groups acquired stakes 
in local banks. Merger and acquisition activity 
was particularly lively in 1997, particularly in the 
main financial centres of the region, such as 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, but the move 
towards globalization extended to other countries 
as well, including Chile, Colombia and 
Venezuela (see chapter III). However, the cost of 
earlier bank bail-outs continued to rise in the 
countries that had suffered most from banking 
crises, as the non-performing loan portfolios of 
problem banks swelled and Governments 
continued their efforts to save these institutions 
from bankruptcy. Mexico is a case in point; early 
in 1998 the Government announced a plan to 
absorb such bank losses into the domestic public 
debt, which would then increase by 15 
percentage points of GDP. 
Despite the rebound in demand for local 
currencies, discussed earlier, the trend towards 
dollarization of the region's economies 
continued. The ratio of deposits in foreign 
currency to broad money in local currency (M2) 
rose from 103% to 107%, on average for all the 
countries for which information is available. 
Although it is true that the average is skewed by 
some very high ratios in a few countries (Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay), the trend was 
widespread (in over half the countries, the 
dollarization ratio was 45%, 15 percentage points 
higher than at the start of the decade). 
Lastly, a regional trend towards a slight 
narrowing of the spread between deposit and 
lending rates, observable earlier, continued 
during 1997; on the average for the year the 
spread was 13 percentage points, one point lower 
than the year before. In a few cases (Bolivia and 
Uruguay, for example), the spreads were at times 
extremely wide (more than 35 and 50 points, 
respectively), but it should be borne in mind that 
their practical significance is small, since the vast 
majority of financial transactions in these countries 
are conducted in dollars, at much lower rates. 
3. Fiscal policy and public finance 
In 1997, the average non-financial public-sector 
(NFPS) deficit for the Latin American and 
Caribbean region expanded slightly to 1.2% of 
output, owing primarily to external shocks that 
reversed the upward trend in fiscal revenue 
observable during the two previous years. 
(a)Overall situation and prospects 
An important fiscal policy objective of the 
countries of the region was to support efforts to 
consolidate macroeconomic stability, and in 
particular to ensure low levels of inflation, by 
controlling the public-sector deficit. To achieve 
this goal, however, Governments had to adopt 
austerity measures, since, in contrast to the trend 
in 1995 and 1996, non-financial public sector 
revenue declined in 1997, by half a percent of 
output, despite efforts to improve collection. 
Faced with declining revenues, a number of 
countries in the region cut back on spending but 
succeeded only partially in closing the gap (see 
figure II.3). The widening of the NFPS deficit was 
due principally to the results of decentralized 
4 This is a simple average for 19 countries of the region and include proceeds from the sale of assets only when a particular 
country counts them as part of its capital revenue. For results net of such proceeds, see section (b). The weighted average NFPS 
deficit for the region (by GDP in constant 1990 dollars) increased from 1.5% of GDP in 1996 to 2.1% in 1997. The difference 
between the simple and weighted averages is explainable by the relative weight of the fiscal deterioration in Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela. In the countries of the English-speaking Caribbean, fiscal deficits expanded less, and this was particularly 
true of Jamaica and Guyana. The economies of this group of countries are discussed in Part Two of this Survey. 
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oo Figure II.2 
LATIN AMERICA: ANNUAL VARIATION IN THE RATIO OF THE MONETARY BASE TO GDP 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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entities, sub-national states, municipalities and 
State-owned enterprises. On the other hand, the 
simple average central government deficit ( 1 % of 
GDP) declined slightly, thanks to an increase in 
total revenues. 
The prospects in 1998 are for even greater 
pressure on both revenue and expenditure, 
leading to a further deterioration in fiscal 
accounts. These expectations have already been 
reflected in raised official targets for the public 
sector deficit. Revenues will be affected by a 
slowdown in economic activity because of the 
Asian economic crisis. Lower prices for the 
region's primary commodities (especially oil and 
copper) will reduce the income of State-owned 
enterprises in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico 
and Venezuela even more than in 1997, because 
the Asian crisis only became evident in the 
second half and did not have its full impact last 
year. Moreover, the heavy damage caused by the 
El Niño weather patterns in 1997 and early 1998 
will require extra government spending to repair 
infrastructure in Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay 
and Peru. Governments in the region have 
therefore begun to implement packages of fiscal 
adjustment measures, including spending cuts, 
higher tax rates, broader tax bases and campaigns 
against tax evasion. 
(b)Trends in fiscal revenue 
In 10 of the 19 countries studied, total 
revenues declined, with the result that average 
NFPS revenue for the region also declined, by half 
a percentage point of output. Most of the decline 
was due to reasons external to the normal revenue 
collection process. A number of countries 
suffered declines in grant income (Bolivia and 
Nicaragua), proceeds from sales of assets (Peru) 
and profits from State-owned oil companies 
(Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela). 
On the other hand, nine countries did succeed in 
increasing revenues compared with the year 
before, chiefly through tax collection (see table II.3). 
In general, the steps taken by the authorities 
to improve tax revenues were seconded by a 
higher level of economic activity, and hence of 
imports as well. On average, taxes collected in 
the region equalled nearly 14% of output in 
1997, the highest percentage in any year of the 
decade, as a result of an increase of 6% compared 
to the amount collected in 1996. In a number of 
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Table II.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL REVENUE 
OF THE NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR a 
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c Refers to central 
countries the authorities decided to raise the rates 
on some indirect taxes, in addition to income 
taxes. Tariff trends in the region were mixed. 
Mercosur member countries decided to increase 
their common external tariff temporarily by three 
points. Colombia and Ecuador also raised their 
tariffs. Costa Rica decided to postpone a 
scheduled tariff reduction in an effort to reduce 
its sizeable deficit, but El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras went ahead with their schedule of 
tariff cuts. Non-tax revenues declined for the 
reasons mentioned in the foregoing paragraph. 
On average, capital revenue in the region 
declined slightly in 1997. The Governments of 
Bolivia and Peru saw a decline in capital 
revenues due to a decrease in grant disbursements 
and privatization proceeds, respectively. In 
recent years sales of tangible and intangible 
assets have been an important source of capital 
revenue for a number of economies. However, 
they are not always included in the fiscal 
accounts; in some countries only a portion are 
reported. Moreover, these special proceeds may 
be accounted for in one of two different ways: as 
capital revenue or as sources of financing. Hence, 
their inclusion often distorts the true state of 
public finance, given their non-recurrent nature, 
and complicates comparison between countries. 
Excluding all proceeds from sales of assets 
recorded under capital revenue, deficit financing 
or both, the average deficit for the region would 
increase to 1.4% of output (see table II.4). 
(c) Trends in fiscal expenditure 
Average NFPS expenditure in the region (24% 
of GDP) declined slightly, chiefly because of cuts 
in investment proj ects, reduced interest payments 
5 Including, for example, the sale of rights to work oil or mineral deposits. 
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Table n.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
BALANCE WITH AND WITHOUT PROCEEDS FROM SALES OF ASSETS2 
















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Refers to central government. 
on the debt and, to a lesser extent, decreases in 
consumption expenditure (see table II.5). 
Current expenditure, which constitutes three 
fourths of total expenditure, increased at a slightly 
slower pace than during most of the decade. 
Within current expenditure, consumption 
expenditure, which includes remuneration of 
public-sector employees and purchases of other 
current goods and services, has remained steady 
at about the same percentage of output throughout 
the 1990s. This suggests that wage payments 
have, on average, tracked the growth of output. 
Current transfers, especially under the social 
security system, have increased in most of the 
countries. Several countries are in the process of 
reforming their social security systems in one 
form or another. Most of the new schemes are 
designed to decrease public contributions to the 
system but entail maintaining expenditure levels 
in the medium term and will result in a deficit at 
least during the initial phase of the changeover 
(see chapter III). 
Interest payments as a percentage of GDP 
declined in nearly all the countries of the region. 
In the case of Venezuela, the most striking 
example, interest payments on the debt dropped 
from 5% to 3% of GDP because of lower interest 
rates. This trend should not, however, obscure 
how heavily public debt service still weighs in 
government budgets: on average, interest 
payments equal one tenth of total expenditure in 
the countries of the region. In Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and Honduras, interest payments 
equalled nearly 5% of GDP. In these three 
countries plus Mexico, nearly one-fifth of total 
expenditure went to interest payments. Chile, the 
Dominican Republic and Paraguay, on the other 
hand, paid out only half a percent of GDP in 
interests (see figure II.4). Capital expenditure, 
which on average accounts for one fifth of total 
NFPS expenditure, went down in 1997. The 
decrease in public works that this reflects was due 
in large part to changes of administration in some 
countries that resulted in temporary delays. There 
6 For more information, see also ECLAC, "The fiscal covenant: strengths, weaknesses, challenges" (LC/G.1997(SES.27/3)), 
Santiago, Chile, 1998. 
7 Average for 16 countries for which data was available. 
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Table II.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
OF THE NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR" 

























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 



























































































































cRefers to central government. 
were also cases in which the authorities were 
obliged to postpone investment to meet their 
fiscal targets. Some countries, however, such 
as Guatemala and Haiti, actively undertook 
infrastructure projects, in the first as part of the 
peace accords, and in the second as part of its 
development plan. 
(d)Trends in the overall balance and its 
financing 
In quantitative terms, 8 of the 19 countries 
studied improved their overall balance; the 
average improvement was 1 % of output. Of these 
8, there were 4 -Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Honduras and Nicaragua- that did better than the 
average. One country, Uruguay, had results 
roughly similar to the previous year's. The other 
10 increased their deficit or reduced their surplus 
by an average of 1.5% of output, a variation more 
pronounced than that of the countries that 
improved the balance on their accounts (see 
table II.6). 
While the regional NFPS overall balance 
shows a slight deterioration, it does not reflect 
situations that are qualitatively different. Most of 
the countries that managed to reduce their deficit 
(or hold it steady) did so by reducing current 
expenditure or increasing current revenue. In 
Ecuador, Nicaragua and Honduras some investment 
projects were suspended, in the first two because 
of delays related to a change of administration 
and in the last in order to meet fiscal targets. 
Of the 10 countries that widened their deficits, 
half did so by increasing investment expenditure, 
social spending and transfers to social security 
systems undergoing reform. The other half 
collected less in revenue. Three in the latter 
category were affected by factors independent of 
fiscal policy, such as a loss of grant revenue, 
fewer privatizations or a decline in the 
local-currency value of proceeds from sales of 
State-owned enterprises because of changes in 
foreign exchange policy. 
Concern for improving the fiscal situation was 
evidenced by a slight increase in public saving in 
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Figure II.4 
SHARE OF INTEREST PAYMENTS IN TOTAL EXPENDITURE OF THE 
NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR, 1997 
10 Percentage 15 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Refers to central government. 
Table II.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR BALANCE ' 




















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Calculated on the basis of figures in local currency at current prices. 
includes adjustments. Refers to central government. 
5 Preliminary figures. : Operational balance; 
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Figure n.5 
NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT FINANCING 


























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Refers to central government. 
1997 to a little over 3% of GDP, achieved by 
reducing current expenditure by somewhat more 
than the decline in current revenue. Average 
public saving in the region has risen slightly for 
the last three years (see figure II.3). 
Only two countries incurred "dissaving" in 
1997. The Argentina national public sector 
recorded negative saving for the second 
consecutive year as a result of increased transfers 
and the merger of provincial pension funds into 
the national system. A sizeable increase in 
current revenues was still not enough to offset a 
surge in expenditure in Haiti, where saving has 
been negative throughout the 1990s. 
Interest payments pushed the financial 
balance into the red, since on average the region 
ran a primary surplus that was down to only 1% 
of output in 1997, in a reversal of the trend of the 
two previous years. Only Bolivia, Brazil and 
Haiti recorded large primary deficits, with real 
interest rates higher than rates of output growth 
(especially in Bolivia and Brazil). If this tendency 
continues in the future, interest payments and 
levels of public debt will progressively rise. 
As in 1996, the Governments of the region 
preferred to finance their deficits with external 
resources. External financing averaged 1% of 
output, very similar to the level of the deficit (see 
figure II.5). Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua borrowed nearly 2% of GDP in 
external capital in view of the potentially higher 
cost of domestic credit. In contrast, domestic 
financing of the deficit was equal to less than 1% 
of output. 
8 The primary surplus equals total revenue less total expenditure excluding interest payments. 
9 The average for 16 countries for which data were available. 
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III. STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
1. General trends 
The outstanding trend in 1997 was a 
second wave of privatization that yielded 
a record amount, largely thanks to Brazil. 
In addition, further progress was made in 
social security reform, regional 
integration and trade liberalization. 
The Governments of the region continued to 
carry out structural reforms designed to open up 
their economies to international competition, 
reduce State intervention in the production of 
goods and services and promote private-sector 
activity. Such efforts have played a crucial role 
in the profound changes the region has undergone 
in the last 10 years in adapting to new global 
circumstances. The reforms, in effect, constitute 
a medium- and long-term economic policy, since 
their aim is to influence the performance of the 
economy by changing the ground rules for 
economic agents. 
Within the region, those in charge of recent 
reforms in South America made strenuous efforts 
in 1997, particularly in the area of privatization, 
to catch up with countries further along in the 
reform process. Significant advances were also 
made during the year by Central American 
countries. The Caribbean countries were less 
active in this regard. 
(a) Privatization 
In 1997, the privatization process maintained 
the momentum established the year before, and 
Privatization initiatives in 1997 yielded 
record proceeds of US$ 25 billion, a large portion 
of that being Brazil's share. Concessions also 
became an increasingly common option in the 
region. The preparation and adoption of social 
security reforms moved forward in 1997; new 
social security schemes were put in place in three 
countries (Mexico, Uruguay and Bolivia). 
In the sphere of trade reform, there were a few 
setbacks in 1997, as in the preceding years, due 
primarily to macroeconomic problems related to 
external balances. The Central American 
countries, however, managed to move ahead with 
their reforms. All in all, regional integration 
processes continued to reshape the economic 
geography of the continent. 
Financial reforms, together with the banking 
crises of previous years, resulted in a process of 
banking and financial consolidation that went to 
great lengths in many countries, a trend 
accentuated by the arrival of foreign banks. 
Meanwhile, monetary authorities persisted in 
their efforts to improve financial supervision and 
oversight. 
Indeed, the resilience shown by the Latin 
American economies during the last quarter of 
1997 and the first half of 1998 in the face of the 
Asian crisis was attributable in good part to the 
reforms in financial regulation and supervision 
already adopted. 
proceeds from that source doubled. The region 
took in around US$ 25 billion, an all-time high, 
bringing total proceeds from privatization over 
the last eight years to US$ 100 billion. This boom 
2. Public-sector reforms 
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was facilitated by an abundance of resources in 
international markets and favourable 
expectations on the part of investors, at least until 
October 1997, which resulted in strong demand 
for acquisition of State-owned enterprises. 
Moreover, Brazil, the region's largest economy, 
after careful preparation, was ready to enter into 
a full-blown phase of privatization. The size of 
the proceeds is also explained in part by the fact 
that Brazil, Colombia and other countries sold off 
many enterprises in the highly capital- and 
technology-intensive electric power sector. 
Moreover, in many cases the prices obtained 
were well above the pre-set minimum for the 
sale. 
Brazil's leading role in the region's wave of 
privatization in 1997 can be clearly seen from 
figure III.l below. Of total privatization 
proceeds, Brazil collected 70%. Colombia also 
realized a significant amount (US$ 3,180 
million), double the figure for 1996. Other 
countries in the region, in contrast, realized less 
than the year before. 
The electric power sector loomed large in the 
privatization process (see figure III.2), 
accounting for 60% of total proceeds. The sale 
of electric power companies accounted for 
100% of proceeds in Argentina, 80% in 
Colombia and 65% in Brazil. In Panama, the sale 
of a 49% stake in the national telecom-
munications company (INTEL) brought in the 
bulk of the year's proceeds. The main 
privatization initiative in Venezuela was the 
sale of the iron and steel firm Siderúrgica del 
Orinoco (SBDOR)for US$ 1.2 billion, 80% of the 
country's privatization proceeds in 1997. On 
the other hand, the banking and 
telecommunications sectors accounted for a 
smaller share regionally than in previous years 
(see figure III.2). 
Figure III. 1 
PRIVATIZATION PROCEEDS BY COUNTRY IN 1996 AND 1997 
(Billions of dollars) 
18000 
1997 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from official and non-official sources (see table III.l). 
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Figure in.2 
SHARE OF PRIVATIZATION PROCEEDS BY SECTOR IN 1997, 







Iron and steel 




Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
With respect to the national origin of the firms 
that acquired State assets in 1997, the list is 
headed by Brazilian companies. Around two 
thirds of privatization proceeds in Brazil came 
from national firms. It is observable, however, 
that the participation of foreign firms in the 
acquisition of State assets has steadily increased 
since the Government of Brazil eliminated 
barriers to foreign interests when it began 
implementing the Real Plan. After Brazilian 
firms, companies from the United States, Chile, 
Spain and other nationalities follow in that order 
on the list. Among Latin American firms, only 
Chilean companies actively participated in 
acquisitions of State-owned enterprises in 
countries other than their own. Brazilian firms, in 
contrast, showed minimal interest in acquisitions 
beyond their borders. 
Privatization, broadly speaking, includes 
concessions. In the region there are many and 
varied projects being carried out on a concession 
basis, involving highways, ports, airports, 
surface and underground railways, nuclear power 
plants and television channels, among others. 
The Government of Chile, for example, 
proceeded with its programme of highway 
concessions in 1997 and for 1998 announced a 
similar programme for its shipping ports, as did 
the Government of Peru. The Government of 
Colombia awarded concessions to operate 
television channels to the private sector, ending 
40 years of State monopoly; it also announced 
that it would grant a concession to operate the 
prison system. The Government of Argentina 
awarded a concession for the postal service in 
1997 and for 33 airports early in 1998, and is 
preparing to do the same for three nuclear power 
plants. The Governments of Mexico and 
Honduras are preparing for a bidding for 
concessions to run the national airports. In Brazil, 
concessions were awarded in 1997 for railway 
lines, highways, container terminals and a metro 
system. 
Among the major contracts awarded during 
the year were cellular telephone concessions in 
Brazil and various petroleum concessions in 
47 
Table n i l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VALUE OF PRIVATIZATIONS, 1990-1997 a b 














































































































Source: Data for 1996 and 1997 from official sources. For 1990-1995, R. Cominetti, "La privatización y el marco regulatorio en 
Bolivia y Nicaragua: un análisis comparativo", Reformas de políticas públicas series, No. 43 (LC/L.973 and Add.l), 
Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 1996; own estimates based on information from Latin Finance, Privatisation International, 
Latin American Weekly Report, Latin American Economy and Business. 
' Cash proceeds plus proceeds in the form of external and domestic bonds reported at their value in the secondary market, except 
in the case of Brazil, for which domestic bonds are reported at nominal value. Figures do not include concessions, except 
in the case of Argentina and Peru. c Includes concessions. Includes US$ 51 million in privatization and US$ 797 
million in capitalization. e Capitalization. 
Venezuela. The cellular telephone awards 
brought in some US$ 5.1 million to the Brazilian 
Treasury; in some cases the floor price was 
exceeded by as much as 400%. Under the 
programme of opening up the petroleum 
industry, the Government of Venezuela collected 
some US$ 2.2 billion for awarding concessions 
to reactivate 18 old and abandoned oil fields. 
These efforts at reform were not always 
problem-free, as is shown by the example of 
highway concessions in Mexico, where the 
process had to be reversed in part. The 
programme was initiated in 1987 and 52 
concessions were awarded, under which 5,400 
kilometres of limited access highways were built. 
Demand was overestimated, however, so that the 
operators suffered losses. In 1997, the 
Government decided to rescind 23 of the 
concessions it had awarded and assume the 
losses, estimated at US$ 7.5 billion. 
The region's plans for 1998 suggest that a 
new record will be reached in privatization 
proceeds, again thanks to the Brazilian projects, 
including the sale of Telecomunicações 
Brasileiras (Telebras) in July 1998, the largest 
privatization deal so far in the history of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and one which has 
brought Brazil more than its entire proceeds for 
1997 (see box III.l). The successful sale of El 
Salvador's electric power companies augurs well 
for the Central American countries, which 
suffered some setbacks in this regard in previous 
years. 
(b)Institutional changes 
During the 1990s, reforms involving sales of 
assets have succeeded in reducing the size of the 
public sector substantially. But much less 
progress has been made on the other outstanding 
task -that of bridging the wide gap between 
society's demands and needs and the capacity of 
the State to meet them. Successful 
macroeconomic stabilization programmes and 
"first generation" structural reforms have 
increased the efficiency of the private sector but 
have not improved the efficacy of public action. 
Meanwhile, social demands have been 
accumulating steadily, and the aforementioned 
gap between need and action has widened. One 
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Box HM 
PRIVATIZATION OF TELEBRAS 
In preparation for the privatization of Telecom unicações Brasileiras (Telehras). the Government of Brazil divided 
the Tclcbras system into 12 companies: three fixed-line operators, eight cellular telephone firms and one 
long-distance and international communications operator. The Government .sold 19.3'/fc of the shares of the group, 
representing 51 .8*% of the voting rights. The floor price for the deal had been set at IiS$ 11.5 billion, but the 
Government was hoping for amund US$ 13.9 billion. The interest of investors was so great, however, that the 
proceeds amounted to USS 19 billion, constituting an average premium of 65'* over the floor price. In the case 
of one company, the premium exceeded 240'*. It is significant that, in contrast to previous privatizations, foreign 
companies (bidding alone or with Brazilian partners) were heavily represented. The majority of the successful 
bidders were European firms. The rales stipulate that the buyers must pay 4()9f of the total amount in 199K and 
the remaining 60% over the following two years. Another interesting point is that the Government proposes to 
use the bulk of the proceeds to retire its domestic debt, Iherebv reducing lhe public-sector deficit. 
approach to narrowing the gap has been to reform 
the existing institutional framework in order to 
enhance the State's capacity to do its job. 
Institution-building is intended to improve the 
delivery of social services and make both market 
and State functioning more transparent. 
Little has been done in this area, however. 
Several Central American countries, including El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, undertook reforms of 
their public administrations in 1997. In Brazil, on 
the other hand, such initiatives have been bogged 
down for three years. Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela, countries in different phases of 
structural reform, are now starting to consider 
reforms to the State itself. 
Judicial reforms are slowly getting underway 
in the region. With the aim of enhancing legal 
safeguards, Bolivia completed the restructuring 
of its judiciary in 1997. In addition to the existing 
institutions, it created the Office of Ombudsman, 
the Judiciary Council and the Constitutional 
Court. Chile, by enacting new legislation 
governing its Supreme Court, took the first steps 
in reform of the judicial structure with the aim of 
increasing both the transparency and the 
credibility of the judicial system. In Peru, on the 
other hand, judicial reforms were stymied and 
even suffered some reverses. 
Another fundamental issue the region is 
timidly beginning to address, one closely linked 
to administrative and judicial reforms, is that of 
corruption, a problem that has become 
increasingly serious and widespread, not only 
within the region but throughout the world. The 
Government that recently took office in Bolivia 
made it one of the priority issues in its new 
programme. In Chile, a bill was introduced in the 
legislature in 1998 aimed at raising the level of 
administrative probity and transparency in the 
functioning of government. The Government of 
Ecuador, on the other hand, was unsuccessful in 
its plan to modernize the customs service and was 
forced to decree a state of emergency in customs. 
In mid-1998 it finally succeeded in setting up 
new customs institutions designed to increase 
efficiency and put an end to corruption. 
Argentina announced that it would consider 
privatizing customs inspections in 1998. 
Technological changes that have diminished 
the importance of economies of scale in the 
telecommunications sector, combined with 
increased demand for telecommunications 
1 "First generation" reforms comprise fiscal reform, price decontrol, liberalization of trade and financial markets, deregulation 
and privatization. 
2 "Second generation" structural reforms include administrative and judicial reforms, decentralization, improvement of 
regulatory and legal frameworks and more effective oversight of financial systems. 
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services, have facilitated their transfer to the 
private sector and the break-up of monopoly. In 
many countries, Governments have privatized 
State-owned enterprises and in some cases 
created regulatory agencies responsible for 
increasing competition and protecting 
consumers. This process is now underway in 
many countries of the region; in 1997 El 
Salvador, Colombia and Brazil joined their 
ranks. That year, the Government of Brazil 
opened the telecommunications sector to 
competition and set up a regulatory agency for 
the industry; in 1998 it went on to privatize the 
State-owned telephone company. 
The electric power sector is following the 
same path, but more slowly. While the gap 
between supply and demand is comparable to 
that in the telecommunications sector, there have 
been far fewer technological innovations. 
Nevertheless, private-sector interest in investing 
in the industry has been growing, as shown by the 
privatization figures for 1997. Moreover, during 
the year Governments in the region put emphasis 
on measures to avoid the formation of electric 
power monopolies (Peru and Ecuador) and 
created regulatory agencies (Brazil). 
With regard to property rights, Nicaragua 
passed a law aimed at resolving outstanding land 
claims and accelerating the process of issuing 
deeds. Mexico and Ecuador adopted new 
intellectual property legislation, and Brazil 
passed a law making software piracy a tax fraud, 
as well as a law on music copyrights. 
(c) Social security reforms 
Of the countries in the region that have 
reformed their social security systems in recent 
years, only Chile adopted a pure funded system. 
The others opted for a mixed system combining 
both economic and social functions, i.e., both 
capitalization and distribution elements, in an 
effort to harmonize the diverse goals of 
improving public finances, increasing savings 
and developing capital markets with the need to 
provide an adequate income in old age. 
As Chile had done earlier, Argentina began a 
process of consolidation involving mergers and 
acquisitions of retirement and pension fund 
management companies (AFJPs) in a bid to reduce 
costs and achieve greater competitiveness. Of the 
26 AFJPs created at the time of the 1994 reform, 
18 remain, covering 5.7 million participants. The 
process was reinforced by the simultaneous 
consolidation of the Argentine banking system. 
Three reformed social security systems went 
into effect in 1997 (in Mexico, Bolivia and 
Uruguay). The first two have run into problems. 
In Mexico, a private pension system began to 
operate in 1997 with 18 retirement fund 
management companies (AFOREs). In their first 
year of operation, the AFOREs enrolled over 11 
million workers, making that the largest and 
speediest enrolment process in all the countries 
that have introduced new systems. Over one 
fourth of the participants, however, make no 
regular contributions to their retirement, and this 
undercuts the profitability of the funds. 
Moreover, AFORE investments are not highly 
diversified; most of the money is invested in 
government bonds. 
The new Bolivian social security system is 
also encountering problems. One of the key 
elements of the new system was the "Bonosol", 
or solidarity benefit, to be paid to all persons over 
65 years of age. The purpose was to provide a 
universal old-age pension in the form of a life 
annuity. But the Bonosol was paid out for the first 
and apparently the last time in 1997. The new 
Government suspended payment of the Bonosol 
on the grounds that it was not financially viable, 
since the first and only payment had resulted in a 
debt of US$ 50 million. In its place, the 
Government is proposing to distribute the shares 
of stock the State still holds in capitalized 
enterprises, but the final decision has not yet been 
announced. 
Seven countries are considering or preparing 
for reforms to their social security pension 
systems (El Salvador, Venezuela, Brazil, 
Panama, Paraguay, Honduras and Costa Rica). El 
Salvador completed the preparatory stage in 
3 For further details on the new social security systems in Mexico and Bolivia, see ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 1996-1997 (LC/G.1968-P), Santiago, Chile, 1997, p. 75, United Nations publication, Sales No. S.97-II.G.2. 
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1997, and in the first half of 1998 authorized the 
operation of five pension fund management 
companies (AFPs), four created with foreign 
capital and one with local capital. Venezuela 
made significant progress in 1997 in preparing 
for changes in its social security system as part of 
the reforms contemplated under the Agenda 
Venezuela programme. The new system is 
supposed to cover pension, health, 
unemployment, disability and housing benefits. 
It is to be based on individual funding and will be 
mandatory for workers and employees in all 
categories. The plan also involves the 
establishment of a trust fund to guarantee a 
Prior to the wave of deregulation in the early 
years of the decade, the region's banking systems 
were heavily regulated, undercapitalized and 
composed of a large number of financial 
institutions with high operating costs. Financial 
liberalization and successful macroeconomic 
stabilization programmes, however, radically 
altered the ground rules, and financial systems 
were forced to adapt. In some cases the changes 
led to banking crises, in others to consolidation 
through mergers and acquisitions. The particular 
severity of the banking crises in 1994 and 1995 
induced the countries affected to strengthen the 
regulatory framework and oversight of the sector 
(see box III.2). 
In 1997, serious financial problems or 
banking crises arose only in Paraguay, Jamaica 
and El Salvador. The Central Bank of Paraguay 
was obliged to intervene, and later, in 1998, to 
order the liquidation of two banks, one of them 
the largest locally-owned private bank. The 
Government of Jamaica spent nearly 10% of 
GDP to facilitate the restructuring of the financial 
sector. Three other countries (Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Uruguay) encountered localized problems 
involving one bank or one financial institution. 
On the other hand, consolidation of the sector 
went further in a number of countries during 
1997. In Colombia, for example, the financial 
sector continued on a course of consolidation 
minimum pension, thereby protecting the rights 
acquired. 
In contrast, reform of the pension system in 
Brazil has been awaiting approval for three years. 
The plan is to do away with the patchwork of 
retirement schemes and to set a minimum 
retirement age of 60 years for men and 55 for 
women. Other features are to calculate the 
pension on the basis of years of contribution 
rather than years of service and to eliminate the 
special privileges some occupations enjoy. It is 
estimated that these changes would result in 
US$ 3 billion annually in savings to the public 
sector. 
begun in mid-1996; between June 1996 and April 
1998, 48 financial institutions were created, 
acquired, merged or liquidated. Financial 
systems in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Venezuela underwent similar changes. In all 
these cases, the active participation of foreign 
banks accelerated the consolidation. In 
Venezuela, for example, it is estimated that in the 
two years following the banking crisis the 
number of banks was reduced by 50%, and half 
of those remaining were owned by foreign 
interests. 
In the area of regulation and oversight, 
Panama adopted measures to strengthen local 
banks and improve the competitiveness of the 
financial system in general. It also has plans to 
create a banking superintendency with oversight 
of local financial institutions and the power to 
impose sanctions when appropriate. In mid-1998 
the Banking Superintendency of Colombia 
assumed oversight of cooperative financial 
institutions, and the introduction of a mandatory 
risk rating system is planned for 1999. The 
Governments of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela signed an agreement to tighten the 
control they exercise over bank transactions 
between countries, in order to prevent financial 
institutions from transferring risks to the 
balance sheets of branches located in other 
countries and to increase the transparency of 




FINANCIAL REFORMS AND THE ASIAN CRISIS 
IN THE REGION 
Prior to the Mexican crisis in 1994, financial reform in the region typically involved liberalization without an 
accompanying effort to strengthen oversight and regulation. Since then, however, the situation has changed 
radically. During the three years from 1995 to 1997, baied on the experience gained from the so-called "tequila 
effect". Governments in the region have adopted programmes designed to strengthen their control of the financial 
sector, facilitate the capitalization of weak institutions and promote the restructuring and consolidation of hanking 
systems. They also privatized State-owned banks and re-privatized banks that had been taken ovcrduring periods 
of crisis, in the process attracting the interest of foreign banks and thereby improving and strengthening the 
structure of the financial system. As a result, the region's banking systems held up well against the external shocks 
generated by the Asian crisis. Thai strength, together with the timely adoption of macroecononiic measures and 
the absence of serious macroeconomic imbalances, enabled the countries to avoid banking and foreign exchange 
crises of the kind that had earlier hit Mexico and more recently the countries of South-East Asia. Hence, capital 
continued to flow in during the first half of 1998, despite the adverse global economic environment. 
flows of money and capital between the signatory 
countries. 
In the area of regulation, a number of countries 
intensified their efforts to combat 
money-laundering. Brazil adopted legislation 
establishing heavy penalties for the crime and 
making it mandatory for financial institutions to 
report suspicious transactions to the monetary 
authorities. Panama passed a law making the 
crime of money-laundering punishable by 20 
years in prison. 
Capital markets also came in for their share of 
attention. Several laws were passed in the region 
aimed at developing them. The legislature of 
Ecuador passed a stock market act and an 
investment guarantee act to attract more 
investment. In Chile, legislation was adopted 
that should make it easier for Chilean banks to 
penetrate other markets by opening branches or 
acquiring interests in foreign financial 
institutions. In addition, a further step was taken 
towards all-purpose banking by expanding the 
line of services banks can provide. Lastly, 
minimum capital requirements were 
harmonized with the rules of the Bank for 
International Settlements in Basel. The new 
investment law adopted in Uruguay included tax 
breaks and incentives for both local and foreign 
capital (exemption from wealth taxes, value 
added tax and some other specific internal taxes). 
The result was to put foreign and local investment 
on an equal footing. The law also guaranteed the 
free transfer of investment capital and profits. In 
addition, the range of investments open to the 
pension fund management companies recently 
created under the country's new social security 
system was expanded. Other new laws in this 
area were passed in 1998: a new foreign 
investment act was passed in Guatemala; a stock 
market act adopted in Bolivia set new rules for 
the operation of stock exchanges; and 
amendments to the General Banks and Other 
Institutions Act in Nicaragua represented a major 
step towards all-purpose banking. 
Honduras passed the Central Bank Act in 
1997 granting greater autonomy to the country's 
monetary authority. Cuba established a central 
bank and expanded the banking activities that 
could be conducted under market conditions. In 
Nicaragua, meanwhile, the Central Bank made 
reserve requirements uniform. 
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4. Labour reforms 
Little has been done recently in the region in the 
area of labour reform. In most cases, 
Governments are trying to improve the efficiency 
of the labour market while still providing (or 
maintaining) adequate protection for workers. It 
is not easy, however, to find a way to achieve 
both these objectives simultaneously; hence the 
first steps towards reform are erratic, prolonged 
and hotly contested. 
The situation in 1997 was no exception. In 
Honduras the merits of a reform of the labour 
code were still under study. In Argentina debate 
continued concerning the future of limited-term 
contracts and non-wage labour costs, debate 
unresolved on either issue by mid-1998. The 
same was true in Chile with regard to a proposal 
concerning unemployment insurance. In 
Paraguay, a proposal was put forward to limit the 
job security of civil servants and to place them on 
the same footing as employees in the private 
sector in terms of employment conditions, but the 
initiative was vehemently rejected. 
Most trade reform in recent years has occurred 
within already existing customs unions or 
bilateral trade agreements, or between individual 
countries and customs unions, in contrast to the 
trade reforms early in the decade, when 
economies were opened to the world in general. 
In consequence, nearly all recent changes in 
customs regimes have been part of the regional 
integration process: tariff reductions between 
members of a group or between the group as a 
whole and the rest of the world. Regional 
integration, however, covers many other areas 
besides trade policy. 
(a) Trade reforms 
The linkages of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries to international markets 
have strengthened as the decade has progressed, 
as a result of a policy of trade openness and the 
Among the main changes in labour legislation 
in 1997 and early 1998 was Brazil's decision to 
expand the opportunities for limited-term 
contracts and to introduce the "time-bank" 
method for compensating overtime with time off. 
Both innovations are subject to collective 
bargaining. The aims are greater labour 
flexibility and lower labour costs. In Nicaragua, 
a new labour code, approved in 1996, took effect 
in 1997. In Venezuela, wages and supplementary 
allowances were combined into one, and an 
accrued severance bonus was legislated in 
preparation for the transition to a new social 
security system. In addition, provisions 
concerning dismissal without cause were 
amended. As a result of these changes, the 
Government recognized implicit liabilities of 
around US$ 8 billion for accrued payment 
obligations. That amount, plus the US$ 6 billion 
needed to re-capitalize the social security system, 
will have profound implications for the 
macroeconomic management of the country. 
increasing globalization of the world economy. 
In the majority of the South American countries 
trade was liberalized early in the 1990s. In 
Central America the process has recently been 
reactivated, while the Caribbean countries are 
proceeding somewhat more slowly. This pattern 
reflects greater caution on the part of the latter 
two subregions in view of the vulnerability of 
their economies to external shocks and their level 
of preparedness. Although some Caribbean 
countries can count on earnings from a small 
maquila industry, tourism or offshore financial 
services, overall their economies are dependent 
on a few export products -natural resources or 
tropical agricultural products- with low value 
added. Hence, certain changes in established 
trade regimes, such as the ruling of the World 
Trade Organization against the preferential 
treatment accorded to Caribbean exports by 
European Union countries, could have serious 
5. Progress in trade reform and the 
regional integration process 
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economic and social consequences for the 
subregion. 
As in previous years, macroeconomic 
problems induced the economic authorities of 
some countries of the region to adopt 
protectionist measures in 1997, but not to the 
extent of reversing the region's general tendency 
towards openness. The devaluation of Asian 
currencies, however, roused fears of a drastic 
increase in imports of Asian products and unfair 
trade practices. In a number of countries 
measures were announced to protect domestic 
producers, such as safeguard clauses, 
compensatory quotas, anti-dumping provisions 
and other non-tariff restrictions. 
(b) The integration process 
Widening external deficits in many countries 
of the region, aggravated by the spillover of the 
Asian crisis starting in October 1997, only 
marginally affected the regional integration 
process. The four existing customs unions moved 
toward full realization of their trade regimes and, 
to varying degrees, addressed related issues, such 
as institution-building, integration of the service 
sector and the free movement of persons and 
capital. Bilateral negotiations lagged, but 
subregional groups showed increasing interest in 
signing free trade agreements with non-member 
countries in the region. These rapprochements 
were motivated in part by the challenges raised 
by the launch of hemisphere-wide negotiations 
early in 1998. 
(i) The Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur) 
With the eleventh meeting of the Common 
Market Council (Forteleza, Brazil, December 
1996), Mercosur entered a phase of deepening 
that transcends purely trade issues. Among other 
aims, it intends to strengthen the political 
dimension of the integration process. In the 
institutional sphere, the Council approved an 
agreement locating the headquarters of the 
Mercosur Administrative Secretariat in 
Montevideo. 
In 1997 the Mercosur customs union 
completed three years of existence, although 
there are still exceptions to its free trade regime 
and common external tariff (CET). The timetable 
for tariff reductions on the few products not yet 
covered is being adhered to, and the countries are 
gradually converging on the agreed CET. Among 
recent advances, the protocol in defence of 
competition, the social security agreement and 
the Montevideo Protocol on Trade in Services in 
the Southern Common Market deserve special 
mention. 
In early 1997, Brazil put restrictions on 
short-term financing of imports, and Argentina 
initiated a series of investigations of suspected 
dumping of Brazilian imports. So far, the friction 
generated by such measures has been resolved 
through direct negotiation between the countries 
concerned, without recourse to the dispute 
settlement mechanism. To counter their growing 
external deficits, Argentina and Brazil decided to 
apply a general surcharge of 3% to the common 
external tariff starting in November, leaving 
Paraguay and Uruguay at liberty to apply the 
surcharge or not. 
During 1997, trade within the group again 
grew strongly (by 17.7%), exceeding the US$ 20 
billion mark and raising the share of intra-group 
exports to 24.3% of the group's total exports. The 
expanded market has become a powerful 
inducement to foreign direct investment in the 
area, while investment between member 
countries, although still at an early stage, is 
picking up. 
In February 1997, an associate membership 
agreement between Mercosur and Bolivia took 
effect, similar to the one signed with Chile the 
year before. No concrete progress was made on 
a rapprochement between Mercosur and the 
Andean Community, but in April 1998 a 
framework agreement was reached on 
negotiations for a free trade area between the two 
groups by the year 2000. 
(ii) Andean Community 
With the ninth session of the Andean 
Presidential Council (Sucre, Ecuador, April 
1997) the Trujillo Act and associated protocol 
went into effect, transforming the Andean Group 
into the Andean Community. The purpose of the 
institutional change was to make the group's 
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structure stronger and more flexible. The Board 
of the Cartagena Agreement was replaced by the 
General Secretariat, which unites in one 
executive body the responsibility for most of the 
decisions that affect the regular functioning of the 
Community. In addition, there are 
decision-making bodies composed of the 
presidents and the foreign ministers of the 
member States, to provide the Andean 
Community with a strong political underpinning. 
Peru, which had not participated in the free 
trade regime of the Group since 1992, rejoined 
the Andean Community at the end of June 1997 
after arduous negotiations. It was agreed that the 
country would have until the year 2005 to bring 
itself gradually into line with the free trade 
regime governing trade between the other 
member countries. It should be recalled that both 
Peru and Bolivia still apply their own national 
tariffs to third-country imports and have no plans 
to adhere to the Community's common external 
tariff. Intra-group trade increased by 14.9% 
during 1997, while exports to the rest of the world 
increased by 7.7%; as a result, the share of 
intra-group exports in total exports rose to 11.2%. 
In terms of outward expansion, the most 
significant development was the framework 
agreement signed between the Community and 
Mercosur in April 1998, which opens up concrete 
prospects for the establishment of a free trade 
area comprising nearly all the South American 
countries. 
In the face of temporary macroeconomic 
problems that developed in the course of the year, 
Colombia and Ecuador raised their tariffs in 
1997, the first for three months, the second for 
nine. Peru, on the other hand, reduced its average 
tariff from 16% to 13% for most imported 
products. 
(Hi) Central American Common Market 
(CACM) 
The Central American integration process 
moved forward in 1997 on two fronts: in the 
deepening of its regulatory and formal aspects 
and in efforts to broaden its scope. At the 
nineteenth Summit Meeting of Central American 
Presidents (Panama City, July 1997), the issue of 
strengthening Central American integration 
institutions was addressed and the possibility of 
a free trade agreement with the host country was 
explored. On the latter issue, the participants set 
the objectives and framework for negotiations 
with Panama. Among the reorganization 
measures adopted, the most significant was the 
decision to combine all existing secretariats into 
one General Secretariat with headquarters in El 
Salvador. 
The assembled presidents further agreed to 
supplement trade integration with cooperation in 
the political sphere and to step up efforts to reach 
an understanding with the Dominican Republic; 
as a result, negotiations successfully culminated 
in a free trade agreement between that country 
and CACM in April 1998. On 18 September 1997, 
Nicaragua signed a free trade agreement with 
Mexico (Costa Rica had done so in 1995); the 
other three Central American countries (El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras), referred to 
collectively as the Northern Triangle, continued 
negotiating with Mexico towards a similar 
agreement. 
During 1997 CACM members advanced trade 
liberalization by progressively reducing tariffs, 
cutting back on safeguard clauses in reciprocal 
trade and virtually eliminating nearly all tariffs 
on their trade in agricultural products. In June 
1997, however, they proposed postponing for 
five years (until 2005) full implementation of the 
common external tariff. On the other hand, the 
countries, with few exceptions, lifted exchange 
controls, a move that also facilitated the 
development of trade within the group. 
Intra-group trade grew by 3.5%, while total 
Central American exports increased by 11.7%. 
Thus, despite some structural weaknesses, 
intra-group trade continued to rebound. 
(iv) Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
The CARICOM countries have made strides in 
implementing their customs union. Basically, 
there is free trade between them in all goods 
4 In any case, Panama's tariffs for all imports averaged 8.25% in January 1998, compared with 35% in 1995. The tariff structure 
comprises six categories, with rates from 0% to 20%. Quotas were eliminated, and ad valorem duties replaced specific taxes. 
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that satisfy the rules of origin. At the 
beginning of 1997, however, there were still 
four countries that were requiring import 
licences on a limited number of products. In 
addition to advances in free trade of goods, all 
but two countries signed a protocol in July 
1997 providing for free movement of capital. 
The members had previously implemented 
concrete measures to facilitate free movement 
of persons, such as reciprocal acceptance of 
identification papers other than passports and 
exemption of university graduates from the 
need for work permits. In addition, in March 
1996 the countries had signed an agreement 
providing for mutual recognition of the social 
security rights of their citizens. It is planned 
that the common external tariff (CET) structure 
will assume its final form in 1998, a step that 
will involve a gradual reduction of tariffs on 
non-agricultural goods to a range between 5% 
and 20%. The third phase of CET 
implementation was scheduled for the first 
half of 1997. In July 1997, Haiti was accepted as 
the rifteenth member. 
(v) Start of negotiations on the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
Preparations to launch another round of FTAA 
talks intensified in 1997, a proposal given definite 
form at the second Summit of the Americas 
(Santiago, Chile, April 1998). In the four vice-
ministerial meetings held in 1997 and the third 
Trade Ministerial Meeting in Belo Horizonte, 
Brazil, in May, the general principles that are to 
govern the talks were elaborated, stressing the 
following: (i) the outcome of the negotiations 
would constitute a single under- taking); (ii) FTAA 
could co-exist with already established 
integration agreements; (iii) countries could 
negotiate individually or as members of a group; 
(iv) special attention should be given to the needs 
of the smaller economies; and (v) negotiations 
should be concluded by the year 2005. 
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IV. LEVEL 
In 1997 the Latin American economies, 
supported by dynamic growth in exports 
and strong investment, turned in one of 
the best performances in recent decades. 
The region averaged GDP growth of 
5.3%, more than one and a half 
percentage points above the average for 
the 1990s to date. Per capita output 
increased on average by 3.6%. In the 
Caribbean, on the other hand, economic 
growth was modest and below the levels 
achieved during the previous three years 
(see tables IV. 1 and IV. 6). 
Three external factors can be identified that 
influenced economic trends in the region in 1997 
and its growth prospects in 1998. First, the crisis 
affecting a number of countries in East and 
South-East Asia since mid-1997 has had 
repercussions on the global and regional 
economies that continue to be felt in 1998. 
Second, the El Niño climatic phenomenon 
caused either severe drought or intense rains very 
damaging to agriculture and infrastructure. 
Third, there was a strong increase in foreign 
direct investment flows to the region; this factor, 
unlike the first two, had a positive effect on level 
of activity. 
The region began to feel the impact of the 
Asian crisis in October 1997 (see figure IV. 1). At 
first the effects were largely financial and were 
particularly adverse in Brazil, Colombia and, 
briefly, Argentina. Then, towards the end of the 
year, the crisis began to spill over into the region 
1 Although a few Latin American countries, notably Brazil, 
2 See also the section that deals more specifically with the C 
ACTIVITY 
via the less direct channel of trade and will 
continue to do so in coming quarters. Its impact 
on trade has been manifested more in falling 
prices for certain primary commodities than in 
reduced export volumes. 
Many of the countries of the region suffered 
and are still suffering from the effects of the El 
Niño climatic phenomenon. By altering ocean 
temperatures and rainfall systems it brought 
drought to some areas and excessive rainfall and 
flooding.to others, reducing not only fish catches 
and agricultural output, but also hydroelectric 
power generation (especially in Central 
America), and causing forest fires and 
widespread destruction of infrastructure and 
housing. 
The third external factor mentioned above was 
a significant increase in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flowing into the region, as shown in figure 
IV.2. The upward trend in FDI in recent years has 
also implied a shift in the composition of flows 
towards longer-term capital. While this shift has 
cut down on the volatility in the capital account, 
it will mean an increase in factor payments to the 
rest of the world in the future. 
The effects of the three external factors 
mentioned and their domestic repercussions 
have persisted into 1998, although their impact 
on the growth rates of the countries of the 
region has been uneven. Extrapolating from the 
trends observed during the first half of 1998, 
one can anticipate that GDP growth will drop 
off sharply from 5.3% in 1997 to 3% for the 
year as a whole. Among domestic demand 
factors, it seems likely that investment will be 
most affected. It is projected that foreign direct 
investment may remain at 1997 levels or even 
increase modestly, and this underlines the 
jmbia and Paraguay, had relatively low growth rates. 
bean subregion in Part Two of this survey. 
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Table IV. 1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual growth rates) 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
a Preliminary figures. Does not include Cuba c Calculated on the basis of the relevant local currency at constant prices. 
d Based on figures at factor cost. e 1991-1996. 
importance of the long-term component of the 
capital account. A major slowing in the growth 
of imports is expected, whereas the growth of 
exports may well remain at alevel comparable to 
that of the last few years. 
So far in 1998, slower growth has been 
most evident in Brazil, owing to its 
adjustmentpolicies,andalsoinChile,Ecuador, 
Mexico and Venezuela, where the effects of 
the slowdown have been exacerbated by a 
drop in prices of export products, notably 
petroleum and copper. In Peru, the loss of 
dynamism has been due in part to the 
lingering effects of El Niño. 
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Figure IV. 1 
LATIN AMERICA: QARTERLY GROWTH IN GDP 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of ofiicial figures. 
1. Supply and demand 
In 1997 the performance of the Latin American 
and Caribbean economies was characterized by 
highly dynamic growth in the various 
components of supply and demand. Aggregate 
supply grew at the highest rate so far in the 1990s, 
thanks to an extraordinary expansion in imports 
(19%) and average GDP growth of over 5%. The 
result was that aggregate supply expanded one 
and a half times as fast as GDP (see table IV.2). 
A number of factors contributed to stronger 
economic growth in the region in 1997. The first 
was a vigorous expansion of investment. As 
figure IV.3 shows, investment had dropped off 
sharply during the economic crisis of 1995, 
which hit Mexico and Argentina particularly 
hard. Within investment, the component of 
imported capital goods assumed growing 
importance in 1997, permitting the incorporation 
of technical progress into the region's stock of 
productive capital. At the same time, a decline in 
public-sector investment was observable. 
Second, external demand contributed strongly to 
the quickening of economic activity. The export 
sector performed very well in terms of volume, 
which increased by 11%. Third, growth in 
consumption closely tracked that of gross 
domestic product. Government consumption 
maintained a steady rate of growth and was much 
less affected by the economic cycle than were 
other variables. 
The expansion of aggregate demand was due 
to the strong recovery of investment and 
continued growth in exports, the latter owing 
largely to increased volumes, since average 
prices for the region's exports declined slightly. 
Consumption expanded in tandem with GDP, 
although the stronger growth was in private 
rather than public consumption, which grew by 
less than 2%. 
Regional imports expanded in volume by 
nearly 20%, thanks in part to a widespread 
tendency towards appreciation of local 
currencies. The four big Latin American 
economies -Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Venezuela- recorded the highest rates of increase 
in import volume, on the order of 20%. In the 
other countries, the figure was in the 10% to 20% 
range. Only Haiti, Honduras and Paraguay had 
very low or negative rates. 
Among the more dynamic components of 
imports were capital goods. Argentine imports of 
capital goods, largely for the industrial sector, 
grew by 37%. In Brazil, the strong expansion of 
capital goods imports was a result of both the 
rising activity level and consolidation of the trade 
liberalization process. The highest rates of 
growth in capital goods imports were recorded in 
Mexico and Venezuela. In most of the other 
countries, such imports also expanded 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of ofiicial figures. 
production. Given the limitations of their 
industrial structures, the countries still found it 
necessary to buy capital goods abroad to increase 
capital formation (see chapter VIII). On the other 
hand, the incorporation of technological progress 
inherent in these imports should enable the 
countries to expand their production frontier and 
improve productivity. 
In a closely related trend, treated in greater 
detail in chapter VI, investment proved to be the 
most dynamic component of domestic demand. 
Regional growth in investment reached its 
highest level in the 1990s and was especially 
strong in Argentina (27%), Costa Rica (23%) and 
the Dominican Republic (over 20%). Greater 
external demand helped considerably to raise the 
level of activity: the growth of exports more than 
doubled that of GDP. 
The trend in domestic consumption tracked 
that of output, as a result of a strong expansion in 
private expenditure (6.5%) and a very modest 
increase in public consumption (2%). Per capita 
consumption increased by 3% in 1997 as a 
regional average, and by over 4% in Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay. 
The rate was lower, however, in Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras and Paraguay. In 
general, per capita consumption levels in the 
region were only 10% above those recorded early 
in the 1980s. The highest values compared to 
1980 were achieved in Colombia (138%), Chile 
(137%), Uruguay (130%), Paraguay (130%) and 
Panama (127%). However, in seven countries 
(Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Peru and Venezuela) per capita consumption was 
actually lower than in 1980. 
Even so, regional per capita output increased 
by 3.7%; despite a population growth rate that 
was still relatively high (1.6%), most of the 
countries showed progress in this regard. 
Argentina, Peru, Dominican Republic, Mexico 
and Chile achieved relatively high rates in 1997. 
Exceptions to the general trend were Haiti and 
Paraguay, which recorded negative rates. This 
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Table IV.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE a 
(Annual growth rates) 
Item 
1. Total supply (2 + 3) 
2. Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
3. Imports of goods and 
services 
4. Exports of goods and 
services 
5. Domestic availability of 
goods and services 
(2 + 3 - 4) = domestic 
demand (6 + 7) 
6. Final consumption 
expenditure 
7. Gross fixed investmentc 
8. Factor payments 
9. Real gross national 







































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
a 19 countries. Preliminary figures. c Includes change in inventories in Haiti. Includes current transfers and 
terms-of-trade effect. 
important indicator of well-being was on average 
only slightly higher in 1997 than in 1980, having 
finally surpassed that level only in 1996. In a few 
countries the level in 1997 was well above that at 
the start of the preceding decade: Chile (75%), 
Colombia (40%) and the Dominican Republic 
and Uruguay (slightly over 20%). On the other 
hand, it remained well below the 1980 value in 
Haiti (-42%), Nicaragua (-39%) and Venezuela 
(-23%). In the other countries, levels of per capita 
output were similar to those at the beginning of 
the 1980s. 
Generally speaking, gross national income in 
the region increased in step with output, although 
a few countries recorded wide discrepancies. In 
Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Chile and 
Colombia, national income grew far more than 
output. In Nicaragua, this was attributable to a 
significant decline in factor payments abroad and 
a simultaneous increase in current transfers. In 
the other countries mentioned, the terms of trade 
improved. In Venezuela, Ecuador and Costa 
Rica, on the other hand, national income grew 
more slowly than output, and in all three of these 
countries the terms of trade deteriorated. In 
Venezuela current transfers also became 
negative. 
2. Output growth 
In the following analysis, output trends in the 
countries of the region, grouped according to 
growth rate, are examined in the light of the three 
basic sets of factors that influence the dynamism 
3 Only 1% in the Caribbean subregion. 
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Figure IV. 3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS, CONSUMPTION, 
INVESTMENT AND GDP, 1990-1997 
(Growth rates) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of ofiicial figures. 
of economic activity: consumption, investment 
and the external sector (see table IV.3). 
In the five countries that recorded growth of 
over 6% (Argentina, Peru, Dominican Republic, 
Mexico and Chile), there were also strong 
increases in each of the three above-mentioned 
areas. In the case of Mexico, while fixed 
investment was relatively low, total investment 
expanded by 23%. 
In the intermediate group with growth rates 
close to the regional average (between 4% and 
6%), domestic demand factors showed less 
dynamism than in the first group. Consumption 
followed closely the average rate of output 
growth, while investment increased on average 
by only 9%, compared to the figure of 17% for 
the top group. Under external sector variables, 
both imports and exports tended to expand less. 
The median current account deficit (the simple 
average is heavily skewed by Nicaragua) was 
smaller than that of the third group. 
In the countries with output growth of less 
than 4% (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Haiti and Paraguay) the external variables 
showed less dynamism (except in the case of 
Brazil). What is striking is that, despite the poor 
economic performance of this group, the external 
deficits were quite high (in some cases exceeding 
5% of GDP), since imports outstripped exports. 
In the countries of the Caribbean, a 
disappointing economic performance was due in 
large part to El Niño weather patterns, which hurt 
agriculture in general and depressed activity in 
Barbados, Jamaica and the members of the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS)4 in particular. In 9 of the 13 Caribbean 
countries studied, the output growth rate was 
lower than in 1996, and the subregional average 
was only 1.9%, compared with 2.6% for the three 
preceding years. 
4 OECS members are Anguila, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. 
5 See also the last section of Part Two of this survey. 
62 
Table IV.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND GROWTH OF 
CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT AND THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 





























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Volume. Based on dollars at current prices. 
3. Production sectors 
The performance of the region's production 
sectors was very uneven in 1997. Construction, 
manufacturing and basic services grew 
vigorously. Mining continued to grow, although 
at a somewhat more moderate pace than in 1996. 
Agriculture and other services were the 
categories with the slowest growth in 1997. 
Since the early 1980s, the primary sector has 
maintained roughly the same share of output, 
showing a slight increase attributable to mining. 
The secondary and tertiary sectors have 




LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH OF PRODUCTION SECTORS 
GDP growth 
8.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of ofiicial figures. 
experienced divergent trends: rising in the case 
of services and construction and falling in the 
case of manufacturing. Over the same period, 
however, there have been major changes in 
sectoral productivity, reflecting important 
structural transformations in production sectors 
over the last few decades. The restructuring has 
been brought about by policies aimed at external 
opening of the region's economies, market 
deregulation and privatization (see table IV.4). 
In 1997, labour productivity followed the 
paths marked out earlier. Back in the 1970s, 
productivity rose in all sectors, but the situation 
changed in the 1980s, when there were 
productivity gains in the primary sector (largely 
in mining) but losses in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors. Labour productivity in the primary sector 
has picked up in the 1990s, and industrial 
productivity has also shown significant gains; 
however, there has been a loss of productivity in 
the service sector. 
(a) Agriculture 
Agriculture suffered a slowing of growth in 
1997 from 3.3% to 1.5%, largely as a result of 
adverse weather patterns caused by the El Niño 
phenomenon. Agriculture turned in the poorest 
sectoral performance, in comparison both to the 
figures for the other sectors and to its own figure 
for the previous year. 
The reduction in quantity prevented producers 
from taking full advantage of higher prices for 
some products (coffee, for example) in 1997. By 
the end of the year, prices of a number of 
agricultural products were on the decline. On the 
other hand, the agro-industrial complex 
developing in Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay and 
Brazil continued to expand strongly during the 
year, with significant increases in acreage under 
cultivation in various crops (such as soybeans). 
(b) Mining 
Although the rate of growth of mining activity 
slowed somewhat, it remained up around the high 
levels of previous years. The sector continues to 
be one of the most important recipients of foreign 
direct investment. In 1997 mining received a 
boost from the process of energy integration 
occurring in Latin America, aimed at supplying 
gas to southern Brazil, particularly São Paulo. 
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Table IV.4 
LATIN AMERICA: LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY BY SECTOR, 1970-1997 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Table IV.5 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT MARKET PRICES 
(Annual growth rates) 










































































































































































































































































































































Included under manufacturing. 
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Table IV.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual growth rates) 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean b 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
a Preliminary figures. Does not include Cuba. c Calculated on the basis of the relevant local currency at constant prices 
Based on figures at factor cost. e 1991-1996. 
(c) Manufacturing 
The sector, as noted earlier, has undergone 
major changes in recent years as a result of 
government programmes to open up the external 
sector, privatize State-owned enterprises and 
deregulate markets. In 1997 manufacturing 
achieved growth of over 6%, one of the highest 
rates recorded in the 1990s. Investment played a 
considerable role in this result. Not a single 
country showed a decrease in industrial output, 
and in general the trends were quite even across 
the region. 
In several countries, high levels of 
manufacturing activity went hand in hand with a 
similar dynamism in the construction industry. 
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Among the higher rates of growth in 
manufacturing were those recorded in Mexico 
(9.8%), Argentina (9.1%), El Salvador (8.2%) 
and the Dominican Republic (7.9%). Another 
factor that explained the strong performance of 
manufacturing was the increase in investment. 
Moreover, the maquila industry showed strong 
growth in Mexico and some of the Central 
American countries. 
(d) Construction 
Construction was the more dynamic 
component of the secondary sector, thanks to 
generally strong economic growth and the surge 
of investment in construction, due in some 
countries (Brazil, for example) to the execution 
of infrastructure projects associated with 
privatization and concession programmes. 
Construction output expanded by 24% in 
Argentina and by over 10% in Costa Rica, Haiti, 
Mexico, Peru, Dominican Republic and 
Venezuela. 
(e) Services 
The tertiary sector as a whole expanded in step 
with GDP. Basic services showed the same 
strength as in 1996, chalking up very high growth 
rates in Chile, Mexico and the Dominican 
Republic. Other services more than doubled their 
performance of the previous year; in most of the 





The inflation rate for Latin America and 
the Caribbean as a whole in 1997 
continued the downward trend begun in 
1994. The rate of price increase, 888% in 
1993, had been reduced to 18.5% by 1996, 
and in 1997 dropped further to only 
10.4%, the lowest level in nearly 50years. 
In the first half of 1998 inflation crept up 
slightly, but this by no means reversed the 
gains the region has made, which are all 
the more impressive in that they have 
coincided with a phase of regional output 
growth (5.3% in 1997). The inflationary 
pressures generated by the strong 
expansion of domestic demand were 
neutralized by the existence of idle 
capacity and the substantial increase in 
external supply. Moreover, an increase in 
the labour force dampened the potential 
for wage hikes resulting from a greater 
demand for labour. 
In addition to the reduction in the overall rate 
of inflation, it is noteworthy that in the last three 
years none of the countries have suffered 
three-digit inflation except for Venezuela, which 
in 1996 saw prices of consumer goods rise by a 
little over 100%. These results are in sharp 
contrast to the figures for the 1980s and early 
1990s, when three-digit inflation rates were 
common and persistent. Moreover, low inflation 
was a widespread phenomenon in 1997. In most 
of the countries the pace of price increase slowed 
or remained at the low levels achieved in 
previous years. Inflation accelerated only in 
Barbados, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, 
but in two of these economies it still remained 
under 10%. Even Venezuela brought down its 
inflation rate dramatically in 1997 to 38% from 
103% in 1996. All in all, the year was marked by 
low rates of price increase: of the 22 countries 
studied, 14 achieved single-digit inflation, and 
another 6 had rates of between 10% and 20%. 
Only Ecuador and Venezuela recorded higher 
rates of between 30% and 40%. 
In the first half of 1998 a few countries 
suffered a slight setback, among them Nicaragua, 
where prices in the 12 months ending June 1998 
rose by 14%, double the rate in 1997, and 
Paraguay, which experienced inflation of nearly 
12%, five percentage points higher than the 
previous year's rate. Inflation should also rise 
slightly in Colombia but is expected to remain 
below 20% for the year as a whole. Uruguay and 
the Dominican Republic, on the other hand, have 
seen a major drop in inflation, and Chile a 
somewhat smaller one. Other countries have 
done no more than hold their ground in terms of 
price stabilization. In some cases, the explanation 
of an acceleration in price increases is to be found 
in the climatic effects of the El Niño 
phenomenon, which have significantly raised the 
cost of some staple foods in a number of countries 
by causing major losses in agricultural 
production. There have also been isolated causes, 
such as increases in government-controlled 
utility rates. Another factor has been the 
depreciation of a number of currencies in the 
region. 
The progress made in recent years in 
controlling inflation has been remarkable, as 
detailed in the previous issue of the Economic 
Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
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Table V.l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONSUMER PRICES 






















































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from official national services. 
a Variation June 1997 to June 1998. b Variation March 1997 to March 1998. 
chapter devoted to analysis of inflation trends 
over the past 50 years. Throughout much of the 
half-century the region suffered from serious 
inflation, which constituted one of the most 
pressing concerns of Governments and the 
community as a whole. But it was in the 1980s 
that the most violent outbreaks of inflation 
occurred, in the wake of the debt crisis, and few 
economies escaped. In five countries (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru) annual 
inflation rates rose above 1,000%, not once but 
repeatedly, on occasion reaching the point of 
classical hyperinflation. A number of other 
countries also experienced high inflation, 
without reaching the extremes seen in the five 
mentioned above. Countries with low inflation 
rates were rare. Only Barbados, Panama and the 
small Caribbean States displayed consistent price 
stability. 
For some years now, however, stabilization 
policies have begun to show promising results, 
and this has been one of the most striking aspects 
of the performance of the majority of the Latin 
American and Caribbean economies. The 
marked slowdown in the pace of inflation in the 
1990s is primarily due to a change in the thrust 
of economic policy, which has made inflation-
fighting a top priority and directed much effort to 
overcoming macroeconomic imbalances. In their 
determination to achieve stabilization, 
Governments have given out unequivocal 
signals, which have positively influenced the 
expectations of economic agents. This effect has 
been facilitated by a favourable international 
1 See ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1996-1997 (LC/G. 1968-P), Santi ago, Chile, 1997, United 
Nations publication, Sales No. S.97.II.G.2. 
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economic situation characterized by clear price 
stability in the developed countries, a strong 
expansion of trade and readily available financial 
resources for investment in emerging economies. 
An abundant influx of capital has made it 
possible to keep exchange rates relatively stable 
in nominal terms, so that exchange rates have 
fallen in real terms. As this phenomenon has been 
widespread, the rate of exchange has acted as a 
nominal anchor and has been the chief factor in 
the decline in inflation. At the same time, 
Governments have undertaken thorough-going 
structural reforms, which have had the effect, 
among other things, of reducing large fiscal 
deficits and improving the competitiveness of the 
region's economies. 
Despite the gains made by stabilization 
programmes, lately inflation has been showing 
some resistance to further reduction. In a number 
of economies, inflation rates, after dropping 
sharply, have hovered at levels higher than those 
of the developed countries, although in general 
fairly low compared with traditional patterns in 
the region. This phenomenon may be related to 
the continued use of indexation mechanisms but 
could also be due to a mild shift in the direction 
of economic policy. The rigour of austerity 
policies has been eased as the more extreme 
instances of inflation have disappeared. In some 
countries fiscal and monetary policies have 
become less restrictive, while in some others 
devaluation of the local currency persists. 
The most striking examples of successful 
inflation control in recent years are to be found 
in the five countries which suffered most from 
runaway inflation in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
In 1997, all five recorded single-digit price 
increases, the most notable achievement being 
that of Argentina, where inflation was near zero 
for the second straight year. In 1998, there has 
been a very slight rise (1%) attributable to 
public-sector rate hikes. Brazil has also achieved 
considerable success in moderating price 
increases in recent years: its inflation rate for 
1997 was only 4%, whereas during the 12-month 
period ending June 1994 it had reached levels of 
around 5,000%. In 1998, the variation has 
continued to be very low, although a little higher 
than during the previous year. Inflation's 
resistance to disappearance is attributable in part 
to the slippage of the exchange rate (0.6% per 
month), which should continue as long as the 
wide gap in the external accounts persists. 
Three other countries that had experienced 
runaway inflation (Bolivia, Nicaragua and Peru) 
also achieved major reductions in inflation rates 
from very high levels, but after the initial drop the 
descent slowed considerably. In 1997 inflation 
declined in these economies, but in 1998 the rate 
has moved upward again. The reversal has been 
due in part to inability to stabilize the exchange 
rate, because doing so might hurt the economy's 
competitiveness, and in part to imbalances in the 
external sector and, more recently, the problems 
caused by the El Niño phenomenon. In Bolivia, 
the stabilization process begun in 1985 and in 
effect for over 12 years enabled the country to 
extricate itself quickly from a state of virtual 
hyperinflation; in 1997 the country recorded its 
lowest inflation rate in 20 years. In Nicaragua, 
after a series of bad inflationary episodes 
between 1985 and 1991, the inflation rate 
dropped drastically and then stalled at around 
10%. In Peru, price increases reached their most 
critical point in 1990, but under a draconian 
stabilization plan initiated in the second half of 
that year inflation began to decline rapidly. After 
stabilizing at a little over 10% annually for three 
years, the rate declined appreciably in 1997 
thanks to a slower rise in the nominal exchange 
rate and the economy's ability to divert the 
pressure of domestic demand towards imports, 
thanks to an abundant inflow of external capital. 
In 1998, inflation has increased slightly. 
There have also been major advances in 
Uruguay, a country which has had a long history 
of inflation without ever suffering an extreme 
espisode. In recent years it has achieved a gradual 
decline in its inflation rate, which was down to 
15% in 1997 and may reach a single-digit figure 
in 1998, something the country has not seen since 
the mid-1950s. Mexico has also made progress 
in recent years in controlling inflation. Since the 
end of the 1980s the trend has been downwards, 
with a blip in 1995 because of the sharp 
devaluation of the currency towards the end of 
the preceding year. Inflation resumed its slowing 
trend in 1996, when the rate of variation was 
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Table V.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BREAKDOWN OF ANNUAL INFLATION 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Refers to June 1997 - June 1998. 
28%, a little more than half the figure for 1995; 
in 1997 it declined further to around 15%, and it 
appears to be stabilizing at that rate in 1998. 
Residual inflation may persist until the rate of 
exchange can be stabilized; the exchange rate 
continues to float, with occasional intervention 
by Banco de México. Jamaica has enjoyed 
relatively low inflation in the last two years, a 
relief from the high rates recorded in the early 
part of the decade. The reduced inflation has 
resulted from the adjustment measures applied 
beginning in 1996, including the adoption of a 
strict monetary policy, together with the gradual 
opening of domestic markets. 
Eleven economies that had enjoyed moderate 
inflation in the past displayed some further 
progress in controlling inflation in 1997. Eight of 
these countries achieved single-digit inflation. In 
Panama the rate, typically, was close to zero. 
Barbados again recorded very low inflation, 
although a little higher than the year before; 
consumer prices rose significantly early in 1997 
as a result of the imposition of a value added tax, 
but the situation returned to normal in October 
when the incidence of the tax was reduced. 
Another country with very low inflation was El 
Salvador, with arate (1.9%) only one third of that 
recorded a year earlier, thanks to a decline in the 
prices of food and gasoline and to the tight 
monetary policy applied by the Central Reserve 



































liquidity. In Chile inflation continued to descend 
gradually, a tendency that persisted through the 
first half of 1998, although lately the descent has 
been slower. In previous years, the real rate of 
exchange noticeably declined, and yet did not 
hasten the drop in inflation. The continued use of 
indexation, of course, makes it harder to 
eliminate inflation, but the strong economic 
growth in recent years has also played a role. 
In Costa Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay and 
Trinidad and Tobago, inflation declined slightly 
in 1997. In Costa Rica the rate has fluctuated 
between 10% and 20% for a number of years; 
when the rate goes up, the authorities tighten 
monetary controls, then relax their grip on the 
macroeconomic variables, when the rate goes 
down. In the Dominican Republic and 
Guatemala, inflation rates have been low but 
fluctuating. A certain amount of price increase is 
allowed, but steps are taken to keep it from 
getting out of hand. The Dominican Republic 
experienced inflation of over 8% in 1997, in part 
because of adverse climatic conditions that 
reduced the supply of agricultural products and 
the introduction of a uniform exchange rate in 
1996, which had a particularly strong impact on 
the domestic price of fuel. In Colombia, inflation 
has hovered around 20% for a number of years, 
and no quick way out of this situation is foreseen. 
In 1997 inflation dipped to under 18%, thanks to 
the drop in the real exchange rate in the first half. 
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Thereafter inflation rose to over 20% as a result 
of a rising rate of exchange and problems related 
to the El Niño weather patterns. By mid-1998, 
however, it was brought under control, giving 
reason to hope that it will not exceed 20% for the 
current year. Honduras registered important 
gains in inflation control in 1997: the rate was 
only half the previous year's figure, though still 
over 10%. Whereas in the previous decade the 
country experienced moderate inflation 
considerably lower than in most of the countries 
in the region, in the 1990s the rate has picked up 
significantly. The downward trend in 1997 has 
reversed in 1998 because of persistent macro-
economic imbalances. 
Another three countries (Ecuador, Haiti and 
Venezuela) performed less well in 1997. In 
Ecuador, inflation, at a little over 30%, was 
higher than the year before, reversing the 
moderate declining trend of previous years. The 
situation has deteriorated further in 1998 as a 
result of the catastrophic rains brought on by El 
Niño and the uncertainties generated by the 
political crisis the country has been undergoing 
in recent years. Venezuela began to experience 
rising inflation in 1993; severe macroeconomic 
imbalances combined with a banking crisis of 
vast proportions propelled the inflation rate into 
the three-digit range in 1996. The stabilization 
programme implemented in April of that year 
brought the rate down rapidly, but the trend came 
to a halt in the second half of 1997, as the 
variation in the index stuck at around 40%. Haiti, 
which once enjoyed low inflation, in 1997 
recorded one of the higher rates in the region. 
This change is directly attributable to the political 
crisis the country has been undergoing for a 
number of years, including, at its most critical 
moment, an international embargo. 
Despite the impressive gains that have been 
made, the current stabilization processes 
continue to present certain weaknesses. The 
events in Mexico towards the end of 1994, 
manifested in a sharp devaluation of the 
currency, an outbreak of inflation and a period of 
economic recession, reawakened misgivings. 
The country's subsequent recovery, though far 
more rapid than after previous crises, has not 
wholly assuaged fears of new inflationary 
episodes, since the majority of the countries of 
the region still suffer from internal and external 
imbalances. Moreover, there may well be new 
crises to come, whether international (price 
shocks, rationing of capital flows, sharp increases 
in interest rates) or domestic (widening fiscal 
deficits, imprudent monetary policies, heavy 
currency devaluation, collapse of banking 
systems, natural disasters) that destabilize the 
region's economies and create the conditions for 
new outbreaks of inflation. So far, the South-East 
Asian crisis has not had a detrimental effect on 
domestic price indices; if anything, it has tended 
to dampen inflation by lowering the prices of 
imported products from Asia. However, some 
economies have suffered a deterioration in their 
external accounts, which has caused serious 
tension in foreign exchange markets; if this 
situation should persist or deepen, it may erode 
the relative price stability some countries have 
recently achieved. Moreover, the much-
mentioned El Niño phenomenon has hurt some 
of the region's economies by diminishing 
agricultural output and damaging road 
infrastructure, with resultant increases in the 
prices of some staples. 
Problems persist in the fiscal area, despite the 
gains made in the late 1980s andearly 1990s. The 
clearest example is the case of Brazil, where 
inability to control the fiscal deficit has obliged 
the authorities to resort to monetary policy with 
increasing intensity by raising interest rates. This 
in turn has aggravated the fiscal situation by 
upping the amount the Government has to pay in 
interest, a situation that could undermine the 
credibility of stabilization policy if it should 
result in an explosive expansion of the public 
debt. Colombia has also been running a large 
fiscal deficit, which makes it harder to reduce 
inflation. Costa Rica, on the other hand, has seen 
some improvement in its deficit. Argentina has 
reduced its fiscal deficit in part by controlling 
expenditure and raising taxes and in part thanks 
to the increase in public revenues resulting from 
economic recovery. Since the fiscal situation is 
highly procyclical, an end to the upturn could 
result in a widening of the fiscal deficit. 
The external accounts of some of the countries 
present some weak points, such as very large 
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current account deficits. In 1997, the region as a 
whole posted a current account deficit equivalent 
to 3.2% of GDP, one percentage point higher than 
the figure for the year before. This deterioration 
could undermine the present stability of 
exchange rates and thus lead to an acceleration of 
inflation. Again, the most worrisome case is that 
of Brazil, which is running a large current 
account deficit (4.3% of GDP and 56% of the 
value of exports of goods and services). Since the 
country's price stability is of recent date, an 
increase in the exchange rate caused by the 
current account imbalance could rapidly 
influence trends in domestic prices, and that, in 
turn, given the size of Brazil's economy, could 
have an adverse effect on neighbouring 
countries. Argentina, in particular, could face 
problems with its external sector if its trade with 
Brazil should shift from a surplus to a deficit. 
Other countries are also encountering difficulties 
owing to significant imbalances on their current 
accounts, which threaten the stability of their 
exchange rates, a key factor in the success of most 
stabilization processes. 
The persistence of inflation, even though 
much reduced, in a number of countries of the 
region, combined with the potential problems 
that could originate in the fiscal or external 
sectors, might create the conditions for a revival 
of the practice of indexation, which has by no 
means disappeared, although currently 
maintaining a low profile. For example, labour 
contracts might once again include clauses for 
automatic pay hikes based on past inflation, and 
automatic adjustments for inflation might again 
be applied to interest rates, and indeed to all types 
of contracts. Given that scenario, inflation might 
accelerate in the face of some external or 
domestic shock, and the inertia built in by 
indexation would make it hard to bring the rate 
back down. 
There is some doubt about the direction 
inflation may take in the immediate future, in the 
light of the impact of the Asian crisis on some 
countries of the region and the fall in the prices 
of basic commodities, particularly petroleum 
and copper. The resultant lower export earnings 
could depress the external accounts of some 
countries and thereby affect the exchange rate 
and, through that mechanism, domestic 
inflation. There is, however, a positive side to 
the crisis, especially for the petroleum-
importing countries, which are benefiting from 
a reduced outflow of foreign exchange and from 
lower fuel costs, which, since they weigh 
heavily in domestic demand, are having a 
distinctly favourable impact on domestic prices. 
Moreover, if the low interest rates in 
international financial markets continue to 
prevail, they will help the region through their 
positive effects on external accounts and public 
finances. 
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VI. INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
1. General overview 
In all the countries of the region except 
Haiti, gross fixed investment outpaced 
GDP growth, and this was reflected in an 
across-the-board increase in the 
coefficients for this variable. Gross 
capital formation approached 25% of 
GDP, a level not seen since the early 
1980s.1 Figure VI. 1 illustrates the 
relationship between GDP growth and 
the coefficient for fixed investment 
during the period 1995-1997. 
Viewed from a dynamic perspective, saving 
and investment may be regarded as the "bridge" 
between the short term and the medium and long 
terms. As may be seen in figure VI. 1, the 
region's growth pattern is a highly investment-
intensive one. Nonetheless, domestic saving, 
which provides the bulk of investment financing, 
has been virtually stalled for several years now 
and is therefore not high enough to finance the 
level of real investment needed to attain higher 
growth rates. Meanwhile, external saving has 
become the fastest-growing component of 
investment financing and is nearing 
unsustainably high levels. 
The figures for 1997 indicate that the region's 
economic growth and stabilization processes 
have been coupled with an extraordinary 
upswing in investment and saving, especially 
external saving. Within the favourable 
international environment that has existed since 
1996, foreign direct investment has continued its 
steep ascent and has far outstripped the rate 
recorded for that year (see chapter VIII). 
The region's high levels of economic activity, 
in conjunction with the buoyancy of investment, 
indicate that its economic growth in 1997 is not 
merely a sign of reactivation but that it also 
signals an increase in regional production 
capacity. According to ECLAC estimates, 
investment needs to exceed 26% of regional GDP 
in order for the region to achieve a growth rate of 
6%. In 1997, the countries that had fixed 
investment coefficients near or above this level 
grew at an average rate of 6.5%. In Argentina, 
Chile, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru, fixed 
investment climbed, on average, to 28% of GDP. 
Because of the limited nature of the region's 
capital-goods production capacity, it has had to 
import large amounts of such items, and this 
poses the problem of how to go about financing 
those purchases. As in earlier years, the growth 
of investment in the region was largely financed 
by an increase in external saving, while national 
saving held steady at around 20% of GDP. In 
1 The region's gross fixed investment rate reached 22.3% of GDP in 1997 (see table VI. 1 ). 
2 In this chapter saving and investment are analysed on the basis of data series at constant 1990 prices. It should be noted that 
these series differ from the series at current prices used in the summary of the Economic Survey. The saving-investment balance 
at current prices is a better indicator for use in flow analyses, particularly in the case of financial flows, whereas investment at 
constant prices is a better measurement of the expansion of production capacity and of potential economic growth. 
3 ECLAC, Fortalecer el desarrollo. Interacciones entre macro y microeconomia (LC/G. 1898/Rev. 1 -P), Santiago, Chile, 1996. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. S.96.II.G.2. 
75 
GFCF/GDP 
Figure VI. 1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN GDP GROWTH AND FIXED INVESTMENT 
COEFFICIENTS, 1995-1997 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Table VI. 1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT 
(As percentages of GDP, in dollars at constant 1990 prices) 







































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Includes variations in inventories in the case of Haiti. ' Includes variations in inventories. 
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addition, the Asian crisis has had a strong impact 
on flows of external finance in some countries. 
Consequently, given the importance of external 
In 1997 total investment (including variations in 
inventories) averaged 25% of regional GDP; this 
was the highest figure in years and was close to 
the levels seen during the period of sustained 
growth achieved by the region in the 1970s. 
Although gross fixed investment was 2.5 
percentage points lower than total investment, it 
followed the same trend. 
As mentioned earlier, most of the countries' 
investment rates were much more similar to one 
another than they had been in the past. Haiti was 
the only country to record a decrease in fixed 
investment, measured as a percentage of GDP. 
Total investment rose particularly sharply in 
Argentina (27%), Bolivia (23%), Costa Rica 
(33%), the Dominican Republic (24%), Ecuador 
(17%), Mexico (23%), Panama (15%) and 
Venezuela (15%). In Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and Panama, inventories increased 
considerably and fixed investment grew more 
slowly. 
Tables VI.2 and VI.3 present two 
commonly-used breakdowns of investment. One 
is based on the sector of origin and distinguishes 
between public and private investment, while the 
other disaggregates the figures by use 
(machinery and equipment, or the construction of 
buildings and other structures). 
One of the after-effects of the crisis of the 
1980s has been a downward trend in public 
investment, whether as a consequence of external 
constraints or of structural reforms. The 
privatization process has reduced the role of the 
State -and, hence, of public investment- in 
production. In 1997, the vast majority of the 
countries for which data are available registered 
an increase in the proportion of private 
investment, with private-sector investment 
growing more rapidly than public investment in 
10 out of 12 countries. 
In 1996 and particularly in 1997, the 
composition of fixed investment shifted away 
from construction and towards machinery and 
saving as a source of investment financing, 
investment growth rates and levels for 1998 are 
expected to be more modest. 
equipment. The available data indicate the latter 
category recorded a higher growth rate than the 
former in 7 out of 10 countries. This increase is 
in keeping with the trend towards a progressively 
higher level of capital goods imports and the 
strong expansion of foreign direct investment 
witnessed in many countries. 
The existence of external constraints or the 
lack thereof have a direct effect on the 
composition of investment and especially on 
investment in machinery and equipment, since a 
large portion of these goods are imported. The 
strong upswing in imports of capital goods and 
foreign direct investment corroborate this 
observation. The decline in public investment has 
been coupled with a downturn in investment in 
construction, although it is still too early to 
determine how the award of operating 
concessions in the region will influence private 
investment in infrastructure. It is expected that 
the Asian crisis may lead to the postponement or 
discontinuation of some of the investment 
projects being financed and conducted by Asian 
firms in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
especially in the industrial sector. Examples 
include the investments originally planned by 
Asian enterprises in the automotive and home 
appliances industries in Brazil and Mexico. 
There are other types of investment projects 
now under way, however, that would be very 
difficult to defer or that form part of long-term 
industrial strategies. This is especially the case in 
the mining sector, which large-scale investments 
are planned in a number of countries. In the 
energy sector, a major power integration project 
is being developed whose objectives include 
forming a grid of gas pipelines that would 
connect up Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, 
Argentina, Chile and Brazil. A number of 
different transnational corporations are involved 
in this project, and the gas pipeline between 
Bolivia and Brazil is already being built. The 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
Table VI.3 
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closely linked to the construction of this pipeline 
and to the exploration and development of new 
deposits in connection with natural gas export 
activities. On the other hand, the Government of 
Peru and a consortium of transnational 
corporations failed to reach an agreement for the 
development and operation of a major natural gas 
project in Peru. 
3. Saving 
Although Latin America has made considerable 
headway in the area of financial liberalization, 
the region's domestic savings rates have 
remained more or less constant. Thus, the 
buoyancy of investment and economic growth 
has been accompanied by an increasing 
dependence on external saving as a source of 
investment financing. 
In 1997 domestic saving remained steady at 
around 21% of regional GDP, thus continuing the 
trend of the last five years. One of the issues 
relating to policies for the promotion of domestic 
saving which is currently the focus of a great deal 
of attention in the region revolves around the 
reforms being undertaken in the financial sector 
(see chapter III) and the nature of the link 
between public and private saving. The empirical 
evidence appears to suggest that public saving 
can serve as a very effective tool for boosting 
national saving. 
(a)Domestic saving and national saving 
In 1997 the trend of recent years remained 
unchanged, as national saving held steady at 
around 20% of GDP, while domestic saving was 
one percentage point above that level. As may be 
seen in table VI.4, the differential between the 
two variables is accounted for by the behaviour 
of current transfers, the terms-of-trade effect and 
net factor payments. The combined effect of 
these variables has remained at about 1% of GDP 
for several years now. Net factor payments, 
which amounted to 3.5% of GDP in 1997, have 
been trending upward and may continue on this 
path or may even rise more sharply in coming 
years, given the region's high levels of inward 
foreign direct investment. Such payments rose by 
US$ 5 billion at constant 1990 prices, and factor 
payments abroad by Brazil and Argentina 
climbed especially sharply. Current transfers 
were stable at around 1% of GDP, while the 
Table VI.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: nNANCING OF 
GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION* 
(As percentages of GDP, in dollars at constant 1990 prices) 
1. Gross domestic saving 
2. Factor income 
3. Current transfers 
4. Terms-of-trade effect 
5. Gross national saving 
(1+2 + 3 + 4) 
6. External saving 
7. Gross capital formation 

















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* In the calculations of domestic saving and national saving, in the case of Argentina it was assumed that gross capital formation 
was equal to gross fixed capital formation. The same assumption was also applied in the case of Brazil for 1980-1985 and 1997 
and in that of Chile for 1980-1985. b Preliminary figures. 
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Figure VI.2 
LATIS AMERICA: VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH THE DIFFERENTIAL 
BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND NATIONAL SAVING 
(As percentage of GDP) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
" Factor income 
"Terms of trade 
' Current transfers 
1 Combined effect 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
increase in net factors payments registered in 
1997 was offset by the positive effect of the terms 
of trade. 
The terms of trade of most of the countries 
improved in 1997, but those of the region's 
major oil exporters registered a marked 
deterioration. In Mexico the negative effect of 
the slump in oil prices was counterbalanced by 
higher prices for other products, since crude oil 
exports represent only 10% of the country's total 
external sales. 
(b)External saving 
External saving continues to be the 
fastest-growing component of the resources that 
finance gross capital formation, accounting for 
20% of the latter in 1997.5 Foreign direct 
investment, which will be discussed in the 
following section, is the component that has the 
greatest influence in terms of the expansion of 
production capacity, however. 
Measured at constant prices, external saving 
has risen to record levels in the 1990s. The figure 
for 1997 (4.9% of GDP) is the highest in many 
years and came close to matching the peak figure 
of 5.1% registered in 1981. This variable was 
higher in the great majority of the countries in 
1997, with the exceptions being the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Peru. It is interesting to note that average GDP 
growth for this group is somewhat higher than 
the average for Latin America and includes the 
two countries that posted the highest growth 
rates (the Dominican Republic and Peru) for the 
year. 
4 External saving is the sum of foreign direct investment, portfolio capital, other capital flows and changes in reserves. When 
calculated at constant prices, this variable has to be adjusted at current prices for, among other factors, the effect of changes in the 
terms of trade and the exchange rate for the base year. 
5 For an analysis of the various components of capital flows, see section 2 of chapter VII. 
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4. Foreign direct investment 
As a result of the events in some Asian 
countries, the exponential growth of foreign 
direct investment in recent years slowed 
somewhat in the final quarter of 1997. 
Nevertheless, the trend of past years is 
expected to carry over into 1998, although 
growth rates are likely to be lower. 
In the first half of the 1990s, inflows of foreign 
direct investment were strongly influenced by the 
privatization programmes being pursued by 
various countries in the region. Latin American 
Governments' revenues from privatization 
operations have gradually been supplemented by 
sizeable new direct investments in the 
modernization of privatized firms, and foreign 
direct investment has consequently provided a 
means of increasing the region's pool of 
productive capital. 
The unmistakable trend of recent years 
whereby foreign direct investment is coming to 
represent an increasingly large share of external 
saving remained in evidence in 1997, as foreign 
direct investment reached an average level of 4% 
of GDP, or over 15% of total investment. A 
significant increase was seen in flows to 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay and Venezuela. 
Generally speaking, most foreign investors' 
attention has been monopolized by services, 
mainly in the energy and financial sectors. 
Investment has also been channeled into 
extractive industries such as mining and oil 
production, manufacturing (especially the 
automotive industry) and export activities such 
as the maquila (assembly) industry. There are 
also some signs that the share of investment 
devoted to capital formation is expanding while 
the share represented by transfers of ownership 
conducted as part of the privatization process is 
shrinking. 
6 Foreign direct investment is discussed here because it is one of the sources of financing for the balance of payments. It should 
be noted that it does not always correspond to the increase in production capacity because it also includes transfers of ownership 
of existing assets. 
7 SeeECLAC, La inversión extranjera en América Latina. Informe /997 (LC/G.1985-P), Santiago, Chile, March 1998. United 
Nations publication, Sales No: S.97.II.G.14. 
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VII. EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 
1. Overview 
At the regional level, a moderate 
improvement was seen in the labour 
market as the pace of economic growth 
accelerated, and employment and 
average labour productivity both rose 
substantially. A small decline was also 
registered in open unemployment -from 
7.7% to 7.3%-but even so the latter rate 
was still the second highest of the decade. 
This fact attests to the seriousness of the 
labour situation in many countries, 
although it is also true that the figure for 
the region as a whole was influenced by 
Brazil's sluggish rate of job creation. 
Meanwhile, the regional averages for 
mean and minimum wage levels rose in 
real terms. 
The upswing in economic growth in 1997 
resulted in a considerably higher rate of job 
creation than in preceding years. Consequently, 
after having declined for the last two years in a 
row, the regional employment rate climbed 
sharply, and the increase was even more notable 
if the results for Brazil are factored out of the 
calculation. A large proportion of newly-created 
jobs were in the form of salaried employment, 
thanks to the stronger demand for labour 
generated by the swifter growth of the region's 
economies. The workforce expanded more 
rapidly as well, after having grown very little 
the year before. This curbed the reduction in 
open unemployment, just as the lower 
participation rate recorded in 1996 had blunted 
the increase in joblessness during that year. As a 
re suit, the le vel of open unemployment recorded 
for 1997 was still high in comparison to its past 
trend. 
Employment in manufacturing was higher in 
many countries during 1997, after having fallen 
during the two preceding years. This upturn was 
accompanied by gains in average labour 
productivity as the output of this sector 
rebounded strongly. This positive showing may 
be due to the attainment of a higher level of 
competitiveness following the organizational 
and technological changes made by the sector in 
earlieryears. Be that as it may, the manufacturing 
sector's rate of job creation was lower than the 
overall rate for the economy as a whole, and the 
downward trend in this sector's share of total 
employment therefore remained in evidence. 
The services sector continues to be the largest 
source of new jobs. 
Within this context of greater economic 
buoyancy, the job creation process has continued 
to follow two parallel paths, one of which leads 
to the establishment of high-quality (skilled) jobs 
while the other gives rise to low-quality 
occupations (low-productivity jobs that do not 
provide social security coverage). Thus, in 
contrast to the relatively widespread 
improvements seen in terms of higher 
employment and lower levels of open 
unemployment, job quality indicators have been 
mixed. Moderate increases in real terms were 
recorded, however, in the regional totals for both 
average and minimum wages, although in many 
countries the economy's greater forward 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a The TPR and ER are expressed as percentages of the working-age population, as is the weighted average regional open 
unemployment rate (shaded area). 
The macroeconomic trends observed in 1998 
appear to herald a slowdown in growth, which 
would have an adverse impact on job creation. 
During the first few months of the year, however, 
no setbacks had as yet been registered in this 
variable except in the case of Brazil. 
2. Labour supply 
The growth rate of the labour force has trended 
downward during the 1990s as a consequence of 
a slower increase in the working-age population. 
Even so, the region's workforce tends to expand 
at annual rates of around 2.5%. One of the 
reasons for this is that the total participation rate 
has risen by approximately 0.3 percentage points 
per year, as a simple regional average, during the 
decade (see figure VII. 1) as increasingly large 
numbers of women join the labour force. 
The overall (unweighted) average 
participation rate for 12 countries in 1997 was up 
by 0.5 percentage points and was thus far above 
its trend level for the decade. This steep increase 
1 Brazil's participation rate has been an exception in that it has remained fairly constant for the last five years; it should be 
noted, however, that the coverage of the available annual figures is limited to six metropolitan areas. 
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in the labour supply can be accounted for by 
earlier changes and by the new employment 
opportunities that opened up in 1997 as a 
consequence of the faster pace of economic 
growth. 
One of the factors at work in 1996 was that, as 
a reaction to a sluggish rate of job creation for the 
second year in a row, many people ceased to look 
for work or never even began to do so because 
they were discouraged by the lack of 
employment opportunities. This checked the 
upward trend in the overall participation rate at 
the regional level, and the labour supply's rate of 
expansion therefore simply reflected the growth 
rate for the working-age population or —when 
calculated as a simple average—actually fell 
below that rate. More specifically, in many 
countries the increase in the female participate 
rate slackened and the male participation rate 
decreased. The decline in the workforce's 
growth rate relieved the pressure on the job 
market and curbed the rise in unemployment 
levels. 
The situation was quite different in 1997, 
inasmuch as economic growth accelerated in 11 
out of the 13 countries for which information on 
the activity rate was available (see figure VII.2). 
This greater buoyancy stimulated job creation 
and, in turn, the appearance of new employment 
opportunities encouraged members of the 
economically inactive population to join the 
workforce. Some of the people who entered the 
labour market in 1997 had been classified as 
"hidden unemployed", i.e., people who had not 
sought work before, even though they wished to 
work, because they felt that they had little chance 
of finding a job. 
Thus, in 8 of these 11 countries, the increase 
in the overall participation rate was above the 
regional trend level of 0.3 percentage points. A 
slight increase in the male labour participation 
rate contributed to the sharp upswing in the 
labour supply in 1997, but the substantial 
increase in the female participation rate was the 
main factor. 
In contrast to the above trends in the labour 
supply in 1997, the participation rate, when 
weighted by the size of the working-age 
population, remained virtually constant due to 
the considerable drop in Brazil's rate (see figure 
VII. 1). This decrease was caused by the 
economy's sluggish rate of job creation, which 
prompted a large number of people (especially 
young people and men) to abandon the job 
market. 
In summary, in 1996 the labour participation 
rate acted as a cushion for open unemployment 
at critical junctures, since after looking 
unsuccessfully for work for some time, many 
unemployed persons withdrew from the job 
market. Many of these people joined the ranks 
of the "hidden unemployed", since although they 
did not continue to actively seek employment, 
they still wanted to work. Consequently, when 
the economy began to rebound in 1997, they 
re-entered the labour market, thus preventing the 
more rapid rate of job creation from making a 
larger dent in the open unemployment rate. 
2 Argentina provides a good example of this upward trend in the labour participation rate, even though in its case the trend took 
shape earlier, during the economic reactivation that occurred in the second half of 1996. Between May and October of that year, 
the proportion of unemployed persons who ceased to be members of the economically active population (EAP) dropped from 27% 
to 21% while the percentage of economically inactive persons who entered the labour force climbed from 7% to 9% of the total 
non-EAP (INDEC informa, October 1997, Buenos Aires). The combined effect of these two trends —the smaller number of people 
leaving the workforce and the larger number of people joining it— was a steep increase in the participation rate. 
3 The female participation rate rose especially sharply in Mexico (38.2% to 39.3%), Panama (41.5% to 43.1%) and Venezuela 
(43.3% to 46.2%). 
4 In Brazil's six largest metropolitan areas, the segment of the EAP aged 24 years and under shrank even in absolute terms. 
The segment between 25 and 39 years of age was unchanged, and the segment aged 40 and over increased slightly. The male EAP 
shrank slightly while the female EAP expanded; nevertheless, the increase in the female rate was below the growth rate for the 
working-age population, and the female participation rate therefore descended as well. 
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Figure VII.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ECONOMIC GROWTH 
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3. Job creation 
In 1995 and 1996, job creation was so sluggish 
that both the simple and weighted averages for 
regional employment levels declined. In 1997, 
however, mostof the countries'job creation rates 
outstripped the growth rate of their working-age 
populations, and their simple average 
employment rates therefore rose substantially 
(see figure VII. 1). Job creation was very strong 
in Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru and Venezuela, where 
employment rates climbed by 1.5 points or more. 
Most of these countries had witnessed steep 
downswings in employment in earlier years, and 
in some, rates have still not regained their former 
levels. Here again, Brazil's poor showing had a 
negative effect on the weighted regional average, 
which consequently rose very little. 
Employment was also down in Colombia and 
Uruguay, but both of these countries saw an 
improvement during the second half of the year. 
At the regional level, employment rose by 3.1%, 
which was considerably higher than the 1.6% and 
2.0% rates recorded for the two preceding years, 
respectively. If the figures for Brazil were left 
out of the regional average, then the job creation 
rate would be even steeper, with a 5.2% jump in 
employment. 
In comparison with the preceding two years, 
not only was there an increase in the number of 
new j obs created in 1997, but the composition of 
employment by occupational category improved 
as well. Salaried employment rose sharply 
(2.7%) as the economic recovery fueled the 
demand for labour (see figure VII.3). The strong 
increase in domestic service jobs (a weighted 
average for eight countries of 5.9%) following 
two years of flat growth may be a reflection of an 
improvement in the purchasing power of 
middle-income groups. The number of salaried 
jobs created in Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico and 
Venezuela was very considerable while, at the 
other extreme, Brazil and Colombia actually saw 
a slight decrease in the average number of wage 
earners in absolute terms for the year as a whole. 
Hence, at the regional level, over 70% of the 
new jobs that were created were salaried 
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Figure VII.3 
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Domestic service (8) 
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Unpaid workers (10) 
Other occupational categories (12) 
Total (12) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Varitions in weighted national rates for the population aged 10 and above based on the relative size of each branch of 
activity and occupational category. Figures is brackets indicate the number of countries for which information was 
available. 
positions (including domestic service), whereas 
the category had only represented around 40% 
and 45% of the total in 1995 and 1996, 
respectively (see table VII. 1). 
Even at the fairly high job creation rate of 
2.7%, however, salaried employment expanded 
more slowly than total employment. 
Consequently, the downward trend observed in 
recent years in salaried jobs as a percentage of 
total employment slowed but nonetheless 
remained in evidence. 
The counterpart phenomenon was that 
self-employment increased more than salaried 
employment did, thereby maintaining its growth 
rate (3.7%) and continuing to make an important 
contribution to job creation (accounting for 30% 
of the total, as compared to 40% in 1995 and 45% 
in 1996); the increases registered in this 
occupational category in Colombia, Costa Rica 
and Panama were particularly striking. This 
further strong increase in self-employment 
indicates, on the one hand, that even though the 
upswing in the creation of salaried jobs was more 
pronounced than in earlier years, it was still not 
enough to absorb the significant increase in the 
labour force and, on the other, that in some cases 
the resurgence of economic growth created new 
income-earning opportunities within this 
occupational category. The changes seen in the 
other categories (unpaid workers, owners and 
others) were minor and offset one another. 
As in the case of the breakdown for job 
creation by occupational categories, its 
disaggregation by branch of activity also reveals 
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Table VH.l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONTRIBUTION 
TO NET JOB CREATION 
(Percentages) 
Contribution of each branch of activity to Contribution of each occupational 
non-agricultural employment category to total employment 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
changes in relation to past years in some cases 
and a continuation of pre-existing trends in 
others. The decline in the agricultural sector's 
importance as a source of jobs, even in absolute 
terms, continued. The weighted average for 
eight reporting countries for 1997 showed a 3.1 % 
contraction in the number of agricultural 
workers, with especially sharp decreases in 
Chile, Colombia and Venezuela. In Brazil, 
where the difference between the performance of 
labour-intensive and non-labour-intensive crops 
translated into a reduction in the demand for 
manpower, formal agricultural employment was 
down by 3.0%. 
Another trend that held firm was the increase 
in tertiary-sector employment. Employment in 
social, community and personal services and in 
commerce continued to rise at much the same 
rates as in earlier years (approximately 4% and 
3%, respectively). The growth rate for 
employment in financial, real estate and business 
services, while quite robust (4.8%), was lower 
than in past years due to the consolidation process 
now under way in the financial sectors of a 
number of the countries in the region. 
Employment in basic services again climbed 
sharply (7.5%), with a particularly marked 
expansion being observed in the transport, 
storage and communications industries. 
Wage earners (including domestic service) 70 
Self-employed 30 
Unpaid workers -2 
Other 2 
In a turnaround from the preceding years' 
decreases in absolute terms, employment in the 
manufacturing sector was up by 1.8%. This 
weighted average masks the existence of widely 
differing situations, however, since the growth 
rates for employment in manufacturing were 
very high in 4 of the 12 countries for which 
information is available (Argentina, Ecuador, 
Mexico and Venezuela), negative in two (Brazil 
and Colombia) and moderate (up to 2%) in a third 
group of countries (Chile, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic and Panama). 
The manufacturing sector's fairly strong 
performance in terms of employment marked 
a contrast with the rates registered for other 
years during the decade, such as 1996, when 
in many countries this sector reacted to 
difficult conditions with lay-offs and increases 
in labour productivity (as reflected in the 
weighted regional average and the national 
averages for 7 out of 15 countries) (see figure 
VII.4). In another five countries, average 
productivity had descended, and in two of these 
cases, the decrease was associated with a 
contraction in manufacturing output. Only 
three countr ies -Chi le , Ecuador and 
Mexico-regis tered increases both in 
employment and in average labour 
productivity in this sector in 1996. 
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In contrast, in 1997 a considerable percentage 
of the countries (8 out of 13) reported upturns in 
manufacturing production as a result of increases 
in both employment and labour productivity. 
The combination of declining employment and 
rising labour productivity that had been so 
prevalent in this sector the year before was 
observed in only three countries in 1997: 
Colombia, El Salvador and Brazil. In Brazil, the 
steep downturn in employment in manufacturing 
carried over into 1998, and this country's 
sluggish rate of job creation once again pulled 
down the regional average. At the other extreme, 
the available data indicate that there were two 
cases (Ecuador and Venezuela) in which 
employment in the manufacturing sector 
expanded rapidly at the expense of productivity. 
Despite the overall increase in employment in 
manufacturing, the downward trend in this 
sector 's share of total employment -a 
characteristic feature of the 1990s-held firm (see 
box VII. 1). 
At the regional level, employment in the 
construction industry had also contracted during 
the preceding two years due to the difficult 
conditions encountered by a number of countries. 
In 1997, this trend was reversed as employment 
in this branch of activity strengthened 
considerably (3.8%). The increase in the number 
of construction jobs was especially striking in 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Venezuela, but 
the prevailing circumstances in Brazil took their 
toll in this subsector as well, driving employment 
in construction down in absolute terms. 
Hence, the two branches of activity in which 
employment had declined during the preceding 
two years -manufacturing and construction-
accounted for 10% and 7%, respectively, of 
non-agricultural job creation in the region, which 
rose by an overall rate of 3.5%. As in previous 
years, however, the majority of these new jobs 
were in the tertiary sector, which accounted for 
85% of all new non-agricultural employment; the 
most important components of this sector in 
terms of employment were social, community 
and personal services (including financial, 
insurance, real estate and business services), 
which were responsible for half of all net job 
creation in 1997. 
As mentioned earlier, the sluggish rate of 
expansion in employment in 1995-1996 
generated pent-up supply pressures which, as the 
pace of growth picked up, spurred the creation of 
both salaried and unsalaried jobs. As a result, the 
correlation between the rates of job creation and 
of economic growth has been quite weak (see 
figure VII.5), and in some countries job creation 
rates have risen at the expense of average labour 
Figure VII.4 
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Box VIL 1 
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
A number of interesting facts can be gleaned from an 
examination of employment trends in the 
manufacturing sector during 1997 within the context 
of the predominant trends of the 1990s. During the 
first half of the decade, the share of total 
non-agricultural employment accounted for by the 
manufacturing sector shrank in almost all the 
countries of the region. The drop was quite 
widespread but was especially steep in large firms, 
where employment was down even in absolute terms, 
than in the sector as a whole (see table VII.2). 
New organizational mechanisms -such as 
outsourcing and the subcontracting of support 
services-played a part in this trend, and Lhe decline in 
employment in large manufacturing firms has thus 
been partly offset by the creation of jobs in small and 
medium-sized industrial concerns and service 
companies. Nevertheless, a large part of the decrease 
in industrial employment is clearly due to the effects 
of net job destruction. 
This poor performance in terms of job creation 
should be viewed within the context of the 
thoroughgoing reorganization process that has taken 
place in a large part of the manufacturing sector in 
many countries of the region. In response to 
mounting competition in both domestic and external 
markets, many firms have taken steps to make 
themselves more competitive, and others have been 
forced to close their doors. Consequently, average 
labour productivity has risen considerahk while the 
use of labour inputs has declined, since many of the 
changes made by these firms have involved the 
substitution of capital and technology for labour. 
During the 1990s this trend has been strengthened in 
many countries by the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate since, by making imported capital 
goods less expensive, this has raised the cost of 
labour relative to other factors of production. 
tn most cases, these steep upturns in Labour 
productivity have not translated into matching 
increases in real wages, and this has done a great deal 
to lower the unit cost ol labour." In those instances 
where the appreciation of the local currency has 
caused domestic goods to become less competitive 
in relation to imports, however, a large number of jobs 
have been lost in labour-intensive branches of 
industry. 
The exception to this pattern of declining industrial 
employment has been the maquila sector, which 
expanded very rapidly in Mexico, Central America 
and the Caribbean during the first half of the 1990s. 
Maquila industries have traditionally engaged in very 
simple production processes, and the bulk of their 
workforce has been made up of women and young 
people having no more than a basic education. Tn the 
past few years, however, these industries' production 
processes have become increasingly differentiated, 
and new, more technologically sophisticated 
activities are being undertaken which require more 
highly educated personnel. As the rest of the 
manufacturing sector is also beginning to import more 
and more of the machinery, intermediate goods and 
inputs it needs, in the Future the occupational profiles 
of maquila and traditional industries may become 
more alike. 
In summary, as the manufacturing sector in many 
Latin American countries becomes more 
capital-intensive and Jess labour-intensive, its direct 
job creation capacity is diminishing. In particular, the 
adjustments that many manufacturing firms have had 
to make in order to cope with increased competition 
have had the effect of lowering their employment 
"floors"' and have therefore led to a substantial 
reduction in this sector's share of total employment. 
Nonetheless, the figures for 1997 do not indicate that 
the sector is heading towards a jobless growth 
situation. Starting from this new and lower 
employment "floor", and within a context ol rapidly 
growing industrial activities, the sector has continued 
to create |obs on the basis of higher levels of 
productivity and conipetui\eness. However, Us rate 
of direct job cieation appears as though it will remain 
below both the growth ol the labour supply and the 
economy's overall job creation rate, and it is therefore 
not expected to emerge as an engine of direct job 
creation; on the contrary, it is likely that its share of 
total employment will continue to shrink. 
Out of 18 countries in the region, the onl} exceptions ore Bolivia and Honduras. See the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), Labour Overview 'V7, Lima, Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, December 1«W7. 
See the International Labour Organization f II .0). Costrn labórale? v compctitividad industrial en Amciu a latina. Geneva. 
1997. 
productivity (see country group "B" above the 
diagonal line in figure VII.5). In four of the five 
countries in this group, employment levels had 
sunk the year before, and the sizeable increases 
in employment seen in 1997 can therefore be 
interpreted in part as a manifestation of formerly 
pent-up supply pressures. This is especially the 
case in those countries where the upswing in 
employment was largely accounted for by 
increased self-employment. 
In contrast to the situation the year before, 
among the countries for which information is 
available only Brazil, Uruguay and, to a lesser 
extent, El Salvador raised average labour 
productivity at the expense of their job creation 
rates, whereas 6 out of 15 countries had done so 
in 1996.5 
The four countries in group "A" in figure 
VII.5 turned in the best performances, with 
moderate-to-high increases in both job creation 
and average labour productivity. Chile, which 
has maintained high growth rates over a lengthy 
period of time and has fairly low unemployment, 
registered a larger increase in productivity (as 
signified by the fact that its position is further 
away from the diagonal line), whereas the 
number of employed persons rose more sharply 
in the other countries in this group. As was also 
true of the countries in group "B", these three 
countries had witnessed major decreases in 
employment in 1995 (Dominican Republic and 
Mexico) or in both 1995 and 1996 (Argentina). 
The performances of the larger countries in 
the region (in which the increases were more 
skewed towards employment in some cases and 
towards productivity gains in others) evened out 
fairly well, since the overall regional figures 
showed a 3% expansion of employment and an 
improvement of approximately 2% in average 
labour productivity. 
A positive macroeconomic performance on 
the part of the region as a whole accompanied 
these significant gains in employment and 
productivity. This fact highlights how important 
a role economic growth plays in the improvement 
of labour indicators, even though the correlation 
between the growth of the economy and job 
creation was quite weak in 1997. 
4. Open unemployment 
Thanks to the strong rate of job creation, open 
unemployment trended downward in many of the 
countries. As noted earlier, however, in many 
instances the entry or re-entry of large numbers 
of people into the labour market prevented the 
reduction in unemployment from being as sharp 
as it would otherwise have been. On the other 
hand, in Brazil (which heavily influences the 
weighted regional average), the decline in the 
activity rate held the rise in open unemployment 
in check. As a result, the urban unemployment 
rate for the region fell from 7.7% to 7.3%, 
although this was still the second-highest level to 
be recorded in the 1990s (see table VII.3). 
Eleven of the countries for which information 
is available managed to reduce their rates of open 
unemployment. In another seven countries it 
rose, and in three countries it remained virtually 
stationary, varying by less than a tenth of a point. 
Relatively sharp drops in unemployment were 
recorded in some countries where it had 
previously been quite high, such as Argentina, 
Barbados, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, 
Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago. In 
Argentina, unemployment continued to follow 
the downward trend that had appeared in the 
second half of 1996, while in Barbados, 
Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago, it has been 
declining gradually for several years now. 
Nonetheless, in all of these countries a 
considerable percentage of the economically 
active population remains unemployed. 
Significant reductions in unemployment were 
seen in Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico as well. 
Unemployment levels had risen sharply in these 
countries in previous years, however, and 
5 The figures given for average labour productivity are often fairly rough estimates, particularly when the survey data cover 
only a portion of a country's territory. 
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Economic growth 
therefore were still higher than they had been at 
the start of the decade despite the decrease. 
Unemployment rose in seven countries. In 
Cuba, Jamaica and Paraguay, the increase was 
attributable to the slow pace of economic growth; 
in Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia, it was due to the 
fact that job creation was slack despite a fairly 
satisfactory average rate of economic growth for 
the year; and in Peru, it was because the increase 
in the labour supply was so steep that it 
outstripped the rate of job creation even though 
the latter was also quite high. 
The unemployment rate for women is usually 
higher than it is for men. For example, in 1997 
the open unemployment rate in Brazil for men 
was 5.3% whereas it was 6.3% for women; in 
Mexico, the figures were 5.3% for men and 6.1% 
for women; and in Peru, the corresponding rates 
were 6 .1% and 9.2% (third quarter). 
Unemployment among women is an even more 
serious problem than these figures suggest, 
however. In countries having indicators that take 
hidden unemployment into account as well, not 
only is the rate much higher, but the differential 
between the rates for men and women is also 
larger. For example, in Colombia the third-
quarter unemployment rate for seven 
metropolitan areas was 9.8% for men and 15.1% 
for women; in Panama, the male and female 
unemployment rates were 10.6% and 18.1%; and 
in the Dominican Republic, they were 9.5% and 
28.7%. This wider differential is attributable to 
the entry barriers faced by women seeking certain 
types of jobs and to the workload represented by 
women's household duties, which discourage or 
hinder many of them from undertaking an active, 
ongoing job search. 
6 This category corresponds primarily to people who have ceased to look for work because they think they will be unable to 
obtain a job. 
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Table VIL 2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS 













































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b The indices for formal-sector industrial employment reflect the situation in large and medium-sized 
firms; the indices for total industrial employment also include small business, microenterprises and self-employment. All 
manufacturing activities except coffee milling. Industrial enterprises having 20 employees or more. e Industrial enterprises 
having 10 employees or more. f Workers paying into the social security system; includes mining. g Industrial enterprises 
in the Lima metropolitan area having 100 employees or more. The figure given for 1980 actually corresponds to 1982. 
' Industrial enterprises having 5 employees or more. J Up to 1990, refers to employment in formal-sector manufacturing; 
from 199Ion, refers to total employment in the manufacturing sector of Greater Buenos Aires as of October of each year. 
Departmental capitals only. Metropolitan region. Seven metropolitan areas, fourth quarter of each year. 
5. Job quality 
The available indicators have reflected a 
considerable and quite widespread deterioration 
in job quality in recent years, but in 1997 they 
suggested that the situation had improved 
somewhat, although the results were still quite 
mixed (see table VII.4). Changes in job creation 
and labour productivity trends, together with a 
number of institutional elements, were 
contributing factors in this respect. 
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Table VII.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Weighted regional average. For methodological reasons does not include the following countries: 
Barbados, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. c Represents a high and increasing number 
of urban areas. d Includes hidden unemployment. e Official estimates. f From 1994 on, figures refer to total urban 
unemployment. 8 From 1995 on, figures refer to total urban unemployment. h Figures for 1980 and 1985 refer to 
unemployment in Montevideo. 
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Greater problems were encountered in 
relation to the volume of work for employed 
persons in 4 of the 10 countries for which 
information was available. This would appear 
to be a reflection of the strong pressure exerted 
by the labour supply, as a result of which some 
members of the labour force only manage to 
obtain part-time jobs even though they would 
like to work full time. In a number of other 
countries where employment levels were rising 
sharply, such as Argentina and Mexico, 
indicators of the presence of an insufficient 
volume of work for employed persons showed 
an improvement, although -with the exception 
of the Dominican Republic and Honduras- they 
were still quite high relative to the levels 
reached in the early 1990s. 
Indicators of insufficient levels of labour 
income were also mixed. In five of the eight 
count r ies for which information was 
available, the number of employed persons 
having incomes below a specified level 
declined, although only slightly in most 
cases. In the other three -Bolivia, Costa Rica 
and Mexico- the percentage of low-income 
employed persons rose. Despite the overall 
modest improvement seen in these indicators 
in 1997, however , the prevalence of 
low-paying jobs remains a problem, and a 
portion of the working population therefore 
has to work longer hours in order to make up 
for the low level of the hourly wages 
received. 
The other available job-quality indicators 
reflect two different trends. First, in most of the 
countries the informal sector has expanded 
during the 1990s, but in some cases (e.g., 
Ecuador and Venezuela), the faster pace of 
economic growth seen in 1997 spurred job 
creation in medium-sized and large firms, which 
caused the informal sector's share of total 
employment to shrink. Second, the deregulation 
of some aspects of the labour market and the 
restructuring of many production chains have 
stimulated the creation of poor-quality jobs that 
are unstable because of the type of contract 
involved (i.e., the increasingly frequent use of 
fixed-term contracts) and/or do not provide 
social security coverage. Indeed, in Brazil, El 
Salvador and Mexico, the percentage of jobs 
whose occupants are not covered by the social 
security system has been on the rise during the 
1990s. This trend was interrupted in 1997 in 
these countries, but in a number of others job 
instability has continued to increase. In 
Argentina, for example, the percentage of wage 
earners holding permanent contracts had slipped 
from around 90% at the end of 1996 to 83% by 
end-1997. 
In many countries job creation has become 
polarized. At one end of the spectrum, the 
modernization of secondary- and tertiary-sector 
activities has led to the creation of more jobs for 
professionals, technicians, administrators and 
executives and has therefore boosted the 
recruitment of highly skilled personnel. 
Consequently, these occupational categories' 
share of total employment is rising in many 
countries; in 1997, this trend was observed within 
a context of robust economic growth in 
Argentina, Mexico and Chile. At the other 
extreme, a large percentage of the new jobs being 
created are in low-skill, low-productivity, 
low-paying occupations, and between 1990 and 
1996 the informal sector's share of total 
non-agricultural employment swelled from 
51.6% to 57.4% at the regional level.8 In 
addition, the percentage of wage earners in the 
private sector working without a contract or on a 
temporary basis also increased. 
7 In 1994, the percentage of employed persons in the urban areas of 12 countries who worked long hours to make up for low 
wage levels ranged from 3% in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela to over 8% in Bolivia, Chile and Paraguay (see ECLAC, Social 
Panorama of Latin America, 1996 Edition (LC/G. 1946-P), Santiago, Chile, 1997, pp. 68 et seq., United Nations publication, Sales 
No: E.97.II.G.4. 
8 See International Labour Organization (ILO), Labour Overview '97, Lima, Regional Office for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, December 1997. 
9 See International Labour Organization (ILO), op. cit., pp. 34 et seq. 
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Table VII.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EMPLOYMENT QUALITY INDICATORS 



























































































Note: Individuals having an insufficient volume of work are defined as those who work fewer hours per day or fewer days per 
week than normal or desired. The precise definition varies from country to country. 
a Preliminary figures. Employed persons working fewer than 35 hours per week for reasons beyond their control who would 
like to work more hours; Greater Buenos Aires. c Employed persons working fewer than eight hours per day; departmental 
capitals. Employed persons working fewer than 35 hours per week who would like to work more; nationwide total, third 
quarter of each year. The figures shown for the years up to and including 1995 are not strictly comparable with those for 1996 
and thereafter due to changes in the sample used. e Employed persons working fewer than 32 hours, working 32 hours or 
more but earning an insufficient income, or working 32 hours or more at a skill level below the level for which they are qualified; 
seven metropolitan areas. Employed persons working fewer than 47 hours per week who would like to work more; 
nationwide total. g Employed persons working fewer than 36 hours per week who would like to work more; all urban areas. 
h Employed persons working fewer than 35 hours per week on a regular basis or for market-related reasons; covers a large and 
increasing number or urban areas. ' Employed persons working fewer than 30 hours per week who would like to work more; 
all urban areas. J Employed persons working fewer than 35 hours per week who would like to work more; all urban areas. 
k Employed persons working fewer than 40 hours per week who would like to work more; nationwide total. Employed persons 
working fewer than 40 hours per week who would like to work more and non-wage-earning employed who would like to work 
more, even if they are already working 40 hours or more; all urban areas. 











































































Note: Individuals having an insufficient income are defined as those who work what is considered to be a normal workday and 
yet earn less than a specified minimum sum. The precise definition varies from country to country. 
a Preliminary figures. Employed persons working in departmental capitals who earn less than what the basic food basket 
costs (does not include unpaid workers, unsalaried apprentices or domestic servants). c Employed persons having no income 
or whose earnings are less than the minimum wage, in six metropolitan areas. Employed persons whose earnings are less 
than or equal to the minimum wage, as of December of each year; seven metropolitan areas. e Employed persons working 
47 hours per week or more whose earnings are less than the minimum wage; nationwide total. Employed persons working 
36 hours per week or more whose earnings are less than the minimum wage; all urban areas. g Employed persons whose 
earnings are less than the minimum wage; covers a large and increasing number of urban areas. Wage earners whose 
incomes are below the minimum wage; all urban areas. ' Employed persons working 35 hours per week or more whose 
earnings are less than what the basic food basket costs per income-earner; all urban areas. J Employed persons working 40 
hours per week or more whose earnings are less than the minimum wage; nationwide total. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Note: The employment quality indicators refer to job stability and coverage under labour laws. 
a Preliminary figures. Wage earners not covered by labour or social legislation, as a percentage of all wage earners; six 
metropolitan areas. c Persons employed on a temporary basis, as a percentage of all employed persons, as of December of 
each year; seven metropolitan areas. Gross underemployment (urban informal sector excluding domestic service and 
agriculture, plus underemployment in the modern sector of the economy); all urban areas. e Employed persons not covered 
by the insurance scheme of the Salvadoran Social Security Institute; all urban areas. Employed persons with no benefits, 
as a percentage of all employed persons; covers a large and increasing number or urban areas. g Private-sector wage earners 
not covered by labour laws and employed persons seeking other employment because they lack job security or because they are 
unpaid family workers; all urban areas. 
of each year. 
Employed persons working in the informal sector; nationwide total, second half 
6. Wages 
In most of the countries, the achievement of a 
fairly high rate of job creation was not matched 
by an upturn in wages. In fact, in 7 out of 13 
cases, real mean wages were flat, showing 
variations of no more than 1% (see table VII.5). 
As a result, a greater convergence of average 
wage levels has been seen than in earlier years. 
The fact that sharp increases or decreases were 
registered in so few cases is a reflection of the 
widespread trend towards lower levels of 
inflation. 
Only five countries reported wage increases 
of over 2%, and in two of these cases the 
slowdown in inflation was a contributing factor 
in the improvement of real wage income. The 
largest increase was in Venezuela, where, with 
inflation still high but abating, wages regained 
part of the ground lost in earlier years, although 
they still fell far short of their 1990 level. The 
considerable upswing in real mean wages in 
Bolivia was largely due to an unexpected drop in 
the country's already low inflation rate at the start 
of 1997. In Chile, the upward trend in real mean 
wages seen over the past few years held firm, but 
in Brazil the upturn in wage levels that began 
with the implementation of the Real Plan 
weakened somewhat in 1997 and continued to do 
so in the early months of 1998. In Ecuador, real 
wages had been rising steadily for several years 
now, but slipped backward in 1997 as inflation 
accelerated. 
Rising wages in large countries (Brazil) and 
sharp increases in others (Venezuela) drove up 
the weighted average of real wage levels for the 
group of countries considered by 2.7% and the 
simple average by 3.0%. The median growth 
rate, however, was only 0.5%. Thus, both the 
simple and weighted regional averages were 
higher than they had been during the two 
preceding years, but the median was lower. 
The tendency of wage levels to converge was 
also reflected in the variations in real minimum 
wages, since in 11 of the 18 countries for which 
information is available, the variation in these 
wage levels stayed within a range of between 
- 2 % and +5% (see table VII.6). This 
convergence is accounted for by improvements 
in inflation control and by the implementation of 
policies directed towards maintaining or 
achieving moderate increases in real income 
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Table VII.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL AVERAGE WAGES 
(Average annual indices: 1990 = 100) 




















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Manufacturing. c Private sector in La Paz. Workers covered by social and labour 
legislation. e Up to April 1993, wage earners in sectors other than agriculture; from May 1993 onward, general index of 
hourly pay. Manual workers in manufacturing. g Average earning reported by persons enrolled in the social security 
Non-agricultural enterprises with 10 employees or more. Average wages, not counting payments in kind or 
Urban non-manual and 
system. _ ___ „ c ._ —r „ - . „ . ..„.-,.._ 
other benefits. J Asunción. Private-sector manual workers in the Lima metropolitan area 
manual workers; second half of each year. 
Table VII.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL URBAN MINIMUM WAGE 





























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Minimum living wage, including supplementary allowances. c Minimum wage in industry and 
services in San Salvador. d Minimum wage, deflated by the consumer price index for Mexico City. Since 1996, deflated by 
the CPI for low-income groups. e Minimum wage in Asunción. Minimum wage in the Lima metropolitan area for 
non-agricultural activities. g Nationwide minimum wage for non-agricultural activities; from 1992 onward, includes meal 
and transport allowances. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from national sources and the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
Preliminary figures. 
half-years. Manufacturing. 
Covers a large and increasing number of urban areas. 
8 Manual workers in manufacturing. 
' Workers covered by social and labour legislation. 
' Refers to first and second 
General index of hourly pay. 
Private-sector manual workers in the Lima metropolitan area. 
levels for low-paid wage earners. While in some 
countries real minimum wages were boosted by 
a larger-than-expected reduction in inflation, in 
others (Ecuador and Venezuela) the ascent of 
price indexes outdistanced the projections and 
thus eroded the real value of the minimum wage. 
There were also cases (El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haiti) in which the real minimum wage fell 
considerably because its nominal level was not 
adjusted. The largest increases in the real 
minimum wage were instituted in Peru and 
Honduras, where these raises were implemented 
in order to help make up for earlier sharp 
decreases. 
As in the case of mean wages, the simple and 
weighted averages for the minimum wage rose 
(by 2.8% and 3.9%, respectively), thus 
rebounding from the declines observed in 1996. 
As a result of the cautious approach taken in most 
of the countries, however, the median variation 
was -0.8%, which was slightly lower than in the 
previous two years. 
10 Guatemala raised its minimum wage on 1 January 1998. 
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7. Trends in 1998 
In a majority of the countries for which 
information is available, no major changes in 
existing trends were observed during the early 
months of 1998. The worst situation was to be 
found in Brazil, where employment levels fell 
and open unemployment climbed to 8% during 
the first half of the year (see table VII.7). Open 
unemployment was higher in Colombia as well, 
reaching 15.8% in June; however in this case, too, 
pre-existing trends remained in place and 
employment consequently rose as well, although 
not as rapidly as the labour supply. 
In contrast, trends in the labour markets of a 
number of other countries have been more 
favourable. In early 1998 Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico, Panama and Uruguay all recorded lower 
levels of unemployment than they had for the 
corresponding months of 1997, and in each of 
these cases the improvement was attributable to 
a faster rate of job creation. 
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VIII. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
The trends seen in the external sector in 
1996 deepened in 1997. Despite the 
retreat of foreign capital triggered by the 
Asian crisis in the second half of the year, 
for 1997 as a whole a record volume of 
external capital flowed into the region, 
making it possible to build up reserves 
and cover larger current account deficits. 
These shortfalls were associated with a 
huge increase in the volume of imports, 
which far outstripped the sharp upswing 
in exports that took place as the world 
economy continued to flourish, even 
though the outlook was dimmed 
somewhat by the possible implications of 
the crisis in Asia. 
Given the brisk pace of economic growth in 
the region, the steep increase registered in the 
current account deficit in absolute terms was only 
equivalent to slightly more than one percentage 
point of GDP, and this aggregate therefore 
In the area of foreign trade, in 1997 the region 
posted one of its best performances of the last 
two decades. This was attributable primarily 
to the steep increase in the volume of imports 
that accompanied the upturn in the region's 
pace of economic growth, but the strong 
showing of the region's exports -thanks to the 
solid progress made by the world economy 
and favourable price trends in the case of 
some commodities- was also a contributing 
factor. 
matched the average growth rate of slightly over 
3% recorded for the period 1993-1994. 
Meanwhile, external capital inflows amounted to 
around 4% of GDP. These inflows included a 
considerable proportion of medium- and 
long-term funds, and a large portion of those 
resources were in the form of foreign direct 
investment. 
Thanks to the ready availability of external 
capital and the fact that this eased the constraints 
affecting domestic investment and the external 
sector, the robust expansion of domestic demand, 
which to a great extent was led by investment, 
was associated with a large volume of capital 
goods imports. Purchases of these and other 
foreign goods were encouraged by a steady 
appreciation of the countries' currencies in real 
terms and an improvement in their terms of trade. 
The external disturbances generated by the Asian 
crisis in late 1997, which affected raw material 
prices (including petroleum) most of all, 
undermined the confidence that had prevailed up 
to that time and caused economic agents to adjust 
their expectations regarding the possibility of a 
further widening of the current account deficit 
and the desired level of that deficit. 
Consequently, despite the improvement in the 
region's real terms of trade, the widespread 
tendency towards deepening trade deficits 
became even more pronounced, and the few 
countries that did have surpluses registered 
smaller ones than before. During the second half 
of the year, the Asian crisis exerted a negative 
effect on the price trends of various raw materials 
and dampened demand for the products exported 
by that region's main Latin American trading 
partners, thereby accentuating the upward trend 
1. Foreign trade 
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in the countries' trade deficits and obliging the 
most severely affected countries to take steps to 
curb the growth of imports. 
(a) The volume of foreign trade 
In 1997 the region's trade in goods and 
services, as measured by the growth of both 
exports and imports, increased more than at any 
other time since the early 1980s (see table 
VIII.l). In fact, estimates on merchandise trade 
prepared by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
for all the world regions rank Latin America and 
the Caribbean in first place (a position that East 
Asia had vacated quite some time before the 
outbreak of its financial crisis); the difference 
between the two was particularly striking in the 
case of imports. 
The region's trade performance for 1997 was 
in line with the long-standing trend towards a 
more rapid rate of growth for imports than for 
exports and with a worldwide growth pattern in 
which trade has been expanding at appreciably 
faster rates than GDP. In 1997, the region's 
imports of goods and services rose 19% while its 
exports climbed by 11%, as compared to 
regionwide GDP growth of 5% (see figure VIII. 1). 
These trends further reinforced the region's 
trade linkages with the rest of the world, as 
measured by its export and import coefficients in 
relation to GDP. The import coefficient 
maintained its historical upward trend, rising to 
0.22, which was more than double its 1980 level. 
The region's export coefficient, for its part, 
climbed to nearly 0.26 (in 1980 it had stood at 
0.15) after having fallen to under 0.1 in the 1980s 
as a consequence of the adjustment made 
necessary by the debt crisis that hit the region 
during that period (see figure VIII.2). 
Consequently, a large number of Latin 
American economies have come to rely to a great 
extent on foreign trade in order to sell their 
products or supply their domestic markets. In 
1997, two thirds of the countries recorded 
imports equivalent to at least one third of GDP. 
Mexico was one of the countries in that group, 
while Argentina and Brazil were the least 
dependent on imports, which were equivalent to 
around 16% of GDP in both cases. Meanwhile, 
exports were equivalent to one third of GDP or 
more in 40% of the countries, including Mexico. 
Here again, Argentina and Brazil were at the 
opposite extreme, with exports amounting to just 
11% of output. 
The fact that the expansion of the region's 
imports outdistanced its export growth in 1997 
was a reflection of the steeper rate of increase 
registered for domestic demand than for external 
demand and of the continued appreciation of the 
Latin American currencies in real terms. These 
two factors have been at work, to varying extents, 
since the start of the 1990s and have both exerted 
the same type of influence. In fact, the only year 
in which exports expanded faster than imports 
was 1995, when the region's economies sought 
to withstand the impact of the Mexican crisis by 
means of a downward adjustment in domestic 
demand and, in countries such as Argentina and 
Mexico, a real depreciation of their currencies. 
(i) An import boom 
As a result of these forces, imports have been 
the most dynamic component of trade both in 
1997 and in the 1990s as a whole. Their 
buoyancy can be attributed to a combination of 
structural factors that have continued to influence 
the region despite the changes made in economic 
policy over the past few decades and of factors 
associated with shorter-term economic 
circumstances, such as the strong expansion of 
domestic demand and the widespread 
appreciation of the region's currencies observed 
in 1997. 
At the regional level, domestic demand rose 
more steeply in 1997 (by over 7%) than at any 
other time since the early 1980s. Given the 
magnitude of this upswing in relation to the 
region's existing production capacity, which is in 
turn a function of its investment flows, in 
absolute terms most of the expansion (58%) was 
channeled into imports, which increased 
accordingly. In relative terms, every 
percentage-point increase in demand translated 
into a 2.6% rise in imports (see figure VIII.3). 
This ratio, which reflects the region's high 
propensity to import, has remained above 2% 
since 1987 (with the exception of 1995) and was 
particularly high in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, i.e., the period during which the countries 
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Table Vm.l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS ' 






































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and national sources. 
a Covers 17 Spanish-speaking countries plus Brazil and Haiti. The indices shown here for unit values and volumes do not 
necessarily coincide with indices for these variables calculated on the basis of the countries' national accounts due to differences 
in methodologies and coverage. c Preliminary figures. 
Figure VIII. 1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VOLUME OF EXTERNAL 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from national accounts. 
were implementing structural reform and 
economic liberalization programmes. Since 
1993, this ratio has leveled off at somewhat 
below 3%. 
The real appreciation of most of the countries' 
currencies was one of the factors that helped to 
keep the region's propensity to import at such a 
high level in 1997; the influence of this factor was 
particularly visible in Mexico and Venezuela, 
which, along with Jamaica, registered the highest 
rates of appreciation for the year. The effect of 
this change in currency values on the local prices 
of imported goods was augmented by the decline 
in international prices, which amounted to an 
average of over 2% in 1997. 
This short-term circumstance reinforced the 
effects of long-standing structural features. On 
the one hand, because of the region's rather 
limited industrial structure, the reactivation of 
production and capital formation necessarily 
entail the purchase of large volumes of 
intermediate products and capital goods from 
foreign producers. Thus, because of the vital role 
played by investment in the expansion of 
domestic demand in 1997, capital goods imports 
increased even more steeply, in relative terms, 
than other types of imports in virtually all the 
countries of the region. 
In addition, it should be noted that, since a 
large percentage of investment is carried out by 
foreign firms, the import boom is also linked to 
the abundant capital inflows received by the 
region in 1997. This link is not confined to the 
indirect sort of relationship entailed by the fact 
that the expansion of the money supply resulting 
from such capital inflows fuels the demand for 
imports. There is also a direct linkage with the 
foreign direct investment that makes up part of 
the stream of capital entering the region; this 
component of such capital inflows has also 
reached record levels, as will be discussed later 
in the section on the current account and its 
financing. A sizeable portion of these foreign 
funds have been used to import the capital goods 
needed to recapitalize local firms bought by such 
companies or to fit out new mining projects or 
production facilities, some of which are 
themselves oriented towards exports. 
The ti-in between imports and production is 
much more obvious in the case of the maquila 
industry, where, as in the case of transit trade, a 
direct link also exists between imports and 
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Figure VIII. 3 
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exports. The expansion of these economic 
activities therefore boosted imports, except in 
Paraguay where the same type of linkage 
accounted for downturns in both imports and 
exports. 
Imports of consumer goods have been 
stimulated by the ready and growing availability 
of foreign manufactures in the region following 
the dismantlement of the import quota systems 
and the sharp tariff rollbacks carried out during 
the 1980s. The tariff reductions made in 1997 in 
some Central American countries have continued 
to encourage imports (and not only of consumer 
products); in Brazil, the scheduled rollbacks for 
the automotive industry sparked a boom in motor 
vehicle imports. In general, the available supply 
of imports has also increased in many countries 
as a result of the expansion and gradual 
development of local import and distribution 
networks that provide potential consumers with 
easier access to such goods. 
In view of the characteristics of these 
products, it would also be reasonable to assume 
that the demand for these items would increase 
particularly swiftly. These are, for the most part, 
durable goods whose income elasticity is greater 
than that of food products and non-durables. In 
addition, because they are imports, they are also 
regarded as "superior goods" in relation to 
locally-produced articles. In the early years of 
the decade, consumer goods were the most 
buoyant component of imports, and although 
recently the lead has been taken over by capital 
goods, they still display a great deal of forward 
momentum. 
(ii)A strong export performance 
In 1997 external demand was an important 
factor in the acceleration of economic activity. 
Although in absolute terms it played a less 
important role in this regard than domestic 
demand did, in proportional terms exports 
expanded more than domestic demand (11% 
versus 7%). This has been the case since the start 
of the 1990s (i.e. , once the debt crisis of the 1980s 
had definitely come to an end) with the sole 
exception of 1995, when the region's major 
economies were striving to make the necessary 
adjustments in the wake of the Mexican crisis. 
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The fact that exports expanded more than 
domestic demand did at the regional level was an 
accurate reflection of the situation in a majority 
of the countries, even though Brazil and Mexico 
skewed the average somewhat by virtue of their 
relative weight in the regional aggregate. In 
Mexico, export volumes rose much more sharply 
than domestic demand, despite the appreciation 
of the currency. The effect of the latter was 
manifested in the slowdown of external sales 
observed during the second half of 1996, 
however. Variations in the exchange rate may 
generate short-term impacts in economies that 
tend to be particularly sensitive to price 
movements, such as Brazil's (where the real 
exchange rate did not vary to any substantial 
degree in 1997) and Mexico's (whose exports 
include a large proportion of manufactures). The 
impact of the appreciation of local currencies was 
much less marked in the other countries, where 
manufactures make up a much smaller 
proportion of total exports. A prolonged real 
appreciation can, however, help to perpetuate the 
existing preponderance of commodity exports, 
which is why the countries' export performance 
is, generally speaking, heavily influenced by 
exogenous supply and demand factors. 
Among the relevant factors of supply, weather 
conditions and other circumstances that affect 
farming and livestock production continued to 
figure prominently. In general, these types of 
factors influenced output in a variety of ways, 
some positive (as in the cases of Argentina's 
maize and wheat crops, Brazilian coffee harvests, 
and soybean production in Brazil and Paraguay) 
and some negative (Costa Rica's traditional 
crops, Cuban sugar, Paraguayan cotton and 
various crops and fishery products in the 
Caribbean). The effects of El Niño were 
especially destructive and towards the end of 
1997 seriously hurt the production sector in Peru, 
among other countries. Another exogenous 
supply-related factor was the break in the 
Bolivian-Argentine gas pipeline, which reduced 
Bolivia's gas exports by nearly one fourth. 
Although these kinds of factors fall outside the 
scope of economic policy, other types of 
measures can still be taken to promote exports. 
In Brazil, commodity sales were encouraged 
through the adoption of fiscal and financial 
measures, such as an exemption from value 
added tax and the re-introduction of an export 
credit insurance scheme, while Costa Rica and 
Panama adopted tax provisions to encourage 
investment in their customs-free areas as a means 
of boosting exports. Mention should be made in 
this connection of the valuable contribution made 
by the maquila sector to the expansion of exports 
in many Central American and Caribbean 
countries, especially the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras. 
On the demand side, the import measures 
applied in destination markets also had a 
considerable impact on certain product lines of 
importance to some countries. The Central 
American countries, for example, continue to be 
heavily influenced by the special arrangements 
instituted in their main market, the United States. 
Thus, that country's decision to eliminate its 
import quotas for clothing gave a boost to Costa 
Rican sales of wearing apparel; the health and 
phytosanitary regulations it applied hindered 
exports of some Guatemalan products; its 
modification of the quotas for sugar imports 
allowed Honduras to increase the volume of its 
exports but had the opposite effect on Belize; and 
the changes it made in quota levels for rice had 
the effect of reducing Guyana's access to the 
United States market. The European Union's 
new banana import regime (which will have to be 
modified in accordance with a WTO ruling) has 
adversely affected Caribbean banana exports and 
has prompted a reduction in the land area devoted 
to this crop in Belize, among other countries. By 
the same token, restrictions placed on 
cross-border trade by Brazil have hurt re-exports 
and other unregistered exports from Paraguay. 
In a broader sense, the region's export 
performance depends upon the level of demand 
in its various target markets. In this respect, an 
important contributing factor to its strong 
showing in 1997 was the continued buoyancy of 
the international economy, which was reflected 
in a 9% upturn in world trade. The expansion of 
economic activity was particularly notable in 
markets of major importance for Latin American 
exporters, such as the United States (a vital 
market for Mexico) and the region itself. The 
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United States economy posted the highest growth 
rate (3.8%) of the last nine years and was largely 
unaffected by the Asian crisis in 1997, with the 
only noticeable impact being an easing of 
potential pressures for a tighter monetary policy. 
The situation was much the same in the Canadian 
economy, and thanks to the fact that a number of 
European countries (including the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Norway) also kept up a brisk 
pace of economic growth, the European Union 
achieved a much higher growth rate (2.6%) than 
the year before. The Japanese economy, on the 
other hand, continued to slow (dropping to a 
growth rate of less than 1% in 1997) and, as a 
result, lapsed into a recession in 1998. The sharp 
downturn in the Asian market caused by the weak 
performance of Japan and of the other countries 
hit by the financial crisis did not, however, begin 
to affect the volume of some Latin American 
countries' exports until 1998. 
Another major demand-side source of 
momentum was the Latin American market 
itself, thanks to the robust growth of economic 
activity seen in the countries of the region in 
1997. This strength was reflected in a sharp 
increase in intraregional trade (see table VIII.2). 
The fastest rates of growth were attained by the 
Group of Three (Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela), whose trade flows jumped by a third. 
Trade between the member countries of the 
Andean Community and Mercosur was up by 
23% and trade within each of these two groups 
climbed by 18%, thereby resuming the upward 
trends that had been interrupted in 1996 (with the 
exception of Mercosur, whose internal trade 
flows have been mounting steadily for a full 
decade now). The soaring levels of Brazil's and 
Argentina's imports included a large proportion 
of manufactures, particularly within the 
automotive industry. Mexico stepped up its 
commercial transactions with Chile and Peru 
(37% and 22%, respectively), and trade among 
the Central American countries was also 
substantially higher. 
The solid progress made by the various 
economic areas was not only a boon to exporters 
in supplier countries; it also had a positive effect 
on the tourism industry, whose steady 
development has made it a highly important 
sector for the region. In keeping with the 
geographic distribution of world and regional 
growth, the most vigorous rates of expansion in 
relative terms were registered in the vicinity of 
North America (with the exception of Mexico). 
The growth rate in tourist arrivals for the 
countries of the Central American isthmus sped 
up to 11%. In the Caribbean, which received 
6% more visitors than the year before, the largest 
increase was in Cuba (where arrivals were up by 
15%), followed by the Dominican Republic, with 
a growth rate of 14%. The number of tourists 
visiting the English-speaking Caribbean rose by 
4%, but arrivals were distributed quite unevenly 
among the various destinations within that area. 
Another new development in 1997 was the 
upswing in travel within Mercosur, which was 
largely responsible for the strong performance of 
the South American countries as a whole (where 
the number of tourists jumped by over 7%). 
(b)The value of foreign trade 
In 1997, the region's foreign trade in goods 
and services rose somewhat less in value than in 
volume since, overall, the prices of the products 
it buys and sells tended to weaken. Export 
earnings were up by over 10%, but the sum paid 
out for imports climbed by nearly 18% (see 
figure VIII.4). Consequently, for a majority of 
the countries the gap between earnings and 
outlays widened, reaching an average level of 
1.6% of GDP. For the region as a whole, the 
shortfall was well over US$ 30 billion, which 
1 This and other figures in this section have been taken from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, 
Washington D.C., 1998. 
2 The following figures refer to the value of trade, since figures on the volume of trade flows were not available; see the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA), Evolución del proceso de integración regional durante 1997 (ALADI/SEC/Estudio 
113), Montevideo, 28 May 1998. 
3 The terms "visitors" and "tourists" are used to denote the number of arrivals to a given country. These data have been obtained 
from the World Tourism Organization, Datos esenciales, Madrid, 1998, and national sources. 
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Table VIII.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTRAREGIONAL AND TOTAL EXPORTS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Includes Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. c Includes LAIA, CACM, 
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahamas, Belize, Haiti, Panama, Dominican Republic and Suriname. 
was almost four times as much as the preceding 
year's deficit. 
Ecuador and Venezuela were the only two 
countries whose export earnings covered their 
expenditures on imports, and in both cases the 
surplus was much smaller than in 1996. Mexico, 
which had been the third member of this select 
group in earlier years, balanced its accounts in 
1997, but the rest of the countries posted deficits 
of varying sizes. In terms of GDP, these deficits 
exceeded 4% only in Bolivia, Paraguay and some 
of the Central American and Caribbean countries 
(El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and 
Nicaragua). 
The region's overall trade deficit was due 
more to the net result of service transactions than 
to its merchandise trade, however, as the deficit 
on the services account topped US$ 17 billion, as 
compared to less than US$ 13 billion on the 
merchandise trade account. The deterioration in 
the latter account was more pronounced, 
however, since it had previously yielded a 
surplus. The fact that, in terms of volume, 
exports rose less sharply than imports was the 
main cause of this turnabout, since the terms of 
trade improved somewhat. 
(i) Generally favourable terms of trade 
The dynamism of the world economy in 1997 
heiped to strengthen the prices of the 
commodities that make up the bulk of almost all 
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Figure Vm.4 
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the Latin American and Caribbean countries' 
exports. The situation took a turn for the worse 
in the second half of the year with the outbreak 
of the Asian crisis, however, as it drove down the 
prices of certain products, particularly those for 
which a large part of world demand is generated 
by the Asian countries (such as minerals and 
metals, including petroleum, and some 
agricultural raw materials). As a result of this 
combination of demand-side forces and of the 
various factors influencing the supply of each 
product -including those that generate the cycles 
characteristic of these markets- price trends were 
quite mixed. 
A comparison of mean price levels in dollar 
terms for 1996 and 1997 reveals a number of 
price increases, especially in the case of food 
products, which were the least affected by the 
Asian crisis during the second half of 1997. On 
the other hand, the prices of many raw materials 
were lower than the year before. The extent to 
which the Asian crisis was responsible for these 
decreases differed from case to case. It was 
probably the main cause of the prices declines 
recorded for copper, nickel, natural rubber, wool, 
cowhide and rice, and was an important factor in 
the descent of petroleum, wood and lead prices. 
Of these last products, petroleum exerts a 
particularly strong influence because of its 
relative weight in the exports of some countries 
and in the imports of many others. In 1997, the 
year-on-year slippage in crude oil prices 
amounted to around 5%, on average. The 
steepest drop came in the first quarter; prices then 
leveled off for the next two quarters, but then 
began to slide again in October as demand in the 
4 Some of the region's most important products for which prices increases were recorded were bananas, beef, cocoa, coffee, 
fishmeal and shrimp, along with aluminium and zinc. Products whose prices declined include cotton, cowhides, maize, soybeans, 
sugar, wheat, wood, wool and numerous minerals, including petroleum. 
5 See International Monetary Fund, op. cit. 
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Asian countries sagged; demand was also weak 
in the northern hemisphere, which had a 
relatively mild winter (perhaps as a consequence 
of El Niño). The effects of these factors were 
compounded by the fact that the OPEC and other 
oil-exporting countries increased their 
production levels. 
The declines in copper and wheat prices -two 
other products that play a very important role in 
Latin American trade- illustrate the two opposite 
types of influence exerted by the Asian crisis. 
The downward spiral (33%) of copper prices in 
the second half of 1997 was primarily due to the 
contraction of demand in the Asian countries, 
which outweighed the rapid pace of consumption 
in the United States and Europe. On the other 
hand, the crisis played virtually no part in the 
steep drop in wheat and other grain prices (with 
the exception of rice), which was instead 
ascribable to the increase in output that came in 
response to high price levels in 1995 and 1996 
and to sluggish world demand. 
The downward trend that took shape in the 
second half of 1997 carried over into 1998, and 
the prices of these products thus continued to 
sink. In March 1998 and again in June, the major 
oil-exporting nations agreed to reduce the level 
of supply being offered on the world market in 
an effort to halt the slide in crude oil prices. 
Nevertheless, during the first half of 1998 oil 
prices fell another 28%. The decrease in copper 
prices, on the other hand, only added a further 6% 
to the steep drop registered in 1997. 
The prices of manufactures (which represent 
a smaller portion of Latin America's exports but 
account for the lion's share of its imports) were 
fairly flat in 1997 in both developed and 
developing countries. As a result of the success 
of anti-inflationary measures in developed 
countries, the price rises for manufactures were 
the smallest to be observed in several decades. 
Consequently, the price index for internationally 
traded manufactures showed a year-on-year 
decrease of 9%. This was partly due to the 
appreciation of the United States dollar, since in 
terms of special drawing rights (SDRs), the drop 
was only 4%. The same exchange-rate effect was 
6 See International Monetary Fund, op. cit. 
in evidence in the case of commodities, inasmuch 
as the IMF commodity price index (excluding 
petroleum) slipped by 4% when measured in 
dollars but climbed nearly 2% when expressed in 
terms of SDRs. 
These uneven price trends were reflected in 
the unit values of the exports sold by the countries 
of the region, which differed according to the 
product mix involved in each case. Most of the 
countries' exports fetched higher prices, 
however. The few exceptions (Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico and Uruguay) were primarily 
attributable to the sagging prices of petroleum, 
grain, copper, leather and manufactures. 
Argentina and Chile were hit the hardest, as the 
unit value of their exports fell by 10%. The 
Central American countries, on the other hand, 
reaped the benefits of higher coffee and banana 
prices, and in most cases the unit values of their 
exports thus climbed by between 3% and 9%. 
Lower prices for manufactures, petroleum and 
grain -all of which are major components of the 
region's imports-translated into an average 
decrease of 3% in the cost of the region's imports 
as a whole. The net effect of this decrease and 
the trend in the unit value of the region's exports, 
which fell by an overall average of 2%, was a 
widely distributed improvement in the terms of 
trade (see table VIII.3). The only countries to 
record a deterioration in the ratio between their 
export and import prices were Argentina, Mexico 
and Venezuela. Thus, generally speaking, the 
movement in this variable was just the reverse of 
what it had been the year before. 
(ii)A deterioration in the merchandise trade 
balance 
In all the countries except Paraguay, the 
decline in import prices was not large enough to 
offset the strong upswing in the volume of 
imports, and import spending consequently rose, 
in most cases quite sharply. There were very few 
countries in which the percentage increase was in 
the single digits, and in Argentina, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela it was over 
20%. 
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On the other hand, in all the countries except 
Paraguay and Bolivia, the expansion of export 
volumes either combined with improved prices 
or offset lower price levels, with the result that 
export earnings rose. In a majority of the cases, 
the increase was in or near the double-digit range 
but under 20%, with the exception of two 
countries (El Salvador and Haiti, both of which 
registered improvements of over 30%). 
The increased expenditure on imports was 
only partially covered by the countries' higher 
export earnings, and the merchandise trade 
balance consequently deteriorated in most cases. 
For the region as a whole, the surpluses of the 
preceding two years gave way to a deficit of 
approximately US$ 13.3 billion. Trends in oil 
prices are usually a crucial factor in producing 
either a surplus or deficit on this account (and, to 
a large extent, in determining its size) because of 
the decisive influence exerted by the size of 
Venezuela's merchandise trade surplus, but in 
1997 the region posted a deficit even though 
Venezuela recorded an ample surplus of some 
US$ 11.6 billion on this account. 
Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela were the 
only countries whose export earnings covered 
their entire import bill; Argentina had previously 
belonged to this select group as well, but ceased 
to do so in 1997. Ecuador and Mexico seemed to 
be on the verge of following suit, as oil prices 
continued to slump. For its part, Mexico had 
routinely recorded deficits on this account during 
the 1990s until it managed to reverse that trend 
(as had Argentina) thanks to the adjustment made 
in the wake of the financial crisis of late 1994. 
In fact, Mexico's merchandise trade surplus 
was less than one tenth the size of its 1996 
surplus, and by July 1997 it had already begun to 
Table VIÏÏ.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARD3BEAN: TERMS OF TRADE FOR GOODS, FOB/FOB ' 
(Indices: 1990 = 100) 





















































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from national sources. 
a The unit value indices used as a basis for the calculation of the indices shown here do not necessarily coincide with the indices 
derived from the countries' national accounts due to differences in methodologies and coverage. Preliminary figures. 
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post deficits on its monthly trade account for the 
first time since January 1995. This trend 
deepened in 1998, when the value of oil exports 
plunged 33% in a single quarter, while its exports 
of manufactures and its imports maintained their 
growth rates. As of the end of the first quarter of 
1998, Mexico's merchandise trade balance 
showed a deficit of nearly US$ 2.2 billion. The 
situation was much the same in Ecuador, whose 
trade deficit for that quarter was unusually large 
(US$ 64 million) as the impact of the drop in oil 
prices was heightened by the disastrous effects of 
El Niño in that country. 
In 1998, unfavourable price trends were 
compounded by the slump in exports which, as a 
consequence of the Asian crisis, began to make 
itself felt quite clearly, at least in Brazil and 
Chile. As a result of Chile's greater exposure to 
any changes in trade flows with Asia, that 
country's earnings from copper and other 
traditional exports, such as forestry products, 
were lower, and the slowdown in import growth 
caused by the cooling of domestic expenditure 
was not pronounced enough to halt the expansion 
of the trade deficit. In Brazil, on the other hand, 
which is another of the countries that has been 
most seriously affected by the Asian crisis, the 
trade deficit was diminishing thanks to the fact 
that imports reacted sharply to the tight fiscal and 
monetary measures adopted in 1997, falling by 
2% in the first four months of 1998. During this 
same period, the growth rate for exports slipped 
to less than 8%, while sales to the hardest-hit 
Asian countries plummeted by 43%. 
(iii)Trade in services 
Most of the countries run a deficit on their 
services trade account, and its effect on the 
current account balance is therefore generally 
negative, although these deficits are usually 
smaller than those recorded for merchandise 
trade; in fact, the former were similar to or larger 
than the latter only in the cases of Argentina and 
Brazil. In Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay, on the other 
hand, trade in services yielded a surplus and thus 
helped to cover part of these countries' 
merchandise trade deficits. 
Payments for services are generally linked to 
merchandise trade, since insurance and freight 
charges for the transport of cargo make up the 
largest category of trade in services. All the 
countries except Panama and Colombia 
traditionally run a deficit under this heading, 
which attests to the region's widespread 
dependence on foreign fleets and services for the 
transport of cargo. Colombia, which has a fairly 
large merchant fleet, is an exception to this rule, 
while Panama earns a considerable amount from 
the provision of services in connection with 
shipping and canal toll fees. In 1997, the boom 
in merchandise trade was reflected in an increase 
in payments for transport services in all the 
countries except Paraguay (the only country in 
which merchandise trade was depressed). The 
increase was in the double digits in most 
countries, and the trend of total payments for 
services was along the same lines. 
Tourism is the main source of the earnings 
entered on the services account and constitutes a 
major export item in quite a few countries; in 
1997 the positive trend in such earnings 
continued, thanks to the increase in this type of 
travel, as mentioned earlier. The upswing in this 
item in the Central American countries (with the 
exception of El Salvador) ranged between 7% in 
Costa Rica (which relies heavily on this source 
of income) and 37% in Nicaragua. The higher 
level of tourism income in Costa Rica and the 
drop in such earnings in El Salvador and Haiti 
were presumably associated with the amount of 
foreign exchange brought into the countries by 
those of their nationals who reside elsewhere 
(chiefly in the United States). 
Costa Rica is one of the countries in which 
earnings from tourism usually account for at least 
a third of total exports. This is also the case in 
the Dominican Republic, where this item jumped 
by 18%, and Uruguay, whose income under this 
heading was up by 6% thanks to an increase in 
the number of tourists (especially from 
Argentina), as travel within this area was boosted 
by the buoyancy of the relevant economies. 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile also benefited a great 
deal from this trend, which translated into 
double-digit upswings in revenues although, by 
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also rose substantially. Tourism continued to 
grow in Peru, and both income and expenditure 
in this category were higher. 
In Colombia and Mexico tourism revenues 
climbed by about 5% and 9%, respectively, 
despite the fact that fewer tourists visited these 
countries owing to deepening concerns about 
public safety. In Paraguay, on the other hand, a 
drop of nearly 10% in the number of visitors 
(owing to the measures applied by Brazil to curb 
cross-border trade) drove down revenues on the 
travel account by around 13%. 
2. The current account balance and its financing 
The deficit on the region's current account rose 
steeply, jumping from US$ 37 billion in 1996 to 
US$ 63 billion in 1997. This meant that it rose 
from 2% of GDP to 3.2% during that period, which 
was similar to the figure recorded for 1993-1994. 
This expansion is mainly attributable to the sharp 
downswing in the trade balance for goods and 
services. Since the supply of external financing 
was plentiful, however, the region was able not 
only to cover that deficit but also to add to its level 
of reserve assets for the second year running (see 
table VIH.4). 
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Except in the cases of the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Honduras and Peru, the 
Latin American and Caribbean countries' 
current account balances were less favourable 
than they had been in 1996. El Salvador and 
Venezuela were the only countries to post a 
surplus in 1997. Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica 
and Panama all registered considerably larger 
deficits, while in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Paraguay and Peru the deficit on this account 
was over 5% of GDP for the second year in a 
row (see figure VIII.6; this figure does not 
include Nicaragua, which has had a deficit of 
over 10% of GDP at least since 1980). 
(a)Factor income and current transfers 
As in 1996, interest payments and profit 
remittances totalled 2.4% of GDP. While this 
ratio did not exhibit any major variations in 
1997, it is important to note that in Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and especially Ecuador, 
factor services remained above 3% of GDP and 
represented over one half of the deficit entered 
on the balance-of-payments current account 
for the year. The region's gross interest 
payments rose only slightly (to US$ 40 billion) 
thanks to the stability of international interest 
rates; in contrast, profit remittances climbed 
steeply, reaching the equivalent of 6.5% of its 
exports of goods and services . Such 
remittances have been trending upward in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico, which are precisely the countries that 
have seen the swiftest increase in foreign direct 
investment since the start of the 1990s (see 
table VIII.5). 
Current transfers received by the region, 
mainly from Latin Americans and Caribbeans 
residing abroad, continued to help finance the 
current account (especially in Central America 
and the Caribbean), providing a total of US$ 14.7 
billion for the region as a whole in 1997. 
Measured in terms of GDP, these financial flows 
represented very significant sums in El Salvador 
(12%), Haiti (14%), and the Dominican Republic 
(9%). These resources turned El Salvador's 
deficit into a surplus and greatly reduced the level 
of Haiti's shortfall, while in the Dominican 
Republic they provided a large part of the 
financing for factor payments. 
(b)Capital flows and international reserves 
(i) General features 
In 1997 the region's net capital inflows 
totalled US$ 80 billion, or 4% of GDP (see table 
VIII.6). Most of the economies in the region saw 
an increase in such inflows, and a number of them 
were also able to build up their reserve assets. 
Among the countries witnessing the strongest 
recoveries, mention should be made of 
Argentina, Mexico and Nicaragua, where the 
level of this variable trebled, while in Chile, 
Colombia and Peru the level of inflows remained 
high. In some countries the level of external 
finance fell sharply; this was the case, for 
example, in Brazil, which consequently had to 
draw down its reserves by US$ 8 billion. The 
countries receiving the highest levels of capital 
inflows, measured in terms of GDP, were 
Nicaragua (35%); Bolivia, Chile, Panama and 
Peru (around 10%); and Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Honduras and Paraguay (between 5% and 6%) 
(see table VIII.4). 
Despite the turbulence created by the Asian 
crisis, the upward trend observed since 1995 in 
the proportion of total financial flows 
represented by medium- and long-term capital 
became much stronger in a majority of the Latin 
American and Caribbean economies in 1997. 
This has enabled the region's major economies 
to cope much more successfully with the bouts of 
financial volatility that have been triggered by 
the Asian crisis since October 1997. 
Foreign direct investment -the least volatile 
component of medium- and long-term flows-
provided a significant portion of the financing for 
a number of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries' current account deficits for the second 
year in a row. Bonds were an important source 
of financing in some of the region's economies 
as well. Bank lending remained at moderate 
levels, and most such loans were provided by 
banking consortia. Equity investment and other 
types of short-term capital continued to represent 
a fairly small proportion of capital inflows in 
most cases. Some countries of the region moved 
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Table Vffl.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(As percentages of gross domestic product)a 





































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and official sources. 
a Estimates based on figures expressed in dollars at current prices. Includes errors and omissions. 
Figure Vin.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CURRENT 
ACCOUNT BALANCE 




















- 9 - 6 - 3 0 3 6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and official sources. 
a In 1996 the surplus amounted 12.9% of GDP. 
" Preliminary figures. 
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Table Vffl.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARD3BEAN: REMITTANCES OF PROFITS AND DIVIDENDS ' 
(Millions of dollars) 




































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and national sources. 
" Includes reinvestment of profits. Preliminary figures. 
Table Vffl.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARD3BEAN: CAPITAL ACCOUNT INDICATORS 
(Percentages) 
Current account balance/GDP * 
Capital account balance/GDP " b 
Overall balance/GDP 
Capital inflows to Latin America/ 
capital inflows to developing countries 
LIBOR (nominal) 
LIBOR (real) 

































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and data from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
" Coefficients have been estimated on the basis of figures expressed in dollars at current prices. The figures on capital inflows 
include errors and omissions. cIn addition, Latin America received US$ 29 billion in exceptional financing. d Net flows 
of long-term resources. 
ahead with the implementation of mechanisms 
designed to discourage excessive inflows of 
short-term and, especially, speculative capital; 
these mechanisms took the form of reserve 
requirements in Chile and Colombia and of 
graduated taxes on financial operations in 
Brazil. 
The region's position in terms of external 
financing in 1997 can be divided into two 
different phases. During the first, which was 
marked by an abundant supply of such resources 
and narrowing spreads over the reference rate, 
the situation was a highly positive one in terms 
of nearly all the various types of capital inflows. 
In June 1998 the Central Bank lowered the reserve requirement from 30% to 1 
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This phase came to an end in September 1997. 
During the second phase, which began in 
October, reference interest rates were stable, but 
financing became more expensive as the Asian 
crisis deepened. This began to affect some of the 
financial flows to Latin American economies 
suffering from major internal and/or external 
imbalances, thus making it necessary for them to 
adopt economic policy measures (primarily in 
the monetary, fiscal and commercial areas of the 
economy) in the fourth quarter of 1997 and the 
early months of 1998. 
The Asian crisis, which had begun to grow 
more serious in July 1997, started to make its 
effect felt on capital flows to the region in 
October of that year, and investors began to pull 
out of some countries. In terms of magnitude, the 
most severely affected components between 
October 1997 and early 1998 were equity 
investment, bond issues and other short-term 
capital. The hardest-hit countries during this 
period were Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Venezuela, where speculative attacks and 
withdrawals of funds were partly attributable to 
the presence of speculative capital in connection 
with investments on their local stock exchanges. 
A total of US$ 5.075 billion in short-term capital 
flowed out of Brazil in the fourth quarter of 1997 ; 
Chile built up a US$ 1.8 billion deficit on its 
balance of payments between December 1997 
and January 1998; US$ 850 million was 
withdrawn from Venezuela in the fourth quarter 
of 1997; and by February 1998, Colombia's 
international reserves were US$ 560 million 
lower than they had been at the end of 1997. 
A number of Governments and business 
enterprises postponed international bond issues 
as well. In November 1997, the spreads on debt 
paper traded on the secondary market began to 
widen sharply, reaching more than 500 basis 
points in the cases of Argentina and Brazil. In 
some other Latin American countries, however, 
the Asian crisis had little or no impact in the 
fourth quarter of 1997 and early 1998.9 
(ii)The structure of capital flows 
- Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
In 1997 Latin America's inflows of foreign 
direct investment reached an all-time record of 
US$ 55 billion. This was largely the result of 
unprecedented levels of investment activity in 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela (see table VIII.7). Around 20% of the 
region's FDI corresponded to privatization 
operations involving foreign capital, with sales 
of State assets being conducted on an especially 
large scale in Brazil and Colombia. Mergers and 
the acquisition of private firms by foreign 
investors also played a highly important role. 
Foreign direct investment was also more 
geographically diversified in 1997, making it 
possible for more than half of the Latin American 
and Caribbean economies to cover a large part of 
their current account deficits with FDI. Thanks to 
the striking increase in these levels, the region's 
share of total FDI flows to developing countries 
swelled from 30% to 45%.'l 
Although FDI still appears to be concentrated 
in commodity-related activities, increasing 
amounts of such funds are being channeled into 
manufacturing, telecommunications, business 
and financial services, and infrastructure 
projects. Intraregional investment also continued 
to mount; meanwhile, the share of investment 
funds coming from the United States held steady, 
but the share accounted for by the countries of the 
European Union increased. As for outward FDI, 
Chilean firms invested a record US$ 2 billion in 
other countries in 1997, and foreign investments 
by Brazilian and Venezuelan residents also 
reached significant levels; in the case of the other 
countries of the region, these flows increased at 
a fairly sedate pace. 
8 See chapters I and n. 
9 See ECLAC, Impact of the Asian Crisis on Latin America (LC/G.2026), Santiago, Chile, May 1998. 
10 See ECLAC, La inversión extranjera en LATIN AMERICA. Informe 1997 (LC/G.12985-P), Santiago, Chile, March 1998. 
United Nations publication, Sales No: S.97.II.G.14. 
11 According to information compiled by the World Bank, in 1997 a total of US$ 120 billion in foreign direct investment was 
received by developing countries, which was quite similar to the figure for 1996. 
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Table Vin.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
(Millions of dollars) 
,ab 













































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and from national sources. 
" Refers to direct investment in the reporting economy minus direct investment abroad by residents. Includes reinvested eamings. 
For some countries this information is not available. In accordance with the fifth edition of the IMF Balance of Payments 
Manual, all transactions between non-financial direct-investment enterprises and their parent companies and affiliates are 
included in direct investment. c Preliminary figures. 
- International bond issues 
As in the past, a limited number of 
economies -notably Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico- accounted for the bulk of the region's 
debt issues on international markets. Most of 
these financing operations were undertaken by 
central governments (see box VIII. 1), with a 
smaller proportion corresponding to business 
enterprises. In 1997, the net amount of 
financing obtained via bond issues totalled 
US$ 25 billion. 
The region's international bond issues in 1997 
were notable for the fact that their average 
maturity doubled and the spreads over the 
relevant reference interest rates narrowed to 
around 300 basis points (see table VIII.8); 60% 
of placements were in United States dollars and 
the remainder in an assortment of European 
currencies and the Japanese yen. In the fourth 
quarter of 1997, however, the turbulence 
generated by the crisis sweeping over many 
Asian economies caused the terms and 
conditions for these bond issues to deteriorate 
considerably; the situation then began to improve 
through April 1998 but began to worsen once 
again in May. 
- Equity investment 
Foreign equity investment held fairly steady 
at US$ 11 billion, which was quite similar to the 
total for 1996. This type of investment is still 
concentrated in a few countries of the region, 
especially Brazil (which received more than half 
of the total in 1997), Argentina, Chile, Mexico 
and, to a lesser extent, Colombia and Peru. The 
level of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) 
climbed to US$ 5.1 billion, which was an 
improvement over the depressed levels of 1995 
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and 1996 but still below the peak level reached 
in 1993. Net equity investment flows showed a 
tendency to expand during the first half of the 
year, especially in some countries, in part 
because of the stimulus provided by bullish stock 
markets, which exhibited a great deal of strength 
with an upswing of 40% up to September 1997 
(see figure VIII.7). During the fourth quarter of 
1997 and the early months of 1998, however, 
equity investment in the region slackened in 
response to the sharp downturns in quotations on 
Latin American exchanges that were triggered, in 
large part, by the Asian stock market crash of late 
October 1997 (see table VIII.9). The impact of 
the Asian crisis on investment flows during this 
period was most intense in Brazil, Chile and 
Venezuela. 
- Bank lending 
Although net bank lending to the region has 
gradually been rising since 1995, the total 
amount of such loans has nonetheless been quite 
moderate and has tended to be concentrated in a 
few countries (and mainly in the private sector). 
The economies receiving the lion's share of such 
flows in 1997 were Argentina, Brazil, Chile and, 
to a lesser extent, Ecuador and Peru. As of the 
end of 1997, international commercial bank 
claims on Latin America totalled US$ 305 
Box VIE 1 
MAJOR INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES8 PLACED BY 




















































Source: ECLÀC, on the basis of World Bank figures. 
a Largest issues placed by Governments of the regjo betwee» January and September 1997. AU the issues shown are 
denominated in dollars and carry fixed interest rates. 
Difference between the yields of the bonds issued and the yield of United States Treasury bonds of a similar term (100 basis 
points equals 1%). 
During 1997 the Governments of Argentina and Mexico continued to pursue their policies of obtaining longer 
maturities for new commitments and lower interest rates. The Governments of Brazil and Venezuela also were 
very active in international bond markets during the year. Until September 1997, the trend towards longer 
maturities that had emerged in 1996 held firm, and some large issues were placed for terms of between 10 and 
30 years. However, even though spreads over nominal interest rates narrowed, in real terms the spreads were 
still very large for most of the issues placed by Governments of the region. 
The Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela used a sizeable portion of these 
resources to retire Brady bonds corresponding to US$ 14.8 billion of debt in gross terms, thereby releasing the 
collateral on those bonds. The restructuring of this debt reduced it by US$ 2.5 billion. 
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Table Vra.8 






























































































































































































Source: Up to the third quarter of 1997: ECLAC, on the basis of figures published in World Bank, World Debt Tablesl996, 
Washington, D.C., and Financial Flows and the Developing Countries, Washington, D.C., (various issues); from the 
fourth quarter of 1997 on: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
" Up to the third quarter of 1997, includes issues over US$ 150 million. b Includes issues made after the crash of the Hong Kong 
(China) stock exchange on 27 October 1997 only. Preliminary estimates. Does not include a US$ 500 million 
expansion of the global bond having a term of 29.5 years. Includes Euronotes and certificates of deposit. Refers to 
the differential between the yields of the bonds issued and the yield of United States Treasury bonds having comparable terms 
(100 basis points equals 1%). 
billion. Information compiled by the Bank for 
International Settlements indicates that bank 
lending to the region proceeded at a good pace 
until the third quarter of 1997. In the fourth 
quarter of 1997 and the early months of 1998, 
however, the serious difficulties facing the 
banking system in Asia drove down the level of 
bank loans to the region.12 After October 1997 
a deterioration was also seen in the terms of bank 
loans; this was particularly apparent in the 
widening spreads over reference interest rates. 
Short-term loans continued to represent a 
moderate proportion of total capital inflows to the 
majority of the countries in the region, and most 
12 In November 1997 Argentina attempted to secure a syndicated loan from international banks, but talks on the subject were 
later suspended. In January 1998, Argentina's primarily foreign-owned banking system extended a 2 billion peso loan with a 
3-year maturity to the Government. 
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Figure Vm.7 
VARIATION IN STOCK EXCHANGE INDEXES 
(Based in indexes denominated in dollars) 
Source: ECLAC.on the basis of figures from the International Finance Corporation. 
of these funds were used for foreign trade 
operations. 
(iii)Net resource transfers 
Since net capital inflows once again exceeded 
remittances of profits and interest payments, the 
net transfer of financial resources to Latin 
America and the Caribbean remained positive, as 
has been the case since 1991. In 1997, net 
transfers totalled US$ 31.6 billion (see table 
VIII. 10). This situation was quite widespread, 
with Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and 
Venezuela being the only countries in which the 
direction of net transfers was outward. In 
absolute terms, the highest levels were seen in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. When 
measured in relation to exports of goods and 
services, the countries receiving the largest 
proportions of such transfers were Nicaragua 
(78%), Bolivia and Peru (42%) and Argentina 
(32%). 
(iv) External debt 
In 1997 the region's foreign debt rose by 3% 
to US$ 643 billion, or 33% of GDP. In over half 
of all Latin American and Caribbean countries, 
the level of external liabilities changed very little. 
Peru and Trinidad and Tobago sharply reduced 
their nominal external debt, in the first case 
thanks to debt restructuring operations and, in the 
second, to a high net level of amortization 
payments. In contrast, the external debts of 
Argentina, Brazil and especially Chile rose 
sharply, mainly because of increased borrowing 
by the private sector. Despite the sizeable 
reduction in government debt in some countries, 
particularly Mexico, public-sector debt 
continued to represent around 60% of the 
region's total debt. 
A number of Governments continued to 
pursue a prudent policy aimed at improving the 
maturity profile of their public external debt 
while at the same time taking steps to reduce its 
financial cost. In order to accomplish this, for the 
most part they turned to international bond 
markets, taking advantage of their liquidity and 
the more favourable terms that were available up 
to September 1997. Some countries used the 
very large sums they obtained on these markets 
to pay off short-term debts, while others used 
them to buy back Brady bonds. Brazil and 
Venezuela floated the largest issues of 
government bonds in the region in 1997 (see box 
VIII. 1). 
Peru and Bolivia made noteworthy progress in 
the renegotiation of their external debts. In 
March 1997, the Government of Peru successfully 
concluded an agreement for the restructuring of 
US$ 8 billion of commercial foreign debt 
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Table Vffl.9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STOCK EXCHANGE INDEXES, IN DOLLARS a 
(Indices: June 1997 = 100) 

















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Finance Corporation. 
a Year-end figures. Figures as of the end of June. 
Table Vm. 10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET RESOURCE TRANSFERS a 
(Millions of dollars) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997b 









































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and national sources. 
a The net transfer of resource is equal to net capital inflows (including involuntary flows and errors and omissions) minus the 
balance on the factor income account (net payments of profits and interest). In this table, negative figures indicate outward 
transfers of resources. Preliminary figures. 
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Table VIH. 11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF TOTAL INTEREST TO 
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES a 
(Percentages) 
































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and national sources. 
In some countries includes interest on portfolio investments. 
included under "exports of goods". 
Preliminary figures. From 1993 on, maquila exports are 
13 (including both principal and interest arrears). 
In the case of Bolivia, in 1997 the World Bank 
approved a debt relief programme for the country 
under the terms of the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (fflPC) Debt Initiative. Honduras and 
Nicaragua, which have made great strides but 
nonetheless continue to exhibit highly worrisome 
debt indicators, could be eligible for this type of 
debt relief programme in 1998. 
The great majority of the countries in the 
region saw a further improvement in their 
external debt/exports and interest payments/ 
exports coefficients in 1997. In some cases, 
however, these indicators continued to be a cause 
of concern (see tables VIII. 11 and VIII. 12). 
Short-term debt continued to represent 
about 18% of the region's total debt in 1997. 
At the individual country level, this coefficient 
was near or below 25% in all cases with the 
exception of Paraguay (35%). Among those 
countries having a fairly high level of 
short-term external debt in absolute terms, as 
of mid-1997 the coefficients for these 
liabilities when measured as a percentage of 
international reserves were 126% for Mexico, 
108% for Argentina, 69% for Brazil, 57% for 
Colombia and 44% for Chile, thus comparing 
favourably with the figures for the Republic of 
Korea (300%) and Indonesia (160%) during 
that same period. 
13 For further information on the terms of this agreement, see ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
1996-1997 (LC/G.1968-P), Santiago, Chile, September 1997, p. 138. United Nations publication, Sales No: E.97.II.G.2. 
14 See the section on Bolivia in this edition of the Survey. In 1996 a similar programme was approved for Guyana. 
15 World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1997, Washington, D.C. 
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Table VHL12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF TOTAL DISBURSED 
EXTERNAL DEBT TO EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
(Percentages) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997" 

































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and national sources. 
Note: A table on the external debt in which the data are expressed in absolute terms is included on the diskettes that accompany 
this publication. 






1. General trends 
Economic activity expanded significantly 
in 1997 and unemployment fell, although 
it continued at high levels. Increased 
domestic demand had no effect on prices, 
which remained practically stable. The 
current account deficit hovered around 
3% of GDP, but was financed without 
problems because of large capital inflows. 
This economic momentum continued 
well into 1998, until the current account 
gap widened as the merchandise trade 
imbalance was aggravated by a fall in 
cereal and petroleum prices, weaker 
demand in Brazil and a continuing high 
level of imports. 
The increase in GDP of more than 8% in 1997, 
following the previous year's recovery, meant 
that cumulative growth in output since the 
beginning of the decade was nearly 50%. Within 
aggregate demand, there was a noteworthy rise 
in investment, while consumption increased 
significantly, although at a slower rate than GDP. 
The economic acceleration generated a 
considerable amount of employment; however, 
most of the new hiring was not on a regular 
indefinite-term contractual basis. The value of 
exports increased by around 6%, while imports 
showed strong growth, resulting in a 
considerable trade deficit. 1997 saw large 
inflows of capital from expanded foreign direct 
investment and from increased private-sector 
issues of securities. For its part, the Government 
undertook a large volume of external financing 
operations, but the net balance was lower than in 
the previous year. 
The positive trends of the previous year were 
consolidated in 1997. Cautious behaviour and its 
effects on portfolio decisions and willingness to 
spend, following the sharp contraction in output 
and revenue of the mid-1990s, gradually began 
to diminish. The supply of foreign credit regained 
fluidity and local financial markets revived 
thanks to the improved international situation 
and perceptions that the economy, and in 
particular the monetary and exchange rate 
systems, had managed to withstand strong 
turbulence. 
Until well into 1997, the financial markets 
reflected the growing availability of funds, with 
rises in the price of assets, interest rate reductions 
and increases in the volume of resources 
channeled through the banks. The marked 
recovery in output generated expectations which 
stimulated spending and investment decisions. A 
sharp increase in construction and in purchases 
of equipment raised capital formation to a 
historically high level. This occurred in a context 
of heightened activity with respect to changes in 
the ownership and control of enterprises, in 
which foreign firms were increasingly involved, 
especially in sectors such as banking. 
The growth in output was generalized, 
extending to various sectors linked to external 
trade. Changes in cultivation methods and 
techniques resulted in improved grain harvests. 
Although on aggregate the volume of exports 
expanded, the rate of increase slowed during the 
period under review, while the trade deficit 
widened considerably. 
Macroeconomic policy sought to reduce the 
fiscal deficit and reinforce prudential measures 
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Figure 1 
ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
• Gross domestic product 
m Gross national Income 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1988 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1998 1997 
% Consumer prices 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
• National non-financial public-sector balance a/ 
H Current account balance 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures 
* Does not include provinces or municipalities. 
ARGENTINA 
for the financial system. In the light of rising tax 
revenue, the need to finance the national public 
sector decreased, as planned. Debt issues were 
well received, with the result that the 
Government attracted resources in excess of its 
immediate requirements. The Central Bank 
increased the liquidity requirements for banks. In 
addition, a contingency credit mechanism was 
established with foreign institutions, enabling the 
Central Bank to have access to a significant 
amount of resources should it consider this to be 
necessary. 
The mid-year crisis in several Asian 
economies had no marked repercussions initially. 
Nevertheless, as the wave of distrust spread to 
other parts of the Asian region, there was a sharp 
drop in domestic bond and share prices towards 
the end of October. The international reserves 
also declined, while bank rates and the 
differentials between yields in pesos and dollars 
increased, although the total volume of deposits 
Economic policy in 1997 was based on a 
positive interpretation of how the main 
variables were performing. The authorities 
also envisaged reforms to correct the 
distortions they had detected in several tax and 
regulatory instruments. One of the main 
macroeconomic objectives established for the 
year was to reduce the national public-sector 
deficit (1.8% of GDP the previous year) to 1.4% 
of GDP, including the effects of transferring 
various provincial pension funds to national 
jurisdiction. This goal, part of the stand-by 
agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), was met by increased tax 
collection. 
During the year, the Government held talks 
with IMF concerning a multi-annual agreement on 
facilities. This agreement, finalized in February 
1998, stipulates a gradual reduction of the 
public-sector deficit to almost zero level in the 
year 2000, on the basis of increasing revenues 
and a reduction in primary expenditure as a ratio 
of GDP. Reducing the external current account 
deficit to less than 4% of GDP, while maintaining 
the merchandise trade deficit at a similar level to 
and loans continued to grow. However, the 
effects of the upheaval did not become 
entrenched. Although some of them persisted, 
after a few weeks there was noticeably less 
pressure on financial markets and securities 
prices rebounded. Furthermore, during the fourth 
quarter, capital inflows reached fairly high levels 
and there was a considerable increase in reserves. 
For a while, financial volatility threatened to 
make credit more expensive and to put a brake on 
spending; there were even signs of industrial 
demand and manufacturing output weakening. 
However, GDP picked up appreciable momentum 
in the fourth quarter of 1997. During the first few 
months of 1998, with sustained domestic 
demand, the economic indicators improved 
significantly over those for one year earlier. 
Nevertheless, as the year progressed signs of a 
slow-down began to appear. First-quarter exports 
were affected by falling prices and were down 
compared with the same period in 1997. 
that of the previous year, was established as a 
goal for 1998. 
During the first few months of 1998, the 
external current account deficit accumulated 
over a one-year period exceeded US$ 5 billion, 
giving rise to debate on prospects for the trade 
balance and whether action should be taken to 
contain domestic spending. However, the fiscal 
deficit in the first quarter was within the limits 
foreseen and the authorities did not find it 
necessary to adopt special measures to adjust 
macroeconomic trends, other than emphasizing 
their determination to maintain strict control over 
public-sector finances. In this respect the 
Government indicated that it was on the alert with 
respect to tax collection, which was not keeping 
up with projections. 
(a)Fiscal policy 
In the area of fiscal management in 1997, there 
was increased activity, strong demand for public 
debt (except in the latter part of the year when the 
effects of the Asian crisis were being felt) and 
demands deriving from the electoral agenda in a 
2. Economic policy 
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Table 1 
ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 




Contribution to growth of GDP c 
Consumption 
Gross fixed investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross fixed investment 
National savings 
External savings 
Employment and wages 
Labour force participation rate 
Open unemployment ratee 
Real average wage 





Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar)8 
Real effective exchange rate 
for imports (index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial accounth 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 














































































































































































































































































(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 


















Table 1 (conclusion) 
ARGENTINA 




Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Money and credit 
Monetary balances of 
banking system 
Net domestic credit 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local currency savings 
and time deposits 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
Deposit rate 
Lending rate 














1990 1991 1992 
Percentages of GDP 
13.3 15.0 17.4 
15.4 16.2 16.8 
-2.1 -1.2 0.6 
1.7 0.4 0.7 
-3.8 -1.6 -0.1 
Growth rates 
230 152 15.0 
220 56 -21.6 
735 112 53.5 
1071 144 51.5 
4 719 65 73.9 
1 803 104 60.7 
473 269 64.6 
Annual rates 
-25.2 -10.4 -3.8 
81.9 43.6 12.5 

















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentages of GDP. d Includes changes in stocks. e Percentages of the total population; urban 
areas. f Percentages of the economically active population (EAP); urban areas. 8 Corresponds to the exchange rate for 
imports. h Capital pending classification according to the methodology used in the fifth edition of the Balance of Payments 
Manual. Includes the banking sector and the non-financial public and private sectors. Includes Errors and omissions. 'Refers 
to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. ' Includes the national 
administration, the national social security system and public-sector enterprises. Relates to final budget figures. 
rates on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
'Interest 
Table 2 
ARGENTINA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
Gross domestic product 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 
Exports (millions of dollars) 
Imports (millions of dollars) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100)" 






















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Preliminary figures. Refers to the exchange rate for imports. 
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time of persisting high unemployment. The 
national public-sector deficit narrowed in 1997, 
according to plan, while the funding 
requirements of the provincial administrations 
again decreased. 
National government tax revenues increased 
more than GDP, which meant that in 1997, unlike 
the previous year, there was a primary surplus 
(0.5% of GDP) and the national public-sector 
deficit decreased. Large government bond issues 
covered the deficit for the period and served to 
refinance the large amount of maturing 
obligations. 
Value added tax (VAT) revenue increased by 
9%, the amount collected on imports rising 
particularly sharply. Revenue from domestic 
sales also increased, but was offset by an increase 
in the volume of rebates. Capital gains tax 
revenue continued to grow (2.5%), especially on 
company profits, because of an increase in the 
rate (to 33%) and in the tax base. Receipts from 
external trade tariffs expanded considerably 
(although their share in total tax revenue 
remained small), owing to the rise in imports and, 
to a lesser extent, the fact that the timetable for 
convergence of rates levied by Mercosur 
partners on imports of capital goods was brought 
forward. In addition, the effect of the increased 
fuel taxes agreed on the previous year began to 
be felt. 
National government current expenditure 
increased by 11.5% to somewhat more than 17% 
of GDP. A large part of this increase was 
accounted for by expenditures of provincial 
pension funds absorbed into the national pension 
system and by family allowance payments. 
Larger transfers to the provinces as a result of a 
rise in receipts subject to revenue sharing also 
contributed to this increase, as did greater interest 
payments. On the other hand, personnel costs and 
payments by the national social security system 
(excluding the absorbed pension funds) remained 
practically unchanged. National public-sector 
capital expenditure increased in line with the 
increase in aggregate activity and stayed at 1.2% 
of GDP. 
National government revenue from 
privatizations and other capital revenues 
amounted to a mere 0.2% of GDP. The most 
important operation was the sale of shares in 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF). 
Government financial management was 
facilitated by a steady decline in the risk premium 
implicit in the interest on Argentine debt paper. 
This trend was abruptly reversed at the end of 
October. Spreads reached their maximum in 
November, at levels similar to those seen in 
mid-1996, although much lower than those 
recorded in the 1995 episode. The tightening of 
financial conditions was also reflected in interest 
rates on National Treasury bills. 
In these circumstances, the Government 
suspended placements on the international 
market for a time. However, conditions for 
obtaining credit improved and in December 
issues were resumed, although for relatively 
short maturities. In the first few months of 1998, 
the volume of bonds issued was again 
considerable; yields were equal to those of a year 
earlier, but still higher than before the Asian 
crisis. 
In the first quarter of 1998, the national 
public-sector deficit amounted to some 1.2 billion 
pesos, lower than the figure provided for in the 
agreement with IMF. Despite the expenditure 
required to remedy the serious flood damage that 
occurred in various parts of Argentina in April, 
the authorities did not revise their objectives as 
to the size of the debt. 
(b)Monetary policy and the financial 
markets 
The rapid increase in the volumes of the 
monetary aggregates continued in 1997. M3, 
which includes money in circulation in the hands 
of the public and bank deposits in pesos and 
dollars, rose by 26% to a level more than 45% 
higher than three years earlier. Of special note 
was the increase in interest-bearing deposits in 
the local currency (36%). There was also a 
marked, though slower, increase in deposits in 
dollars. The rise in demand for money supply in 
1997 was comparatively moderate (8.6%) and 
similar to growth in output. 
The financial liabilities of the Central Bank 
expanded in the light of greater money demand 
and increased bank placements with that 
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institution. Over the year as a whole, the external 
credit of the Central Bank covered those 
liabilities almost totally. The minimum liquidity 
requirements for banks were increased on two 
occasions in 1997, each time by one percentage 
point (the differentials in the ratios required by 
placements with varying maturity terms being 
maintained). 
The volume of bank credit to the non-financial 
private sector increased by around 17%, the 
increases in peso and dollar financing being 
comparable. There was a proportionately large 
upturn in the total value of loans to individuals. 
Interest rates fell in the period before the Asian 
crisis. The differentials for the various types of 
operation remained very large, but the gap 
between yields in local currency and foreign 
currency narrowed. In September, the average 
interest rate charged by banks to first-class-risk 
corporate borrowers was less than 8%, much the 
same as that for dollar loans. The securities 
markets behaved in a similar way. In the first nine 
months of the year, public-sector securities, in 
both pesos and dollars, continued to rise in price. 
In the same period, between the end of December 
1996 and September 1997, share prices went up 
by more than 30%. 
Towards the end of October there was a 
turn-around in this situation, with declines in the 
prices of financial assets and rises in interest 
rates, especially on assets denominated in pesos. 
Nonetheless, the flow of funds into the banks 
(a)Economic activity 
The growth rate accelerated in 1997, with a 
rise in GDP of around 8.5%. The level of 
economic activity was thus greater than that 
achieved in 1994, the peak of the previous cycle. 
The major components of aggregate demand 
increased significantly, but the upturn in 
investment was especially marked (more than 
27%). Contributing factors in this result were the 
fulfillment of expectations concerning economic 
performance and the favourable financial 
conditions that prevailed for much of the year, 
marked by readily available credit, which had a 
continued uninterrupted. In any event, the 
financial repercussions of the Asian crisis did not 
worsen. In the last few weeks of 1997, interest 
rates began to go down, while bond prices 
recuperated, although with ups and downs, and 
share prices fluctuated erratically. During the 
early months of 1998, bond and share prices 
advanced, without, however, regaining their 
levels of prior to the upheaval, while interest rates 
fell and the volume of bank deposits continued to 
increase. But uncertainty as to financial market 
trends was not dispelled and at the end of May 
share prices again slipped. 
(c) Structural reforms 
In the area of privatization, the main events 
were the sale of shares in the YPF petroleum 
company, the granting of the postal service 
concession and the adoption of an act providing 
for the sale of the operating concession for the 
electricity-generating nuclear power plants. 
Parliamentary approval was also granted for the 
Banco Hipotecario Nacional to be privatized. At 
the beginning of 1998, the Government 
implemented a decree on the granting of an 
airports management concession. Reform of the 
labour market continued to be debated, in view 
of the divergent approaches of the Government, 
the trade unions and the employers' associations. 
In addition, as of mid-1998, the Congress was 
considering various tax reform bills. 
perceptible effect on construction and probably 
also on decisions to install equipment. 
Investment in construction increased by almost 
24%, but spending on machinery and equipment 
was even higher: 30% more than in the previous 
year and 19% more than the 1994 maximum. 
Investment in equipment of domestic origin 
remained below previous levels, in spite of an 
increase of around 8% in 1997. In contrast, 
purchases of imported capital goods, which 
increased in volume by almost 40%, far exceeded 
those recorded three years previously. 
Consumption went up sharply (more than 
6%), although somewhat less than output. As a 
3. The main variables 
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result, the national savings rate increased more 
than one point, to 22.8% of GDP, the highest rate 
for the decade. However, the increase in savings 
was considerably less than the increase in 
investment; the external savings ratio thus rose, 
to around 5% of GDP (in constant prices). 
The volume of exports of goods and services 
increased considerably. Compared with the 
cyclical high in 1994, exports continued to be the 
item of aggregate demand with the greatest 
grov*h (more than 40%). The volume of imports, 
which In recent years has fluctuated considerably 
in response to variations in the level of domestic 
spending, surged (28%) in 1997. 
The information available for the early 
months of 1998, mainly relating to 
manufacturing industry, indicates significant 
advances. In mid-May, particular attention was 
being paid to the issue of whether the level of 
activity and the volume of spending, especially 
on imported goods, were gradually decreasing in 
such a way as to narrow the trade gap without 
provoking abrupt changes in the rate of 
production. 
The expansion observed in 1997 involved all 
the major sectors. In every case output exceeded 
the peak recorded three years previously. 
Aggregate activity in goods-producing 
industries increased proportionally more than 
overall GDP, with particularly strong growth in 
construction (24%). Manufacturing activity also 
accelerated, while mining maintained the 
momentum of recent years. The increase in 
agricultural output was more modest, despite a 
much larger grain harvest in 1996/1997. 
Infrastructure services as a whole, which 
throughout the decade have been undergoing 
drastic changes as to the form in which they are 
provided and have attracted very large 
investments, expanded 6.5%. 
The 1996/1997 grain harvest was 26% larger 
than the previous season's. The much greater 
area sown after good agricultural prices were 
obtained in 1996 and changes in cultivation 
methods that gave improved yields per unit were 
factors contributing to this result. Cereal crops 
(up 50%) accounted for the bulk of this expanded 
production, with especially large increases in 
wheat and maize. 
Grain production is expected to have 
expanded again significantly (17%) in the 
1997/1998 season, to more than 62 million tons, 
although that estimate does not take into account 
the damage caused by the huge floods that 
occurred in April 1998. This time, the main 
increase has been in the oil seed harvest, which 
was almost one third larger. Apart from a few 
exceptions, such as sunflower seeds, there were 
significant improvements in yield per hectare, 
with an especially notable jump in soybean 
production (47%). Cereal production increased 
by almost 10%, with greater volumes of maize, 
sorghum and other grains. On the other hand, the 
wheat crop was down, although in absolute terms 
it was considerably larger than a few years 
earlier. 
More intense competition with grain for land 
use had resulted in a decrease in the number of 
cattle reared in the previous few years. In the 
biennium 1995-1996, more animals were 
slaughtered than were bred. In the same period, 
the average weight of cattle slaughtered went 
down and the number of breeding heifers 
slaughtered increased. Herd reduction was 
carried over to the beginning of 1997, but the 
down-turn in supply affected prices and tended 
to restore incentives for activity in this sector. 
Mining output continued to expand rapidly 
(8%), with petroleum and, especially, natural gas 
extraction on a satisfactory course. Intense 
activity continued in metal mining, a sector that 
is starting to be developed in Argentina. 
Industrial production indicators showed 
growth of about 9%, some 7% more than the 
maximum of three years previously. The rise in 
manufacturing output continued throughout the 
first 10 months of 1997 when firms in the sector, 
on aggregate, interpreted the demand for their 
goods positively. In the latter part of the year this 
perception slipped, as did production, but at the 
beginning of 1998 there were renewed signs of 
expansion. In mid-year, however, it was unclear 
which way the trends were leading. 
Output performance by the different 
manufacturing industries throughout 1997 as a 
whole was extremely varied. Among the 
expanding sectors, the automobile industry, 
construction-related activities and the 
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manufacture of agrochemicals stood out. 
Production of such goods as food and beverages, 
household articles, cellulose and paper, iron and 
steel and petroleum products expanded at a 
slower rate. In contrast, there was a decline in 
production of various goods in the chemicals and 
machinery categories. 
There was generalized expanded provision of 
basic services, with especially spectacular 
growth (more than 150%) in the number of 
cellular telephones. Electricity generation 
increased by around 8%. Water supply and gas 
production also went up (3.6% and 7% 
respectively). 
(b)Prices, wages and employment 
In a context of stability, the increase in the 
consumer price index (0.3%) was a little higher 
than in the previous year (0.1%) mainly because 
of adjustments in tariffs for public services, 
especially the urban telephone system. During 
the first few months of 1998, consumer prices 
posted somewhat larger increases than in 
previous periods. The cumulative increase for 
January and February was 0.9%; this reflected 
changes in transport tariffs and increases, in part 
seasonal, under other headings. Although the rise 
in the consumer price index halted in March and 
April, the cumulative increase over 12 months 
was 1.2% in June. Wholesale prices went down 
0.9% during 1997, both for domestic products 
-agricultural and non-agricultural alike- and for 
imported goods, and remained lower until well 
into 1998. 
The recovery that followed the severe 
recession of 1995 did not initially provide 
increased employment. The figures for May 1996 
showed the employment rate in the main urban 
areas to be at a minimum level (34% of the 
population), although unemployment, at around 
17%, had declined somewhat from its peak level 
because of a drop in the number of people 
declaring themselves members of the workforce. 
From this point on, there was a marked 
turn-around in the volume of employment. In the 
latter part of 1996 and in 1997, the employment 
rate went up and the October 1997 figure 
(36.5%), exceeded pre-recession levels. Net job 
generation was greater than the increase in the 
labour supply (the participation rate also 
increased), with the result that unemployment 
fell noticeably, although it remained high 
(13.7%) and there was much underemployment. 
The fall in unemployment was evenly spread 
geographically and was observed in about three 
quarters of urban population centres surveyed. 
Between October 1996 and October 1997, a 
large amount of net employment was generated 
(around 800,000 jobs), as estimated by 
extrapolations from the results of household 
surveys. In part, this increase reflected the larger 
numbers included in official programmes 
offering temporary employment. But, the private 
sector accounted for the bulk of labour 
absorption, largely through fixed-term contracts. 
Unit wage indices for industrial workers 
declined slightly during 1997. However, 
average remuneration in the private sector, 
calculated on the basis of declarations to the 
social security system, went up 1.2% between 
the first quarter of 1996 and the same period in 
1997. Wages increased (by up to 7%) in such 
sectors as banking, mining, trade and health 
services, and decreased in transport and 
communications, construction and several 
branches of industry. 
(c)The external sector 
The deficit in the balance-of-payments 
current account widened to some US$ 10 billion 
in 1997, a similar amount to three years 
previously. Its size relative to merchandise 
exports, although considerable (40%), was less 
than in the three-year period 1992-1994. The 
large increase in the deficit (more than US$ 6 
billion) between 1996 and 1997 was mainly due 
to a significant rise in imports. To a lesser degree, 
the expansion of imports of real services and the 
widening deficit in investment income also 
contributed to widening the deficit. 
Interest paid out increased considerably, in 
particular as a result of higher yields on public 
debt. This was partly compensated for by the rise 
in income on assets of the Central Bank, the 
banks and, according to estimates, the 
non-financial private sector. The deficit on 
profits and dividends, which had been reduced in 
1996 in spite of increasing inflows of foreign 
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investment, rose to more than US$ 2.2 billion in 
1997. 
Capital inflows enabled the current account 
deficit to be financed and appreciable reserves 
(almost US$ 3.2 billion) to accumulate in the 
Central Bank. The volume of reserves fluctuated 
during the year, rising significantly (by US$ 2.4 
billion) in the fourth quarter. 
Net capital inflows reached an unprecedented 
level, around US$ 13 billion. Flows were 
especially large in the fourth quarter (almost half 
the total for the year), after the crisis broke out in 
Asia. For the year as a whole the banking sector 
posted a net outflow of funds, while external 
financing of the non-financial public sector, 
although very substantial, was lower than in 
1996. The increase in capitai inflows was 
accounted for by operations of the non-financial 
private sector. Bond issues by this sector 
generated net proceeds of US$ 4.1 billion. The 
deficit on other transactions, including errors and 
omissions, contracted to less than one third, from 
US$ 5.4 billion in 1996 to US$ 1.6 billion in 
1997. 
There was remarkable and sustained growth 
in direct investment not associated with 
privatizations. It exceeded US$ 5.5 billion and 
represented around 43% of the net inflow of 
funds, a lower share than in 1996, but more than 
double the figure for the three-year period 
1992-1994. Privatizations (of electricity 
companies in the province of Buenos Aires) 
brought in some US$ 750 million of external 
resources (less than 6% of capital inflows, as 
against 20% in the period 1992-1994). 
The national government issued bonds to the 
value of around US$ 11 billion to non-residents, 
a similar amount to the previous year. However, 
redemptions increased and the Government 
bought back paper worth a little over US$ 2.2 
billion. 
As a result of borrowing abroad, the estimated 
gross external debt, excluding direct trade and 
financial liabilities of the non-financial private 
sector, went up by some US$ 10 billion in 1997 
and totaled nearly US$ 110 billion. Somewhat 
more than two thirds of this amount corresponded 
to the overall debt of the pubhc sector, including 
the Central Bank, whose share of the aggregate 
has been consistently decreasing. After going 
down for three consecutive years, the ratio of 
gross external debt to exports increased to around 
4:3. The ratio of debt to GDP, at about 34%, was 
a little larger than in the previous year. 
Unit prices declined for the first time since 
1991, which slowed the rise in value of exports. 
Over the year as a whole, export volumes 
increased significantly (by more than 11%) and 
were up more than one third compared with four 
years previously. 
The lower export prices chiefly affected fuels 
and commodities, and were most pronounced in 
the case of cereals, which had achieved 
satisfactory price levels in 1996. The 
deterioration in wheat and maize prices lasted 
into the early months of 1998. A similar pattern 
was observed for petroleum prices. On the other 
hand, the prices of some other export products, 
including oils, maintained their levels or 
improved. 
Notwithstanding price behaviour, the value of 
cereal exports rose sharply in 1997 (more than 
16%) thanks to considerably increased volumes 
of maize and rice shipments. After several years 
of sustained growth, oil-seed product exports as 
a whole contracted; this included a sharp 
reduction in the volume of soybean and 
sunflower seed exports, although sales of oil 
derived from them increased. The total value of 
sales of other agricultural products fell. 
In spite of prospects of controlling 
foot-and-mouth disease, the value of meat 
shipments declined by around 4%. Wool exports 
were also down, but sales of leather and skins 
increased. 
After a period in which they shot up, fuel sales 
declined. As a result, manufactures accounted for 
almost the entire increase in total exports in 1997. 
There was a remarkable increase (of 65%, to US$ 
2.5 billion) in exports of vehicles, although the 
trade deficit of the automobile sector widened 
because of larger purchases of parts and finished 
goods. Other manufacturing exports grew by 
about 11%, with rises in exports of iron and steel, 
chemical products and machinery and apparatus 
industries. 
Sales to Mercosur expanded (13.5%) more 
than the aggregate. As a result, the share of 
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regional sales in total exports from Argentina was 
around 36%. In the case of industrial 
manufactures, more than 60% of the value 
shipped went to Mercosur destinations. 
Merchandise imports expanded by 28%. 
Purchases of capital goods increased at a 
particularly fast rate (37%), as did imports of 
consumer durables (30%). Purchases of 
intermediate goods increased a little less sharply 
(25%), with large growth in imports of metal 
manufactures and metalworking inputs. 
In the area of external trade policy, talks were 
held concerning the proposed creation of a 
hemispheric free trade area and the Mercosur 
countries decided to support the negotiations to 
that end as a bloc. Towards the end of 1997, 
Mercosur agreed on an increase in external 
tariffs; in the case of Argentina, this would 
compensate for the abolition of the statistical 
surcharge, the application of which had been 
objected to by the World Trade Organization. 
The regional partners held talks on, among other 
issues, non-tariff restrictions, particularly 
financial restrictions, applied by Brazil to 
intra-Mercosur imports; the rules for banks of 
one country operating in the market of another; 
and policies relating to specific sectors, such as 




1. General trends 
With inflation at its lowest level since 
1975 (6.7%), the growth rate of the 
Bolivian economy exceeded 4% in 1997, 
but the external and fiscal deficits, mostly 
financed with external resources, 
widened considerably. Monetary and 
fiscal policy remained subordinate to the 
priority objective of consolidating 
macroeconomic stability. Supported by 
the flow of foreign capital, investment 
was as high as 19% of GDP, an increase 
linked to the privatization (capitalization) 
of public enterprises, thereby giving effect 
to one of the main goals of the outgoing 
Government. In accordance with the 
agreement on heavily indebted poor 
countries concluded with multilateral 
financing organizations, Bolivia's 
external debt was reduced by more than 
US$ 500 million over a period of 10 years. 
This debt reduction entails a commitment 
by the State to expand considerably its 
investments in education and health. 
The increase of the overall non-financial 
public sector deficit to the equivalent of 3.4% of 
GDP was basically due to the cost (2.6% of GDP 
in 1997) of the transition to the new pension system. 
In the external sector, the current account 
deficit widened considerably, to 8% of GDP, 
owing to a surge in imports and stagnating exports. 
In August, a Government was formed, 
incorporating all of the main political groupings 
except for the party of the outgoing administration. 
The new Government's programme contemplates 
no major changes in the economic sphere; its 
priority objective remains macroeconomic 
stability, which entails respecting the autonomy 
of the Central Bank. Using resources derived in 
part from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Debt Initiative, public-sector investment in both 
infrastructure and in the areas of health and 
education will be promoted. The Government 
will also endeavour to consolidate the recovery 
in domestic and foreign private investment in 
production, in order to promote growth and 
generate sources of employment to bring down 
the high level of unemployment. 
The Government's political programme 
features a national drugs control plan; in the last 
few months of 1997, major progress was made in 
terms of the number of hectares of illicit crops 
which were eradicated. 
At the end of the first half of the year, growth 
in GDP of the order of 4.5% was projected for 
1998, although there was some uncertainty 
owing to the impact on production of the El Niño 
phenomenon and the earthquake which struck the 
central area of the country in May. Inflation had 
increased as a result of the decision in late 1997 
to raise domestic hydrocarbon prices. The fiscal 
deficit was expected to decrease by the 
equivalent of 4% of GDP. It was hoped that 
private-sector investment would remain buoyant, 
particularly in the hydrocarbons sector, thanks to 
the construction of the gas pipeline to Brazil, the 
expansion of the domestic network and the 
fulfilment of investment commitments by the 
enterprises involved in the capitalization of 
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2. Ecori 
There were no major changes in economic policy 
in the early part of the year. The outgoing 
Government continued its endeavours to 
preserve macroeconomic equilibrium and to 
complete the ambitious structural reform 
programme that it had begun during its four years 
in office. Economic growth with price stability 
was maintained, but imbalances in the external 
and fiscal sectors worsened. 
The incoming Government, which is based on 
a broad coalition of the former opposition parties, 
does not propose to make fundamental changes 
in macroeconomic policy. Its basic intention is to 
consolidate progress in structural reforms and in 
the stabilization policies which have been 
applied for more than a decade, and to give 
increased priority to the social sector. 
(a)Fiscal policy 
The implementation of the programme of 
structural reforms, especially in the areas of 
pensions and capitalization, halted the downward 
trend of the non-financial public sector deficit, 
which rose to the equivalent of 3.4% of GDP. In 
particular, measures in connection with the 
change in the pensions system represented 
additional outlays of about 2.5% of GDP. 
The proportion of non-financial public-sector 
income in relation to GDP declined slightly from 
31.3% the previous year to 30.6% in 1997. This 
was essentially due to the fall, equivalent to 
three percentage points of output, in income 
from sales of hydrocarbons on the domestic 
and external markets, which in turn was due to 
the transfer of the State hydrocarbons 
company, YPFB, to "capitalize" firms. For the 
same reason, there was also a fall in income from 
sales by other enterprises transferred to the 
private sector. On the other hand, tax revenue 
increased to 13.1% of GDP, compared to 11.9% 
the previous year. 
The financing of the social security system 
and of the capitalization of public enterprises 
remained pending. Spending in 1998 to cover the 
deficit from pensions reform is estimated at about 
4% of GDP. Since it is intended to restrict the 
overall imbalance in the non-financial public 
ic policy 
sector to 4.1%, the rest of the sector will have to 
achieve a balanced result. 
(b)Monetary policy 
Monetary policy remained focused on 
keeping money supply growth in line with 
product growth and domestic inflation goals. 
Relative to the previous year, analysis of some of 
the relevant variables suggests a more lenient 
approach, while others reflect a more restrictive 
policy stance. The monetary base expanded by 
19%, owing to the net accumulation of 
international reserves, the fall in net domestic 
credit to the financial system, the expansionary 
effect of credit to the non-financial public sector 
and the increase in medium- and long-term 
liabilities. 
The 16% growth, mostly fuelled by increased 
money creation, in means of payment in national 
currency caused some concern, especially since 
the Central Bank considers it to be one of the key 
inflationary factors in Bolivia. Quasi-money in 
national currency increased by as little as 10%, 
which accentuated its marginalized position as a 
reserve instrument in relation to foreign 
currency deposits. It should be noted that the 
differential in the real deposit rate between 
savings deposits in national currency and in 
dollars was barely three points, whereas for 
lending rates it was more than 15 points. Money 
supply in dollars expanded by 18%. Broad 
money (M3), including dollar deposits, grew by 
17%. 
Monetary policy also sought to temper 
interest-rate volatility and to ensure a stable yield 
from Government securities. In the medium term, 
domestic and international rates (including a 
country-risk premium) are expected to converge. 
Lending and deposit rates fell a little, but the 
spread did not change. The foreign-currency 
lending rate remained stable in 1997, fluctuating 
around 17%. The lending rate in national 
currency for short terms (up to 60 days) fell 
steeply from an annual average of 37% to 17%. 
However, the longer-term rate remained above 
40%, showing that the country risk premium is 
still very high. 
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Table 1 
BOLIVIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997" 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 3.8 4.6 
Per capita gross domestic product 1.5 2.3 
Gross national income 2.2 6.1 
Gross domestic product, by sector 
Goods 4.6 6.3 
Basic services 7.5 5.4 
Other services 2.8 2.5 
Contribution to growth of GDP 
Consumption 2.3 2.7 
Government 0.1 0.0 
Private 2.2 2.7 
Gross domestic investment -2.1 2.0 
Exports 3.6 2.0 
Imports -0.1 -2.0 
Gross domestic investment 11.1 
National savings 6.0 
External savings 5.2 
Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100)b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(bolivianos per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
Public debt 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 









































Employment and wages 
Labour force participation rate 51.9 51.3 
Open unemployment ratee 9.9 7.3 
Real average wage 






100.0 93.4 97.1 
Growth rates 
Prices (December-December) 
Consumer prices 16.6 18.0 














Millions of dollars 







































































































77.4 69.6 72.1 
4.80 5.08 5.25 












































































Table 1 (conclusion) 
BOLIVIA 




Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Money and credit 
Monetary balances of 
banking system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit to public 
sector 
Domestic credit to private sector 
Money (Ml) 




Real interest rates (annualized) 
Deposit rate 
Lending rate 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregates as a percentage of GDP. d Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the 
economically active population (EAP). Includes Errors and omissions. i Refers to net interest as shown on the balance 
of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange 
rate. 
Table 2 
BOLIVIA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1995 1996 1997 a 1998 a 
I II III IV I n III IV I II III IV I II 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 9.7 10.9 9.4 12.6 14.5 12.3 13.3 8.0 3.6 5.2 3.7 6.7 9.4 7.9 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 119.2 122.0 120.0 114.8 111.2 111.9 110.6 110.9 109.6 109.1 107.7 107.0 103.2 103.7 
Real interest rates 
(annualized, to) 
Deposit rate 7.0 6.2 12.8 -3.8 2.7 16.6 8.1 10.2 16.6 5.5 9.7 -1.5 3.6 
Lending rate 34.3 35.3 51.3 26.0 27.7 53.2 40.1 52.7 58.5 44.5 43.0 17.7 31.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Preliminary figures. Refers to the exchange rate for imports. 
143 
The Central Bank established new 
regulations concerning the reserve 
requirement, with a view to lowering its cost 
for financial institutions and improving the 
Bank's control of the financial system through 
new liquidity mechanisms. The new 
regulations incorporate two different models: 
reserves in cash and reserves in securities, both 
compulsory. In the first, the average of about 
9% required in the past is reduced to 2%, to 
maintain cash reserves enabling the bank to 
conduct everyday transactions without 
difficulty. The second model will enable the 
banks to maintain a liquid assets fund which, 
invested in profitable instruments, will 
generate a market yield for participants. The 
latter model will give financial entities access 
to an automatic line of credit should they need 
very-short-term funds. This fund is mainly 
financed from amounts freed by the reduced 
reserve ratio. 
Stock market transactions increased, totalling 
almost 40% more in 1997 than in the previous 
year. Trading was concentrated on a 
fixed-interest market characterized by lack of 
variety among the instruments and a very small 
number of institutional issuers and investors 
(mutual funds, pension funds). 
(c) Foreign exchange policy 
The Central Bank persevered in its policy of 
fixing the exchange by means of 
mini-devaluations. In its market interventions it 
continued to use an auction mechanism known as 
the "mini-market" (bolsín). This policy has 
enabled it to preserve price stability and maintain 
a stable but competitive real exchange rate, to 
avoid eroding the competitiveness of the 
Bolivian economy in relation to its main trading 
partners. At the end of the year, the Central 
Bank's selling rate was 5.37 bolivianos to the 
dollar. 
Nonetheless, the magnitude of external flows, 
in connection with the capitalization of 
public-sector enterprises and other direct 
investments, led to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate which, while it relieved 
inflationary pressure, encouraged imports and 
weakened export performance. Bolivia 
experienced an appreciation of the exchange rate 
with practically all its main trading partners. 
As of December, the cumulative rate of 
devaluation of the nominal exchange rate was 
-3% and real appreciation against the dollar 
was about 3%. 
(d)Structural reforms 
The outgoing Government implemented a set 
of structural transformations: administrative 
decentralization, educational reform, popular 
participation, privatization or capitalization of 
public-sector enterprises, and changes in the 
pension system. The last two were closely linked, 
since the private pension funds, which manage 
the Individual Capitalization Fund made up of 
the contributions of all the participants, are also 
in charge of the Collective Capitalization Fund. 
The latter Fund operates using the resources set 
aside by the capitalized enterprises for payment 
of the solidarity bond (Bonosol). 
In 1997, more than 350,000 persons received 
this benefit, equivalent to US$ 248 per capita. 
The amounts disbursed, including US$ 7 million 
paid by the private pension funds for 
administration, totalled US$ 96 million, 
exceeding the initial forecasts of US$ 75 million 
and 300,000 recipients. The payment of the 
solidarity bond is financed by means of shares 
owned by Bolivian citizens and the dividends 
paid to the private pension funds by the 
capitalized enterprises, which totalled about 
US$ 46 million in 1997. The remaining US$ 50 
million was covered by means of a bank loan, at 
an interest rate of 11.25%, secured by the equity 
of the capitalized enterprises. 
As part of its structural reform commitments, 
the new Government has undertaken to improve 
the regulatory framework, privatize the refinery 
and service areas of Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), submit a new Code 
of Penal Procedure to Congress, draft 
amendments to the Labour Code and design a 
broad programme of customs reforms. The latter 
will include control and supervision systems and 
will be supported technically and financially by 
the International Monetary Fund, the 




One of the new Government's structural 
reform proposals is the Bolivian strategy for 
controlling drug trafficking, which aims to take 
the country out of the illegal drugs trade within 
five years. The goal is the eradication of all illicit 
In 1997 the Bolivian economy grew by 4.2%, 
with particularly strong performances in basic 
services, construction and public works. Inflation 
continued to fall, reaching its lowest level since 
1975 (6.7%); however, employment trends were 
not encouraging. In the external sector, the 
current account deficit widened considerably, 
financed by exceptional growth in foreign direct 
investment. 
(a)Economic activity 
Overall supply and demand grew by over 5% 
in 1997. Increased demand was mostly based on 
increased investment, particularly from the 
private sector, concentrated in the hydrocarbons 
sectors (petroleum and gas). Exports contracted 
slightly. Within the overall aggregate supply, 
there was significant increase in imports; this 
reflected growth in investments, an area 
incorporating a large imported component. 
The almost 12% increase in gross fixed capital 
formation brought this item up to 17% of GDP in 
national currency. Higher investment was 
reflected in a US$ 75 million increase in capital 
goods imports and in the boom in public and 
private construction; construction was stimulated 
by the fact that the capitalized enterprises had 
begun to give effect to the investment 
commitments which they had undertaken. There 
was also a significant increase in inventory 
changes, owing to the construction of the gas 
pipeline to Brazil. Although total gross 
investment in national currency amounted to 
19% of output, national savings remained 
stagnant at around 11% of GDP. Most of the 
increase in investment was financed from 
external savings, through the expansion of the 
current account deficit to more than 8% of GDP. 
The electric power, gas and water industries 
registered the lowest growth rate in the past five 
and excess coca crops by the year 2002. The cost 
of this five-year strategy will amount to about 
US$ 950 million, 85% of which will require 
external financing. 
years (7.6%), but were still among the most 
buoyant areas. The most important event of the 
year in this sector was the beginning of 
construction of the gas pipeline to link the 
department of Santa Cruz to the major Brazilian 
city of São Paulo; this accounts for more than one 
percentage point of the growth of output in 1997. 
Gas exports are expected to begin in 1999, with 
a commitment to supply eight million cubic 
metres per day for the first year. The Brazilian 
side has expressed interest in receiving up to 30 
million cubic metres per day in the seventh year 
(2006). 
In the area of goods production, the 
agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing sector 
performed well, with a growth rate of 5%, 
significantly higher than the previous year, 
fuelled by good wheat, cotton and sunflower 
harvests, and good fruit crops. The livestock 
industry also performed well. The construction 
and public works sector grew by more than 7%, 
but growth in transport, storage and 
communications slumped to 6.8% owing to a 
slowdown in telecommunications. 
The performance of manufacturing industry 
as a whole was similar to that of GDP. The most 
buoyant branches were clothing, leather 
footwear, chemicals, non-ferrous metal basic 
industries and printing. 
(b)Prices, wages and employment 
In November 1997 the cumulative inflation 
rate was under 4%, but there was a 2.9% surge in 
December owing to a 28% rise in fuel prices and 
an increase in transport charges. The increase in 
the level of consumer prices was 6.7% as of the 
end of the year, but this was still the lowest 
increase in 23 years. The area that showed the 
biggest increase at the national level (averaging 
18%) was transport and communications, 
3. The main variables 
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because the readjustment of fuel prices had a 
direct impact on transport charges. Food and 
beverages rose by only 0.6%. 
The index of average private-sector wages, 
calculated by the National Institute of Statistics, 
showed an increase of 8%. The biggest real wage 
increases were in mining, manufacturing and 
financial services. No significant progress was 
observed in respect of job creation or the 
unemployment rate. 
(c)The externa] sector 
The current account deficit widened 
considerably, by US$ 300 million, resulting in an 
overall trade gap of US$ 660 million, equivalent 
to 8% of output. The worsening of the external 
deficit was to a great extent due to the increased 
trade imbalance, caused by considerable growth 
in the volume of imports and the stagnation of 
exports, although the terms of trade improved 
slightly. 
The value of exports weakened slightly, 
mainly owing to the considerable fall (-25%) in 
natural gas exports following the break in the gas 
pipeline to Argentina early in the year. There was 
also a slight fall in the price of gas exports. 
Bolivia's export base consists of a small 
number of commodities. Soya, zinc, gold, timber, 
tin and natural gas account for almost two thirds 
of total exports. Analysis of the composition of 
shipments in recent decades shows a stagnation 
of the share of minerals, a significant fall in that 
of hydrocarbons and a large increase of 
non-traditional agro-industrial products. When 
the gas pipeline to Brazil becomes operational, 
this export structure will change in favour of 
natural gas, exports of which will exceed US$ 
500 million per year from 1999 onwards. 
The value of imports grew by 12% as a result 
of an overall trend; imports of consumer durables 
rose by more than 10%, those of raw materials by 
14% and those of capital goods by 11%. The 
latter increase was affected by rising domestic 
and foreign investment, with the implementation 
of investments agreed to as part of the 
capitalization of public-sector enterprises, the 
increase in foreign direct investment and the start 
of construction of the gas pipeline to Brazil. 
Thus, the volume of capital goods imports 
increased by 13%, although there was a slight fall 
in the unit values of those goods. 
Foreign direct investment continued to rise in 
1997. The new institutional framework, 
macroeconomic stability and the capitalization 
process encouraged capital inflows, and overall 
foreign investment increased by 16%. 
Hydrocarbons were the most attractive sector, 
accounting for 54% of the total. The start of 
construction of the pipeline to Brazil for natural 
gas exports contributed significantly to the 
increase of foreign investment in the sector. 
The balance of the medium- and long-term 
external public debt at 31 December 1997 was 
US$ 4,233 million, US$ 133 million down on the 
previous year's figure. The country received US$ 
383 million in external disbursements in 1997, 
mostly for the consolidation of structural reforms 
and for infrastructure projects, especially in the 
areas of transport and energy. 
The net international reserves of the Central 
Bank of Bolivia increased by US$ 115 million, 
ending the year at US$ 1,066 million, an amount 
sufficient to cover almost six months' worth of 
imports. 
In September 1997, Bolivia acceded to the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative. 
This agreement represents valuable support for 
the sustainability of the balance of payments, 
since it is equivalent to a reduction from 270% to 
225% in the present value of the debt-export 
ratio. This means a reduction of some US$ 450 





In 1997 the Brazilian economy grew at 
the same rather sedate pace (3%) as the 
year before, while the continued progress 
of the stabilization process was reflected 
in the lowest rate of inflation (4.3%) to be 
recorded in the last 50 years. The deficit 
on the country's external accounts 
deepened further, but the copious inflow 
of external resources provided enough 
financing to cover the shortfall. 
Nevertheless, the size of this deficit (the 
equivalent of over 4% of GDP) and the 
failure to move more quickly in carrying 
out a thoroughgoing adjustment in 
public-sector accounts have placed the 
country in a highly vulnerable position, 
as became evident in late October when 
the Asian crisis began to have a stronger 
impact on Brazil's economy (primarily in 
the form of voluminous capital outflows). 
The adoption of corrective measures and 
the severe deterioration in the external 
situation triggered an economic 
slowdown and pushed the unemployment 
rate up slightly. The Government did 
succeed, however, in checking the rapid 
descent of international reserves, and in 
the first half of 1998 it actually managed 
to reverse this trend altogether. The 
prospect of general elections in October 
complicated the situation further, since, 
depending on the outcome, they could 
1 trends 
spell changes in the course of economic 
policy. 
The process of restructuring Brazil's 
production activities on the basis of reforms 
implemented in previous years moved forward in 
1997. The high level of incoming foreign direct 
investment was associated with the 
Government's rapid progress in implementing its 
privatization programme, and the total 
investment rate reached its highest level of the 
decade (around 23%). Exports of goods and 
services expanded by over 10%, thereby 
regaining their former momentum, although 
imports rose even faster (15%). The real 
exchange rate climbed slightly but the local 
currency continued to appreciate at a 
considerable rate in real terms. 
Exports to the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur) were up by 24% and thus outpaced 
Mercosur imports (21%) by a small margin; 
Brazil nonetheless posted a deficit on its trade 
within this customs union, in contrast to the 
situation some years ago, when it had been 
running a large surplus. The operation of this 
agreement was upset to some degree when Brazil 
and other member countries introduced import 
barriers, and an arduous round of negotiations 
had to be undertaken in order to mitigate the 
impact of these measures. 
Until October 1997, economic policy had 
been based on the assumption that the inflows of 
external savings used to cover the current account 
deficit would continue at their present level or 
even increase further. Economic policy-makers 
were also working on the assumption that 
nominal interest rates, which had been very high 
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ever since the introduction of the Real Plan in 
1994, would begin to moved downward. These 
expectations were not borne out, however, and 
the decline in inflation led to further increases in 
real interest rates. This, in conjunction with the 
stagnation of total wages, precluded a more rapid 
expansion of the economy, and the high level 
of imports fueled expectations of an unstable 
growth pattern. Nevertheless, the headway 
made by the privatization programme, together 
with the merger and restructurings of numerous 
business firms and banks, drew investors into 
the stock market, and during the first half of the 
year the stock index soared by over 70%. The 
fiscal deficit for January-October 1997 was 
somewhat lower than it had been, but was still 
very high. Up to September, Brazil's bond prices 
were rising sharply, implying a favourable 
assessment by international economic agents of 
its country-risk. Delays in the passage of 
constitutional amendments needed to undertake 
civil-service and social-security reforms are 
hindering the Government's efforts to bring 
public-sector accounts under control, however. 
Late in October, the intensification of the 
Asian crisis and a lack of confidence in the future 
course of the economy set off a flurry of sell 
orders on the São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro stock 
exchanges, and this was mirrored by a massive 
sell-off of Brazilian Brady bonds on international 
markets by national investors trying to cover their 
losses on the local and other emerging markets. 
The collapse of bond prices from November on 
provided a profit-making opportunity for 
arbitrageurs, since the domestic interest rate was 
lower than the implicit rate on these securities. 
When speculative movements in currency 
futures were detected, the Central Bank had to 
sell off a huge amount of its international reserves 
(over US$ 10 billion) in order to shore up its 
foreign exchange policy. 
Policy-makers then changed course, and in 
response, in particular, to the prospect of a flow 
of resources into emerging markets, the 
Government adopted a package of measures 
aimed at reducing the economy's external 
vulnerability. Tighter monetary and fiscal 
policies were implemented in an effort to 
preserve the existing exchange-rate regime, 
maintain price stability and curb the increase in 
external borrowing requirements. Real annual 
interest rates doubled, jumping to over 35%, and 
the Government announced a series of measures 
designed to boost the public sector's primary 
balance by approximately 20 billion reais (2.5% 
of GDP) in 1998. 
The uncertainty prevailing in the market 
paralyzed the domestic financial system, as the 
tightening of the money supply caused by the 
outflow of dollars prevented the system from 
achieving the necessary liquidity to set interest 
rates. At the same time, the heavy losses 
registered on the stock exchange and on other 
types of operations cast doubt upon the solvency 
of some financial institutions, especially in the 
case of a number of brokerage houses and 
investment banks. The Central Bank had to buy 
up large amounts of federal bonds from the 
financial system and announced that it was 
doubling its benchmark interest rates. In the final 
week of October, the Central Bank's net bond 
acquisitions amounted to 3.8 billion reais and the 
liquidity assistance provided to the system 
totalled 6.5 billion. 
These adjustment measures, in combination 
with adverse expectations, pushed the 
economy into a severe slump in October 1997. 
During the first quarter of 1998, year-on-year 
GDP growth amounted to only 1.1%. This 
sluggish performance served to consolidate the 
progress made in terms of price stabilization 
and to curb the expansion of the current 
account deficit, but it did so at the cost of a 
deteriorating fiscal situation and retreating 
investment. This cooling down of the economy 
was seen mainly in the manufacturing and 
services sectors, where it had a direct impact 
on unemployment. In fact, unemployment. 
topped 8% in March as the level of 
manufacturing activity and the tertiary sector's 
job creation capacity both plummeted. The 
steepest downturn was in the production of 
consumer durables (-22%). In contrast, 
exports of manufactures soared by 17% in 
January-April, thanks to the momentum 
provided by automotive and aircraft sales. 
Rising interest rates spurred capital inflows, 
and by the end of April 1998 the influx of funds 
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Table 1 
BRAZIL: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 




Contribution to erowth of GDP c 
Consumption 
Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National savings 
External savings 
Employment and wages 
Labour force participation rate e 










































































































































Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100)" 
Nominal exchange rate 
(reais per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 
100.0 85.2 83.3 
Growth rates 














































Millions of dollars 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account ' 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
Gross debt 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 
























































-17 972 -24 347 -33 484 
-10 814 -14 586 -19 569 
51 819 54 524 60 252 
62 633 69 110 79 821 
31 905 33 122 25 647 
13 933 8 775 -7 837 
-12 919 -8 664 7 871 
22.6 23.0 24.7 
15.7 18.0 17.2 
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Money and credit 
Net international reserves 
Money (Ml) 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
Deposit rate 
Lending rate 
Equivalent interest rate 






1990 1991 1992 
Percentages of GDP 
28.9 24.6 24.2 
33.2 30.6 30.7 
1.4 -0.2 -1.8 
Growth rates 
3.0 -5.7 152.5 
2 334.7 330.7 867.3 
Annual rates 
3.3 34.7 31.9 
405.8 89.6 196.8 














































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. For 1989 and 1990, includes changes in stocks. e Percentages of the 
working-age population; six metropolitan areas. Percentages of the economically active population (EAP); six metropolitan 
areas. 8 Workers covered by existing social and labour laws. This rate is expressed in reais per US$ 1 million for the 
years up to 1989 and in reais per dollar from 1990 onward. One reais -Brazil's new currency- is equivalent to 2,750 cruzeiros 
reais. ' Includes Errors and omissions. J Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports 
of goods and services. Includes operating adjustments. Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the 
exchange rate. 
Table 2 
BRAZIL: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1995 1996 1997" 1998a 
I II III IV I H III IV I II III IV I II 
Gross domestic product 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year)" 10.4 6.4 1.0 -0.3 -1.4 2.2 5.4 4.8 3.8 3.9 2.9 2.2 1.1 1.7 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 277.1 33.4 25.5 22.0 20.1 16.3 13.0 9.1 8.6 5.9 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.6 
Real effective exchange ratec 
(index: 1990=100) 
Exports 
(millions of dollars) 
Imports 
(millions of dollars) 




120.9 125.0 121.3 118.4 115.6 113.5 113.5 114.7 112.4 112.2 112.9 115.0 114.3 115.4 
9731 11 719 12729 12 328 10 302 12619 12955 11 882 10 656 14 130 14899 13301 11 902 14 103 
12 085 13 631 11918 12 030 10 734 12 474 14 235 15 835 13 233 15 409 17 248 16 103 13 415 14 560 
33.0 24.7 25.8 15.7 19.9 9.9 17.2 19.0 13.0 16.1 19.5 29.9 21.7 18.0 
114.5 89.9 59.9 63.1 44.0 28.1 46.0 48.5 41.7 32.8 37.8 63.8 63.2 92.2 
Money (Ml) 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 202.0 145.0 22.3 26.0 34.6 33.4 31.9 4.6 62.2 58.7 56.1 60.1 11.0 17.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Preliminary figures. Based on figures expressed in the local currency at constant prices. Refers to the exchange rale for imports. 
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had driven up international reserves to 
approximately US$ 72 billion, or US$ 12 billion 
more than before the outbreak of the crisis in 
October 1997. The country has been receiving 
substantial inflows since February 1998 in the 
form of medium-term financing (bonds and 
notes), equity investment and short-term 
capital. In addition, thanks to the narrowing of 
the trade gap brought about by slower import 
growth and an increase in exports, the current 
account deficit has leveled off at slightly over 
4% of GDP. 
In response to the improved foreign trade 
situation, more optimistic expectations 
concerning the international financial scenario, 
the abundant foreign exchange inflows of the 
preceding months and the slippage in the level of 
economic activity, the Central Bank lowered its 
benchmark interest rate on a number of 
occasions, and by May 1998 it had dropped to 
21.75%, which was almost as low as its pre-crisis 
level. It was hoped that this lower rate would spur 
a reactivation of production while still attracting 
external financial resources. 
The reduction in interest rates will also have 
a positive effect on public-sector accounts, 
whose balances have taken a turn for the worse 
since the final quarter of 1997. The total 
operating deficit for the 12-month period 
ending in September 1997 had decreased to 
2.6% of GDP, but it then surged upward, thus 
closing out the year at 4.3%, which was higher 
The country's heightened external vulnerability 
and, later on, the impact of the Asian crisis 
obliged the Government to adopt a series of 
measures to cut its fiscal deficit. Furthermore, the 
policy aimed at lowering the domestic 
economy's high interest rates, which had been 
implemented in conjunction with the 
introduction of the Real Plan in 1994, had to be 
suspended and, ultimately, reversed so 
completely that rates actually doubled. Foreign 
exchange policy was not altered, however, and 
the exchange-rate band therefore remained in 
place, although it's slope was somewhat steeper 
than the increase in the consumer price index. 
than the 1996 figure. The gap continued to widen 
during the early months of 1998, carrying the 
cumulative 12-month figure to 5%, as a result of 
the combined effect of higher debt service 
payments and a steep drop in the primary 
balances of all levels of government and of State 
enterprises. If privatization revenues are factored 
in, then the figures are less worrisome, but the use 
of those earnings has sparked a heated 
controversy. The dispute centres around the fact 
that some units of government, particularly the 
states, have used them to pay back wages, to 
cover debts owed to suppliers, to make pension 
fund contributions and to undertake social 
investments and expenditures, whereas the 
federal government had intended for the bulk 
of these funds to be used to reduce the public 
debt. 
The fiscal measures adopted in November 
1997 did not have the expected results. Federal 
government revenues for the first four months of 
1998 were up 26%, but this was partly due to 
factors that had nothing to do with the new policy 
package. What is more, the deficit was no smaller 
than before, since the upturn in receipts was 
offset by higher debt service and other spending 
pressures. In addition, the central government's 
primary surplus virtually disappeared and the 
positive primary balance registered by State 
enterprises shrank. One of the main causes of this 
poor outcome was the social security system's 
mounting deficit. 
Structural reforms continued to move forward, 
and the Government's ambitious privatization 
programme was once again a central feature of 
this effort. 
(a)Fiscal policy 
Up to September 1997, the Government's 
operating deficit was shrinking, thanks to 
improvements in the primary balance and lower 
interest payments in real terms. The public sector 
posted a primary surplus equivalent to 0.7% of 
GDP (in contrast to a 0.1% deficit in December 
1996). The slight decline in interest payments 
2. Economic policy 
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(from 3.8% of GDP in December 1996 to 3.4%) 
lowered the operating deficit to 2.7% of GDP 
(versus 3.9% the year before). 
The results turned in by State enterprises 
and by the state and municipal governments 
were responsible for this improvement, as the 
federal government had made the refinancing 
of the latter's debts conditional upon the 
implementation of fiscal austerity policies. The 
elimination of the primary deficit, however, 
was mainly a t t r ibutable to the use of 
privatization revenues and to the reduction in 
the debt burden achieved through its 
renegotiation with the federal government. For 
their part, State enterprises were able to 
improve their primary balance through rate 
adjustments and stricter controls on current 
expenditure. 
In contrast, the federal government ran into 
difficulties when it tried to improve its finances. 
Apart from the additional receipts obtained from 
the provisional financial transactions tax (CPMF), 
real revenues were flat, and the Treasury had to 
increase its transfers in order to cover the social 
security system's growing deficit. 
Disbursements for unemployment insurance and 
other current expenditures also rose. 
During the last quarter of 1997 the fiscal 
situation took a turn for the worse. In December, 
state and municipal governments ran up the lion's 
share of their primary deficit for the entire year 
(5.1 billion reais out of a total of 6.6 billion). 
After having eliminated virtually the whole of 
their nominal deficit in the 12 months to 
September, State enterprises' outlays rebounded 
sharply in the final quarter. As was also true of 
Brazil 's state governments, some public 
enterprises used their privatization revenues 
for investments, but others had to make very 
costly adjustments or modifications before 
they could divest themselves of all or part of 
their assets. 
The deteriorating fiscal situation and the 
renegotiation of payment obligations between 
the executive branch of the federal government 
and state governments both influenced the level 
of domestic public debt, particularly with regard 
to federal government securities. In December 
1996, the balance of those securities was 
equivalent to 21.4% of GDP, but by December 
1997 the figure had risen to 29.9% and by the 
following February to 35.8%. Then, with the 
outbreak of the Asian crisis, debt maturities 
began to grow shorter, and the Government 
reached the point where it was issuing indexed 
35-day bonds, something which had not been 
seen since the first few months of the Real Plan. 
This combination of mounting debt levels, 
sharply rising interest rates and shorter maturities 
coalesced into a vicious circle in terms of the 
Treasury's cash flow. 
Despite the new conditions prevailing in the 
international market, the Government wanted to 
prevent the rate of depreciation from 
accelerating, since this would negate the 
beneficial effects of the stabilization process. 
Accordingly, it took steps to bring about a drastic 
reduction in the supply of external financing. In 
addition to restrictive monetary measures, it 
announced a tough fiscal package and a series of 
export-promotion measures. All this was 
intended to reduce the public sector's deficit for 
1998 by 20 billion reais. 
To this end, cuts were made in both current 
and capital expenditure (the budget allocations 
for health, education, social welfare and agrarian 
reform were not touched, however); tax rates and 
other charges were increased (personal income 
taxes; excise taxes on motor vehicles, beverages 
and fuel; the airport tax; and the rates and prices 
charged by federal government enterprises); and 
regional and sectoral tax incentives were cut 
back. In addition, the transfer of available assets 
and profits of government-owned banks was 
made mandatory, new borrowing limits were set 
for state and municipal governments and for 
State-owned firms, and all applications for 
external loans from multilateral and government 
agencies were suspended. The Brazilian 
Reinsurance Institute was added to the list of 
firms slated for privatization, and the authorities 
began to consider the possibility of auctioning off 
additional highway operating concessions. A 
credit guarantee fund was set up for loans to small 
and medium-sized exporters, and provisions 
were introduced to provide their raw material 
suppliers with access to external financing. The 
necessary regulations were established for the 
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re-introduction of export-credit insurance 
coverage, and funds were transferred to the 
Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento 
Económico Social (National Bank for Economic 
and Social Development, or BNDES) as backing 
for export credits. The common external tariff 
was raised by three percentage points under an 
agreement with the other members of Mercosur, 
and a number of measures relating to the 
financial system were adopted in an effort to 
reduce expenditures and exercise greater control 
over commercial banks' foreign-exchange 
positions. 
The implementation of these measures 
encountered a great deal of resistance and ran into 
operational difficulties. The increase made in 
income taxes and the cutback of tax incentives 
were, as expected, the measures that roused the 
greatest opposition. As part of the Government's 
response to this reaction, lay-offs of civil servants 
were scaled back and greater selectivity was 
employed in determining which staff members 
should be let go. In addition, the level of 
severance pay was increased. 
Eight months after this policy package was 
announced, the fiscal situation had still not 
been cleared up. The federal government's 
increased revenues were the result of one-off 
measures, such as cellular telephone operating 
concessions, the temporary tax on financial 
transactions (CPMF) and advance payments on 
corporate income taxes. Meanwhile, spending 
pressures in the areas of health and education 
continued to be felt. The best-case scenario for 
state governments and State-owned enterprises 
was that they would manage to balance their 
primary accounts. At the same time, the state 
governments' privatization drive was slowing 
down, although the State of São Paulo did carry 
off the auction of one of its electric power 
distributing companies (ELEKTRO) successfully, 
selling it for nearly US$ 1.3 billion. The picture 
is even bleaker than it would otherwise seem 
because some of the most important fiscal 
instruments used to boost revenues -including the 
CPMF tax, the fiscal stabilization fund and the 
increase in the ceiling rate for personal income 
taxes-have only been authorized for a fixed 
time period. 
(b)Monetary policy 
The influence of the Brazilian economy's 
increased external vulnerability on monetary 
policy had already made itself felt in 1997. In 
May, the Central Bank suspended the gradual 
reductions it had been making in its benchmark 
interest rates since the year before and 
stabilized its basic rate -the TBC- at a monthly 
level of 1.58%. Factors underlying this 
decision included the prevailing uncertainty as 
to the future course of domestic economic 
activity and the trade balance, the need to hold 
the rate of devaluation to around 0.6% per 
month without eroding the rate of return in 
dollar terms of local-currency operations, and 
the need to take precautions given the 
possibility of impending changes in 
international interest rates. In November, the 
Central Bank doubled its benchmark rates as a 
way of firming up the stabilization process, 
which was being undermined by the sharp 
downturn in capital inflows prompted by the 
Asian crisis. 
At the same time, steps were taken to 
consolidate the restructuring of the country's 
financial system. A number of major Brazilian 
banks were sold to foreign firms (Hong Kong & 
Shanghai Banking Corporation and Banco 
Santander), the privatization of a number of 
State-owned banks was begun (including those 
of the states of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais) 
and two privately-owned local banks merged 
(Banco Brasileiro de Desconto, or Banco 
Bradesco, and Banco de Credito Nacional, S.A., 
or BCN). 
Because of the high cost of inter-fund 
transfers -owing, inter alia, to the establishment 
of a temporary 0.2% tax on financial transactions 
(the CPMF)-economic agents stopped using other 
monetary instruments, such as time and savings 
deposits, that are usually very common during 
periods of high inflation. Consequently, both the 
monetary base and Ml expanded substantially 
(by around 60%). The October crisis obliged the 
monetary authorities to adopt an expansionary 
stance in order to counteract the effects on 
domestic liquidity of the country's losses of 
international reserves, and in the final quarter, the 
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Central Bank had to buy up 20.5 billion reais 
worth of Treasury securities. 
The stock market index skyrocketed 70% in 
the first half of the year, thanks to the progress 
made in implementing the Government's 
privatization programme and to the merger and 
restructuring of a number of firms and banks. 
During the first nine months of the year, net 
portfolio investment inflows totalled US$ 8.4 
billion. In late October, however, the deepening 
crisis in Asia and doubts concerning the 
economy's future sparked heavy selling on 
Brazilian exchanges, which recorded a 
cumulative drop of over 30%; nevertheless, the 
stock index was still 20% above its end-1996 
mark. 
(c) Foreign exchange policy 
No major changes have been made in the 
Government's foreign exchange policy. Price 
stability continued to be its prime objective, 
although policy-makers also took care to keep the 
country's external accounts in balance by 
promoting exports, curbing the rapid growth rate 
of imports and paving the way for capital inflows 
so that the country would be able to cover its 
current account deficit. These efforts have played 
a decisive role in maintaining price stability, but 
they have not stopped the current account deficit 
from increasing sharply, even though in 1997 
export growth rebounded from the sluggish rates 
of the two preceding years. 
In order to safeguard the progress made by the 
stabilization process, the Government decided to 
hold the currency's rate of depreciation steady 
despite the adverse implications of the October 
crisis, and it therefore had to adopt certain 
monetary and fiscal measures to ensure the 
viability of that policy stance. The requirement 
that import sales be made on a sight-payment 
basis was maintained, except in the case of 
operations having a term of over one year, and 
the common external tariff was raised three 
percentage points by agreement with the other 
member of Mercosur. 
In 1997 the depreciation of the currency 
bordered on 7.4%, with a monthly average of 
0.6%. This rate was maintained well into 1998, 
apart from small discretionary deviations, as 
the currency band was adjusted to permit some 
slippage in the exchange rate. In practice, the 
system has worked much like a preset crawling 
peg, since the Central Bank is constantly 
intervening in the market, setting up a 
succession of large increases and decreases in 
reserves. 
Thanks to the greater convergence of 
domestic prices (for tradables and 
non-tradables), the real exchange rate declined in 
the first half of 1997, but it rose in the second, 
and this trend carried over into the early months 
of 1998. The exchange rate rose against the 
United States dollar but fell against the other 
currencies in the basket, since the dollar 
appreciated against the yen and the deutsche 
mark. 
(d) Structural reforms 
In the area of State reforms, US$ 17.4 billion 
worth of federal and state assets were privatized 
in 1997. The federal government sold off its 
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) and the 
first power generating units to be privatized, as 
well as cellular telephone concessions. 
Meanwhile, a number of state governments 
transferred electricity distribution companies and 
shares in telephone companies to the private 
sector. Procedures were also established for the 
sale of State telephony firms and of the major 
power generating companies that are scheduled 
for privatization in 1998. On 29 July 1998, the 
Government auctioned off 12 firms that had 
made up Telebras, the State telecommunications 
holding company, for US$ 19 billion. Regulatory 
agencies were created to watch over the 
telecommunications, electricity and petroleum 
industries and the State petroleum monopoly was 
disbanded. 
The federal government's hopes for quick 
passage of the constitutional reform bills 
concerning the civil service and social security 
system that it needs in order to balance its fiscal 
accounts were dashed, however, when 
Congress voted in June 1998 to eliminate a 
number of important provisions proposed by 
the Executive. 
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3. The main variables 
(a)Economic activity 
GDP growth remained in the 3% range in 1997, 
but showed a tendency to weaken in the second 
half of the year after ending the first half with 
a growth rate verging on 5%. Thanks to a strong 
increase in the volume of imports of goods and 
services, total supply expanded by 5% (two 
percentage points more than GDP). The 
external component of total demand grew 
considerably more rapidly than its domestic 
component (9.2% versus 4.6%); within the 
latter, however, fixed investment was quite 
robust (up by nearly 8%) after its sluggish 
performance of the year before. As a result, 
gross capital formation rose to 22.9% of GDP, 
thus reaching its highest level so far this decade. 
At 4.3% of GDP, the increase in investment in 
imported machinery and equipment was 
particularly notable. This coefficient had been a 
meagre 0.8% in 1990, but has been climbing 
steeply ever since in response to the country's 
structural reform process. 
As was also true during the three preceding 
years, consumption outpaced GDP, thus causing 
national saving to slip to 15.8% in 1997 (versus 
20% in 1993), and external saving consequently 
had to be used to finance nearly a third of gross 
capital formation. 
The manufacturing sector's performance was 
very uneven. Until the third quarter, the sector's 
GDP was growing at a year-on-year rate of 5.3%, 
but this trend came to an end in November, and 
was reversed altogether in the first quarter of 
1998. Consumer durables surged upward at an 
annualized rate of 16% up to June 1997, but by 
September this category ' s growth rate had cooled 
to 10%. This loss of momentum was attributable 
to flagging domestic demand for electronics and 
motor vehicles; nevertheless, the output of these 
products reached record levels, thanks to higher 
exports. In the course of 1997 the production of 
capital and intermediate goods rallied, however, 
as stronger investment, especially in 
infrastructure and industry, generated additional 
purchase orders for Brazilian producers. 
Meanwhile, suppliers of inputs and other raw 
materials have been carrying out a 
comprehensive restructuring process in order to 
heighten their ability to compete against imports; 
their efforts in this regard have been bolstered by 
a narrower spread between the cost of domestic 
and external financing and by the opportunity to 
lengthen their maturity profiles. 
The measures adopted in response to the 
Asian crisis changed the situation, however. By 
December, the seasonally-adjusted monthly 
index for the manufacturing sector had fallen 
8.2% below its October level. The adjustment 
was particularly dramatic in the case of consumer 
durables, where the drop for the two-month 
period amounted to 28%, and in capital goods, 
where it totalled 18%. The branches of industry 
that rely the most heavily on financing were hurt 
the most. For example, in that same two-month 
period, the production of motor vehicles plunged 
11.6% year on year. In contrast, manufacturing 
production closed out the year with an increase 
of 4.1%. 
In the first quarter of 1998, industrial output 
showed a 1.2% year-on-year decrease, but this 
adjustment was, as before, concentrated in 
consumer durables (-22%). The production of 
capital goods climbed by 5.6%, while 
intermediate goods and non-durables showed 
virtually no change. 
Given the lack of growth in livestock 
production, the performance of the agricultural 
sector was somewhat lackluster (1.9%), but 
thanks to the persistent upswing in farm prices, 
which jumped by 18%, its earnings were more 
than double (5%) what they had been the year 
before. The soybean and maize harvests were up 
sharply (by 13% and7.5%, respectively), but the 
coffee harvest shrank by 13%. Coffee production 
is expected to rebound sharply (27%) in 1998 and 
soybean output is likely to maintain its forward 
momentum (19%), but a 12% contraction in the 
maize harvest is projected. As a consequence of 
the drought in the north-eastern part of the 
country, the first bean harvest was down by 20%, 
and the shrinkage in the rice harvest is estimated 
at nearly 5%. Unless the Government steps in and 
sells part of its stocks, the reduction in the supply 
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of these staple foods, which are included in the 
consumer shopping basket, will be reflected in 
price levels. 
Construction continued to display the 
buoyancy seen the year before (8.5% growth in 
1997), thanks to the stimulus of investment in 
infrastructure (especially in privatized 
enterprises or areas of activity transferred to 
private operators, as in the case of highway 
concessions) and the reactivation of lending for 
housing and urban development projects. 
Although it was hurt by the steep rise in domestic 
interest rates and the crisis in the international 
marketplace, construction was helped by the 
passage of a law creating a new mortgage finance 
system which provides for more flexible 
regulations in terms of lending ceilings, 
repayment terms and collateral requirements. 
(b)Inflation, wages and employment 
Consumer prices rose by only 4.3% in 1997 
(the lowest rate registered since the Second 
World War), thereby consolidating the 
downward trend observed since the stabilization 
plan was launched in 1994. Owing to the trend in 
food prices in general and in meat prices in 
particular, which registered a cumulative 
upswing of 22% in annualized terms, during the 
early months of the year the rate was somewhat 
higher than had been projected, but it then began 
to decline as agricultural markets returned to 
normal. 
In early 1998, the 12-month inflation rate 
increased slightly, thus approaching 5%, as a 
result of the price pressures exerted by 
agricultural products, especially those destined 
for the domestic market. Until April, the 
wholesale index yielded a cumulative annualized 
rate of 7.3%, as compared to an increase of just 
2.2% for industrial prices. In May and June, 
soaring rice and bean prices drove up the value 
of the staple food basket to levels not seen since 
the start of the Real Plan. The average price of 
this basket jumped by 7.7% between March and 
May. In response to the emergency situation 
created by the drought in the north-eastern region 
of the country, the Government was preparing to 
sell food from its stockpiles. Midway through the 
year, agricultural production was returning to 
normal, and the 12-month inflation rate 
consequently fell back to slightly over 4%. 
The fact that prices have been absorbing part 
of the impacts generated by domestic and 
external shocks demonstrates that during the four 
years in which the Real Plan has been in effect it 
has succeeded in reducing the inflexibility of the 
price structure created by the country's now 
rapidly disappearing indexation mechanisms. 
Although increases have been seen in 
public-sector rates and service charges, they have 
primarily come in response to specific 
imbalances in supply and demand. Convergence 
towards low inflation rates has buttressed the use 
of nominal figures in loan contracts and wage 
negotiations. 
The increase (to 5.7% in 1997 versus 5.4% the 
year before) in the average annual rate of 
unemployment in the country's major 
metropolitan areas was entirely due to the rise 
registered in the fourth quarter. In the first four 
months of 1998, unemployment was two 
percentage points higher than during the 
corresponding period of 1997. The bulk of this 
increase was attributable to the cooling of the 
economy brought about by the policy package 
implemented in early November 1997. 
Nonetheless, the average income of workers 
employed in the formal sector of the economy in 
major urban areas was up by another 3%, after 
having risen 7.3% the year before. However, 
since this sector is shrinking as the informal 
sector expands, it is possible that the increase in 
average wages for all workers, taken as a group, 
was smaller. 
(c)The external sector 
The Brazilian economy's external 
vulnerability was heightened in 1997 as the 
deficit in its merchandise trade -and, 
consequently, on its current account as 
well-deepened. The shortfall on the country's 
merchandise trade account amounted to US$ 8.4 
billion, which was 52% more than just a few 
years ago. The annualized deficit to September 
was US$ 9.7 billion, but thereafter it diminished 
as import growth slowed during the final two 
months of the year. These new trends firmed up 
in early 1998, cutting the deficit to nearly half its 
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former level, but the current account deficit, 
which had totalled US$ 24.3 billion in 1996 
(close to 3.1% of GDP), climbed to US$ 33.5 
billion in 1997 (4.3% of GDP). 
The rapid year-on-year growth of imports 
(19%) registered for the period January-October 
1997 was associated with a rising level of 
economic activity and the consolidation of access 
to foreign products, especially raw materials and 
capital goods. Imports of consumer goods were 
also higher, with the increase being led by motor 
vehicles. The measures implemented in response 
to the Asian crisis had a severe impact on imports, 
however, and the level of external purchases 
recorded for the last two months of the year was 
quite similar to what it had been in the 
corresponding period of 1996. As was also true 
of domestic production, the most seriously 
affected sectors were consumer durables (except 
motor vehicles), raw materials and fuels, while 
imports of capital goods remained buoyant 
(31%). 
During the first four months of 1998, the 
slowdown in imports continued; as a result, the 
level of imports for this period was 2% below 
what it had been in the first four months of 1997. 
The downturn was concentrated in fuels and 
lubricants (-20%) and consumer goods (-5%), 
while small advances were posted for 
intermediate and capital goods (2% and 0.8%, 
respectively). The decrease would have been 
even sharper had it not been for the 23% surge in 
motor vehicle imports that came in response to a 
reduction in the applicable tariffs; these lower 
customs duties are part of a scheduled rollback in 
the tariff regime for Brazil ' s automotive industry, 
under which assembly plants located in the 
country are authorized to act as direct importers. 
Export growth accelerated to 11% in 1997, but 
even so did not manage to keep pace with 
imports. After registering a very small increase 
(2.5%) in 1996, the growth rate for exports began 
to steepen midway through the following year, 
with particularly strong increases being seen in 
such commodities as coffee beans and soybeans; 
the upward trend in exports of manufactures also 
finned up, especially in the case of aircraft and 
automotive products (motor vehicles, parts and 
accessories). Most of the demand for these 
products came from the Mercosur countries, 
Chile and the United States. 
The upswing in commodity exports in 1997 
was largely attributable to the decision to extend 
the authorized exemption from the value added 
tax, a more abundant supply of competitively-
priced financing for export firms, and a number 
of other measures, particularly the establishment 
of an export credit insurance system. 
In the first four months of 1998 exports rose 
by 7.7%, which was quite similar to the preceding 
year's growth rate; this was a quite creditable 
figure in view of the poor performance of 
commodity exports, which were down by nearly 
8% as a consequence of a decrease in shipments 
of coffee and soybean meal and lower soybean 
prices. 
The trend of commodity exports in 1998 was 
influenced by the crisis in the Asian countries, 
which are major buyers of those products. As of 
April, total sales of Brazilian products to the 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Indonesia had plummeted by 43%. 
The upswing in exports of manufactures 
(17%), on the other hand, was driven by 
high-value-added industrial products: transport 
equipment, communications equipment, 
electrical and electronic appliances, and other 
types of machinery. This appears to be associated 
to some degree with increased sales to members 
of the Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA) and, to a lesser extent, to a number of 
European countries, including Italy and 
Germany. 
The deficit on trade in services deepened in 
1997 owing primarily to the results for 
international transport and travel, which 
generated a deficit of US$ 8.9 billion (26% more 
than the year before). In addition, the deficit on 
the income account jumped from US$ 12.7 
billion to US$ 16.1 billion, chiefly as a result of 
increased outlays in the form of profit 
remittances, which amounted to US$ 6.5 billion 
(169% more than the year before). Net interest 
payments rose by just 5.5%, however, for a total 
ofUS$ 10.3 billion. 
Three different phases can be identified with 
regard to trends in the capital account: (i) the 
situation that prevailed before the October 1997 
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crisis; (ii) the uncertainty or "closure" of 
international markets that occurred during the 
period from November 1997 to February 1998; 
and (iii) the resurgence of robust capital flows 
observed between then and the end of April. As 
of mid-1998, capital inflows were tapering off as 
fears regarding the Brazilian economy's future 
and the effects of the Asian crisis mounted. 
Inflows to Brazil were abundant in 1997, and 
the country was therefore able to build up its 
international reserves to over US$ 62 billion by 
September. The level of direct investment 
received as of October was twice as high as it had 
been for the same period of 1996 and, at US$ 14.1 
billion, provided more than half of what the 
country needed to cover its current account 
deficit. Privatizations and the increase seen in 
external capital in the manufacturing, 
commercial and financial sectors accounted for 
the higher level of inflows. 
In addition, funds continued to pour into the 
country's stock exchanges, and stock indexes 
rose sharply. In the first nine months of 1997, net 
inflows of portfolio investment totalled US$ 8.4 
billion. In addition, particularly strong increases 
were seen in bond issues (US$ 17.1 billion up to 
October, which was 46% higher than for the same 
period of 1996) and credit operations (a gross 
sumofUS$ 19.9 billion), which were boosted by 
the system of mandatory import coverage. The 
public sector was much more active in the bond 
market than before, taking in US$ 6.9 million, 
and its interest rate spread on such instruments 
narrowed to less than 250 points over United 
States Treasury notes. 
Inflows contracted drastically in the final 
quarter of 1997, and reserves were drawn down 
by US$ 10.3 billion as the net result of current 
account outflows of US$ 11.1 billion and total 
capital inflows of just US$ 1.4 billion (whereas 
the quarterly average for the year was US$ 8.5 
billion). Incoming resources during this period 
were extremely limited, and it became difficult 
to roll over existing credits. Amortization 
payments for the final quarter amounted to 
US$ 13 billion, which was half as much as the 
sum of such payments for the entire year. A total 
of US$ 5.9 billion was paid out on bonds, but bond 
placements brought in only US$ 154 million. 
Nevertheless, the private external debt 
continued to climb in 1997, and it did so at a faster 
rate than the public-sector debt. In 1995, the 
medium- and long-term private external debt 
amounted to US$ 37.3 billion, but by 1996 it had 
risen to US$ 53.7 billion and by December 1997 
to US$ 77.5 billion. In contrast, short-term debt 
-mostly commercial bank loans and lines of 
credit for foreign trade operations- was down to 
US$ 35.2 billion from the previous year's level 
of US$ 37.8 billion. The figures for the first 
quarter of 1998 confirmed this trend, with 
medium- and long-term external debt totals of 
US$ 92 billion for the private sector and of US$ 




1. General trends 
In 1997 the Chilean economy completed 
14 years of uninterrupted growth. 
Inflation again declined, slightly, ending 
at around 6%. Gross domestic product 
expanded by 6.9%, domestic demand by 
8.5%. The national savings rate increased 
from 26.3% to 27.8%, but the amount 
saved was insufficient to finance the 
vigorous effort in gross capital formation 
(35.6% of output), which again required 
a significant amount of foreign capital. 
The current account therefore yielded a 
deficit of 5.3% of GDP, similar to the 
figure for 1996 but significantly higher 
than those for previous years; however, 
the deficit was more than covered by 
medium and long-term foreign 
investment. The public sector helped 
sustain investment with a savings rate 
of 5.5% of GDP and an overall surplus 
of 1.9%. Unemployment affected 6.1% 
of the labour force, while employment 
increased by 2.1%, real wages by 2.4% 
and average labour productivity by 
5%. 
The Asian crisis surprised the Chilean economy 
in the midst of an expansive phase characterized 
by the progressive easing of monetary policy, a 
Until October, the economy was flourishing, 
thanks to a vigorous expansion in private 
spending, although the drop in the real rate of 
exchange was eroding the competitiveness of 
exports. The scenario altered as the Asian crisis 
took a turn for the worse, and the effect was 
compounded by the steep downturn in the 
international price of copper that had begun in 
July. 
Confronted with a widening current account 
deficit and increasing pressure on the foreign 
exchange market, the authorities took major 
corrective steps in the first half of 1998, the last 
of them in June. As the real interbank exchange 
rate shot up for a few days to an annualized level 
of 100%, the authorities cut back on fiscal 
expenditure, substantially reduced the width of 
the currency band and reduced the reserve 
requirement on external credits. With these 
measures they also succeeded in maintaining the 
policy of gradually bringing down inflation. 
For 1998 a current account deficit equal to 
6.5% of GDP is projected. Economic activity 
should show a decline, both because of the Asian 
crisis and because of a deliberate policy of 
narrowing the gap between expenditure and 
output. This will mean living with higher interest 
rates and little margin to increase public 
spending. The decline in the terms of trade 
(between 6% and 10%) should allow for only a 
modest increase in national income. 
marked decline in the real exchange rate, a sharp 
drop in the price of the country's main export 
commodity and a widening current account 
2. Economic policy 
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deficit. Roughly 30% of Chile's exports go to 
Asian markets, and the country has felt the ill 
effects of the crisis primarily in the trade sphere, 
in the form of lower export prices and volumes, 
to the detriment of the terms of trade and national 
income. 
The price of copper began to slide in July 
1997, and the average price of the metal is 
projected to be 30% lower for 1998 than for the 
previous year. The lost earnings, estimated at 
US$ 1.6 billion, or the equivalent of 2% of GDP, 
will heavily skew the balance of trade, since 
copper still accounts for a little over 40% of the 
country's exports. Moreover, the lower real 
exchange rate and the depreciation of Asian 
currencies have boosted imports. In terms of 
financing, external credit has become scarcer and 
more costly, an effect all the emerging economies 
are experiencing. 
The expansive phase of the first three quarters 
coincided with a debate about the sharp decline 
of the real exchange rate and its possible impact 
on exports and growth. Debate focused on the 
sustainable level of the current account deficit 
and its counterpart, the economy's capacity to 
absorb new capital flows without risking 
macroeconomic stability or the dynamism of 
exports. Towards the end of the year, concern 
sharpened about the size of the external 
imbalance, since the large current account deficit 
of 1997 accumulated during a period when 
annual average international prices were still 
favourable. 
Although ultimately it was a year of 
adjustment, 1997 saw GDP grow by 6.9% and 
domestic spending by 8.5%. Moreover, from the 
second quarter onward, growth in spending 
outstripped growth in output, and the gap 
increasingly widened, averaging four percentage 
points during the second half of the year. In the 
last quarter, GDP grew by 9.6%, spending by 
13.7%. 
The basic cause of the external deficit was 
excess spending over the course of the 1997, 
stimulated by successive cuts in interest rates, in 
combination with the sharp drop in copper prices. 
When the Asian crisis heated up in November, 
the Chilean economy was running a considerable 
external deficit and was faced with projections 
that copper prices would remain low, carrying the 
threat that the current account deficit would reach 
6.5% of GDP in 1998. Since, moreover, the real 
exchange rate had accumulated a decline of 10% 
by the end of October, the reading of the markets 
was that an adjustment of the parity was 
imminent. 
In January 1998, confused signals given out 
by the authorities concerning the appropriate 
level of the exchange rate caused turbulence in 
the market, which pushed the rate as high as 475 
pesos to the dollar (414 pesos in October). 
Disorder in the financial and foreign exchange 
markets spread until the Central Bank raised the 
real cost of money to 8.5%, thereby restoring 
credibility, but at the cost of interest rates higher 
than those prevailing when monetary easing 
began. As the gravity of the Asian crisis was 
borne home, the public sector reduced its 
budgeted expenditure; it did so again in April. 
However, there was a fresh bout of turbulence in 
June as the Japanese situation worsened, bringing 
renewed pressure to bear on the exchange rate. 
The authorities reacted promptly to restore 
confidence. They made additional budget cuts, 
modified the currency band system and reduced 
the reserve requirement on foreign credits, as the 
interbank interest rate skyrocketed for a few 
days. 
In the event that these measures should prove 
to be insufficient to narrow the spending gap, the 
authorities have expressed their willingness to 
increase the public sector's contribution in order 
to bring the external imbalance back to a level 
sustainable over the long term. The size of 
international reserves, the low level of external 
debt and the small proportion of short-term 
external commitments, in conjunction with the 
quality of domestic bank regulation and the 
continuing fiscal surplus, are important assets in 
the effort to put through the adjustment. 
(a) Fiscal policy 
Central government accounts again showed a 
surplus in 1997, this time equivalent to 1.9% of 
GDP, four tenths of a point lower than in 1996. 
This result was achieved despite the fact that 
current revenues expanded only 4.4% in real 
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Table 1 
CHILE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
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External savings 
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Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100)b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
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External debt 
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Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Money and credit 
Monetary balances of 
banking system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
Deposit rate 
Lending rate 
Equivalent interest rate 



























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the 
economically active population (EAP). Includes Errors and omissions. 8 Refers to net interest as shown on the balance 
of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange 
rate. 
Table 2 
CHILE: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
Gross domestic product 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 
Exports 
(millions of dollars) 
Imports 
(millions of dollars) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Preliminary figures. Refers to the exchange rale for imports. " Private sector. 
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terms, considerably less than output, and is 
explainable by the relatively moderate increase 
in spending (6.1%). Current outlays expanded by 
5.7%, investment spending by 7.8%. 
Prepayments of external debt in previous years 
allowed for a major reduction in interest 
payments (-20%) and thus helped substantially in 
generating the surplus. Other items of 
expenditure increased at a rate in line with output 
growth. That revenues grew only modestly was 
owing to two factors: the performance of foreign 
trade taxes, reflecting tariff reductions under 
economic integration agreements, and reduced 
collections of value added tax (VAT). 
The fiscal surplus was not large enough to 
slow the rate of expansion of domestic demand, 
given the vigour of private demand. Moreover, 
projections for 1998 foresee slower growth in 
public revenues due to a decline in copper export 
earnings and in taxes on domestic activity. In 
view of these projections, the Government on 
three occasions (January, April and June) revised 
its budget downward. The spending cuts should 
amount to some 0.9% of GDP. 
(b) Monetary policy 
Pursuing a policy of gradually easing 
monetary controls, the Central Bank reduced the 
interbank interest rate by one quarter of a point 
on four occasions in 1997, lowering it from 7.5% 
in February to 6.5% in September. The long-term 
rate did not follow suit; in fact, it was expected 
to rise, given the rapid expansion of spending and 
the extent to which the external accounts were 
deteriorating. In the third quarter, the tendency 
towards a moderate rise in long-term rates was 
accentuated once the high levels of economic 
activity for the period became known. In addition 
to these signs that the economy was overheating, 
interest rates also became more sensitive to the 
impact of the Asian crisis on the external 
accounts. 
The exchange rate reacted by rising beginning 
in November, reversing nearly ten months of 
nominal stability and hence of steady real 
appreciation of the peso. Since by October the 
real rate of exchange had declined by 10%, the 
adjustment was sharp, resulting in unaccustomed 
nominal depreciations of 2.5% in November and 
3.1% in December. At first the Central Bank 
allowed the exchange rate to slide, in view of the 
accumulated cushion. However, given the 
aggravation of the Asian crisis and data 
projecting a further deterioration in the external 
accounts in 1998, on 8 January 1998 the Central 
Bank raised the interbank rate from 6.5% to 
7.5%. The market viewed the measure as 
insufficient and unleashed a heavy speculative 
attack against the peso that carried the exchange 
rate to a high of 475 pesos to the dollar. In this 
situation, banks directed their resources towards 
realizing foreign exchange profits, even to the 
point of neglecting their provisions to meet 
monthly reserve requirements. In response, the 
Central Bank decontrolled the interbank rate, 
which on one day rose to 100% in real terms and 
hovered for a couple of weeks at a real rate of 
15%. 
On 3 February, the Central Bank set the 
interbank rate at 8.5% in real terms, an increase 
of 1.5 percentage points, in effect abandoning the 
policy of mini-adjustments it had been following 
and raising the rate by twice the amount it had 
been lowered in 1997. This increase underlined 
the Central Bank's commitment to moderating 
the rise of the exchange rate, reining in spending 
and meeting its inflation target. 
During the first five months of 1998, interest 
rates on short-term instruments again lagged 
behind long-term rates. A fresh outbreak of 
turbulence in June obliged the Central Bank once 
again to float the interbank interest rate, while the 
Government implemented a package of measures 
that cut budgeted expenditures and altered 
foreign exchange policy. 
(c) Foreign exchange policy 
In January 1997 the Central Bank widened the 
currency band from 10% to 12.5% to either side 
of the reference parity and changed the 
composition of the basket of currencies that 
defined the exchange rate, increasing the relative 
weight of the dollar. In March, noting what it 
deemed excessive levels of arbitrage, it 
re-imposed reserve requirements on external 
credits on transactions from US$ 10,000 to 
US$200,000, reversing the measure of the 
previous December eliminating them; however, 
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the exemption was maintained for transactions of 
under US$ 10,000. In October, in an attempt to 
limit both the capital account surplus and 
arbitrage options, the Foreign Investment 
Committee lowered from 70% to 50% the 
maximum amount of financing with external 
credits allowed for projects registered under 
Decree-Law 600, at the same time raising the 
minimum for such operations from US$ 25,000 
to US$ 1 million. 
During the first three quarters there was a 
noticeable decline (8%) in the real exchange 
rate. But during the last two months of the year, 
the nominal exchange rate began to rise, 
obliging the Central Bank to intervene a 
number of occasions between November 1997 
and mid-May 1998, at the cost of US$ 2 billion 
in international reserves. 
There followed two months of exchange rate 
stability, which ended in June 1998 with a fresh 
(a)Economic activity 
The fastest-growing category of expenditure 
was gross fixed capital formation, which 
increased by 13.2% over the previous year, 
bringing the ratio of fixed capital investment to 
GDP to a record 32%. Private consumption 
increased by 6.8%, that is, at a pace similar to the 
growth of output. Aggregate supply increased by 
9%, outstripping output by more than two 
percentage points, owing to a surge in imports. 
A favourable trend in the terms of trade 
formed the basis for an increase of 8.2% in real 
disposable gross national income. Lower prices 
for imported goods and the drop in the real 
exchange rate combined with the gradual easing 
of interest rates to direct this enhanced 
purchasing power towards consumer goods, 
especially imports. 
Among non-tradable sectors, growth was 
particularly strong in transport and 
communications (12.9%) and electricity, gas and 
water (9.5%); among tradable sectors, mining 
(8.1%) and fisheries (7.9%) were the leaders. 
Manufacturing achieved growth of 4.4%, while 
agriculture and forestry suffered a 2.1% setback 
attack on the peso, triggered by the fall of the yen 
against the dollar and the effects of this latest 
episode in the Asian crisis on the price of copper 
and external financing. A resurgence of demand 
pressures in the foreign exchange market obliged 
the Central Bank to sell approximately US$ 1.3 
billion in June. 
The intensification of pressure on the 
exchange rate led to the adoption of a set of 
measures, one of which was to narrow the band 
to a minimum of 3.5% below and a maximum of 
2% above the reference value. The bandwidth of 
12.5% to either side of the peg had not, in fact, 
been functioning, owing to the continual 
interventions of the Central Bank, which had 
made large inroads into international reserves. 
The idea behind narrowing the band was to limit 
Central Bank interventions to occasions when the 
price moved all the way to one edge of the band 
or the other. 
because of adverse climatic conditions, in the 
form of drought in the first half year and excess 
rainfall in the second, affecting truck-farming in 
particular. 
In the first quarter of 1997 output increased by 
4% and spending by only 1.6%, thanks to the 
reinforcement of monetary restrictions applied at 
the end of 1996, when it became evident that 
output and spending were both growing at an 
unsustainable pace. The slowdown was also 
facilitated by the increase in interest rates in 
December 1996 and the impact of the drought. 
But a significant upturn in levels of activity and 
spending was already visible in the second 
quarter and was consolidated in the third, owing 
to an improvement in the terms of trade and 
successive reductions in interest rates. By the 
third quarter GDP growth reached 9%, spending 
12.9%. These high growth rates were surpassed 
in the fourth quarter, when output grew by 9.6% 
and spending by 13.7%. 
In the first quarter of 1998, GDP increased by 
7.2% and domestic demand by 14.6%, still 
excessive in view of the desire to slow spending 
and reduce the current account deficit to 
manageable proportions. Beginning in May the 
3. The mam variables 
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economy began to show signs of the cooling the 
adjustment was intended to accomplish. 
(b)Prices, wages and employment 
Inflation in 1997 was 6%, six tenths of a point 
lower than the rate for the previous year. The tight 
money policy that prevailed during the early part 
of the year facilitated a rapid drop in wage 
inflation and in utility rates in the first half year. 
The twelve-month variation in prices of 
non-tradables gradually slowed from 8.2% in the 
first quarter to 6.3% in the fourth. The rise in 
prices of tradables also tended to slow, but that 
trend was interrupted in third quarter despite a 
drop in the real exchange rate, suggesting rigidity 
in the mark-up on tradables. 
Between July and October inflation 
accelerated temporarily, owing to increases in the 
prices of perishable goods, meats at first and later 
fruits and vegetables, because of the effects of 
rainstorms associated with the El Niño 
phenomenon. Basically, however, excluding 
seasonal variations in a few products, the 
underlying trend of inflation was downward. 
The labour force increased by 1.7%, following 
an increase of barely 0.4% the year before. The 
rise in employment (2.1 %) occurred mostly in the 
second half and was stronger in non-tradable 
sectors (construction, commerce, transportation 
and communications), although there was also an 
upturn in industrial employment. 
The average unemployment rate was 6.1% of 
the labour force; the rate hovered around 6.7% 
throughout the third quarter and fell sharply in 
the last. Stronger job creation and a mild 
tendency to higher unemployment in the third 
quarter coincided with a strong expansion of the 
secondary labour force. The annual 
unemployment rate marked its third straight year 
of decline from a high of 7.8% in 1994. 
The increase in nominal wages slowed; 
whereas the annualized rate was around 10% in 
the first quarter, by the end of the year the 
cumulative annual variation was 7.8%. The 
slowdown was reflected in real wages, which 
rose only 2.4%, at half the rate of increase in 
average labour productivity (5%). Moreover, the 
increased participation of the secondary labour 
force, coupled with the location of most new jobs 
in sectors of lower-than-average productivity, 
tended to keep average real wage increases low. 
(c)The external sector 
The overall balance-of-payments surplus 
equalled US$3.2 billion, combining a current 
account deficit of US$ 4 billion and a capital 
account surplus of US$ 7.2 billion, or 9.5% of 
GDP. International reserves increased by US$ 3.2 
million to total US$ 17.84 billion by year-end, 
equivalent to a year's worth of imports. The 
steady accumulation of international reserves 
was interrupted between November 1997 and 
January 1998, when around US$ 2 billion were 
lost. Further declines in 1998 amounted to some 
US$ 1.3 billion by June. 
The widening of the current account deficit 
compared with 1996 was due primarily to a 
US$ 200 million increase in the trade deficit, 
which developed chiefly in the last quarter. The 
terms of trade improved, and merchandise export 
volumes grew by 10.7%. The deterioration in the 
merchandise trade balance, then, was a result of 
the pick-up in aggregate demand, which fuelled 
a surge in imports, causing them to expand by 
20% in volume in the second half. The value of 
merchandise exports increased by 9.9%, despite 
a drop of 0.8% in unit prices. Imports for the year 
increased by 10.4% in value and 16% in volume, 
while import prices dropped by 4.7%. In value 
terms, copper exports expanded by 18.7%, other 
exports by 4.2%, including a 6.9% increase in 
non-traditional exports. 
Medium and long-term flows maintained their 
preponderance in the capital account. Net foreign 
investment flows, including both direct and 
portfolio investment, were 20% greater than in 
1996. Net foreign direct investment amounted to 
US$ 3,467 million, while portfolio investment 
totalled US$ 2,370 million, double the previous 
year's figure, including strong sales of American 
Depositary Receipts (ADR), both primary and 
secondary. Proceeds of bond issues increased by 




1. General trends 
In 1997 the Colombian economy stepped 
up the pace of growth to 3.2% and 
inflation slowed, but other macro-
economic indicators were less 
favourable; the domestic scene was 
marred by a serious deterioration in 
public order. 
The rate of inflation declined by four 
percentage points to 17.7%, but the cumulative 
variation in the first half of 1998 reached 14.1%, 
which may make it difficult to achieve the target 
for the year. 
The unemployment rate continued to rise. The 
rate for urban areas rose from 11.2% in 1996 to 
12.4% in 1997 (on average) and further increased 
to 15.8% in June 1998. 
The fiscal gap continued to widen, although 
less rapidly than in previous years. The 
consolidated non-financial public sector deficit 
equaled 3.1% of gross domestic product (GDP), 
the central government deficit 4.2%. 
The deficit on the current account increased 
from5.8%in 1996 to 6.0% in 1997 and was offset 
by a surplus, estimated at some 6.7% of output, 
on the capital account. Net foreign direct 
The start of 1997 saw an end to efforts to cool 
down the economy to correct for the imbalances 
created during the expansionary phase from 1992 
to 1995. The authorities began to work towards 
reviving output, without abandoning the goals of 
fighting inflation and correcting external and 
investment mounted to an unprecedented level of 
US$ 5,170 million, owing in large part to 
privatization proceeds: in the course of the year 
the sale of State assets brought in US$ 3,180 
million (3.4% of GDP). 
On the external front, in March 1997 the 
Government of the United States, Colombia's 
main trading partner, decided that it could not 
certify Colombia's efforts against drug 
trafficking, a position it changed a year later. The 
effects of the El Niño climatic phenomenon and 
the Asian crisis up to the end of 1997 appeared 
to be moderate. 
In the first half of 1998, however, the trend 
towards depreciation on foreign exchange 
markets intensified and, in conjunction with the 
uncertainty surrounding elections, brought on 
speculative attacks against the currency. A drop 
in world prices for the country's three main 
exports (oil, coffee and coal) further complicated 
the picture. 
The central bank (Banco de la República) 
made its main goal the defence of the currency 
band, a goal it pursued by selling over a billion 
dollars, raising interest rates and relaxing the 
conditions on external borrowing. Pressure on 
the exchange rate eased after the presidential 
elections this June. 
fiscal imbalances. Recovery was visible by the 
second quarter of 1997 and was accompanied by 
a slowing of inflation. The best that could be 
achieved in regard to the fiscal and current 
account deficits, however, was to slow their rate 
of expansion. In January 1998, attention turned 
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to defending the currency band against 
speculative attacks. 
(a)Fiscal policy 
In January 1997 the Government declared a 
state of economic emergency and, exercising its 
emergency powers, adopted a number of 
measures to combat the appreciation of the peso, 
tax evasion and smuggling, measures it hoped 
would raise revenues equivalent to 0.8% of GDP. 
In March, however, the Constitutional Court held 
the decree declaring the emergency to be 
unenforceable. To make up for part of the 
revenue thus lost, the Government opted for a 
temporary (three month) increase in tariffs 
starting in April, which raised the average tariff 
rate from 11% to 14%. Moreover, in mid-year 
Congress approved a new tax reform package 
that included most of the measures implemented 
during the economic emergency. In May, the 
Banco de la República adopted a more 
restrictive policy for managing short-term 
external debt. 
For the second year running, the central 
government deficit was above 4% of GDP. In 
addition, the erosion of the social security surplus 
and the deficits posted by the electricity and 
petroleum sectors and by regional and local 
governments widened the consolidated deficit 
for the non-financial public sector (NFPS) 
widened from 1.9% to 3.1% of output. However, 
if the plentiful proceeds from privatization are 
included, consolidated NFPS accounts show a 
small surplus. 
The central government deficit was 
financed primarily (80%) with domestic credit, 
in response to a major shift in debt management 
policy. The authorities are trying to phase out 
the practice of requiring certain investors to 
buy government paper at interest rates below 
market. As a result of the new policy, the stock 
of non-mandatory treasury bills (TESs) in 
circulation increased by 63% in 1997. 
However, the sharp rise in interest rates in the 
first half of 1998, associated with defence of 
the currency, led the Government to change its 
financing plan, dropping the target for net TES 
placements for the year from 6 billion to 2.8 
billion pesos. 
(b) Monetary policy 
In 1997, the Banco de la República tried to 
reconcile the goals of bringing down inflation 
and reviving the economy. To that end, it 
planned for annual increases of 16% in the 
monetary base and 22.3% in broad money (M3 
plus bonds). In May, owing to the unexpected 
increase in currency in circulation, it raised the 
first of these targets to 20%, but adhered to its 
original target for the broad money supply. By 
year's end, the monetary base had expanded by 
25% (compared with 10.6% the year before), 
the money supply (Ml) by 21.7% and broad 
money (M3 plus bonds) by 25%. These results 
were influenced by the spectacular drop, from 
2,337 billion pesos in May to only 54 billion 
pesos by the close of the year, in the 
outstanding stock of central bank open market 
securities (títulos de participación). The 
combined effect of a number of seasonal and 
domestic demand factors kept the increased 
liquidity from accelerating the rise in consumer 
prices. 
Thanks to acceptable trends in inflation, the 
Banco de la República was able on three 
occasions to reduce the interest rates 
associated with its interventions in the money 
market. The minimum rate of 23% and 
maximum rate of 33% were reduced to 21.25% 
and 28.5%, respectively, in March; to 20.5% 
and 27.5% in May; and to 20% and 27% in 
August. Since credit demand was low to begin 
with, these actions resulted in an appreciable 
decline in the cost of money. Lending and 
deposit rates in August 1997 were some eleven 
percentage points lower than they had been 12 
months earlier. In the third quarter, however, 
they began to go up again, a trend that was 
accentuated in the first quarter of 1998. A wave 
of speculative attacks on the currency obliged 
the central bank to sell foreign exchange, a 
move that contracted the monetary base, and to 
raise the minimum and maximum rates for its 
money market interventions from 20% and 
27% to 23% and 30%, respectively. The 
interbank rate became erratic and tended to 
rise. In May the monetary authorities took steps 
to control that volatility and to absorb liquidity. 
As a result of these measures by the central 
171 
Table 1 
COLOMBIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 





















































































































































Employment and wages 
Labour force participation rate ' 
Open unemployment rate e 






Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
for imports (index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
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Capital and financial account g 
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Variation in reserve assets 
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8.8 11.2 12.4 
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Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Money and credit 
Monetary balances of banking system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To public sector 
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Local-currency savings and 
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Real interest rates (annualized) 
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Lending rate 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the 
level of that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population; seven metropolitan 
areas. e Percentages of the economically active population (EAP); seven metropolitan areas. f Manufacturing industry 
workers. g Includes Errors and omissions. Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports 
of goods and services. ' In the private sector. J Interest rates on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
COLOMBIA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
I 
1995 
111 IV I 
1996 
II III IV I 
1997a 
II III IV 
1998a 
Gross domestic product 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year)" 6.4 5.9 4.3 5.2 4.4 2.3 2.0 -0.2 -0.3 2.9 4.2 5.4 
Consumer prices (nationwide) 
(12-month variation, %) 21.3 21.2 20.8 19.5 20.2 19.7 21.6 21.6 19.0 18.8 18.2 17.8 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 
Exports 
(millions of dollars) 
Imports 
(millions of dollars) 
Ml 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 




72.7 73.0 75.4 78.2 73.7 71.0 68.7 64.2 63.5 62.0 64.4 70.2 
2 341 2 547 2 441 2 514 2 387 2 754 2 525 2 907 2 429 2 109 2 961 3 025 
3 145 3 545 3 553 3 611 3 245 3 411 3 478 3 539 3 143 3 901 4 062 4 271 
19.4 17.9 13.1 20.2 19.3 15.6 15.3 16.5 14.9 22.7 19.6 21.5 
-2.6 9.0 18.1 17.2 -5.8 10.0 11.7 14.8 -2.4 3.5 7.6 12.2 








Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Refers to exchange rate for imports. 
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bank, from October 1997 to June 1998 the 
reference rate (the average interest rate on 
fixed-term deposits) rose by more than ten 
percentage points. 
Despite the lower cost of financing in 1997, 
only in the final quarter did credit demand 
revive. The total loan portfolio of the financial 
system grew by 27%, more than the previous 
year (24%), but still well below the 37% 
recorded in 1995. The financial sector was still 
in the throes of the restructuring process 
initiated in mid-1996. Between June 1996 and 
April 1998, 8 banks, 3 savings and loan 
associations, 10 finance corporations, 11 
conventional commercial finance companies 
and 16 commercial finance companies 
specializing in leasing were created, 
privatized, acquired, merged or liquidated. As 
a result, the financial system moved into a stage 
characterized by greater competition, larger 
institutions, narrower intermediation margins 
and accelerated technological change. 
In order to strengthen the capacity and 
transparency of the financial system, the 
Banking Superintendency in mid-1998 will 
assume the oversight of cooperative financial 
institutions, and the introduction of a 
mandatory risk rating system in 1999 has 
been announced. 
(c) Foreign exchange policy 
The movement of the exchange rate went 
through two completely different phases in 1997. 
In the first half of the year the rate stayed close 
to the floor of the band, despite measures taken 
to make foreign borrowing more expensive. 
In August, the value of the peso began to 
depreciate and in barely two months hit the 
ceiling of the band, fora variety of reasons. Given 
a large current account deficit and the poor 
outlook for the Colombian oil industry (see box 
1), external capital inflows played an active role 
on the foreign exchange market. The steady 
decline in domestic interest rates shifted the 
relative yields of investments in pesos and 
foreign currencies in favour of the latter, while 
the measures taken by the Banco de la República 
made foreign borrowing more expensive. For the 
same motives, the authorities and the Empresa de 
Energía Eléctrica de Bogotá agreed that the 
company would not bring into the country the full 
amount of the foreign exchange proceeds from 
its capitalization. Lastly, the private sector 
decided to prepay foreign loans by taking 
advantage of low domestic interest rates and a 
US$ 150 million line of credit set up by the 
Government at the Banco de Comercio Exterior 
(Bancoldex). 
Instability on international stock exchanges 
in the last quarter of 1997 did not help to soften 
the tendency towards depreciation. The nominal 
depreciation of the exchange rate for the year 
was 29%, equivalent to 8% depreciation in real 
terms. 
The Bank of the Republic decided to change 
the gradient of the currency band from 15% to 
13% in 1998. Nevertheless, during the first half 
of the year, the exchange rate remained close 
to the ceiling of the band. The currency even 
suffered some speculative attacks, especially 
intense during February, May and June. In 
defence of the peso, the central bank sold over 
US$ 1 billion dollars of its international 
reserves, and towards the end of January 
reduced the reserve requirement on external 
loans from 30% to 25% and shortened the time 
the deposit would be frozen from 18 to 12 
months, thereby easing private sector access 
to international financing. Subsequently, it 
raised the interest rate on its open-market 
securities, in order to increase the cost of 
sources of liquidity and discourage 
speculation. The attacks on the currency in 
May and June, however, obliged the 
authorities to rein in liquidity and loosen the 
interest rates on its interventions in the money 
market, which then climbed to levels of around 
80%. The Government succeeded in placing 
US$ 160 million in the British Eurobond 
market and US$ 225 million in the Italian 
market. It also announced that it would repatriate 
US$ 420 million that it was holding in 
accounts abroad. 
(d) Structural reforms 
In terms of structural reform, 1997 was an 
important year for privatization. The sale of State 





If no new reserves are discovered, Colombian crude oil exports could decline over the medium term. Since 
exploratory drilling has been lagging, proved reserves have remained at 2.6 billion barrels. In 1997 only 18 
test wells were drilled (76 in 1988), a decline attributable to the high costs of exploration and development 
(sabotage by guerrillas), unfavourable contracts and the offer of better terms by other countries (such as 
Venezuela). 
In order to reverse this tendency, the Government made and the State-owned enterprise Ecopetrol made 
changes in petroleum contracts to render them more attractive, announced a strategic plan for discovering new 
reserves and launched an aggressive campaign to attract investors to the industry. 
The capitalization of the Empresa de Energía 
Eléctrica de Bogotá (US$ 2,177 million) netted 
the largest amount in the history of Colombian 
(a) Level of economic activity 
While 1997 did not get off to a promising start, 
as the pace of activity continued to slow in the 
first quarter, later in the year the economy 
showed a significant recovery, closing the year 
with growth of 3.2% and continuing the upward 
trend into the first quarter of 1998 (5.7%). 
The growth in domestic demand was steeper, 
at 5.6% (2.1% in 1996). Of particular note was 
the recovery in investment (3.4%), after a decline 
of 1.4% the year before. There was also vigorous 
growth (6.7%) in final consumption (3.9% in 
1996), spurred by the private sector, while the 
growth rate of public-sector consumption was cut 
by more than half (4.6% in 1997, as compared 
with 10.4% in 1996). 
The activities that posted the strongest growth 
were transport, storage and communications 
(5.5%); mining and quarrying (4.4%); 
community, social and personal services (4.2%); 
financial services (3.5%); and electricity, gas and 
water supply (3.4%). Manufacturing overcame 
the 2.7% setback it suffered the year before, and 
wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels 
(3.1%) more than made up for their slight decline 
in 1996. 
privatization. In addition, the long-distance 
telecommunications sector was opened to 
competition. 
Agriculture turned in the poorest performance 
in 1997, with output down by 0.7%. Despite good 
international prices, green coffee production 
dropped by 4.4%. Production of annual crops 
again declined, this time by 1.8%, while the value 
of perennial crop production held steady. 
Livestock raising increased by 2%, reflecting a 
surge in pig-farming (6.4%). 
The rebound in manufacturing in 1997 was in 
response to stronger domestic demand. 
Excluding coffee threshing (processed coffee), 
manufacturing production dropped 6.7% in the 
first quarter and rose 11.7% in the last. Coffee 
threshing showed no growth in 1997, following 
the previous year's 10% increase. 
Under the heading of manufacturing, the 
following categories turned in the best 
performance: electrical machinery and apparatus 
(15.6%), iron and steel basic industries (14.9%) 
and pottery, china and earthenware (14.6%). 
Altogether, 20 manufacturing industries showed 
growth, while 11 experienced declines. The 
worst results were recorded in wood (-29%), 
footwear (-19%) and rubber products (-14%). 
The construction industry remained 
depressed, although the sluggish results hid two 
3. The main variables 
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opposing tendencies. The decline in the 
construction of housing and other buildings 
(-22.1% in 1996) braked in 1997 (-3%), while 
infrastructure construction expanded by a further 
1.2%, following the 15.6% expansion of the 
previous year. 
Mining and quarrying production increased 
by 4.4%, lead by natural gas production (27%) 
and iron ore mining (25%). Coal mining 
continued to expand at a good pace (10%), while 
gold and silver mining continued a precipitous 
decline (-66%). Growth in crude petroleum 
production slowed to 3.9% (7.2% in 1996). 
(b) Prices, wages and employment 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price 
index (CPI) slowed to 17.7% in 1997 (from 21.6% 
the previous year) and thus fell within the target 
(18%) set by the Bank of the Republic. 
Prices of tradables rose by 12.7%, much less 
than those of non-tradables (20.5%), which were 
pushed up by large increases in the costs of 
education (22.8%), health care (21.5%) and 
transportation. 
In the first half of 1998, prices rose by 14.1%, 
compared with a figure of 11.2% for the same 
period in the previous year, an increase that 
undermined chances of achieving the official 
target of 16% for the year as a whole. El Niño 
weather conditions reduced food production, and 
the resulting scarcity pushed up prices. Another 
factor was probably the delayed effect of the 
devaluation of the peso, which put pressure on 
production costs and made tradables more 
expensive. Nevertheless, setting aside food 
prices, the rate of inflation has been on the 
decline. 
As a result of the sharp nominal depreciation 
of the currency and fluctuations in international 
prices of relevance for Colombia, the producer 
price index (PPi) accelerated its rise, reaching 
17.5% (14.5% in 1996) and thereby reversing the 
trend of previous years. 
The employment situation continued to 
worsen. The unemployment rate in seven 
metropolitan areas rose from 10.2% in March 
1996 to 12.3% in March 1997 and 14.5% in 
March 1998. The economic recovery created 
340,000 new jobs between March 1997 and 
March 1998, a substantial figure for the 
Colombian economy. But since the total labour 
force participation rate rose from 58.3% in the 
first quarter 1997 to 62.3% in the first quarter 
1998, the new jobs generated did not match the 
increase in the number of persons seeking 
employment. The trend worsened in July 1998, 
when the unemployment rate reached 15.8%. 
Real industrial wages improved by 4.2% in 
1997 (2.3% in 1996), but the gap widened 
between the pay of manual and non-manual 
workers: wage of manual workers increased by 
2.8%, those of non-manual employees by 
5.7%. 
(c)The external sector 
The current account deficit (US$ 4,950 
million in 1996) widened further to US$ 5,680 
million in 1997 and as a percentage of GDP 
increased from 5.8% to 6.0%. 
Both exports and imports showed great 
dynamism in 1997. Exports grew by 9.7% (at 
twice the previous year's rate) to a level of 
US$ 11,680 million. Imports, which in 1996 
recorded a slight decline of 1.1%, increased 
by 12.6%, to a total of US$ 14,410 million. 
As a result, the merchandise trade balance 
rose from US$ 2,140 million to US$ 2,730 
million. 
Among traditional exports, the value of coffee 
sales soared (43%), an improvement entirely due 
to better international prices; the opposite 
occurred with prices of oil and petroleum 
products, so that Colombian oil exports declined 
by 7% in value. Non-traditional exports did well, 
growing by 12%. 
The increase in imports was a consequence of 
the economic recovery. Imports of consumer 
goods expanded by 16% in 1997, after declining 
by 4% the year before, imports of capital goods 
followed a similar path (increasing by 28% in 
1997 after declining by 9% in 1996), reflecting a 
surge in private investment. Imports of 
intermediate goods stagnated. 
The surplus on the financial account shrank 
to US$ 6,320 million, equivalent to 6.7% of 
GDP (US$ 7,100 million the year before), but 
was large enough to cover the current account 
deficit. Net reserves of the Bank of the 
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Republic declined slightly, ending the year at 
around US$ 9.9 billion. The structure of the 
capital account continued to improve, thanks to 
a copious influx of long-term funds. Net foreign 
direct investment reached an unprecedented 
level (US$ 5,170 million), owing in large part 
to privatization proceeds. The influx of capital 
from foreign borrowing dropped appreciably 
because of changes in the management of the 
publicdebt. 
Total external indebtedness increased by 8% 
in 1997 to US$ 31.4 billion; 52% of that amount 
was owed by the public sector. The country's 





1. Outline of recent developments 
With a 3.1% increase in gross domestic 
product (GDP), Costa Rica resumed the 
growth which had been interrupted in 
1996, when there had been a decline of 
0.5%. Macroeconomic variables 
generally showed improvement, 
particularly the inflation rate, which fell 
from 13.9% to 11.2%, and the fiscal 
deficit, which fell from 3.3% to 1.6%. The 
latter reflected a special effort to break the 
political pattern of an expansionist phase 
during the pre-election period. 
The recovery in GDP resulted from a 14% 
increase in gross fixed investment, mostly due to 
easier access to credit -thanks to greater liquidity 
in the banking system and lower real interest 
rates- and to considerable flows of foreign direct 
investment into free trade zones. Of lesser 
importance for the economic recovery was 
growth in consumption (1.7%), which was 
encouraged by rising employment, a slight 
increase in real wages, improved access to credit 
and lower inflation. At the same time, helped by 
a notable improvement in the terms of trade, 
national income rose by 4.1%. 
The behaviour of external indicators was less 
encouraging; there was a marked worsening of 
Generally speaking, economic policies 
combined to create favourable conditions for 
economic recovery or at least not to impede it. 
the current account deficit (by about US$ 300 
million). However, thanks to the abundance of 
foreign capital, mostly in the form of foreign 
direct investment, the previous deficit was 
covered comfortably and foreign exchange 
reserves grew by about US$ 130 million. 
The country's new specialization in the 
manufacture of electronic and telecom-
munications products in maquila plants 
deepened; this activity was also a major focus for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreshadowed 
the possible creation of a technological cluster. 
The quality of the labour force continued to be a 
comparative advantage for attracting this type of 
investment. The new law on free trade zones and 
increased competition in industrial inputs also 
helped to make the country more attractive as a 
location for such ventures. On the other hand, 
Costa Rica continued to lag behind in terms of 
other competitiveness indicators, such as 
infrastructure. 
The outlook for 1998 includes an improved 
rate of GDP growth (about 4.7%), inflation close 
to 1997 levels, a marginal increase in the current 
account deficit and a fiscal deficit of the same 
order as that recorded in 1997. The financial 
crisis in Asia is expected to have some 
repercussions for the Costa Rican economy 
because of falling demand for the country's 
exports, but this should be of limited scope, since 
only 3% of its exports in 1997 went to Asia. 
Monetary and wage policies less restrictive than 
the year before and an expanded government 
construction programme stimulated economic 
2. Economic policy 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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activity. The containment of government 
spending with the aim of reducing the 
public-sector deficit was not strong enough to 
correct the financial imbalance, which remained 
fairly large, although smaller than in the previous 
year. Lastly, foreign exchange policy was 
consistent with the goal of maintaining export 
competitiveness and avoiding inflationary 
pressures. 
(a)Fiscal policy 
As in previous years, fiscal policy was 
designed to reduce the central government 
deficit, and that indicator was in fact brought 
down from 5.2% to 4% of GDP between 1996 and 
1997. This was achieved thanks to an increase in 
revenue of about 7% in real terms resulting from 
economic growth and a marginal fall in real 
central government spending. 
Wages and pensions continued to be a large 
proportion of overall spending, totalling about 
42%. 
The reduction in the fiscal deficit is a notable 
achievement in view of the fact that it took place 
during an election year. However, the deficit is 
still one of the weaknesses of the country's 
economy, especially because of the size of the 
debt in the form of bonds, equivalent to 34.5% of 
GDP in 1996 and 36.6% in 1997. Bond interest 
paid was 5.4% of GDP in 1996 and 4.7% in 1997. 
This slight decrease was mostly due to lower 
interest rates. The operational deficit, which 
reflects interest paid in real terms, was 2.3% of 
GDP in 1996 and 1.4% in 1997. 
Generally speaking, progress in reducing the 
fiscal deficit in 1997 was due not so much to 
legislative changes and the restructuring of 
domestic debt over the previous two years, but 
rather to growth in economic activity and lower 
real interest rates. The economic upturn led to 
increased imports, which contributed 
substantially to tariff revenue (30.8%) and, under 
the heading of indirect tax revenue, amply made 
up for the reduction in sales tax from 15% to 13%. 
In addition, lower real interest rates helped to 
reduce current expenditure by cutting the real 
cost of servicing the domestic debt. In 1997 that 
cost increased only marginally in nominal terms 
(2.3%). 
The 1995 tax reforms intended to increase tax 
revenue (the Tax Equity Act and the Tax 
Adjustment Act) and the package of measures 
introduced in 1996 for the specific purpose of 
reducing the domestic public-sector debt were 
still showing limited results. Increased numbers 
of people filing tax declarations and more 
efficient tax administration, including simplified 
procedures for taxpayers, together with 
economic growth, contributed to an increase in 
direct tax revenue (about 10% in real terms). 
Of the bills proposed in 1996 to reduce 
domestic debt, only a few had been adopted by 
1997, some of them late in the year, so their 
results were not yet visible; others were still 
before the Legislative Assembly. Measures 
which had come into effect included the 
replacement of government bonds in the hands of 
public bodies with so-called "real-yield 
securities"; taxation of the income of certain 
public bodies; an increase from 280 to 535 in the 
number of enterprises included in the list of 
"major taxpayers"; the imposition of an excise 
tax on gasoline; and the abolition of the tax 
ceiling on luxury cars. 
Having achieved more room for manoeuvre 
in its budget, the Government was able to 
increase its real investment expenditure by 
more than 40%. Much of this was spent on 
repairing the damage caused by hurricane 
Juana and on providing the education sector 
with equipment and new premises, which were 
necessary for the implementation of the 
education reform. 
The privatization of public enterprises and the 
concession of maritime and coastal areas, also 
part of the public debt reduction package, 
remained stalled. 
1 This measure is not without consequences, since it leads to a reduction in revenue for certain public bodies. 
2 This measure will take effect in 1998. 
3 The education reform provides for 6% of GDP to be spent on education. In addition, the teaching of computing and English 
became compulsory at all levels of schooling. 
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Table 1 
COSTA RICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National savings 
External savings 
Employment and wages 
Labour force participation rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real average wage (floor rate) 
(index: 1990=100) 
Prices (December-December) 
Consumer prices (nationwide) 
Wholesale prices 
Industrial producer prices 
External sector 
Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(colones per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
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Millions of dollars 
Jalance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account8 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
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(as a percentage of GDP 
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Money and credit 
Monetary balances of banking system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
Deposit rate 
Lending rate 
Equivalent interest rate 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the 
economically active population (EAP). In 1993 the wholesale price index was replaced by an industrial producer price 
index. g Includes Errors and omissions. Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports 
of goods and services. ' Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
COSTA RICA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
Gross domestic product 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 
Exports (millions of dollars) 
Imports (millions of dollars) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Refers to the exchange rate for imports. c 180-day deposits. Short term. 
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(b)Monetary policy 
The overall objective of monetary policy 
remained the lowering of the inflation rate. 
Beginning in September 1996, however, policy 
was eased in order to permit some degree of 
recovery in economic activity. 
Domestic credit certainly grew, particularly in 
the private sector, thanks to reductions in real 
lending rates of about one percentage point 
(except for the rates charged by financial 
enterprises) and in reserve requirement rates, 
which were intended to bring them to a uniform 
level of 15% in March 1998. The private sectors 
most favoured with credit were housing, which 
absorbed 6.8% in 1997, as compared to 2.4% in 
1996; the agricultural sector, with an increase 
from 6.4% to 8.2%; and consumption, which 
expanded its share from 17.4% to 19.8%. 
Trends in monetary policy during 1997 are 
difficult to discern through the corresponding 
statistics, because of two major problems 
which are reflected in the accounts and make 
analysis difficult: the change in the mechanism 
of bond issues by the Central Bank of Costa 
Rica between 1996 and 1997, and the change 
in the registration of current account deposits 
and time deposits owing to the shift from a 
system of differential reserve requirement to an 
uniform rate. 
The first phenomenon can be seen in the 600% 
increase in the issuance of monetary stabilization 
bonds compared to the previous year. Although 
it was in fact necessary to issue these bonds in 
1997 as a means of sterilizing part of the inflow 
of foreign exchange, it produced serious 
distortion in the figures. 
The second problem is reflected in the figures 
for monetary liabilities. Although they grew by 
17.9% overall in nominal terms, analysis of Ml 
and M2 shows highly abnormal trends: Ml rose 
by 43%, as a result of a 66.7% increase in current 
account deposits, and M2 rose by 15.4% because 
of a 7.9% decrease in time deposits. Although 
there were factors which favoured growth in M1, 
such as the reduction in interest rates, which 
lowered the opportunity cost of liquid assets, and 
the competition among banks to bring in clients 
through services attractive to current account 
holders, deposits in current accounts were 
artificially high owing to accounting transfers by 
banks from time deposits to current account 
deposits. 
Foreign currency deposits expanded more 
slowly than in previous years (22.9%), 
probably owing to renewed confidence in the 
economy and greater investments in the 
productive sector. 
An important aspect of longer-term 
financial policy was the adoption in January 
1998 of a securities market regulation act which 
had been debated during 1997. The new legal 
framework provides for more adequate 
regulation of the market by taking into account 
the new instruments which have been developed 
internationally in recent years. The Office of the 
Superintendent of Securities, created under the 
new law, will have important functions, 
including the authorization, regulation and 
supervision of the public offering of securities 
and the entities that deal in them, such as 
stockbroking firms and investment fund 
managers. 
In October 1997, in a further effort to improve 
security in non-banking financial markets, the 
Central Bank decided to broaden the base of 
instruments subject to minimum reserve 
requirements to include credit unions and 
housing cooperatives. 
(c) Foreign exchange policy 
The authorities continued the policy of daily 
mini-devaluations, leading to a nominal 
4 It should be made clear that the excessive growth in monetary stabilization bonds in 1997 is solely an accounting problem. In 
1996 joint auctions were held for Central Bank and Ministry of Finance bonds, and monetary stabilization bonds were therefore 
no longer issued. In April 1997, the Central Bank began issuing monetary stabilization bonds again, and the 1997 increase in the 
latter therefore appears disproportionate. 
5 This also involves an accounting problem resulting from the reclassification by the banks of long-term deposits as current 
account deposits. Some current accounts had typically been classified as long-term accounts to avoid the high reserve requirement 
on the former, but this practice ceased to be necessary with the introduction of the 15% uniform rate. 
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cumulative devaluation of 12% over 1996. The 
result was a slight devaluation in real terms of the 
adjusted real exchange rate, suggesting a policy 
favourable to exports but fairly neutral in terms 
of inflation. 
3. The main variables 
(a) Economic activity 
Economic activity took a positive turn, 
moving from a 0.6% contraction in 1996 to 3.2% 
growth in 1997. As for demand, the greatest 
improvement came from a major upturn in 
investment in machinery and equipment (14.5%) 
and construction (13.1%). Both of these areas had 
experienced a phase of contraction or low growth 
lasting several years. Although the private sector 
provided the greatest boost, public sector 
investment, which had been sluggish for a long 
period, also grew significantly. 
Exports, on the other hand, grew only half as 
quickly as in the previous year, while 
consumption had only a marginal effect on 
aggregate demand. 
On the supply side, imports of goods and 
services showed considerable dynamism, mostly 
in response to investment activity and the overall 
economic recovery. 
With the exception of agriculture, down by 
0.7%, the other productive sectors showed 
improved performance in 1997, particularly 
construction, which grew at the exceptionally 
high rate of 16.3%. There was a significant 
upturn in manufacturing (4.5%), and services in 
general averaged the same growth rate as GDP 
(3.2%). 
There were various reasons for the 
exceptional growth in construction. In addition to 
the usual construction boom during periods of 
economic recovery, activity in this sector was 
boosted by the granting of low-income housing 
vouchers, which the Government financed by 
issuing bonds on the domestic market, and by the 
beginning of the construction of Intel plants. New 
public works were also undertaken, including 
school buildings. 
In the manufacturing sector, increased 
investments and the growth in construction 
provided a particular stimulus to metal 
manufactures and machinery, which grew by 
15.2%, and to non-metallic minerals (11.6%). 
This reduced to some extent the widening gap 
between the growth sectors producing 
primarily for international markets, and the 
more stagnant sectors supplying the domestic 
market. Increased private consumption also 
had some impact in certain sectors such as 
printing and publishing, which grew by 
14.7%. 
Agricultural activity, on the other hand, 
decreased by 0.7% owing to highly unfavourable 
climatic factors which affected both export crops 
(bananas, coffee and sugar) and certain basic 
grains, particularly beans. In the case of bananas, 
there was also a further deterioration in 
production conditions on the plantations; 
productivity, in cases, per hectare has fallen by 
about 30% since 1990. 
Lastly, in the services sector, transport, 
storage and communications showed a 4% 
increase; this was influenced by the 
proliferation of telematic services and the 
upturn in seaport activity due to high imports. 
Commerce also grew by 4%, owing to the 
increases in both domestic economic activity 
and imports. Growth in electrical services 
reflected increased demand for energy (5.7%), 
which was met thanks to the substantial 
increase in electric power generation (13.2%). 
Two geothermal power plants, Boca de Pozo 2 
and 3, came into operation in late 1996 and 
early 1997 respectively, and some new private 
hydroelectric plants began functioning in the 
past year; this explains the exceptional growth 
in electric power generation. 
6 Between 1989 and 1997, enterprises producing mostly for export doubled their share of overall industrial production; by the 
end of the period, they accounted for three quarters of manufacturing production. 
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(b) Prices, wages and employment 
The inflation rate was lower than in the 
previous year: 11.2% compared with 13.9%, 
December to December. Various factors were 
involved, including the lowering of sales tax 
from 15% to 13% and the fall in oil prices on the 
international market; these compensated to some 
extent for the new fuel consumption tax. 
Wages, after falling steadily in real terms 
over the previous two years, recovered by 
about 1%, but this did not make up for the 
decrease of about 4% during the previous 
period. The lowest wages, especially the 
minimum wage, increased the most in real 
terms (3.7%). State pensions also increased 
significantly in real terms (about 12%). 
The unemployment rate fell from 6.2% to 
5.7%, with a larger proportional decrease in 
urban areas (from 6.6% to 5.9%) than in rural 
areas (from 5.9% to 5.6%). In urban areas, 
construction and services absorbed labour and 
helped to reduce unemployment. On the other 
hand, despite the expansion in manufacturing, 
the sector did not generate many jobs, a sign of 
improved productivity. 
(c)The external sector 
The current account deficit widened markedly 
(by US$ 297 million over the previous year) 
basically owing to the 16.2% increase in 
merchandise imports. 
Expanded purchases of goods on the 
international market were mostly due to the boom 
in investment and construction. Although, 
imports of consumer goods rose by only 2.3%, 
imports of intermediate and capital goods 
increased by 24%. A major part of the growth in 
the former was due to construction, while in the 
case of capital goods, those intended for the 
transport and manufacturing sectors showed a 
considerable increase (27.6% and 20.3% 
respectively), as did those for the agricultural 
sector (62%), although these were only a small 
proportion of the total. 
Imports, especially of capital goods, resulted 
in part from investments by foreign enterprises, 
of which Intel was the most important, and 
entailed inflows of foreign capital to finance 
them. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was very 
high during 1997 (US$ 446 million). Those 
investments were closely linked to export 
activities, so the spending on imports generated 
foreign currency inflows through foreign sales. 
The trade deficit was therefore of a different 
nature from those observed during periods of 
economic recovery, when imports for 
consumption, which are comparatively difficult 
to finance, were much more significant. 
Exports rose by 8.8%, owing mainly to 
non-traditional exports (15.8%), since traditional 
exports fell for the second consecutive year 
(-3.6%). A considerable part of the increase in 
non-traditional exports, however, was due to 
favourable movements in international prices 
(12%), while volume grew by only 5%. 
Traditional exports were affected by floods and 
other climatic phenomena; in the category, only 
coffee showed an improvement in export value 
thanks to steep increases in international prices. 
Non-traditional exports gained impetus owing 
to renewed access to the United States market 
following the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
ruling prohibiting the United States from 
continuing to impose quotas on clothing imports 
from Costa Rica. 
Exports produced in the free trade zones were 
particularly dynamic and posted an increase of 
23% over the previous year. Government policy 
was aimed at giving additional stimulus to 
investments in this sector, through the June 1997 
reform of the law on free trade zones; among 
other things, the reform provided for substantial 
fiscal incentives for the reinvestment of profits in 
the sector and broadened the definition of what 
constituted a free trade zone. 
The structure of exports by destination was 
much the same as in the previous year, although 
exports to North America (over 50% of the total) 
increased, as did those to South America and the 
7 This rate of increase differs from that which can be deduced from the "merchandise" heading in the balance of payments, 
since the latter does not include goods for processing (value added of maquila plants and free trade zones), which come under the 
heading of "Other goods, services and income". 
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Caribbean; exports to the European Union 
decreased, owing to the fall in banana exports. 
The proportion of exports to Central America, 
other European countries and Asia remained 
constant. Within Central America, which 
absorbed 13.6% of the total, exports to Panama 
and Nicaragua showed particular improvement. 
Tourism, which has become an important 
source of foreign exchange, grew more quickly 
than in the previous period; income from tourism 
showed a net growth of about 4%, and new 
projects continued to be undertaken in this area. 
As mentioned above, FDI remained at very 
high levels, totalling US$ 446.2 million, 
more than double the amount recorded in the 
early 1990s; the electronics company Intel 
accounted for about a quarter of the overall 
amount. 
External debt showed a marginal decrease 
over the previous year, owing to loan repayments 
by the public sector, while private-sector debt 
tended to increase because of the need to finance 
new investments during the economic upturn. 
The policy pursued in 1996 of replacing public 
external debt with domestic debt was partly 
reversed in 1997, when it was decided that bonds 





1. General trends 
The rate of recovery of the Cuban 
economy slowed to 2.5% in 1997 (7.8% in 
1996) and the balance-of-payments 
current account deficit grew owing to a 
large increase (21%) in the volume of 
merchandise imports and mediocre 
export performance (3%). Growth in 
income from tourism services and current 
transfers helped to mitigate the foreign 
currency shortage. Despite persistently 
high liquidity ratios and a deterioration of 
20% in the exchange rate, no major price 
adjustments were reported and the fiscal 
gap was reduced to 2% of output. 
The smaller 1996/1997 sugar harvest (-4%) 
caused a decrease in the volume exported, and 
international prices also fell. The disappointing 
performance of the sugar industry and the 
escalation of the foreign embargo made it 
difficult for the Cuban economy, which is in 
the process of restructuring, to make progress. 
The country was faced with delays and higher 
costs for foreign borrowing, lower 
international prices for its main export 
commodities (sugar and nickel) and the effects 
of unfavourable weather phenomena and pests 
in the agricultural sector. Hurricane Lily, 
which struck the central area of the island in 
mid-October 1996, left damage estimated at 
US$ 800 million. 
In the area of reform, the main positive 
developments were a major institutional reform 
of the banking sector and increased 
decentralization of operations in the external 
sector. However, the implementation of reforms 
in productive sectors lagged behind, resulting in 
inefficient use of inputs in the public sector, as 
was the case in the sugar industry, or 
handicapping the growth of new private-sector 
activities. The increasing dollarization of the 
economy and the adoption by more and more 
public-sector enterprises of management policies 
based on financial profitability are adding to the 
costs and tensions associated with the 
coexistence of the new economy with the old 
system of fixed prices and incomes. 
In 1998, it is anticipated that progress with 
macroeconomic stabilization will be slow, owing 
to the difficulties confronting the external and 
fiscal sectors. Thus, it is expected that the 
non-financial public-sector deficit will rise to the 
equivalent of 3% of output and that cumulative 
monetary liquidity will contract to no more than 
200 million pesos. Despite the reduced 
1997/1998 sugar crop, there will probably be a 
slight improvement in external accounts, thanks 
to the fall in the oil bill and increased flows both 
of family remittances and foreign investment. 
However, the trade gap and the fact that the 
Cuban economy has scarcely any access to 
capital markets will limit output recovery to a 
maximum of between 2.5% and 3.5%. 
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2. Economic policy 
The authorities persevered with the 
implementation of the macroeconomic and 
structural adjustment programme initiated in 
1993, while seeking to improve depressed 
production levels without sacrificing basic social 
services. 
Clearly, the increasingly swift transformation 
of the economy and the distortions in relative 
prices make analysis of the situation more 
difficult. The system of national accounts is 
being adapted to the new realities and may not 
fully take into account the activity of new actors. 
Wide price differentials (from 1 to 20) between 
regulated and free markets, and between the 
official and parallel exchange rates, make it 
difficult to compare the various monetary circuits 
and to establish a single price index. 
(a)Public finances 
The public-sector deficit fell to 2% of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1997, compared to 
2.5% in 1996; in Cuba, this deficit has particular 
significance owing to the socialist nature of the 
economy, and is financed through money 
creation. The reduction in the deficit was due to 
the fact that revenue contracted less than 
expenditure (-0.8% and -1.6%). On the spending 
side, there was a slight increase in current 
expenditure (0.8%) and a contraction of capital 
expenditure (-14%). It should be borne in mind 
that the flows which were reported as expenditure 
correspond to amounts that the official entities 
concerned were unable to finance independently, 
from their own income or borrowing. This is 
particularly important in the case of investment, 
since the investment growth reflected in the 
national accounts is due to activities connected 
with the external sector and semipublic 
companies, which have their own 
foreign-exchange resources. 
Tax revenue increased by 6.6%, while 
non-tax revenue fell by almost 15%. The 
reduction in circulation and sales taxes (-4.6%) 
can be explained by the decline in the supply 
of various goods at regulated prices, 
particularly tobacco, beer and alcoholic 
beverages. The profit margin, which forms the 
base for such taxes, also narrowed because of 
increased production costs. 
A decline in taxes on utilities was associated 
with reduced revenue from the levy on electric 
power. As fuel prices increased, the wholesale 
price of electricity rose, but this was not passed 
on to consumers. 
On the other hand, revenue derived from new 
activities increased. The higher amounts 
collected in personal income tax (22%) were due 
to increased payments by private farmers (40%) 
and self-employed workers (4.2%). There was 
also an increase in revenue from taxes on use of 
labour (132%) and on utilities (86%). 
In accordance with social priorities in 
economic policy, social assistance expenditure 
increased (16%), as did spending on housing and 
community services (13%). The budgetary 
resources allocated to education and public 
health (6.2% and 5.4% of GDP respectively) made 
it possible to maintain positive achievements in 
those areas. Social security continued to absorb 
the lion's share of current expenditure (7.1% of 
output) because of the rising numbers of 
pensioners (1,323,000 persons); this is a burden 
to fiscal equilibrium and entails the adoption of 
innovative means of financing. 
Transfers to public-sector enterprises fell by 
10%, owing to decreases both in losses (-17%) 
and in price subsidies for various goods and 
services (-1.4%). The Ministries of the Sugar 
Industry and of Agriculture received the largest 
share of these funds because of profitability 
problems faced by entities under their 
jurisdiction. Government assistance to basic 
cooperative production units (UBPCs) also had to 
be increased by 4.5%. 
The 1998 budget anticipates higher growth in 
expenditure (3.4%) than in revenue (1.5%), 
which will bring the unfinanced fiscal deficit up 
to 3% of output. With the extension of the new 
fiscal regime to all enterprises and entities in the 
country, the dual tax system will disappear. 
(b)Monetary and financial policies 
Excess liquidity in the hands of the population 
and the build-up of outstanding accounts among 
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public-sector enterprises continued to be matters 
of primary concern in the monetary field. As a 
result, the monetary authorities continued to 
restrict the supply of credit in national currency. 
The rationing of foreign currency in the State 
circuit was accentuated because of the decline in 
sugar exports. 
Poor yields from the circulation tax and from 
taxes on sales by the public sector of goods and 
services in national currency, made it difficult to 
make headway in absorbing excess liquidity. Net 
liquidity, in other words, currency outside banks 
plus regular savings accounts fell slightly to 40% 
of output (41% in 1996). Available information 
suggests that the problem of delinquent accounts 
in the public sector (3.58 billion pesos) remained 
serious, even in the thriving tourism sector, 
where the chain of unpaid accounts grew by 
US$ 16 million in six months. 
At the beginning of the second half of 1998, 
interest rates on local currency deposits rose for 
the first time in many years. They were increased 
from 2% to 3.5% for savings accounts, and for 
time deposits the new rates ranged from 4.5% (30 
days) to 5.5% (360 days). 
The dollarization process intensified, with the 
expansion of markets in foreign currency and the 
increasingly significant role of income in convertible 
currencies in determining household purchasing 
power. Half the population is thought to have access 
to foreign currency, through purchases with Cuban 
pesos at exchange offices, family remittances 
from abroad, wage incentives in convertible 
currency and the growth of international tourism. 
The amount of merchandise sales in dollars to the 
population increased by 17.8% and is thought to 
represent more than US$ 750 million. 
The official exchange rate remained at one 
Cuban peso to one United States dollar, while the 
average rate on the parallel foreign exchange 
market deteriorated from 19.2 to 22.8 pesos. The 
parallel exchange rate improved slightly in the 
first quarter of 1998 as tourism increased. 
(c) Structural reforms 
The most significant progress in restructuring 
the Cuban economy was made in the financial 
system and in the export sector. 
The Central Bank of Cuba was established in 
1997; its priority objectives are to implement 
policies for improved control of monetary and 
credit variables. In the course of the decade, 16 
foreign financial institutions, including 13 banks, 
have been granted licences to establish agencies 
in Cuba. During the biennium 1996-1997, 
financial institutions (banking and non-banking) 
operating in Cuba extended credit totalling a 
billion dollars to Cuban entities, on strictly 
market conditions; this had a favourable effect on 
productive recovery. 
Structural reforms have encouraged the 
decentralization of external trade; in 1997, some 
300 enterprises had already been authorized to 
buy and sell abroad. Also, about 600 foreign 
firms had commercial agencies in Cuba, and 435 
Cuban enterprises were entitled to carry out 
transactions in convertible currencies. 
Eleven new bilateral investment treaties were 
signed in 1997, increasing to 30 the number of 
countries with which Cuba has agreements of this 
type, and the number of joint ventures with 
foreign entities increased to 317 (260 in 1996). 
Another 200 entities operate in three free trade 
zones, to respond to the growing demand 
generated by tourism and provide links between 
that sector and agriculture and related activities. 
There are now semipublic enterprises in 34 
different branches of industry. Telephony, oil 
prospecting and extraction, and metal ore mining 
are currently controlled 100% by such 
enterprises, as is the production of rum, 
lubricants, soaps, detergents and perfumes. Joint 
ventures involving foreign capital control 70% of 
citrus fruit production and 50% of nickel and 
cement production. Also, 10% of the country's 
hotel infrastructure for international tourism is 
owned by semipublic enterprises and a further 
41% is operated by foreign hotel chains under 
management contracts. 
With the creation in 1997 of five more joint 
ventures in the real estate sector, work began on 
projects totalling about US$ 300 million for the 
construction and refurbishment of property for 
rent or sale in foreign currency to foreigners or to 
Cubans resident abroad. 
In the area of what might be referred to as 
the "second economy", consisting of the 
191 
Table 1 
CUBA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth b 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 




Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 













Currency outside banks 



















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Calculated on the basis of series in constant 1981 pesos, and as the official exchange rate of 1 peso to 
the dollar. c Calculated at the official exchange rate of 1 peso to the dollar. 
activitiesoftheemergingprivatesector.themost 
important event was the legalization of the 
renting of rooms. Since about 20% of tourists 
obtain accommodation in private homes, 
standards were established for this activity in 
May 1997 and a mechanism was created for the 
payment of the corresponding taxes. In late 
September 1997, some 3,000 landlords had 
registeredas taxpayers,mostly in thecapital city. 
The fifth Congress of the Communist Party of 
Cuba recognized the legality of the work of 
self-employed persons and its contribution to 
employment and to supply, but reiterated that 
such activities would remain within the 
existing system. In 1996, self-employed 
workers made up 8% of the employed 
population, in addition to the 4.1% employed 




Economic performance continued to be 
determined by the severe restrictions facing the 
country, both externally and in the reorganization 
of its productive and commercial system. In this 
context, the reduced sugar crop had a significant 
impact, not only because of the close links 
between the sugar industry and the rest of the 
economy, but also owing to the fact that sugar 
production is used as collateral for foreign 
borrowing. However, increasing numbers of 
public-sector enterprises are showing signs of 
recovery following radical restructuring. 
(a)Economic activity 
The 5% growth in total supply originated in 
the significant increase in imports of goods and 
services (20%), while GDP grew by only 2.5%. 
The growth of the economy was driven by 
exports of goods and services, which increased 
by more than 9%, and investment, which rose by 
almost 8%. As for sectoral performance, there 
was an 18% surge in tourism, mining grew by 
11.9% and manufacturing industry by 7.7%, 
whereas agriculture contracted (-1.6%). 
Tourism from abroad grew to 1,180,000 
visitors, providing gross income of US$ 1,546 
million. With the expansion of hotel 
infrastructure, the number of rooms increased 
from 26,878 in 1996 to about 29,000 in 1997. 
Mining and quarrying expanded on the basis 
of joint ventures involving foreign capital and 
Cuban entities, as well as the introduction of new 
models of self-financing in foreign currency and 
incentive schemes for workers. Once again, a 
new record was set for nickel production (62,600 
tons). 
Two opposing trends were observed in 
manufacturing industry. On the one hand, 
non-sugar industries made progress, with growth 
in light industry (4%), the food industry (6%), 
building materials (10%), and metal 
manufactures and machinery (17%). On the other 
hand, the sugar industry suffered because of a 
further decrease in the sugar crop, to 4.3 million 
tons. The situation was worsened by other 
factors, including interruption in financing in the 
amount of more than US$ 200 million which was 
variables 
needed for timely purchases of inputs before the 
sugar harvest, delays in the application of 
economic reforms, which had an unfavourable 
impact on production management, and adverse 
weather conditions. To remedy this situation, an 
incentive programme was launched in the 
UBPCs (cooperatives set up on former State 
lands), including a 52.8% increase in the price of 
sugar cane. 
The disappointing performance of non-sugar 
activities in the State and cooperative sectors, and 
the stagnation of the livestock sector eroded the 
provision of supplies to the population at 
regulated prices and the availability of foreign 
currency. The small private subsector (17% of 
the land) appears to have performed somewhat 
better, as evidenced by the almost 40% increase 
in its contributions to the State budget and its 
improved participation in free agricultural 
markets, in a context of falling sale prices. The 
gross fish catch was up 14% as a result of new 
management systems and incentive schemes for 
workers. 
Construction rose by 4.8% owing to work 
carried out on hotel, housing and airport projects, 
as well as water-related infrastructure. A total of 
53,000 dwellings were completed in 1997. Two 
dams were built and work progressed on four 
others, for irrigation and for water supply to the 
population. 
(b) Prices, wages and employment 
The information available shows that 
consumer prices rose by only 2%. Prices fell in 
the free agricultural market (-2.2%) and the 
informal economy (-3.1%). 
The value of sales on the free agricultural 
market fell by 5.3%, owing to reductions in both 
volume and prices. Private enterprise produced 
the lion's share of supplies (72.7%), while the 
participation of the State and cooperative sectors 
fell (by 23.7% and 3.6% respectively). The value 
of sales on the free markets for industrial and 
cottage industry products grew by almost 50%. 
Although the appreciation of the dollar on the 
parallel markets did not affect regulated prices, it 
lowered households' purchasing power. The 
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higher cost in pesos of buying consumer goods 
available only in foreign-currency shops 
increased the cost of living for that part of the 
population which does not have access to 
sufficient income in convertible currencies. 
Average nominal wages improved by 3.3%, in 
the context of the policy of promoting priority 
activities. This system of incentives in kind and 
in foreign currency, linked to the employee's 
productivity and the fulfilment of production 
goals, was extended to more than 1.4 million 
workers. Despite this, average labour 
productivity rose by only 0.6%, owing to low 
efficiency levels in the agricultural and sugar 
industries and to insufficient progress in 
industrial downsizing. The number of workers 
available for relocation fell to 8,800, and the 
unemployment rate was down to 6.9% (19,000 
and 7.6% respectively in 1996). 
(c)The external sector 
The balance-of-payments current account 
deficit widened owing to an increased 
merchandise trade deficit, despite increased 
current transfers and lower payments for factor 
services. The positive balance of the capital 
account was barely sufficient to finance the 
current account deficit, while international 
reserves remained very low. Capital inflows took 
the form of foreign direct investment, mainly in 
the communications and real-estate sectors, as 
well as bank loans and trade credits. 
The deepening trade deficit is basically due to 
a steep rise in the value of goods imports and 
virtual stagnation of that of exports. The terms of 
trade declined by 1.5%. The mediocre 
performance of the value of external sales of 
goods (0.6%) was due, on the one hand, to the 
fact that the price of nickel fell, although the 
volumes exported were higher, and, on the other 
hand, to reduced shipments of sugar, the price of 
which also fell. Efforts to diversify exports were 
reflected in an increase of more than 15% in 
non-sugar exports. The increased value of 
imports (20%) was entirely due to the greater 
volumes involved (21%), since international 
prices fell slightly (-0.8%). Food and oil 
purchases increased in 1997. The services 
balance continued to show a surplus, attributable 
to increased tourism and international 
telecommunications. 
Sales of domestic products in the market 
segment which operates in foreign currency 
accounted for 41 % of all purchases in 1997 (35% 
in 1996). These sales, either to meet demand from 
the tourism sector or in foreign-currency shops 
open to the population, enable import 
substitution and help to increase the foreign 
currency income of the State sector. 
The external public debt increased slightly 
to about US$ 10.5 billion. One-fifth of that 
amount consisted of short-term borrowing. It 
should be noted that perception of the country 
risk on international financial markets has 
improved in recent years. Bid prices for Cuba's 
external debt on secondary markets was up 
from US$ 0.0825 in 1993 to US$ 0.25/0.27 in 
late 1997. In March 1998, a debt rescheduling 
agreement was signed with Japanese 
enterprises for an amount of 100 billion yen 
(approximately US$ 770 million). However, 
access to foreign bank loans and trade credits 
remains severely restricted and subject to very 
onerous terms, with high interest rates (14% to 




1. General trends 
Despite political problems, Ecuador's 
economy grew by 3.7%, a better 
performance than in the preceding two 
years. Ecuador also managed to curb the 
upsurge in inflation that occurred in the 
early part of the year and to reduce the 
non-financial public-sector deficit. Even 
so, these were again modest achievements 
compared with the regional average. 
The beginning of 1997 was marked by a 
profound political and social crisis that 
culminated in widespread social unrest; in 
February, the Government was forced to resign, 
and an interim Administration was appointed for 
a period of 18 months. The new authorities, 
endorsed by a general referendum in May, 
devised a programme to control a projected high 
fiscal deficit, reverse the rise in inflation and set 
the economy on a path of moderate economic 
growth. 
The authorities were successful in their efforts 
to rein in the resurgence of inflation in early 1997, 
and at year's end inflation stood at 30.7%. The 
reduction in the non-financial public-sector 
deficit to 2.5% of GDP, prudent monetary policy 
and a 4% real appreciation of the sucre all 
contributed to this result. Thanks to the 
expansion of both exports and private 
investment, GDP grew by 3.7%. Owing to a strong 
increase in imports, however, the current account 
deficit widened to 4% of GDP, similar to the levels 
recorded prior to 1996. The problem of service 
arrears on public debt owed to Paris Club 
countries remained unresolved, a situation that 
explains in part the fact that international 
monetary reserves increased further, on this 
occasion by over US$ 200 million. 
In contrast to the relative success of its 
macroeconomic policy, the Administration was 
unable to make progress on modernization of the 
State; for example, the auction of a 35% stake in 
the enterprises formed after Empresa 
Ecuatoriana de Telecomunicaciones (EMETEL) 
was split up had to be postponed twice. 
Imbalances became more acute in early 1998, 
chiefly owing to a steep fall in oil prices and the 
effects of the El Niño weather pattern. Inflation 
again accelerated, while the fiscal situation and 
the trade balance both deteriorated. The period 
leading up to new elections was marked by labour 
disputes and conflict between the branches of 
Government, reflecting serious problems of 
governability. This complicated the search for 
solutions to these problems, especially the high 
fiscal deficit. As a consequence, projections for 
1998 are for growth of only 1 %, inflation of close 
to 40% by year's end and an increase in the 
balance-of-payments current account deficit to 
6% of GDP. 
2. Economic policy 
The Government that took office in August 1996 element of which was to be a foreign-exchange 
proposed major economic reforms, the key system based on a currency board, entailing a 
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ECUADOR 
fixed exchange rate and local-currency liquidity 
management determined solely by the supply of 
international monetary reserves. The interim 
Administration appointed in February rejected 
this plan and -faced with major imbalances-
made it clear that its principal objectives for 1997 
would be to reduce the fiscal deficit, slow the 
inflation rate and boost economic growth; it also 
signalled its intention to move ahead in reforming 
the State. 
To that end, the Administration took steps to 
rein in expenditure and boost government 
revenue and adopted a prudent monetary policy. 
The exchange-rate band was adjusted in order to 
control expectations of a devaluation stemming 
from the inflationary surge early in the year, and 
to head off a substantial hike in interest rates. A 
dollar auction system was introduced to dampen 
speculative fluctuations. 
When new imbalances arose in early 1998, 
monetary control measures were adopted and the 
exchange-rate band was again adjusted. 
However, in the pre-electoral period, it proved 
impossible to reach a consensus on measures to 
deal with the critical fiscal situation. Under these 
conditions, the Administration was obliged to 
revise its growth and inflation targets. 
(a) Fiscal policy 
The difficult fiscal position influenced 
economic policy during the period. When the 
interim Administration took office in February 
1997, the projected non-financial public-sector 
deficit was 6.6% of GDP, and the target set by the 
authorities was to reduce that to 2.5%. This goal 
was attained in late 1997, and the deficit came in 
slightly lower than in 1996, though it was still 
higher than in other years of the decade. The 
deficit was to a large extent -2.1% of GDP-
financed with external funds. 
This modest success in holding down the 
fiscal deficit was chiefly due to the reduction in 
expenditure from 27.6% to 25.9% of GDP; this 
reflected the fact that capital expenditure fell in 
real terms, while the rise in current expenditure 
lagged behind the rate of economic growth. 
Government revenues began to feel the 
impact of markedly lower oil prices, as export 
earnings dipped by almost 2% of GDP and 
revenues from domestic sales of petroleum 
products showed a moderate drop in real terms. 
A further factor contributing to the downturn in 
fiscal revenue was the decline in the operating 
surplus of State-owned enterprises from 2.5% to 
1.5% of GDP. This slump in income was partially 
offset by the growth in non-oil revenues; the most 
notable increases were in value added tax (VAT) 
and customs receipts, attributable in part to 
higher levels of economic activity. 
The main steps taken to boost government 
revenues were a hike in customs tariffs by up to 
4% for the remainder of the year by invoking the 
Andean Community safeguard clause, the 
reimposition of the 8% tax on financial income 
and a rise in some utility rates. In mid-1998, the 
corporate income tax rate was restored to 25% (it 
had been lowered in late 1996) and certain VAT 
exemptions were eliminated. Steps were also 
taken to improve tax collection efficiency, 
including the establishment of an autonomous 
internal revenue service. 
In 1998, the Government again set itself the 
target of holding the non-financial public-sector 
deficit to 2.5% of GDP. However, projections of 
the deficit had to be revised upwards to nearly 7% 
of GDP, owing to a combination of wage hikes, 
higher outlays caused by El Niño and, especially, 
falling oil prices. To counteract this situation, a 
tariff of up to 5% was introduced on imports from 
countries not members of the Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA), to remain in 
effect throughout 1998. Other measures 
proposed by the Executive early in the year, such 
as an increase in VAT, were rejected by Congress. 
Thus, in the first half of 1998, Ecuador faced 
an extremely difficult fiscal situation, affected by 
strong pressures on both the expenditure and 
revenue fronts, as well as unfavourable political 
conditions that rendered a solution to fiscal 
problems difficult. 
(b) Monetary policy 
In response to the resurgence of inflation in 
early 1997, the authorities raised the reserve 
requirement from 10% to 12% in March. The 
additional 2% could be held in the form of 
monetary stabilization bonds (BEMs), as that they 
would earn interest, and not have an adverse 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population; urban areas. e Percentages 
of the economically active population (EAP); urban areas. Up to 1992, refers to the exchange rate on the regulated market. 
From 1993 on, refers to the exchange rate on the open market. 8 Includes Errors and omissions. Refers to net interest 
as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. ' In 1994 and 1995, includes expenditures 
related to staff reductions. J Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
ü Preliminary figures. Refers to exchange rate for imports. 
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effect on the banks' operating results. The 
authorities also continued the policy of sterilizing 
the liquidity generated by international monetary 
reserves, which expanded during the first six 
months, owing in part to a high level of external 
financing (Eurobond issues). Growing 
non-financial public sector (INFPS) deposits, 
which over the period showed a cash surplus, 
were available for that purpose. In the second half 
of the year, international reserves dipped a 
fraction, thus facilitating the application of 
prudent monetary policy; by the end of the year, 
primary money had expanded by 25% compared 
to the end of 1996, below the inflation rate, in 
spite of a simultaneous drop in NFPS deposits with 
the Central Bank. 
By December, growth in Ml had reached 
30%, while M2 (excluding foreign-currency 
deposits) had increased by 23%. The slowdown 
in the growth of quasi-money in local currency 
(20%, versus 40% in 1996) was partly offset by 
increasing dollarization of financial savings. 
Foreign-currency deposits expanded by 47%, 
bringing their share of total quasi-money to 37% 
by the end of the year. 
Interest rates had begun to decline in 
mid-1996, and continued on the same path until 
mid-1997; bank spreads followed suite. The 
greater credibility of foreign exchange policy, 
the overcoming of the severe liquidity problems 
that had beset banks during 1995 and part of 
1996 and low demand for credit all contributed 
to this process. Midway through the year, 
interest rates on deposits became negative in real 
terms. In the second half, this tendency eased as 
interest rates recovered slightly, thanks to 
greater demand for credit. The volume of credit 
contracted in real terms up until the third quarter; 
however, by the end of the year, in a context of 
a mild economic recovery, credit had expanded 
by 39% in nominal terms. Increasingly, credit 
was extended in dollars, and by late 1997 loans 
made in foreign-currency accounted for 48% of 
the total. 
In early 1998, in the face of a fresh outbreak 
of inflation and a difficult fiscal position 
characterized by a reduction in NFPS deposits 
with the Central Bank, the authorities extended 
the reserve requirement to deposits of 360 days 
and longer, while also relying increasingly on 
monetary stabilization bonds to control liquidity, 
and succeeded in cutting the annual rate of 
growth in primary money to 21% by the end of 
June. This caused interest rates to rise, which 
helped head off greater pressure on the exchange 
rate associated with the growing political and 
economic uncertainty. 
The financial system continued to recover 
from the severe liquidity crisis in late 1995 and 
thereafter. By the end of 1997, the proportion of 
non-performing loans in private banks' 
portfolios dropped to 7%, while provisions for 
bad loans rose to 73% of the overdue portfolio. 
In order to improve banking supervision, the 
Superintendency of Banks established a risk 
assessment centre charged with monitoring 
trends in consolidated financial debt. 
However, parts of the financial sector are still 
very vulnerable because of slowing of some 
economic activities and rising interest rates; by 
mid-1998, the proportion of non-performing 
loans had risen a gain to nearly 9% of the total 
portfolio. 
(c) Foreign exchange policy 
The interim Government reinstated the 
currency band to control expectations of 
devaluation in accordance with inflation. In 
response to the inflationary surge early in 1997, 
the authorities readjusted the band in March, 
raising the central parity by 3.8%, steepening the 
gradient from 18.5% to 21% and setting the 
bandwidth around the central parity at 10%. A 
dollar auction system was also introduced in an 
effort to curb speculative fluctuations in the 
exchange rate. 
As the inflationary outbreak early in the year 
was brought under control and the auction system 
functioned successfully, the exchange rate, 
showing relatively little fluctuation, slipped 
slightly below the centre of the band. As a result, 
the sucre was devalued 25% with respect to the 
dollar. In real terms, the annual average reflected 
a 4% real appreciation of the sucre in relation to 
a basket of currencies of its main trading partners, 
largely as a result of the appreciation of the dollar 
with respect to other currencies, since the index 
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of the real exchange rate of the sucre to the dollar 
rose by just 2%. 
In response to a new wave of inflation early in 
1998 and to counteract growing uncertainty, the 
authorities again raised the exchange-rate band, 
in March 1998, for the fifth time since the bank 
was introduced, on this occasion by 7.5%, though 
the gradient was reduced to 20%. Thus, although 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
gathered momentum, in real terms, the sucre 
again appreciated 2.8% between December and 
June. 
(d) Structural reforms 
Late in 1997, a constitutional amendment 
authorized the State to delegate the delivery of 
public services to private firms and to privatize 
State-owned enterprises. That paved the way for 
privatization of a 35% stake in Andinatel and 
Pacifictel, the two companies to emerge from the 
split-up of EMETEL. However, the auctions 
scheduled for November 1997 and April 1998 
both had to be postponed. 
The trends in the main variables were 
satisfactory, in light of previous years' results and 
the adverse circumstances encountered early in 
the year, but they are also an indication of the 
Ecuadorian economy's continuing structural 
weaknesses. 
(a) Economic activity 
In spite of the difficult political situation in 
early 1997, GDP grew by 3.7% and per capita GDP 
edged up; these results represented a slight 
improvement on the preceding two-year period. 
During the first six months, the main components 
of aggregate demand reflected the impact of the 
political crisis. Economic agents, however, 
viewed the prospects with a certain degree of 
optimism, and this translated into a strong 
build-up of inventories. In the second half of 
1997, both merchandise exports and gross fixed 
capital formation by the private sector expanded 
The National Finance Corporation continued 
to move forward with the disinvestment policy 
initiated in previous years, and in late 1997 sold 
its stock in two cement companies. In order to 
promote private investment, the Investment 
Guarantee Act was passed; this law guarantees 
income tax stability for a period of 10 to 20 years, 
depending on the type of investment. 
In March 1997, a law was passed providing 
for the distribution of 15% of the central 
government budget (excluding income from 
loans) to municipalities and provincial 
councils by the year 2000. This percentage will 
be reached in steps, with 7% due to be 
transferred in 1998. Another law enacted in 
October set up the legal framework for the 
transfer of functions from the central 
government to sectional governments. 
However, many of the decentral ized 
administrations have little experience in 
carrying out their new responsibilities, and this 
scheme for managing fiscal expenditure is 
proving very difficult to implement over the 
short term. 
relatively quickly, reaching annual growth rates 
of 5.4% and 4.0%, respectively. In contrast, 
household consumption increased by only 2.3%, 
roughly the same as the rate of population 
growth, while wages lost ground in real terms. 
Robust import growth caused aggregate supply 
to expand by 4.6%. 
Almost all branches of activity grew faster 
than the previous year. The best performances 
were registered in agriculture (4.1%) and 
transport and communications (3.9%), while 
non-petroleum manufacturing grew by 3.5%. 
The most dynamic manufacturing sectors, thanks 
to increased exports, were the textile industry and 
the manufacture of machinery and equipment 
and transport equipment, with growth of over 
5%. The good results of the agricultural sector 
were mainly due to a few export products such as 
bananas and coffee, though other products for 
domestic consumption such as rice, fish and 
livestock also played a role. With the exception 
3. The main variables 
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of a few crops (sugar cane and soya), the El Niño 
phenomenon had little effect on the 1997 harvest, 
but it wreaked havoc on newly sown crops, 
plantations and road infrastructure, damage that 
-along with the decline in oil prices- will be 
reflected in the results for 1998. GDP for the first 
quarter of 1998 did, in fact, decrease by 3% from 
the previous quarter. 
(b) Prices, wages and employment 
Early 1997 saw a surge in inflation, owing to 
a combination of the earlier growth in the money 
supply, steep hikes in some utility rates and the 
uncertainty generated by the social and political 
unrest that culminated in a change of 
government; accordingly, the consumer price 
index (CPI) shot up 10% in the first two months 
of thé year. Subsequently, efforts to control 
inflationary expectations met with success, and, 
in general, monthly rates of price increases 
subsided to between 1.5% and 2%. The cautious 
fiscal policy applied in the first half of 1997, the 
sterilization measures undertaken by the 
monetary authorities and the real appreciation of 
the sucre all contributed to this stabilization. The 
year closed with an inflation rate of 30.7%, 
compared to a figure of 25.5% for the previous 
year, but the authorities proposed to achieve 
annualized rates of no more than 25% by the 
second quarter of 1998. 
However, the weather-related damage 
sustained by the agricultural sector and the 
transport system, along with renewed 
uncertainty, led to a fresh outbreak of inflation at 
the start of 1998, so that by the end of the first 
half, the 12-month inflation rate was running at 
35.9%. 
During 1997, efforts to control inflation also 
had a bearing on policy with respect to the 
minimum wage. The real minimum wage 
(including supplementary allowances) had in 
recent years made up some of the ground lost 
prior to 1992, but in 1997 gains in the early and 
middle part of the year failed to match the rate of 
inflation, so that the minimum wage declined by 
3.5% in real terms. Moreover, the real average 
wage declined by 2%. Given the inflationary 
spurt in the early part of 1998, by June the real 
minimum wage had fallen a further 8%. 
The greater dynamism in economic activity 
seen in 1997 led to a slight improvement in the 
employment outlook. The unemployment rate 
dropped from 10.4% in November 1996 to 9.2% 
in November 1997, though it remained above 
pre-1996 levels. The informal sector's share in 
employment dipped from 44.3% to 41.6%. 
Social, community and personal services and 
manufacturing generated most of the new jobs 
created in urban areas. 
(c)The external sector 
Exports continued to expand, although at a 
slower pace. Among merchandise exports, 
bananas did particularly well and showed 36% 
growth that reflected increases in both prices and 
volumes; as a result, bananas replaced crude oil 
as the leading export product. In 1997, Ecuador 
managed to boost its sales in its traditional 
markets, while also expanding its presence in 
new ones, such as China. Shrimp exports also 
recorded vigorous growth (38%). In contrast, 
crude oil sales declined by 8%, since a slight 
increase i£ volume was not sufficient to offset 
lower prices. Sales of petroleum products went 
into an even greater slump, resulting in a 13% 
drop in petroleum exports as a whole. Other 
traditional export products, such as coffee and 
cocoa, also recorded flat sales. 
In contrast to the strong growth of previous 
years, non-traditional exports expanded by a 
meager 1%, though products such as flowers, 
fruit juices and preserves, and motor vehicles 
remained robust. A drop in sales of non-factor 
services limited the increase in total exports of 
goods and services to just 3.5%. 
Imports, which had declined the previous 
year, rose steeply in all categories. The 
merchandise trade surplus therefore shrank to 
less than half its level the year before. The deficit 
on the income account did not change 
significantly, but remained very high by regional 
standards. As a result, the current account swung 
from a surplus -a rare occurrence- in 1996 to a 
deficit equivalent to 4% of GDP, similar to the 
level of earlier years. 
In April, the Government placed US$ 500 
million in Eurobonds and used part of the 
proceeds to buy back Brady bonds with a face 
202 
value of US$ 250 million. Public external 
debt decreased slightly, to 63% of GDP, but 
private external debt expanded by US$ 560 
million. Notwithstanding the failed attempt to 
privatize portions of EMETEL, foreign direct 
investment reached a record US$ 580 million, 
reflecting growth in petroleum investments 
and cellular telephone concessions and 
helped to generate a substantial surplus on the 
financial account. 
Even so, it proved impossible to offset the 
entire current account deficit, and the overall 
balance showed a small deficit of US$ 100 
ECUADOR 
million. However, since payments to members of 
the Paris Club were delayed, reserve assets 
increased by more than US$ 200 million, causing 
international monetary reserves to swell to nearly 
US$ 2.1 billion, a new high. 
During the first half of 1998, exports were 
seriously affected by poor weather conditions 
and low oil prices; that led, unusually, to the 
posting of a merchandise trade deficit on the 
order of US$ 350 million for the first six months 
of the year. During the same period, international 





1. General trends 
In 1997, the economy of El Salvador 
performed better than in the previous 
year. Gross domestic product (GDP) rose 
by 4.1%, a change which was mostly due 
to a significant increase in exports. 
Although the trade deficit was still high, 
the current account balance moved into 
the black, leading to a considerable 
accumulation of international reserves. 
The overall economic picture was 
remarkably stable. December-to-
December inflation fell to a record low of 
1.9%, while the annual average was 
4.5%; the nominal exchange rate 
remained unchanged and the fiscal 
deficit decreased. However, there was no 
improvement in the employment situation 
and real wages fell. 
High international coffee prices brought about 
a considerable increase in export earnings and a 
notable improvement in the terms of trade in 
goods. The exports of the maquila industry grew 
and there was a significant increase in family 
remittances from abroad. Improved growth in 
production came from the manufacturing, 
financial, construction and commercial sectors. 
On the other hand, in the context of the debate on 
the forgiveness of agrarian debt, the performance 
of the agricultural sector deteriorated, partly owing 
to adverse weather conditions caused by the El 
Niño phenomenon, which also affected fisheries. 
Stability in the financial and foreign exchange 
markets was a major objective for the monetary 
authorities; to that end, they developed an active 
policy of sterilization of external inflows. 
Furthermore, irregularities at the Financiera de 
Inversiones Seguras y Productivas (FINSEPRO) 
company and a number of related enterprises 
which were discovered in mid-year demonstrated 
the fragility of the system of financial controls. 
In 1997, the non-financial public sector deficit 
was brought down to manageable levels, 
although the goal set in the Monetary and 
Financial Programme was not achieved. The 
overall outcome in terms of the non-financial 
public sector deficit was influenced by delay in 
the sale of State enterprises, which resulted in a 
lack of the capital revenue that had been 
anticipated, the fact that tax revenue was lower 
than expected and the payment of liabilities in the 
form of compensation to government employees. 
In the area of structural reforms, reform of the 
pension system began and a legal and regulatory 
framework was set up for pension fund 
management firms. Progress was also made in 
drafting reforms of the regulatory and legal 
framework of the Central Reserve Bank (BCR) 
and of the bodies which monitor the financial 
system. 
The outlook for 1998 points to increased 
growth in economic activity, inflation remaining 
at international levels and increases in the 
balance of net international reserves and in the 
rate of export growth. The favourable 
environment created by low interest rates and the 
privatization of State enterprises may lead to 
higher levels of public and private investment, 
based on privatization proceeds, increased 
foreign investment, lower tariffs and the success 
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2. Economie policy and reform 
Economic policy in 1997 continued to pursue the 
objectives of growth and macroeconomic 
stability adopted in 1996. Priority was given to 
the goals of reducing the inflation rate to 
international levels, maintaining exchange-rate 
stability in nominal terms, strengthening the 
stability of the financial system, adjusting credit 
to meet the targets for the growth of monetary 
aggregates and, lastly, increasing saving and 
investment. 
The main achievement during the period was 
the reduction of the December-to-December 
inflation figure to international levels; for the first 
time in 25 years, it was as low as 1.9%. Success 
was also achieved in raising the growth rate to 
4%, increasing exports of goods and services by 
25% and lowering nominal and real lending rates 
relative to the 1996 average. 
These results were achieved in the framework 
of a strategy of sustaining growth in foreign 
investment and improving linkages to 
international production chains. This strategy 
accentuated the importance of reducing the 
country cost and improving international 
competitiveness, through modernization of the 
physical and social infrastructure. 
Progress also continued to be made in 
structural reforms. These included privatizations, 
particularly the sale of electric power distribution 
and telecommunications companies, and the 
establishment of a pension system fully funded 
on an individual basis and based on the 
profitability of investments made by the first 
pension fund management companies 
authorized to operate. New measures were 
taken to strengthen tax reform, particularly 
through the expansion of the tax base and the 
creation of a modern regulatory and legal 
framework, a key element of which will be the 
new tax code. In addition, the national 
authorities believe that further steps towards 
trade openness are needed and that the correct 
functioning of capital markets must be ensured, 
through a process of financial liberalization 
subject to supervision and control, to prevent 
the type of problems which arose in 1997 with 
FINSEPRO. 
(a)Fiscal policy 
In the context of falling current revenues, the 
goal of fiscal policy in 1997 was to balance public 
finances by containing current expenditure. The 
fiscal deficit of the non-financial public sector 
was equal to 1.8% of GDP, lower than the 1996 
level of 2.5%, but not down to the target level of 
1.1% proposed in the Monetary and Financial 
Programme. The deficit was mainly financed by 
expanding foreign borrowing through the issue 
on international markets of short-term treasury 
bills in dollars, for an amount equivalent to 9.9% 
of the total balance of external public debt. 
The 1997 tax burden was 10.8%, slightly 
below the 1996 figure. The current revenues of 
the non-financial public sector fell by 3.3%, 
whereas tax revenues rose by 5.7% in nominal 
terms, despite tariff reductions and the sluggish 
performance of the economy the previous year. 
VAT accounted for 54% of tax revenues, income 
tax for 27%, tariffs for 11.8%, and from property 
transfer duties and taxes on consumption for the 
remaining 7.2%. VAT and income tax rose by 
10.1% and 7.2% respectively in comparison with 
1996, while import taxes fell by 10.6%. 
Another factor contributing to difficulties in 
raising revenue in 1997 was the delay in the 
collection of capital revenue from the sale of 
assets and the privatization of public enterprises, 
such as electric power distribution companies, 
the National Telecommunications Adminis-
tration (ANTED and alcohol plants. Only 41.5 
million colones were collected, compared with 
the 167 million forecast in the programme for the 
period. 
All these factors made it necessary to reduce 
spending by 4.9%, leading to a fall in gross 
investment and in consumption expenditure, 
including the operating costs of public 
enterprises. This reduction was achieved despite 
the fact that ANTEL had to make compensation 
payments to employees in December totalling 
552 million colones. 
The principal measures implemented in 1997 
by the tax authorities to increase collection rates 
and reduce tax evasion were: (i) broadening of 
the tax base, (ii) introducing four bills in the 
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Table 1 
EL SALVADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
National income 











Gross domestic investment 
National savings 
External savings 
Employment and wages 
Labour force participation rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 





Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100)b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(colones per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
of imports (index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial accountg 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
Public debt 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 











































































































































































































































































































Table 1 (conclusion) 
EL SALVADOR 








Money and credit 
Monetary balances of banking 
system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 
M2 
Dollar deposits 




Equivalent interest rate 



















1990 1991 1992 






































































































































Source:: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
" Preliminary figures. b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the 
economically active population (EAP). Real minimum wage in the manufacturing and services sectors in San 
Salvador. g Includes Errors and omissions. Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by 
exports of goods and services. ' Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
EL SALVADOR: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1995 1996 1997a 1998a 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 
Exports 
(millions of dollars) 
Imports 
(millions of dollars) 
Real effective exchange rate b 
(index: 1990=100) 




























































I II III IV I II 
7.4 4.9 2.1 1.9 1.5 3.1 
387 418 263 292 422 342 
671 784 758 761 948 1 024 
71.9 72.5 72.9 73.8 73.1 72.1 
1.6 10.3 12.8 14.0 2.8 
5.9 15.0 17.0 17.9 6.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Preliminary figures. Refers to the exchange rate for imports. 
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Legislative Assembly to regulate relations 
between the tax authorities and taxpayers, and 
(iii) taking legal action against smuggling and tax 
evasion. 
(b)Monetary and exchange rate policy 
In 1997, as in 1996, the nominal exchange rate 
remained stable and pressures on the real 
exchange rate were kept under control; the 
authorities continued with the monetary policy of 
sterilizing foreign exchange inflows through 
open market operations. 
Monetary policy can be said to have achieved 
its main goal of cutting the inflation rate to a 
record low and adjusting the money supply to 
match demand, despite pressures on liquidity 
arising from financial problems during the year 
and the influx of foreign exchange due to 
increased exports. 
Growth in money supply was controlled by 
regulating the growth of the monetary base, 
which grew by 9% over the year. The main factor 
in this growth was a 33% increase in net reserves 
as a result of growth in export earnings, increased 
family remittances and official capital flows. In 
addition, there was a 19.2% increase in private 
sector credit, which reached 40.5% of GDP, three 
points higher than in 1996. Credit was used for 
construction and housing, personal loans and 
services and, to a lesser extent, other sectors such 
as commerce, manufacturing and agriculture. 
These growth factors made it necessary to 
neutralize excess liquidity by issuing monetary 
administration certificates. 
Broad money as measured by M3 was 12.7% 
higher than in 1996, mainly because of the 
increase in investment certificates (49.3%) and 
foreign-currency deposits (40.4%). As for its 
components, Ml money was 1.9% lower, mostly 
owing to a fall in demand deposits, while M2 in 
national currency was 11% higher, owing to the 
rebuilding of financial asset portfolios. 
Despite falling inflation, interest rates 
remained high. The average nominal short-term 
lending rate was 16%, 2.6 percentage points 
lower than in 1996, and the average real lending 
rate rose to 13.9%. An average nominal rate of 
11.4% was applied to 180-day deposits, 3.6 
percentage points lower than in 1996. Lastly, the 
real deposit rate averaged 9.7%, 3.5 percentage 
points higher than the average for the previous 
year. 
New draft legislation was proposed, to 
provide the system with more complete legal 
instruments, increasing its competitiveness 
and improving the regulation of the capital 
market. 
(c) Trade policy 
Under the tariff reduction programme, the 
customs duty applicable to capital goods and 
inputs was cut to zero in December 1996 and, 
beginning in July 1997, tariffs on intermediate 
and final goods began to be reduced 
progressively by one percentage point every six 
months. The goal of the programme is that, by 
July 1999, tariffs on intermediate goods should 
be between a floor of 5% and a ceiling of 10%, 
and tariffs on final goods should not exceed 
15%. 
In 1997, negotiations continued between 
Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries of 
Central America (consisting of El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras), particularly 
regarding the list of tradable goods, with a view 
to determining deadlines for tariff reductions 
on those goods and the corresponding rules of 
origin. The process began in September 1996 
and considerable progress has been made in 
drafting the basic texts of an agreement. 
Progress was also made in negotiations with 
the Dominican Republic, and the 
corresponding agreements were signed in 
April 1998. 
1 These were bills relating to the tax code, reform of VAT and income tax legislation, and the suppression of smuggling. 
2 Amendments to the laws on banks and finance companies, the charters of the Central Reserve Bank and the Federation of 
Savings and Loan Associations, and the law on the Office of the Superintendent of Securities; and bills concerning consolidated 
supervision of financial conglomerates, money-laundering and deposit insurance. A law regulating the El Salvador commodity 




The main structural reforms have 
progressed unevenly and with varying degrees 
of success. In the area of tax reform, consisting 
of a series of measures to broaden the tax base 
and reduce tax evasion, new draft legislation is 
currently under consideration, including a new 
tax code and amendments to the laws on VAT 
and income tax. Efforts to improve trade 
openness are progressing more slowly, but 
steadily; they include negotiations at the 
subregional level regarding the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) and between 
Mexico and the Northern Triangle. Thirdly, 
liberalization has brought significant growth to 
the financial sector, although there are some 
weaknesses in the system of monitoring and 
(a)Economic activity 
1997 saw a major upturn in economic activity 
after the modest growth of 2% in 1996, but the 
growth figure was still below the 5.9% average 
for the previous five years. The real GDP growth 
rate was 4.1%, thanks to the improved 
performance of the manufacturing industry 
(8.2%), construction (6%), the financial sector 
(4.6%) and commerce (4.5%). However, 
according to information supplied by the national 
authorities, agriculture was badly affected by the 
El Niño phenomenon, although this was offset by 
good sugarcane harvests, so the downturn in the 
sector was only 0.3%. 
The construction sector was faced with labour 
problems which led to wage rises. The financial 
sector was affected temporarily by the reaction 
of public opinion to the conflict mentioned 
earlier; the commercial sector grew by 4.5%, a 
much lower rate than the almost 9% and 10% 
which had been achieved in 1994 and 1995 
respectively. 
Overall demand grew by 7.5%, as a result of 
increases of 19% in external demand and 5% in 
domestic demand. This was due to increased 
exports of goods and services, and also to higher 
gross domestic investment, particularly 
control, owing to continuing gaps in the existing 
legalstructure. 
Fourthly, privatizations have taken much 
longer than had been originally planned. Capital 
revenues in 1997 were therefore lower than 
expected, especially from the sale of ANTEL. The 
sale of the electric power distribution companies 
provided a much greater sum ($ 586 million) than 
that originally estimated in the Monetary and 
Financial Programme. In 1998, capital revenues 
from the sale of assets are likely to exceed $ 320 
million. 
As for the pension system reform, the pension 
superintendency began to operate in 1997 and 
started the process of creating the first five 
pension fund management companies; the new 
system of funded pensions is expected to bring 
about a significant increase in net savings. 
public-sector investment in infrastructure works 
and roads. The higher demand was also 
influenced by increased consumption. 
The index of manufacturing value added rose 
by 8.2%, 6.6 points more than in 1996. The 
growth of the manufacturing sector was mostly 
due to the expansion of maquila industry 
services, whose growth rate increased from 
12.6% in 1996 to 30.3% in 1997. The metals 
manufacture and machinery sector grew by 
11.5%; wood and paper products, by 7.8%; 
textiles, clothing and leather products, by 7.7%; 
and food, beverages and tobacco, by 6.2%. 
(b) Prices, wages and employment 
The inflation rate for 1997 (December to 
December) was 1.9%, one of the lowest figures 
in recent years and well below the expected level 
of between 5% and 7%. The average inflation 
rate for the year was 4.5%, much lower than the 
1996 figure of 9.8%, and one of the lowest in 
Latin America. 
The downward trend in the yearly variation of 
the consumer price index (CPI) was due to a fall 
in food prices, the largest component of the 
index, and to a lesser extent in clothing and 
housing prices. The decrease in food prices was 
3. The main variables 
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due to the fact that bean prices, which had risen 
sharply in 1996, fell back to their previous levels 
in 1997. 
Gasoline prices also fell, owing to the fall in 
oil prices; this had a significant impact on 
production costs for enterprises. Also, the 
gradual decline in lending rates and the removal 
of tariffs on inputs and capital goods helped to 
hold down costs and the associated pressure on 
overall price levels. Another highly significant 
factor was the monetary policy of the Central 
Bank concerning the sterilization of excess 
liquidity. 
The wholesale price index, which excludes 
coffee prices, continued the downward trend 
noted since mid-1996; prices of goods produced 
domestically rose during the early part of the 
year, but at the end of the third quarter they were 
3.4% down on an annual basis. The annual rate 
of price increases also fell in the case of imported 
goods, and prices of export products, apart from 
coffee, continued the downward trend begun in 
July 1996. 
Minimum wages have not changed since 1995 
in nominal terms. However, in real terms they 
have fallen since 1996, when they experienced 
negative growth of -3.7%, followed by -4.3% in 
1997. Preliminary employment figures also show 
a slight deterioration in the employment 
situation, with a total annual unemployment rate 
of 8.0% for the year; the rate was 7.5% in urban 
areas, 8.7% in rural areas and 7.4% in the 
metropolitan area. 
(c)The external sector 
The external sector showed improvement in 
1997. For the first time in the 1990s, the current 
account showed a surplus, amounting to $ 95.9 
million. However, the balance of trade in goods 
and services was still seriously in deficit (-10% 
of output), although this was an improvement 
over 1996 because the rate of growth of exports 
(29%) exceeded that of imports (14%). 
Family remittances continued to increase, but 
more slowly than in previous years; in 1997 they 
totalled $1.2 billion. The external sector also 
benefited from increased export volumes of 
coffee and sugar and from excellent coffee 
market prices. Terms of trade in the main 
tradable goods also improved, from -2.5% in 
1996 to 6.1% in 1997. Another positive factor 
was the boom in maquila exports (up 38.3%), 
the value of which increased from $ 764.1 
million to $ 1,056.8 million. These exports 
made up 43.7% of the total, non-traditional 
exports accounted for 31.3% and traditional 
exports 25%. The main non-traditional exports 
to countries outside the region were raw 
materials for medicines; bed linen and table 
and kitchen linen; underwear, clothing 
accessories and outer wear; cotton yarn; and 
aluminium products. As for traditional 
products, exports of coffee and sugar increased 
by 52.7% and 52.9% respectively. 
Growth in imports was higher than in 1996; 
those of the maquila industry increased by 
39.1%, followed by consumer goods (15.9%), 
capital goods (10.8%) and intermediate goods 
(8.6%). 
In the area of intraregional trade, El Salvador 
achieved balance-of-trade equilibrium with the 
other Central American countries thanks to a 
25.6% increase in exports, while imports rose by 
only 14.4%. There was an increase in the 
proportion of trade with Honduras, Guatemala 
and, to a lesser extent, Costa Rica. 
Official transfers fell by 10.2%, ending the 
year with a balance of $ 55.2 million. Current 
transfers increased by $ 106.8 million (8.5%); 
family remittances constituted a major element, 
increasing by 10.4%, equivalent to 10% of 
output. 
The positive balances of the current and 
capital accounts were reflected in a $ 362.6 
million balance-of-payments surplus, $ 200 
million higher than in 1996. 
The external debt stood at $ 2,667 million at 
the end of 1997, an increase of 5.9% over 1996 
and equivalent to 93% of total exports of goods 
and services. Interest payments fell to 4% of the 
value of exports. 
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1. General trends 
Guatemala's gross domestic product 
grew by 4%, a percentage better than the 
3% achieved in 1996 and consistent with 
the original expectations of the 
authorities. Important factors in the 
expansion were the good performance of 
exports -especially coffee- and the easing 
of monetary policy during the course of 
the year. Moreover, inflation slowed to 
7.1%. 
During the reporting period, Guatemalan 
society evolved under the influence of the 
Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, signed 
in December 1996, which put an end to over three 
decades of internal armed conflict and concluded 
the peace process in Central America. As a result, 
much of government policy, particularly 
economic policy, was shaped by the 
commitments entailed by the peace accords. 
The tendency of economic policy was to 
adopt monetary and fiscal measures less 
restrictive than those of the previous year. As 
a result, the overall public-sector deficit was 
equivalent to 1.4% of GDP, compared with 
0.6% in 1996. For the second consecutive 
year, economic policy was implemented 
without the supervision of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Although the 
authorities proposed signing a stand-by 
arrangement with IMF in 1997, this did not 
Both central government and private-sector 
investment increased. Enhanced private 
investment was due primarily to lower interest 
rates and tariff reductions on imports of inputs 
and capital goods. Central government 
investment was boosted in particular by 
increased spending on road repair and 
maintenance. 
Growth expectations for 1998 include 
continued good export performance, and trends 
in central government and private sector 
investment comparable to those for 1997. 
However, it is anticipated that agriculture will 
show the negative repercussions of the El Niño 
phenomenon. Nonetheless, the authorities have 
set a goal of 4.5% growth and 8% to 10% 
inflation. Although the overall public-sector 
deficit is expected to be 1% of GDP, 1998 will 
be a politically sensitive year because of the 
run-up to elections; moreover, constitutional 
reforms will be undertaken that will have a 
profound impact on the political structure of the 
country. 
materialize, primarily because of a lack of 
agreement on tax matters. 
As mentioned above, 1997 saw the start of 
implementation of the Agreement on a Firm and 
Lasting Peace, which embraces a series of 
complex social and economic issues. The end to 
internal armed conflict has allowed the country 
to work on building a more open and democratic 
society. A number of substantive goals set forth 
in the Agreement have already been realized. The 
international community promised its backing 
2. Economic policy and reform 
213 
Percentages of GDP 
o a 
8 _ 




C J I O C J I O C J I O C J I O C J I O C J I O C J I O 
Annual growth rate 


























for the peace process at a meeting of the 
consultative group held in Brussels early in 1997 
and confirmed its support in the follow-up 
meeting that took place in August of the same 
year in Antigua, Guatemala. 
(a)Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy was obliged to deal with 
disparate goals during 1997. In order to comply 
with the peace accords, the authorities made an 
effort to meet tax revenue targets, while stepping 
up spending and reorienting it towards social 
sectors. At the same time, they saw the need to 
support monetary policy aimed at controlling 
total liquidity, and this entailed maintaining 
fiscal balance. 
The central government deficit was around 
1% of GDP, higher than the figure for 1996. The 
tax burden net of tax credit refunds was 
approximately 8.7%, owing to continued 
collection of the emergency solidarity tax. Value 
added tax (VAT) revenues rose by 22.8% as a 
result of revived economic activity and increased 
imports. Despite the implementation of a tariff 
reduction programme, customs revenues also 
rose because of the disproportionate expansion of 
imports. 
Government expenditure increased 
considerably (by around 20% in real terms), 
largely because of the costs entailed in 
implementing the peace accords and ensuring 
public safety. In general, Government continued 
to redirect its spending towards social sectors; 
nevertheless, inadequacies were reported even in 
areas in which government spending increased 
strongly. 
The Government financed its increased 
expenditure to a great extent by contracting new 
public debt, both foreign and domestic. It 
successfully placed a US$ 150 million bond issue 
in the international market, an operation that also 
served to reinforce a monetary policy directed at 
reducing domestic interest rates. The domestic 
debt did, however, increase by some 800 million 
quetzals, a figure exceeding the previous year's 
figure by roughly 15%. Efforts continued to 
restructure maturities and interest rates on the 
domestic debt, consisting largely of securities 
issued with maturities of one (77%) or two (15%) 
years. 
Tax laws underwent major changes. Measures 
intended to improve collection included 
eliminating various exemptions created by 
earlier legislation. Important amendments to the 
tax law applicable to mercantile and agricultural 
enterprises were introduced, aimed primarily at 
ensuring payment of a minimum tax by such 
enterprises. In addition, taxes on beverages, 
petroleum products and travel fares abroad were 
raised. Lastly, other legal provisions were 
changed in order to sharpen the penalties for tax 
fraud. Early in 1998, a law was passed creating a 
superintendency of tax administration to ensure 
efficacy and professionalism in that area. 
Other changes were made that could work 
against increased revenues. One such change was 
the plan to cut the maximum corporate and 
individual income tax rate gradually from 30% to 
25% ; another was the implementation of the 
above-mentioned tariff reductions on inputs and 
capital goods. The changes introduced in 1997 to 
the uniform real estate tax with the aim of 
increasing collections were eliminated in 
February 1998. Even more importantly, the 
solidarity tax, an important source of revenue in 
1996 and 1997, will not be collected in 1998, and 
the new commercial and agricultural enterprises 
tax act, despite its revenue potential, will be in 
effect only until April 1999. 
(b)Monetary policy 
In 1997, monetary policy was less restrictive 
than in 1996. The monetary authorities virtually 
suspended open market operations to sterilize 
excess liquidity, but received substantial support 
from the fiscal side, as the balance of negative net 
credit to the central government increased to 
2,805 million quetzales (compared to 674 million 
1 These exemptions included tax incentives to the tourist industry and private producers of electricity, and exemptions benefiting 
the armed forces. 
2 The maximum tax rate was 30% in 1997 and is due to be reduced to 27.5% in 1998 and 25% in 1999. 
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GUATEMALA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investmentb 
Gross domestic product 
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Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
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Labour force participation rate e 






















































































































































Consumer prices (nationwide) 
External sector 
Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100)" 
Nominal bank exchange rate 
(quetzales per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
20.2 59.6 10.2 14.2 11.6 11.6 8.6 10.9 































(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
Public debt 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 











































































Table 1 (conclusion) 
GUATEMALA 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997" 






Money and credit 
Monetary balances of 
banking system 
International reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 
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Equivalent interest rate 
in foreign currency h -5.4 




























































































































-1.7 22.7 6.2 1.9 12.8 2.4 7.0 2.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. d Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the 
economically active population of (EAP). Includes Errors and omissions. 8 Refers to net interest as shown on the 
balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. Nominal interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation 
in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
GUATEMALA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1995 1996 1997° 1998* 
i ii in iv i n in iv i ii in iv i ii 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 8.4 8.2 8.4 8.6 10.7 11.1 11.8 10.9 11.5 9.1 8.3 7.1 6.1 7.5 
Real effective exchange rate b 
(index: 1990=100) 80.0 81.6 81.7 80.5 80.6 78.2 76.6 73.0 73.3 72.4 73.0 74.0 73.5 73.1 
Real interest rates 
(annualized, %) 
Deposit rate 6.0 -6.8 2.0 -4.4 -3.3 -2.2 -3.4 -2.5 -7.4 7.2 -3.8 -2.1 -4.6 
Lendingrate 19.2 5.2 14.9 7.1 10.7 11.4 10.5 11.6 5.9 21.3 8.2 8.4 5.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Prelim ¡nary figures. Refers to the exchange rate for imports. 
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in 1996), a figure unmatched in recent years. The 
variation in negative net credit (2,131 million 
quetzales) was larger than the increase in net 
international reserves (1,980 quetzales) and 
hence made it possible to sterilize the liquidity 
from that source. 
Nonetheless, there was a sudden expansion of 
liquidity when the monetary authorities refrained 
from renewing monetary control instruments as 
they matured. That expansion, combined with a 
drop in financial yields, put upward pressure on 
the exchange rate. The authorities showed 
themselves willing to sacrifice international 
reserves in order to ease the pressure. The 
suspension of open market operations also had 
the effect of reducing the losses of the Banco de 
Guatemala (which performs the functions of a 
central bank). 
Despite this turn of events, the monetary 
authorities showed no signs of deviating from 
their decision to pursue a less restrictive 
monetary policy. Towards the end of the year, 
they announced a series of measures designed to 
reduce the effective bank reserve requirement 
from 24.6% to 19.1% over a period of seven 
months ending June 1998. As a result, net 
international reserves in February 1998 were 
down by more than 500 million quetzales from 
their level in December 1997. 
The effect of the monetary measures was to 
lower interest rates. Yields on government debt 
paper dropped to 10.5%, compared to 15.5% in 
1996. The average bank lending rate declined 
from 22.4% at the end of 1996 to 16.4% in 
December 1997. In the second half of the year, 
lending to the private sector increased; indeed, 
bank loan portfolios expanded by over 60%, 
reflecting in particular an increase in loans to the 
wholesale and retail trades and to consumers. 
There was a decline in interest rates on deposits 
similar to the decline in lending rates. As a result, 
the intermediation spread (approximately 10 
points) remained wide. 
Early in 1998 the monetary authorities 
announced their decision to authorize the 
opening of accounts in dollars and the 
issuance by the central bank of bonds payable 
in dollars as additional means of controlling 
liquidity. 
(c) Foreign exchange and trade policies 
The average nominal rate of exchange hardly 
varied, so that the problem of an appreciating real 
exchange rate persisted. The Banco de 
Guatemala made net sales of some US$ 200 
million. 
On the trade front, the tariff reductions 
scheduled for the period 1997-1999, in 
coordination with the other Central American 
countries, began to take effect. 
As part of the subregional integration process, 
negotiations began concerning the rules that were 
to govern such matters as trade in services, 
settlement of disputes, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures and rules of origin. In addition, 
negotiations proceeded between the countries of 
the "Northern Triangle" (El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras) and Mexico concerning the 
establishment of a free trade area, and Guatemala 
also participated in meetings at the ministerial 
and technical levels in relation to the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA). Early in 1998, a 
proposal was put forward to establish a free trade 
agreement between the Central American 
countries and the Dominican Republic, and in 
March these same countries signed a trade and 
investment framework agreement with the 
United States with the aim of promoting freer 
interchange in those areas. 
(d)Structural reforms 
An important reform was the passage of the 
new civil aviation act upholding the "open skies" 
principle. A new mining act was also passed to 
provide a regulatory framework for exploration 
and development of mines and oil and gas 
deposits. On the other hand, efforts to privatize 
the telephone and electricity companies did not 
come to fruition. 
Concessions were granted, however, for 
railway and mail services, some state enterprises 
were sold and progress was made in putting 
together a programme of port and airport 
concessions. In addition, the first highway built 
under concession to a private firm was opened. 
Activities carried out under Guatemala's 
National Competitiveness Agenda produced 
some significant results in 1997. For example, 
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tourism was identified as one of the economic 
clusters that would receive priority attention 
from both government and the private sector. In 
1998, the maquila industry was identified as 
another strategic sector, the goal being to turn 
Guatemala into a regional centre for textiles and 
apparel. The hope is that the sectors just 
mentioned, plus forestry and frozen fruits and 
(a)Economic activity 
In 1997 the Guatemalan economy grew by 
4%, improving upon its performance in the 
previous year (3%). A number of factors 
contributed to this result. First of all, private 
consumption expanded more rapidly (7%) than 
in the year before (3%). Exports also did very 
well, expanding by 12% in real terms. Moreover, 
investment increased by 5%, whereas it had 
declined in 1996. 
The agricultural sector achieved a rate of 
growth (2.8%) that was modest but slightly better 
than the figure for 1996, thanks primarily to the 
increase in production for export. Another 
positive factor was the availability of more 
grazing land in areas previously affected by the 
internal conflict. 
On the negative side, El Niño weather patterns 
hurt coffee production somewhat and caused 
major harm to corn crops. Rice and bean crops 
were also affected to a lesser extent. Other 
agricultural exports showed a slight increase, 
except for sugarcane, which was actually 
benefited by the El Niño drought conditions that 
allowed for an extended harvest, with excellent 
results. 
Mining output continued to show strong 
growth as a result of increased petroleum 
production. Construction grew by 5.5%, an 
improvement over its performance the previous 
year, thanks to road repair and housing 
construction programmes. The sector was also 
given a boost by continued expansion and 
modernization of the country's hotel 
infrastructure. 
The manufacturing sector also improved its 
performance, increasing output by 2.6%, 
vegetables, can develop strategic industrial 
clusters in the years to come. 
So far in 1998, a new foreign investment act 
has been passed that extends national treatment 
to foreign investors, and it is hoped that the 
privatization of the telephone and electricity 
companies can be put through during the course 
of the year. 
compared with 1.9% in 1996. Major factors in the 
growth of this sector were the revival of private 
consumption and the dynamic expansion of 
manufacturing exports to other Central American 
countries. Maquila exports, especially textile 
products, also showed a positive trend, but 
smuggling and a lagging exchange rate continued 
to act as a drag, especially on the food and 
beverage subsectors. 
Basic services showed a notable growth of 
7.5% due in part to the realization of a plan to 
extend electricity lines into the interior of the 
country and in part to the qualitative and 
quantitative increase in telephone lines and 
equipment. 
(b)Prices, wages and employment 
The average annual rate of increase in 
consumer prices remained in the single-digit 
range (9.2%), despite significant increases in 
local telephone and electricity rates. The pace of 
inflation gradually slowed over the course of the 
year, so that the annualized rate in December was 
just 7.1%. In part, the slowdown was due to the 
delayed effect of highly contractionary monetary 
and fiscal policies applied in 1996 and to the 
stability of the nominal exchange rate. 
In the areas of education and of transportation 
and communications, price increases were 
substantially higher than the average rate of 
inflation. Education costs were influenced by the 
insufficiency of State-provided education 
services and the absence of adequate regulation 
of private educational facilities. The increase for 
transportation and communications resulted 
from higher telephone rates and new taxes on 
petroleum products. 
3. The main variables 
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The employment situation took a negative 
turn in the first half of the year, but in the second 
half the employment rate improved somewhat in 
the private sector, as the livelier economy created 
new jobs. The Government authorized hiring for 
education and security but adhered to its policy 
of cutting public-sector jobs in areas considered 
low-priority. 
Minimum wages were held at the same level 
for the second consecutive year because of failure 
to reach agreement on new wage levels. 
Contractual wages continued to be set by 
labour-management negotiations in each 
separate company. In the public sector, the 
Government granted its employees a 10% wage 
increase. 
In 1998, the minimum wage in industry and 
agriculture was raised by 12%, and government 
workers received another 10% raise. 
Nevertheless, in the first quarter of 1998 there 
were reports of strikes by workers on two banana 
plantations over wage demands. 
(c)The external sector 
The balance-of-payments current account 
deficit widened to US$ 450 million, topping the 
figure for 1996, and equalled 3.4% of GDP, 
compared with 2.9% in 1996. 
The deterioration in the current account was 
due to a deficit of some US$ 811 million in 
merchandise trade. Exports showed good growth 
(16%), but imports, stagnant in 1996, outpaced 
them in 1997 (22.4%), with the result just 
indicated. 
The negative impact of the merchandise trade 
balance was offset to some extent by transfer 
income of US$ 630 million, including 
remittances by Guatemalans residing abroad 
estimated at US$ 400 million. Moreover, the 
tourism and maquila sectors recorded a surplus 
of US$140 million. 
Exports of sugar and coffee recorded a 
positive trend, thanks to some growth in volume 
combined with favourable international prices. 
There were significant increases in the volume of 
petroleum exported (10%), in exports to other 
Central American countries and in exports of the 
maquila industry. Some non-traditional exports 
were hurt by the unilateral application of sanitary 
andphytosanitary standards by the United States, 
the chief destination for these products. 
The strong growth in imports involved all 
categories of goods but was most striking in the 
case of capital goods (35%), partly owing to tariff 
reductions. There was also a substantial increase 
(24%) in imports of consumer goods, whereas 
external purchases of intermediate goods 
expanded at a rate of 16%. The value of 
petroleum purchases declined by nearly US$ 60 
million, because of lower prices in international 
markets. 
In 1997, Guatemala achieved good trade 
balances with all the Central American countries, 
for a combined surplus of roughly US$ 256 
million on its subregional trade. 
A notable feature of the external situation in 
1997 was that capital inflows were primarily the 
result of official borrowing (around US$ 460 
million) from international organizations and 
private lenders; the stock of public external debt 
increased from US$ 2,075 to US$ 2,131 million. 
Total capital flows made it possible to increase 
international reserves. 
With respect to external debt policy, in 1997, 
for the first time in the 1990s, disbursements to 
central government exceeded its debt service 
payments, changing the net transfer of funds in 
that regard from negative to positive. 
Nonetheless, for the public-sector as a whole, the 
net transfer remained negative, primarily because 
the central bank paid off US$ 115 million in its 
continuing effort to reduce its external 
indebtedness. 
A significant event was the successful 
placement of a US$ 150 million government 
bond issue in international capital markets with a 
maturity of 10 years and a fixed interest rate of 
8.5%. The external funds received in 1997 in 
support of the peace process proved to be less 
than hoped for, and this situation is not expected 




In fiscal year 1997, the performance of 
the Haitian economy was quite mediocre, 
with overall growth barely exceeding 1%. 
Dissension between the executive and 
legislative branches of government 
hampered the implementation of the 
reforms agreed upon at the beginning of 
the year with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). This cut deeply into inflows 
of official finance from abroad and held 
up the progress of the development plans 
that had been designed to spur the 
economic recovery. 
This situation had serious repercussions in 
terms of the level of activity, since almost all 
sectors experienced a slowdown in their rate of 
expansion, while some even recorded negative 
growth. On the other hand, trade picked up after 
its decline of the year before, with the volume of 
exports and imports increasing by almost 8% and 
3%, respectively. Once again, Haiti had a huge 
trade deficit (US$ 513 million), which it bridged 
by using the transfer payments that have been 
pouring into the country ever since the embargo 
was lifted. 
These transfers also made it possible to build 
up the country's international reserves, which the 
1 The review period is the fiscal year beginning in October 
trends 
Banque de la République d'Haïti (BRH) was then 
able to draw upon in order to satisfy the increased 
demand for dollars and thus maintain a stable 
nominal exchange rate. This bolstered the effect 
of the measures adopted to forestall any 
excessive expansion in domestic liquidity such as 
might result from the increase in bank credit. 
Consequently, both inflation and the local 
currency's rate of depreciation gradually abated. 
The average annual variation in domestic prices 
totalled 16%, which was lower than in previous 
years, while the average exchange rate remained 
close to that of 1996 at approximately 16.2 
gourdes to the United States dollar. 
The fiscal deficit expanded, but only by a 
fairly moderate amount (2% of GDP) thanks to a 
significant increase in tax collections at a time 
when, despite financing constraints, current 
expenditure was outpacing inflation. Although 
the public investment programme was 
strengthened in the areas of rural development 
and education, it did not have the catalytic effect 
it was expected to have on other government 
programmes. 
The prospects of resolving the country's 
political crisis are quite bleak, and the longer 
Haiti remains without an authority who has the 
necessary capacity and resources to take action, 
the more remote the chances of achieving the 2% 
target set for GDP growth for the forthcoming 
fiscal year. 
and ending in September 1997. 
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The performance of the country's economic 
authorities in 1997 was constrained by their 
inability to make any headway in the 
implementation of the enhanced structural 
adjustment facility (ESAF) agreement signed with 
the International Monetary Fund for a total of 
91.1 million special drawing rights (SDRs). These 
funds were to have been disbursed gradually 
over the three years covered by the programme. 
Early in 1997, fiscal policy ran into trouble due 
to the delay in securing authorization for the 
privatization of State enterprises and, 
subsequently, to the absence of any competent 
authority (i.e., a Prime Minister) to implement 
the economic programme so long as the 
political confrontation between the President 
and the majority in Congress remains 
unresolved. 
Furthermore, the use of external funding to 
finance the bulk of expenditures put upward 
pressure on liquidity, thereby compounding the 
effect of the pressure generated by the increase 
in bank credit to the private sector. Monetary 
policy was aimed at counteracting these 
pressures and maintaining a stable exchange 
rate. 
(a)Fiscal policy 
In the absence of congressional approval, the 
fiscal budget had to be drawn up along the same 
lines as the previous year's, with total 
disbursements divided up proportionately 
(one-twelfth of the total per month). 
Accordingly, budget performance involved 
restrictions on the payment of wages and 
subsidies; development projects were hit the 
hardest, however. The Government's operating 
budget, which for the first time was consolidated 
with the investment budget, was not approved 
until the third quarter of the fiscal year. With two 
thirds of the budgeted financing at its disposal, 
the Government tended to relax its fiscal 
discipline, and the fiscal deficit therefore 
widened to 2% of GDP. 
Grants from external sources amounted to 695 
million gourdes, or the equivalent of close to 70% 
ic policy 
of the deficit. As net repayments were made on 
foreign loans, total domestic financing, 
consisting mainly of extrabudgetary funds and 
the deferral of domestic payments, exceeded 
financing from abroad. In keeping with its 
strategic objective of controlling expenditure 
without bank financing, the Government paid out 
104 million gourdes as part of its BRH debt 
consolidation programme. The decentralization 
process being conducted in the case of nine State 
enterprises was suspended since, with no Prime 
Minister in office, there was no one to authorize 
the transfer of public assets. 
The increase in fiscal revenue (39%) again 
overshot the estimated levels, this time owing to 
the effect of a number of measures adopted 
during the previous financial year, including the 
establishment of a flat rate for the turnover tax of 
10% and the application of this tax to all goods 
across the board, including staples. This measure, 
combined with stricter enforcement, accounts for 
the 27% real increase in tax revenues and the 
ascent of the tax burden from 7.9% to 9.2% of 
GDP. 
Taxes on foreign trade also showed an 
improvement, with revenue under this heading 
more than doubling. This increase is 
attributable to the steps taken to curtail tax 
evasion, the extension and simplification of 
import duties (for which the maximum rate was 
set at 10%) and the application of a single, 
across-the-board levy of 4% for import control 
purposes. No less significant was the 
introduction of a 10% excise tax on imported 
vehicles. Since imports were robust, the 
clamp-down on tax exemptions had the effect 
of more than doubling receipts from taxes on 
external transactions. 
Despite the freeze on the disbursement of 
external funds, current outlays were almost 28% 
higher than they had been the previous fiscal year 
and represented approximately 10% of GDP. 
These expenditures consisted primarily of 
operational expenses and wages. Staffing cuts, 
accomplished in part through voluntary and early 
retirement schemes as part of the public sector's 
reform process, were temporarily suspended. 
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Nominal bank exchange rate 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Includes Errors and omissions. e Refers to net interest as shown on the 
balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. Figures to September of each year. 8 Interest rate on 
deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate over the fiscal year. 
Contrary to plans, the government payroll grew 
by 4.5% and the wage bill by just over 14%, 
although this was, in any event, below the rate of 
domestic inflation. 
Extrabudgetary expenditures, which 
accounted for almost one fifth of total spending 
and included the country's heavy debt-service 
burden (395 million gourdes), rose more 
steeply. In fiscal years 1996 and 1997, public 
investment amounted to just barely over 0.8% 
of GDP, which was only one third as much as 
during the 1980s (when it had averaged 2.3% 
of GDP). 
(b)Monetary and foreign exchange policy 
The principal factors in the expansion of 
liquidity were the increases in international 
reserves and in credit to the private sector, both 
of which were influenced by decisions taken by 
the BRH. 
The legal reserve requirement for commercial 
banks was reduced in stages from 48% in October 
1996 to 26% by mid-1997; at the same time, the 
process of standardizing the required cash ratio 
for different types of deposits, which had been 
initiated a year earlier, proceeded. As a means of 
countering the expansionary effect on the money 
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supply of this reduction in the reserve 
requirement, the Government issued what came 
to be known as "BRH bonds", which were 
intended for bank portfolios and provided 
higher returns than time deposits. 
Nevertheless, the banking system significantly 
expanded its private-sector lending. Almost 
27% of this credit went to private individuals, 
while the agricultural sector received barely 
1%; the remainder was distributed mainly 
among wholesale and retail commercial 
enterprises (almost 40%) and manufacturing 
companies (close to 25%). 
In a bid to reduce the pressure being put on 
the exchange rate by increased liquidity and 
stronger demand for dollars, monetary 
authorities also sold off foreign exchange, 
which led to a growing dollarization of the 
economy. In the first quarter of 1997, they 
auctioned off US$ 39 million (the equivalent 
of 652 million gourdes) and, late in the second 
quarter, instituted a standard 12% reserve 
requirement on dollar deposits. 
As a result of these measures, the money 
supply (Ml) swelled by 12%, boosted by a 43% 
increase in private credit and a 19% expansion in 
international reserves. On the other hand, in line 
with the Government's policy of reducing its debt 
with the BRH, credit to the public sector 
contracted by more than 5%. Owing to the 
increase in time deposits, local-currency liquidity 
(M2) expanded by 14% and the broad money 
aggregate (M3) by 18%, reflecting a strong 
upswing (34%) in dollar deposits, which came to 
account for more than one fifth of M3. The 
exchange rate underwent numerous fluctuations, 
but ultimately averaged out at 16.7 gourdes to the 
dollar, which represented a 14% appreciation in 
real terms. 
(c) Trade policy 
In 1997, the authorities were unable to make 
any progress in the implementation of trade 
liberalization measures, and the proposed 
rationalization of import duties, which was to 
entail a reduction of the schedule to just three 
tariff rates (0%, 5% and 10%), remained pending. 
On the other hand, Haiti's membership in the 
Caribbean common market (under the aegis of 
CARICOM) could lead to a revision of its 10% 
maximum tariff rate for agricultural goods, 
since the other countries apply a tariff ceiling 
of 20%. 
(d) Public external debt 
Financial stringency in the disbursement of 
funds, which amounted to only 68% of the 
annual average for the preceding biennium, 
and arrears in service debt payments were 
major factors affecting Haiti's external debt 
position in 1997. At the end of the fiscal year, 
the external debt stood at US$ 1.025 billion 
(US$ 110 million more than in September of 
the preceding year). 
Most of the funds received during the year 
were provided by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) in the form of balance-of-payments 
support, although the US$ 21.3 million 
earmarked for that purpose corresponded to less 
than 17% of the total amount agreed upon under 
the enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) 
for the three-year period 1997-1999. 
The transfer of responsibility for external debt 
servicing from the Treasury, via the central bank, 
to the entities that had actually incurred those 
external obligations resulted in delays in loan 
payments. On the other hand, Haiti benefited 
from Argentina's decision to forgive US$ 15.6 
million (85% of the total) of the debt owed to it 
by Haiti and to reschedule the remaining balance 
of US$2.8 million. 
(e) Structural reform 
The Management and Fiscal Control Unit 
was created to support the inter-ministerial 
administrative reform effort. A council on 
modernization of State enterprises was also 
set up to oversee the privatization of such 
enterprises. The General Tax Bureau was 
equipped with a computer and information 
system to help it cut down on tax evasion, and 
foot patrols were established to control 
smuggling. In addition, land was handed 
over to peasant farmers in February and 
November 1997 as part of a reform programme 





(a)Level of activity 
Economic activity increased by a scant 1.3% 
of GDP but, since imports climbed by almost 3%, 
aggregate supply expanded by 1.9%. On the 
demand side, the main source of momentum was 
exports, which were up by almost 8%. Although 
the increase in trade may be regarded as 
insufficient when viewed in the context of the 
ongoing deterioration of the external sector that 
occurred up until the time the economic embargo 
was lifted, it nonetheless marked a turning point 
in the downswing observed the previous year. 
On the other hand, domestic demand cooled 
off (1.2%) as a result of the decline in gross 
investment and the slow rate of increase in 
consumption relative to the rate of population 
growth. Delays in the passage of the budget and 
cutbacks in disbursements by external donors 
re-introduced a climate of uncertainty which 
daunted investors (-1.5%). Stability of the 
nominal exchange rate and a more abundant 
credit supply, bolstered by the availability of 
dollars, shored up private consumption, which 
actually strengthened somewhat. 
In terms of the various sectors of the economy, 
the largest contribution to overall GDP growth 
came from the production of goods (1%) and, 
within that sector, particularly the construction 
industry (11.5%), which brought mining along 
with it. Since 1994, construction has nearly 
doubled its share in the overall value added by 
the economy. In 1997, building activity was 
concentrated in the private residential and 
commercial sectors, since the Government 
confined its activities to the continuation of a 
number of projects that were already in the 
pipeline. 
Agricultural production again suffered a 
setback (-2.5%), even though farming continues 
to be the economy's most important sector and is 
being treated as a priority area by the 
Government. A drought in the north-western 
region of the country severely damaged export 
crops and some traditional subsistence crops, but 
production figures were up for rice, a staple in the 
Haitian diet. 
variables 
Manufacturing, which had begun to recover 
from the damage done by the trade embargo, 
stalled once again (0.8%), with an uneven pattern 
of development being observed among the 
various industries in the sector. Food processing, 
which accounts for over one third of the sector's 
total output, was flat (0.1%). The harvesting and 
processing of some agricultural products, such as 
sugar and flour, have been almost entirely 
discontinued and these goods now have to be 
imported, reflecting an increasingly marked 
trend in relation to staple foods. Sectors that 
performed well included non-metallic minerals 
and smelting (with growth rates of 15% and 
6.7%, respectively), in both cases as a direct 
result of the buoyancy of the construction 
industry, and beverages (5.4%). 
The reopening of 12 firms and the 
establishment of 11 others confirmed the 
turnaround in the maquila industry, which 
apparently helped to boost the growth of the 
garment sector (2.7%). 
The services sector was sluggish. Among 
basic services, the drought experienced in the 
middle of the year led to water shortages and, 
hence, supply problems. Electrical power 
generation continued to expand, however, 
despite the fact that illegal connections and 
unmetered consumption (54% of electricity 
generation) represent a severe drain on the 
system. Almost two thirds of the overall increase 
in electricity use may be attributed to higher 
consumption by the commercial and industrial 
sectors. Other basic services, transport and 
communications posted slower growth rates. 
Growth was weak in commerce and the hotel 
industry (0.6%). Tourism grew by 1.9%, but the 
number of visitors, which had slumped to one 
third of its former level during the embargo, was 
less than 65% of the average recorded for the 
1980s, despite an increase in the frequency of 
visits by nationals living abroad. 
The financial sector was one of the fastest 
growing areas of the economy (a growth rate of 
4.3%) as a result of the expansion of existing 
institutions made possible by mergers between 
local and foreign-owned enterprises. Home 
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ownership also generated a higher level of value 
added (1.8%) in response to intense demand 
pressure in the country's capital city. Community 
services remained stagnant owing to budgetary 
constraints. 
(b) Prices, wages and employment 
Consumer prices rose by an average of 
16.2% in 1997, down from 20.6% in 1996, and 
a gradual decline in inflation was observed 
towards the end of the period, thanks in part to 
the stability of the nominal exchange rate. The 
improvement would have been even more 
marked had it not been for the difficulties 
encountered in the production of foodstuffs, 
which are the largest component of the general 
index. The cost of housing exerted a similar 
influence, owing to the housing shortage 
existing in Haiti's overcrowded capital, where 
almost a quarter of the country's entire 
population lives. Nevertheless, the increase in 
this variable slowed in the final quarter 
following a drop in the price of charcoal, an 
important household fuel. 
A 140% adjustment in 1995 notwithstanding, 
the minimum daily wage continued to lose 
purchasing power, since no adjustments were 
made in nominal terms. As a result, this wage 
was 40% lower in real terms than it had been in 
1990; in fact, it reached its lowest level for the 
entire decade, with the sole exception of 1994, 
the last year of the trade embargo. Currently, the 
daily wage paid in maquila industries is 
estimated at less than half the minimum wage, 
although workers also benefit from a 
supplementary allowance that covers their social 
security contributions. 
On the emp] oyment scene in 1997, in addition 
to the new jobs created in construction and 
financial services, the upturn in the maquila 
industry had a considerable impact. Employment 
in this sector climbed to approximately 23,000, a 
significant improvement however remote from 
the figure of 40,000 recorded during the previous 
upswing. New hirings in banking, insurance and 
real estate establishments continued, although at 
a slower pace than the year before, while 2,180 
new civil servants (4.5%) were hired. The 
suspension of the early retirement programme, 
did, nevertheless, ease pressure on the job 
market. 
(c)The external sector 
The balance of payments showed a net 
accumulation of US$ 18 million in reserves. This 
was partly attributable to the narrowing of the 
merchandise trade deficit, which in turn led to 
some improvement in the overall trade balance 
(-US$ 513 million). The current account deficit 
was slightly higher than in 1996 and, at 
approximately -US$ 86 million, was the highest 
to be recorded thus far in the decade; the 
financial account registered a decrease in net 
capital inflows. 
The value of imports rose by almost 3%. The 
greater supply of consumer credit and business 
loans was reflected in a 44% increase in total 
imports of manufactures, but the other categories 
of imports contracted. Imports of food products 
and edible oils, which constitute the largest 
category (38% of the total), fell by almost 8% due 
to a sharp decrease in imports of flour and of 
some types of rice, since local production of this 
item was higher. 
Merchandise exports posted a spectacular 
increase of slightly over 30% in terms of value, 
chiefly thanks to the recovery of the maquila 
industry and to brisk sales of handicrafts. Taken 
together, these two activities accounted for over 
half of the increase in the value of total exports. 
Among agricultural products, coffee and mangos 
performed well on the export market; in the case 
of coffee, this was because of the rise in 
international prices (45%) and in that of mangos, 
it was due to producers' success in meeting 
strong demand from the United States market 
during the picking season. 
In 1997, the purchasing power of exports 
improved significantly (33% over 1996), largely 
as a result of increased shipments. Nevertheless, 
the balance for travel and transport services 
appears to have deteriorated, and this, together 
with higher interest charges, caused the current 
account deficit to widen. Another equally 
important factor in this regard was the US$ 22 
million decrease in external transfers. On the one 
hand, official grants and donations, which 
amounted to US$ 185 million in 1997, were 
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down by US$ 126 million from the previous 
year; on the other, private remittances from the 
United States and Canada climbed by US$ 104 
million (a 68% improvement compared with 
1996). 
The financial account registered a notable 
increase in the banking sector's commitments to 
external lenders (almost US$ 16 million) for 
letters of credit drawn upon by importers, but this 
fell far short of what would have been needed to 
offset the decline in the net resources received by 
the public sector and the rest of the private sector. 
Although direct investment (US$ 5 million) was 
still less than half its peak level, it nonetheless 
provided an indication of the gradual recovery 
being made by the maquila sector, as well as 
reflecting the arrival in the country of a number 
of gasoline distributorships which are 





1. General trends 
In 1997 the Honduran economy 
developed in an increasingly stable 
environment, thanks to a conjunction of 
domestic and external factors which 
reversed its unfavourable performance of 
the previous year. Gross domestic product 
(GDP) increased by 4.5%, inflation 
slowed significantly, and progress was 
made in fiscal consolidation. The current 
account deficit was reduced by almost 
than half, while capital inflows continued 
to increase, contributing to an 
accumulation of almost US$ 300 million 
in international reserves. In the labour 
market, although there were high levels 
of underemployment, real wages made a 
strong recovery. 
Inflation and interest rates dropped, thanks to 
a smaller public-sector deficit and exchange-rate 
stability during the second half of the year. 
Favourable external factors included improved 
terms of trade due to lower international oil prices 
and increased export prices for coffee, meat, 
shrimp, tobacco and zinc. 
Higher consumption and increased private 
investment contributed considerably to growth in 
production, and, unlike the previous year, 
agricultural supply was sufficient to avoid the 
need for imports. Mining continued to expand on 
the strength of export products; manufacturing 
maintained strong growth, as did the maquila 
industry, which generated value added of more 
than US$ 300 million. The building of hotels led 
the expansion of private construction, while 
public construction declined for the fourth 
consecutive year. 
Overall, macroeconomic indicators showed 
improvement, although there was little growth in 
per capita output because the rate of population 
increase remained high and economic growth 
was not sufficient to cause an appreciable 
improvement in the overall standard of living. 
The sharp contraction in public investment in 
recent years is also significant, owing to its 
effects on economic and social development. 
The outlook for 1998 includes economic 
growth of about 4%, inflation close to 1997 
levels, falling real interest rates and a marginal 
increase in international reserves; the real 
exchange rate is expected to be unchanged. It is 
anticipated that the budgetary commitments for 
1998 inherited by the current Government will 
make it difficult to maintain the trend towards 
fiscal balance. The probable reduction in the 
income tax rate, major wage increases in certain 
occupations, the lowering of tariffs and the 
strengthening of national security structures 
could constitute obstacles to fiscal 
consolidation. 
2. Economic policy and reforms 
The Government's economic policy was 
designed to consolidate stabilization through 
tight, disciplined management of public finances 
and monetary aggregates. At the same time, 
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progress was made in lowering tariffs and 
applying market-oriented measures. Economic 
policy goals were incorporated into a monitoring 
programme agreed with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF); its fulfilment in respect of 
variables such as GDP, inflation, fiscal deficit, 
exchange rate and international reserves was 
very satisfactory, although domestic credit 
increased considerably owing to foreign capital 
inflows. 
In 1998, the new Government is expected to 
maintain the overall thrust of economic policy, 
with emphasis on controlling public spending, 
strengthening revenue, and deepening structural 
reforms. 
(a)Fiscal policy and public finance 
Fiscal policy was characterized by efforts to 
increase revenue and to improve discipline in 
spending, despite wage demands from certain 
occupational groups and the threat to fiscal 
austerity from the November elections. The 
central government deficit fell from 3.8% in 1996 
to 2.5% in 1997. 
Overall central government revenue increased 
by 5.1% in real terms, whereas overall spending 
rose by only 1%. The increase in revenue was 
influenced by higher non-tax revenue; there was 
only a modest rise in tax revenue. A new tax code 
came into effect, designed to improve tax 
collection; for the first time, severe penalties 
were imposed on offenders and smuggling and 
tax evasion were defined as criminal offences. 
As for spending, investment in real terms 
remained limited, except for certain areas such as 
road building and repair, irrigation works, and 
hospital improvements. Under current 
expenditure, which increased moderately 
(2.3%), the greatest increases were in wages and 
salaries and the payment of interest on debt, 
which together made up 68% of current 
expenditure. The central government deficit was 
financed mostly with external resources from 
structural adjustment loans, investment 
certificates issued by the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration (CABEI) and other 
borrowing. 
It is anticipated that some problems may arise 
in 1998 which would make it difficult to keep the 
public-sector deficit within reasonable limits, in 
the light of commitments to raise minimum 
wages and wages for various occupations as of 1 
January 1998. The rate of corporate income tax 
will probably fall. During the first few months of 
1998, pending the adoption of the new budget by 
Congress, public expenditure was contained. It is 
quite possible that there will be cuts in current 
expenditure and investment, and tariffs will 
continue to be reduced, including the elimination 
of export taxes on marine products and sugar. 
(b)Monetary policy 
The Central Bank resorted to open-market 
operations to ensure that the excess liquidity 
caused by the considerable capital inflows would 
not cause excessive growth in credit (although it 
did not succeed in that objective), or exert 
inflationary pressure. Open-market operations 
were also intended to replace reserve 
requirements as the main tool for managing 
monetary aggregates. Thus, Central Bank and 
central government securities were issued by 
public auction. These debt instruments were well 
received by the public thanks to their attractive 
yields (an average annual rate of over 35%) in the 
first half of the year, although in the third and 
fourth quarters there was a downward trend, and 
they ended the year at 22%. 
Lending by the banking system to the private 
sector rose by 35% in real terms. Most of that 
lending was for investment, and foreign-currency 
financing continued its rapid growth (56%), 
representing 29% of the overall amount of 
domestic credit. The dollarization of deposits 
also continued to rise owing to high yields. In 
contrast, lending to the non-financial public 
sector by the financial system diminished 
because of decreased demand from central 
government. Intermediation margins remained 
high (up to 30%); however, owing to increasing 
competition, the average margin fell to 14% in 
mid-year. 
A single reserve requirement rate of 12% (for 
deposits in both national and foreign currency) 
was established for commercial banks, savings 
and loan associations and finance companies. For 
deposits in national currency, additional 
percentages of mandatory investments in 
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8.6 -50.1 8.6 4.9 -9.6 -12.8 2.7 6.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each aggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of that same 
aggregate as a percentage of GDP. d Open unemployment rate in Tegucigalpa. e Includes Errors and omissions. Refers 
to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. 
variation in the average bank exchange rate (selling rate) for banknotes. 
g Interest rate deflated by the 
Table 2 
HONDURAS: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1995 1996 1997a 1998a 
1 II III IV 1 II 111 IV I II III IV I II 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 33.8 29.3 28.3 26.8 21.5 23.2 25.7 25.5 26.0 21.7 17.1 12.7 12.3 14.2 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 114.0 112.0 110.8 109.6 112.0 112.5 115.3 113.8 109.9 108.7 105.9 105.0 102.3 98.7 
Real interest rates 
(annualized, %) 
Depositrate -22.3 -9.6 -7.3 -6.5 -3.4 -11.2 -11.6 -1.7 -1.8 9.3 8.5 16.2 -2.3 
Lending rate -12.1 2.4 5.5 -6.0 6.5 -0.3 -0.3 8.2 6.1 17.7 18.5 28.6 8.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Refers to exchange rate for imports. 
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government securities were fixed: 19% for 
commercial banks, 9% for savings and loan 
associations and 3% for finance companies. An 
additional obligation was created for foreign 
currency deposits: 38% must be kept in 
investments at foreign banks of recognized 
financial soundness. Although the reserve 
requirement is still considered high, it should be 
borne in mind that the danger of excess liquidity 
due to the major inflows of foreign capital would 
have been even greater if the reserve requirement 
had been reduced. 
Exchange-rate stability, particularly in the 
second half of the year, and the downward trend 
in inflation, brought about an increase in real 
interest rates, although these began to decrease in 
the last six months, when the excess liquidity in 
the economy prompted a downward adjustment 
of nominal yields. The leading interest rate for 
government bonds reached 38% in mid-year, but 
from July onwards it decreased (in line with 
falling inflation) to around 20%. 
(c) Foreign exchange and trade policy 
The goal of foreign exchange policy was to 
maintain a neutral real exchange rate, and the 
means continued to be the system of public 
foreign-exchange auctions was continued. 
This system entails weekly auctions with a 
reference price relative to which the exchange 
rate is de te rmined within a band not 
exceeding 5% of the reference price. Since 
April 1997, the reference price has been 
adjusted every five weeks in line with the 
expected differential between domestic 
inflation and the rate of inflation in the 
country's main trading partners. 
Thanks to capital inflows, the foreign 
exchange market was stable in the second half of 
the year. The average price of the dollar rose by 
11% in 1997 (the December-to-December 
slippage was 2.2%), resulting in a real 
appreciation of the lempira of 7.6%. The 
currency also appreciated in real terms during the 
first few months of 1998. However, a nominal 
devaluation of 12% is expected in 1998, 
equivalent to the anticipated rate of inflation. 
The tariff reduction programme begun in 1996 
continued, in accordance with the relevant 
Central American plan, but dates for the 
reduction of tariff rates on certain products were 
also brought forward, a decision consistent with 
the objective of generating conditions of 
competitiveness similar to those in the rest of the 
subregion. Thus, the rates for capital, 
intermediate and final goods were reduced, and 
additional reductions were provided for in the 
medium term. Import quotas, permits and 
licences and other quantitative restrictions were 
also abolished. 
(d)External debt policy 
The overall amount of the country's external 
debt was slightly less than in 1996, standing at 
US$ 4,095 million, equivalent to 87% of GDP. 
Progress was made in the restructuring of the 
external public debt (80% of the total), relieving 
pressure generated by its servicing (32% of the 
value of exports); the country obtained bilateral 
debt cancellations totalling US$ 90 million with 
the Paris Club and US$ 75 million with the 
Government of France. 
Positive macroeconomic performance made 
possible disbursements totalling US$ 247 
million in 1997, of which 31% was in the formal 
structural adjustment loans to support the balance 
of payments, 20% was for investment in roads 
and airports, and 19% for social development 
projects. The main sources of financing were 
multilateral financial institutions. With the 
Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration (CABEI), debts totalling more than 
US$ 400 million were restructured, enabling 
Honduras to reduce its debt servicing by as much 
as 50% in the next few years (the saving under 
this heading amounted to US$ 6.5 million for 
1997). 
New borrowing declined from US$ 375 
million in 1996 to only US$ 123 million in 1997, 
owing to the provision adopted in 1996 requiring 
that loan should be taken out only on 
concessional terms, except for high-priority 
projects. The loans went to agriculture (US$ 83 
million), the financial sector (US$ 14 million), 
health (US$ 7.5 million) and energy (US$ 2.7 
million). The financial conditions of the loans 
were somewhat less favourable than in the 
previous year: on average, the loan maturity was 
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29 years, the grace period 8.8 years and the 
interest rate 1.8%. 
(e) Structural reform 
The reforms introduced in the law on the 
Central Bank of Honduras came into effect, 
giving the institution greater autonomy in the 
management of monetary policy; important 
aspects include the Bank's responsibility for 
maintaining the value of the currency, its 
function as lender of last resort, limitations on its 
involvement in determining interest and 
exchange rates, and the elimination of automatic 
financing of the public deficit by the bank of 
issue. 
(a)Economic activity 
Domestic demand was the main factor in 
economic growth. Consumption increased by 3% 
and investment by 8%; the latter was mostly due 
to a 18% increase in private investment, 
increasingly concentrated in tourism, tobacco, 
mining, construction, the maquila industry and 
certain manufacturing sectors. By contrast, 
public investment fell by 11%. 
The agricultural sector grew at a slightly faster 
rate than the population; the production of basic 
grains reached record levels and helped to 
consolidate both sufficient supply and an overall 
fall in prices. The lack of rain associated with the 
El Niño phenomenon did not greatly affect 
activity in the sector; in fact, the absence of 
tropical storms in the Caribbean, attributed to El 
Niño, produced favourable conditions for 
agriculture in the Olancho valley and on the 
northern coast, although in early 1998 some 
negative effects were observed for shrimp 
farming and other products. 
Mining, sustained by silver, lead and zinc -all 
export products- continued to show great 
vitality. A new mining code is expected to be 
adopted soon, to modernize the regulatory 
framework with respect to prospecting, 
concession, exploitation, and the fiscal regime 
Although studies and laws relating to the 
process of divesti ture, concession or 
privatization of public enterprises and utilities 
were complete or at an advanced stage, no great 
progress was seen in economic reforms, partly 
owing to the fact that the outgoing Government 
had left the new Administration to decide the 
direction that the process should follow. 
Divestiture of the Honduran telecom-
munications company (HONDUTEL) and the 
national electric power company (ENEE) is 
expected to be completed in 1998. As for the four 
airports, currently leased to private companies, 
the draft laws concerning civil aviation and 
concessions are still awaiting debate and 
adoption. 
for mining, and to make the sector more attractive 
for foreign direct investment. 
The manufacturing sector grew by more than 
6%, thanks to the performance of the chemical 
industry (12%), paper (9%), textiles and apparel 
(8%) and non-metallic minerals (8%). The 
maquila industry remained very vigorous, and 
considerable investments are expected in future, 
particularly by domestic investors and in the 
garment sector; the incorporation of new areas 
into the free trade zone regime will encourage 
growth in the maquila industry. 
Construction continued to decline as a result 
of the contraction in public works and also, in 
the private sector, because of high real interest 
rates. However, there was much activity in the 
construction of tourist infrastructure, 
encouraged by foreign investments mostly 
from El Salvador and Guatemala. Twenty-two 
hotels are currently under construction, 
involving a total investment of about two 
billion lempiras. When the hotels are finished, 
the availability of rooms will increase to 
12,500, 16% more than in 1996. 
Low rainfall is also affecting hydroelectric 
power generation and the drinking water supply. 
More than half of the country's electricity comes 
from hydroelectric plants, and the water in their 
reservoirs is at very low levels. 
3. The main variables 
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(b)Prices, wages and employment 
The rate of price increases slowed 
significantly in 1997, thanks to the neutralization 
of the inflationary factors which had been active 
in 1996. Fiscal prudence, the relative stability of 
the nominal exchange rate, falling fuel prices and 
sufficient supply of basic foodstuffs contributed 
decisively to holding back the inflationary trend 
in prices. The inflation rate was 12.7%, half the 
1996 level. 
Average growth in minimum wages in 1997 
was 15% for the public sector and 33% overall. 
Real wages therefore rose for the first time 
since 1993. Congress passed amendments to 
the Minimum Wage Act that provided for 
periodic automatic adjustments: every six 
months if the inflation rate in June exceeds 
12%, and yearly if it is lower. In addition, a 
Teachers' Code was adopted, providing for 
salary increases over the coming four years; 
and doctors succeeded in obtaining indexation 
of their salaries. With falling inflation, this 
wage policy seems likely to involve a 
considerable fiscal effort; there is also a danger 
that other occupational groups may try to 
obtain similar treatment in future. 
The employment situation improved in 1997. 
The open unemployment rate is estimated to have 
fallen, but underemployment remained high. The 
maquila industry continued to be the biggest 
generator of new jobs, employing a total of 
90,000 persons. 
Inflation tended to remain stable in early 
1998. The peak in February (2.8%) was due to 
seasonal factors, such as higher enrolment fees at 
the beginning of the school year, increases in 
teachers' salaries, and a sudden upsurge in the 
domestic price of coffee (80%). On the other 
hand, there was a fall in international oil prices, 
beginning in late 1997, and especially in early 
1998. Inflation for the year as a whole is 
estimated at about 12%. 
In January 1998, an increase in minimum 
wages averaging 17.1% was announced. The 
biggest increase was for those employed by firms 
in the financial sector (20.6%), and the lowest 
was in microenterprises in the service sector. 
Wage claims are expected later in the year, since 
improved wages for certain favoured groups 
have widened differentials in relation to other 
categories of workers. 
(c)The externa] sector 
The external sector was under less pressure 
than in 1996. The overall balance-of-payments 
surplus for 1977 stood at US$ 210 million 
(compared with US$ 103 million in 1996), 
resulting from a US$ 101 million current account 
deficit, a US$ 262 million surplus on the capital 
account, and errors and omissions totalling 
US$ 49 million. 
The current account deficit fell by a little 
under half, owing to the narrowing of the trade 
gap, the significant rise in the value added of the 
maquila industry (US$ 300 million), the increase 
in the amount of transfers, and the reduction in 
the amount of interest paid on foreign debt. 
The capital account reflected the surge in 
foreign direct investment (US$ 114 million, 26% 
higher than in 1996), mostly in tourism; a 
significant proportion of the investment was from 
Central American countries. Other recipient 
industries were sugar cane, African oil palm, 
other foods and beverages, banking, and 
paperboard. Short-term capital inflows (28% of 
total foreign investment inflows) were due to 
exchange-rate stability and attractive yields on 
the money market. Consequently, international 
reserves rose by almost US$ 300 million, 
contributing to a record increase of more than 
US$ 600 million over the past three years. 
Exports of goods (not including the maquila 
industry) increased by 9.2% to more than 
US$ 1.4 billion. This result was influenced by 
improved export prices for coffee, tobacco, meat, 
shrimps and zinc. Notable among traditional 
exports was coffee (the biggest export product, 
representing 23% of the total), with an increase 
of 17%, which was entirely due to the 40% rise 
in price, since the volume exported fell by 16%. 
The volume of banana exports decreased but, 
unlike coffee, their price also fell, resulting in a 
26% drop in the value of exports; even so, banana 
exports remained second in importance after 
coffee (14% of the total). Exports of mining 
products were very buoyant, but barely made up 
4.5% of the total. Wood exports fell by half, and 
meat exports were stagnant. Sugar prices 
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remained static, but larger export volumes (due 
to the increased quota allowed by the United 
States) produced a considerable increase in 
export value. 
Non-traditional exports (56% of the total) 
increased by 18%. They are more diversified than 
traditional exports; with the exception of 
shrimps, which represent 20%, the market shares 
of the remaining products -lobster, pineapple, 
melon, and soap and detergent- are more evenly 
divided. 
Imports of goods increased by 12%, bringing 
their value up to US$ 2 billion. The lower cost of 
petroleum and paper imports was compensated 
for by increased foreign purchases of capital 
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goods, chemicals and products for the food 
industry. Imports of fuel and lubricants decreased 
in value owing to lower petroleum prices, the 
replacement of fuel oil (bunker fuel) by coal in 
cement plants, and lower demand from the 
national electric power company (ENEE). 
Constraints on the external sector are 
anticipated for 1998, because disbursements of 
international loans are expected to be modest. If 
macroeconomic performance remains good, it is 
hoped that the terms of a new agreement with IMF 
may be agreed upon in 1998; among other 
objectives, this would facilitate future 
renegotiations and debt cancellations, helping to 




1. General trends 
The Mexican economy has continued to 
experience strong growth, with GDP 
advancing by 7.3%. An upswing in 
domestic demand and robust exports 
pushed down unemployment to a rate 
nearly as low as the level recorded before 
the 1994 crisis. On the other hand, real 
wages remained depressed. 
The macroeconomic climate of stability and 
growth was reflected in declining inflation and 
nominal interest rates together with abundant 
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
These inflows contributed to a real appreciation 
of the peso and prompted the authorities to 
make adjustments in the way they were 
managing monetary policy in order to curb 
short-term capital inflows and thus avoid an 
excessive rise in the local currency. Capital 
inflows boosted international reserves, but the 
monetary impact of this increase was sterilized 
through the placement of government 
securities. 
With tax revenues strengthening and with 
investment and social expenditure picking up, 
government finances posted a small deficit. The 
huge sums set aside to bail out faltering banking 
institutions drove up the cost of assistance 
programmes for the banking system and its 
debtors to 14.5% of GDP. The application of these 
measures helped to stabilize the ratio of 
non-performing bank loans and facilitated the 
capitalization of the banking system, but it was 
nonetheless unable to fully resume its 
intermediation functions. 
The real appreciation of the peso contributed 
to a slowdown in exports and a sharp surge in 
imports which narrowed the trade surplus and 
increased the balance-of-payments current 
account deficit. The Government successfully 
applied a policy designed to reduce and 
consolidate its external debt. Short-term 
maturities were refinanced through the 
placement of longer-term bonds on international 
markets. 
These positive macroeconomic results stand 
out in stark contrast to the uneven performance 
of the production base; large firms, exporters and 
companies that have access to external financing 
have displayed a great deal of dynamism, but 
smaller businesses that are geared to the domestic 
market have had difficulty in obtaining financing 
and, hence, in regaining their former levels of 
activity. 
The financial crisis which originated in 
South-East Asia has had repercussions (although 
so far the impact has been fairly slight) on 
financial markets in Mexico. Capital flows have 
slowed and this has prompted adjustments in the 
exchange rate and the securities market which, in 
any event, were regarded as being necessary even 
before the crisis. Interest rates have risen 
accordingly, but the fundamental trends in the 
country's financial markets, inflation and 
economic activity have not been altered. The 
downturn in oil prices has been a more influential 
factor in motivating the authorities to cut back on 
public spending in 1998 and in fueling 
expectations of slower economic growth. 
With weaker growth forecast for Asia, the 
crisis' deflationary impact on oil prices may be 
expected to persist; for Mexico, this signifies a 
reduction in export earnings and, even more 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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importantly, in public-sector revenues. Oil sales 
account for 37% of the public sector's total 
budget revenue. 
In short, growth for 1998 is expected to be 
below 5%. The balance-of-payments current 
account deficit could exceed US$ 15 billion 
(3.5% of GDP), with a trade deficit of US$ 7 
billion. By year's end the exchange rate is 
expected to be over 9 pesos to the dollar, which 
implies an inflation rate on the order of 14%. 
2. Economic policy and reforms 
The aim of economic policy continued to be the 
restoration of macroeconomic equilibria. Priority 
was given to curbing inflation, strengthening the 
financial standing of the banking sector and 
stimulating economic growth; the system of 
floating exchange rates remained in place, as did 
the strategy for refinancing the country ' s external 
debt through the placement of issues on 
international markets. 
(a)Fiscal policy and public finance 
Fiscal policy-makers continued their efforts 
to balance the public sector's finances. As 
complementary measures, steps were taken to 
encourage domestic saving and productive 
investment. Incomes policy was directed 
towards boosting receipts by expanding the tax 
base and achieving a more equitable 
distribution of the tax burden, while policy 
measures regarding government expenditure 
focused on promoting public investment, 
production activities and social development 
programmes. 
As a consequence of this latter policy, the 
public sector ran a deficit equivalent to 0.8% 
of GDP in 1997 (slightly above the official 
projection) after having balanced its accounts 
in 1996, and the primary surplus shrank from 
4.4% to 3.5% of GDP over the same period. The 
Federal Government's financial deficit 
widened from -0.5% in 1996 to -1.4% of GDP 
in 1997. 
Bolstered by brisker economic activity and 
stricter enforcement measures, tax receipts 
expanded by 12%; this was the main cause of the 
2.3% real increase in budgetary revenues, since 
oil revenues stagnated owing to the downturn in 
export prices. This performance, together with 
the reduction in the financial costs associated 
with the public debt, brought in sufficient 
funds to cover the cost of the country's social 
security reforms and helped to boost physical 
investment expenditure, spending on social 
development programmes and the level of 
funds received by states and municipalities 
under the government revenue-sharing 
scheme. Government spending on social 
programmes included food assistance, the 
expansion of basic education coverage and 
employment programmes. 
The Federal Government's net domestic debt 
increased substantially as a consequence of its 
placement of large volumes of government 
bonds; the value of government bonds 
outstanding equalled 81% of the total domestic 
debt, which amounted to 8.1% of GDP. However, 
if Congress passes the bill submitted by the 
Executive Branch in March 1998, under which 
the liabilities of the Bank Savings Protection 
Fund (FOBAPROA) (552.3 billion pesos or 
US$ 65,243, million as if 28 February 1998)1 and 
the Federal Government's domestic debt would 
be consolidated, then this figure would rise to 
811,532, million pesos or the equivalent of 
21.8% of projected GDP for 1998. 
For 1998, a deficit equivalent to 1.25% of GDP 
is anticipated. In the early months of the year, 
downward pressure on oil prices drove down 
earnings, and this in turn led to a 3% reduction in 
government spending as policy-makers sought to 
avoid revising their fiscal goal. In an effort to 
shore up international prices for crude oil, 
towards the end of the first quarter the 
1 The Bank Savings Protection Fund (FOBAPROA), afundsetupintheBancode México, has boughtup banks' loan portfolios 
in the wake of the 1995 banking crisis in order to assist in their re-capitalization. Its assets currently amount to US$ 40 billion. 
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Table 1 
MEXICO: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National savings 
External savings 
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Labour force participation rate 





















































































































































Real average wage 
(index: 1990=100)f 
Prices (December-December) 




Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(new pesos per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
for imports (index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account g 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
Gross debt 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 







100.0 106.5 114.3 
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3.38 6.42 7.60 7.92 
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Capital expenditure (net) 
Adjustments 
Financial balance 
Money and credit 
Monetary balances 
Bank of Mexico international 
reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To central government (net) 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 




Real interest rates (annualized, %) 
Deposit rate (30 days) 
Equivalent interest rate 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each aggregate on 
GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of that same aggregate as a 
percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population; urban areas. e Percentages of the economically active 
population (EAP); urban areas. Manufacturing industry. g Includes Errors and omissions. Refers tonetinterest 
as shown in the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. ' Includes dollar deposits. J Interest rate on 
deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
MEXICO: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1995 1996 1997a 1998a 
i ii in iv i n HI iv i ii in iv I II 
Gross domestic product 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year)" -0.4 -9.2 -8.0 -7.0 0.1 6.5 7.1 7.1 4.9 8.6 7.9 6.7 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 15.0 33.8 41.7 48.7 43.8 31.0 30.0 27.7 24.6 20.4 18.7 15.7 
Real effective exchange ratec 
(index: 1990=100) 133.1 118.8 111.2 123.1 115.7 108.3 105.0 104.1 97.4 95.2 91.4 91.6 
Exports 
(millions of dollars) 
Imports 
(millions of dollars) 
18 787 19 631 20 087 21 036 21 870 23 607 24 247 26 275 25 099 27 440 28 176 29 716 
18 190 17 033 17 873 19 258 19 935 21 409 22 835 25 288 23 529 26 800 28 485 30994 
Real interest rates 
(annualized, %) 
Depositrate" -21.2 -18.4 5.4 3.3 -3.8 -3.2 2.5 -3.6 -5.4 2.7 0.6 -1.2 
Money (Ml) 
(change from same quarter 




28 226 29 886 
29 972 31 031 
-8.2 0.2 
24.8 20.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Preliminary figures. Based on series that have not been seasonally adjusted, at constant domestic prices. Refers to the rate of exchange 
for imports. 30-day deposits. 
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Government cut oil exports by 100,000 barrels 
per day. 
(b)External public debt 
The main policy objectives in relation to the 
external public debt were to reduce 
debt-servicing costs and to lengthen its maturity 
profile by refinancing short-term commitments. 
The necessary resources were generated 
primarily through the placement of bond issues 
on international markets. 
The public sector's gross foreign debt (not 
counting the liabilities of the Banco de México) 
was reduced from more than US$ 98 billion in 
1996 to just over US$ 88 billion in 1997. Thanks 
to the payments it made to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Banco de México was 
able to decrease its debt from US$ 13.3 billion in 
1996 to slightly over US$ 9 billion in 1997. In 
contrast, the private sector's external debt 
swelled by US$ 6.6 billion to stand at US$ 52.2 
billion. Thus, the country's total external debt 
diminished from US$ 157 billion to less than US$ 
150 billion. 
Government debt issues on international 
markets amounted toUS$ 8,904, million in 1997. 
The average maturity of these obligations was 
slightly under nine years, at a fixed rate of 8.2% 
and arange of 3.1%-11%. These terms were more 
favourable than those obtained for the 
placements made in 1995 and 1996. The funds 
obtained from these issues were used to refinance 
short-term maturities and to make prepayments 
on external debts. The servicing of the external 
debt absorbed over US$ 40 billion (10% of GDP), 
of which over US$ 33 billion corresponded to 
debt amortizations and close to US$ 7 billion to 
interest and commissions. 
(c) Monetary and financial policy 
Monetary policy continued to play an 
instrumental role in reining in inflation as well as 
helping to stabilize financial and foreign-
exchange markets; this was reflected in interest 
rates, which settled at lower levels. 
Owing to the large volumes of foreign 
exchange pouring into money and securities 
markets, net assets mounted to almost eight times 
their anticipated minimum level. This, together 
with the brisk pace of economic activity, drove 
the Banco de México to modify its targets for the 
monetary base and net domestic credit. The latter 
contracted more sharply than had been projected, 
while the monetary base was adjusted upwards 
by only a slight amount, since the authorities 
were already taking steps to sterilize capital 
inflows. 
The Banco de México modified its monetary 
policy to help bring about a decline in interest 
rates as a means of staunching short-term capital 
inflows. Accordingly, central bank authorities 
announced a possible increase in the liquidity 
ratio of financial institutions effective from the 
end of September. The use of this mechanism 
could lead to a slower accumulation (or actual 
decrease) in international assets by diminishing 
short-term capital inflows. This would tend to 
curb the appreciation of the peso in real terms, 
an objective which appeared to be the 
underlying motivation for the Bank's 
manoeuvre. 
Towards the end of the first quarter of 1998, 
however, the Banco de México switched from a 
neutral monetary policy stance to a more 
restrictive one by making it necessary for 
financial institutions to maintain a short daily 
position (a deficit of 20 million pesos) in their 
current accounts with the Bank. As this 
represented only 0.02% of the money in 
circulation at the close of April 1998, the 
restrictive impact of this measure was very slight. 
In fact, the main reason why the financial 
authorities took this step appeared to be their 
desire to alert the economy to the trend in the 
exchange rate, which they felt had depreciated 
more than was warranted by the relevant 
fundamentals; the Bank also appeared to be 
drawing attention to the effects of the movement 
in the exchange rate on real prices and interest 
rates. 
The level of domestic credit made available to 
the private sector by the commercial banking 
system continued to decline in real terms in 1997, 
despite the economic reactivation and the upturn 
in bank deposit-taking and financial saving. This 
was probably a result of the banks' cautious 
lending policy, which was reflected in, among 
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other factors, the large spread between deposit 
and lending rates. 
Nominal interest rates descended except 
during short periods of moderate volatility. 
Thus, the benchmark 28-day Treasury 
Certificate (Cetes) rate was lowered from 27.5% 
in the last quarter of 1996 to approximately 20% 
in mid-1997, where it remained until the end of 
the period (except during October, when the 
financial crisis in some Asian countries 
triggered a bout of instability). The average 
annual 28-day Cetes rate was 19.8%, with a 
monthly high of 23.5% in January and a low of 
18% in October. 
Substantial foreign capital inflows, positive 
economic trends and abundant liquidity on 
international markets made for a bullish capital 
market in 1997. Equity placements by companies 
listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange picked up 
as well. The Index of Prices and Quotations 
(IPYC) climbed 56% in 1997, and this 
performance, in combination with the stability of 
the nominal exchange rate, provided investors 
with significant gains in dollars. The effect of the 
Asian crisis on the capital market has thus far 
taken the form of a downward adjustment in the 
IPYC, which was felt to be called for in any 
event, since this indicator had built up a 
cumulative yield of 62% between January and 
October 1997. 
(d) Foreign exchange policy and markets 
The system of floating exchange rates 
remained in force, with the Banco de México 
reserving the right to intervene under specific, 
previously announced conditions. The market's 
hallmark during the period was the nominal 
stability of the exchange rate, except for short 
episodes of speculation between February and 
March (as the market reacted to the increase in 
interest rates in the United States) and in late 
October (owing to the turmoil on Asian markets), 
but these interruptions did not alter the overall 
trend towards an appreciation of the peso in real 
terms. 
The Banco de México continued to auction off 
foreign exchange to financial institutions as a 
means of building up its reserves and stabilizing 
the currency market. Thus, in July 1997 the 
monthly sum placed on auction was increased 
from US$ 130 million to US$ 300 million and, in 
August, the central bank again raised the amount 
-to US$ 500 million- in order to counter the 
persistent appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
It later reduced the amount to US$ 250 million in 
response to the financial volatility and currency 
speculation observed towards the end of October. 
This practice contributed to the upward spiral 
of the Banco de México' s net international assets, 
which soared from just over US$ 6 billion at the 
end of 1996 to almost US$ 20 billion at the end 
of 1997. The build-up of reserves enabled the 
Bank to strengthen its position in anticipation of 
possible turmoil on the foreign exchange market 
and allowed it to obtain better terms from foreign 
lenders. 
The persistence and intensification of the 
financial crisis in Asia in early 1998 increased the 
volatility of the foreign exchange market, 
causing a 9% nominal appreciation of the dollar 
in the first five months of the year. The Banco de 
Mexico's net international assets continued to 
climb, reaching just over US$ 22 billion by the 
end of May. 
(e) Structural reform 
Reforms to the social security system took 
effect in July 1997. Under the new pension 
system, the traditional pay-as-you-go system 
was replaced by a funded system that 
provides for a guaranteed minimum pension. 
Each Pension Fund Management Board 
(AFORE) will be able to operate a number of 
different pension funds for its members, 
although during the first four years, none will 
be allowed to have a market share greater than 
17%. The funds will be invested by AFORE 
mutual funds (Specialized Retirement Fund 
Investment Companies, or siEFOREs), which 
will function as financial intermediaries, 
taking in savings deposits and then placing 
these funds in safe, profitable investment 
instruments. 
After a slow start in the early months of the 
year, enrolments began to escalate, and by the 
end of 1997, over 10 million (out of a total of 
slightly over 11 million) workers had signed up 
with the system. Most of the AFOREs posted losses 
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in their first few months of operation, even 
though their start-up expenses are to be 
amortized over a period of several years, and 
this situation has sparked expectations of 
future mergers. 
Little headway has been made in the 
privatization of airports, railways and secondary 
petrochemical facilities of Petróleos Mexicanos 
(PEMEX). The motorway concession programme 
had to be modified substantially owing to a series 
of problems which made it necessary for the 
Government to intervene and take back 23 of the 
29 toll road concessions that it had previously 
awarded. 
Towards the end of the first quarter of 1998, 
the Executive sent a number of financial-system 
reform initiatives to Congress, and it is hoped that 
Congress will take action on these bills in the 
course of the year. These reforms seek to: (i) 
transfer responsibility for foreign- exchange 
policy to the Banco de México (this area of 
policy is currently in the hands of a foreign 
(a)Economic activity 
The reinforcement of the trends that had 
started to emerge in 1996 allowed production 
activity to continue its recovery in 1997. Private 
consumption picked up considerably (6.6%). The 
pace of exports slowed somewhat but still 
remained in the double-digit range and, with an 
increase of 21%, gross fixed investment was the 
most dynamic component of demand. Aggregate 
demand grew by 10% and this, given the weight 
of the import component in domestic spending, 
boosted imports by 22%. 
The recovery in private consumption was 
uneven, since it was mainly a result of increased 
expenditure on consumer durables (a trend 
usually associated with spending patterns of 
middle- and high-income groups). Department 
stores -the main retailers of consumer durables-
registered a much sharper increase in sales than 
self-serve establishments, which are 
predominantly suppliers of food products and 
other basic items. The higher demand for durable 
goods (a large proportion of which are imports) 
exchange board composed of three 
representatives of the Ministry of Finance and 
Public Credit and two from the central bank); 
(ii) give autonomy to the National B anking and 
Securities Commission, strengthen its regulatory 
and supervisory functions with respect to the 
financial system and change it into a 
decentralized organ of the Banco de México; 
(iii) do away with restrictions on foreign 
investment within the financial system as a 
way of increasing the capitalization of the 
country's commercial banking system; (iv) 
create two bodies to take the place of the Bank 
Savings Protection Fund (FOBAPROA), with 
one being responsible for guaranteeing the 
public's savings up to a specified limit and the 
second being put in charge of selling off the 
commercial bank assets bought up by 
FOBAPROA; and (v) consolidate the debts of 
FOBAPROA with the public debt of the Federal 
Government. 
can be attributed both to the increase in 
private consumption and to the decline in the 
relative prices of such goods occasioned by 
the appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
Since the growth of disposable income is 
primarily a function of rising employment 
and/or real wages, it may be concluded that 
the upturn in private consumption was due to 
the increase in employment, since real wages 
remained static. 
Following its recovery in 1996, the growth 
of the agricultural sector slowed to 1.4% in 
1997 as a result of adverse weather conditions, 
thus falling below the rate of population 
growth. Sharp decreases in the harvest of major 
crops, such as corn, beans, sorghum, coffee and 
cotton, were contributing factors. In the early 
months of 1998, the problems caused by the 
drought affecting large areas of the country 
intensified, while other regions suffered from 
floods, leading to fears that unless conditions 
improved, it would become necessary to 
resort to imports to supplement domestic 
supply. 
3. Level of activity, inflation and employment 
248 
MEXICO 
The 9.2% growth rate recorded for the 
industrial sector (mining, manufacturing, 
construction and electricity, gas and water) 
was driven by the buoyancy of the 
manufacturing sector (9.8%). The rise in 
consumption contributed to the recovery of 
industries that had been hit hard by the 1995 
crisis, such as food products, textiles, clothing, 
footwear and wood, although their average rate 
of expansion was less robust than that of the 
export sector. 
In the early months of 1998, domestic 
demand remained firm, and given the climate 
of financial volatility and the strong surge in 
imports (and therefore in the current account 
deficit), there were some signs that economic 
policy-makers wanted to cool it down. The 
Government has exhibited a great deal of 
ardency in signalling the need to rein in 
consumption, has cut back on public 
spending and has adopted a somewhat tighter 
monetary policy. In any event, economic 
growth is expected to be slower than in 
1997. 
With respect to the banking crisis, in 1997 
the various programmes for bailing out the 
banking sector and providing support to its 
debtors remained in effect. The banking 
system posted improved capitalization and 
reserve indicators, and debtors were able to 
restructure their payment commitments. 
However the banking system is still a long 
way from resuming its role as an efficient 
financial intermediary. Credit institutions are 
faced with the challenges involved in 
cleaning up their portfolios, luring back 
reliable clients and competing to reduce the 
cost of financing; at the same time, however, 
they have yet to overcome the damage done 
to their loan receivables. 
Non-performing loans increased from 
21.4% of total portfolios in 1996 to 29.8% in 
1997, largely as a result of the new accounting 
procedures adopted by the country's banks; for 
example, under the new regulations, the total 
debt is treated as a non-performing loan, rather 
than just the monthly payments that are 
overdue. The highest default rates are on loans 
for the purchase of consumer durables (55.6%) 
and housing (42%), in both cases probably as a 
result of the level of overindebtedness of many 
households, which had been building up in the 
years prior to the outbreak of the crisis in late 
1994. 
The cost, in net present value terms, of the 
programmes set up to bail out the banking system 
and its debtors rose from 8% to 11.9% of 
projected GDP for 1997. This increase was a 
reflection of the huge amount of resources used 
to shore up insolvent financial institutions, whose 
shareholders have lost both their capital and their 
control over these firms. By early May 1998, it 
was estimated that the cost of these programmes 
had risen to 14.5% of GDP as a consequence of 
the financial rehabilitation operations 
implemented in the case of four commercial 
banks. 
(b)Prices, wages and employment 
Inflation continued to subside in 1997, thanks 
mainly to the virtually stationary nominal rate of 
exchange, as well as to wage restraint and to 
policy-makers' monetary and fiscal stringency. 
The consumer price index (December-
December) rose by 15.7%, approximately half of 
the increase recorded in 1996. 
Real wages continued to descend -for the 
third consecutive year in the manufacturing 
sector and for the fifteenth year in a row in the 
case of minimum wages, in contrast to the 
sharp slumps recorded in 1995 and 1996, 
however, the declines in manufacturing and 
minimum wages in 1997 were less than 1%. 
contractual wages were the only category to 
show an improvement, and this was 
particularly the case in a limited number of 
export-based companies, the maquila 
(in-bond processing) industry and manu-
facturing firms. Nevertheless, the wage bill 
rose in real terms owing to the increase in 
employment. 
Economic growth boosted job creation in 
1997. Figures released by the Mexican Social 
Security Institute (IMSS) show an 11.3% increase 
in the number of workers registered with the 
Institute on a permanent basis, which means that 
close to one million individuals signed up for 
249 
social security coverage in 1997. This indicates 
that formal employment now far exceeds the 
level attained prior to the 1995 recession. 
Construction and manufacturing (including the 
maquila industry) were the most dynamic 
sectors. Employment continued to soar in the 
maquila sector, bringing the total number of jobs 
in this industry to almost one million by the end 
of 1997; this was 20% more than the figure 
recorded at the end of 1996 and reflected the 
creation of around 160,000 additional jobs. 
The favourable trend in employment was also 
reflected in a decline in unemployment 
throughout 1997. The rate of open unem-
ployment stood at 3.1% of the economically 
active population in the fourth quarter and 
averaged 3.7% for the year as a whole, which was 
quite similar to the level recorded prior to the 
December 1994 crisis. In early 1998 
unemployment rose as a consequence of 
seasonal factors, but it then resumed its 
downward trend. 
Economic growth is still not fast enough to 
absorb all the people who enter the labour force 
every year, and as a result employment in the 
informal sector has continued to act as a cushion 
for the labour market. This situation has an 
adverse effect on working conditions, exerts 
downward pressure on wages and hinders 
productivity gains as well as access to social 
safety nets. 
In the first five months of 1998, prices rose 
by 7%, which will make it difficult for the 
Government to attain its target figure of 12%. 
The surge in inflation seen in the first few 
months of the year was primarily due to the 
slippage in the nominal rate of exchange; other 
factors included the adjustment of minimum 
wages in January and increases in the prices of 
public-sector goods and services (gas, 
electricity, gasoline) and staple foods (chiefly 
milk and tortillas). 
(c) The external sector 
Financial inflows from abroad were quite 
substantial, as was the deterioration in the 
balance-of-payments current account surplus, 
although it was kept within manageable limits. 
Exports remained buoyant, growing by 14%, 
while imports gained momentum, expanding by 
22%. 
Foreign investors' favourable expectations 
regarding the country's economic outlook, 
together with the high rates of return available on 
Mexican financial markets within a context of 
exchange-rate stability, generated a strong inflow 
of foreign investment (close to US$ 17.5 billion). 
Unlike the situation the year before, the bulk of 
these inflows (almost US$ 12.5 billion) were in 
the form of direct investment; 60% of these funds 
went to the manufacturing sector and 25% to 
services. It is estimated that a significant portion 
of direct investment was channelled into the 
purchase of existing assets. 
The balance-of-payments current account 
showed a deficit of almost US$ 7.5 billion, which 
was three times as high as in 1996, but still quite 
small as a percentage of GDP (1.8%). The 
deepening of the deficit was chiefly attributable 
to the fact that imports grew far faster than 
exports, a pattern which has been resulting in 
negative monthly trade balances since the second 
half of 1997. 
The merchandise trade surplus narrowed from 
just overUS$ 6.5 billion in 1996 to only US$ 623 
million in 1997, which, given the total volume of 
the country's trade flows (US$ 220 billion), was 
tantamount to a position of virtual equilibrium in 
its international merchandise trade. The deficit 
on the income account was similar to that of 1996 
(slightly under US$ 13 billion) and was mainly 
the result of the amount of interest paid out on the 
external debt (US$ 12.5 billion). 
In the wake of the December 1994 
devaluation, exports had been extremely 
dynamic in 1995 and 1996; in the second half of 
1996 their rate of growth began to slow, however, 
partly as a result of the real appreciation of the 
peso. The stronger peso also contributed to an 
upswing in imports which has also been 
supported by the economic reactivation that 
began in 1996. The total dollar value of 
merchandise exports exceeded US$ 110 billion, 
a 15% increase over the 1996 figure; for their 
part, imports swelled by 23% to just under 
US $ 110 billion. For the first time since January 
1995, foreign trade transactions began to post 
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negative balances in July 1997, and this trend has 
been deepening in 1998. 
In early 1998, the trade deficit began to 
worsen; exports of manufactured goods 
continued to display great buoyancy (a growth 
rate of 17% was recorded in the first three 
months), but oil exports slumped 33% over the 
same period. This, together with the 23% 
increase in imports, led to a deficit of 
US$ 2,188, million in the first quarter of 1998. 
The trade balance is expected to remain negative 
throughout the remainder of 1998, and 
projections put the total deficit for the year at 




1. General trends 
In 1997 Nicaragua achieved Us highest 
rate of GDP growth of the decade (5.5%) 
thanks to abundant foreign capital 
inflows that underpinned private 
investment and consumption. The 
progress made in terms of well-being was 
even greater, as open unemployment fell, 
the inflation rate dropped to single-digit 
levels (7.3%) and the country's terms of 
trade with the rest of the world improved. 
However, the already excessive deficit on 
the balance-of-payments current account 
increased further, although only slightly, 
due above all to a widening of the 
merchandise trade gap. 
Higher tax revenues led to a significant 
increase in primary saving by the non-financial 
In a bid to reduce both poverty and 
unemployment, the Administration that took 
office in January 1997 launched an economic and 
structural reform programme whose main 
objectives are to galvanize the production 
apparatus (giving priority to the reactivation of 
the agricultural sector), cut inflation and put 
public finances back on a sound footing. The 
programme calls for measures aimed at boosting 
the efficiency of the public sector and creating an 
appropriate economic climate for increased 
domestic and external private investment. One 
important development in this connection was 
public sector (NFPS). At the same time, a bigger 
current surplus and a decrease in capital 
expenditure meant that the overall NFPS deficit, 
before grants and donations, shrank to half (7% 
of GDP) of what it had been, despite higher 
interest payments. 
Monetary policy focused on open market 
operations and the management of the legal 
reserve requirement as means of controlling 
liquidity in the market. The continued use of a 
crawling-peg system under which 
pre-announced adjustments are made in the 
exchange rate had a favourable effect in terms of 
inflationary expectations. 
The country also made significant inroads in 
the area of structural reform in the course of the 
year, including the passage of new legislation on 
taxation, commerce, banking and property rights. 
In addition, at year's end a new agreement was 
signed with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for a second structural adjustment loan. 
the passage of the Fairness in Taxation and 
Commerce Act in July, a piece of legislation that 
simplifies the tax system, broadens the tax base 
and rationalizes the eligibility requirements for 
tax exemptions. It also includes provisions 
designed to encourage investment, especially in 
the agricultural and export sectors, and to roll 
back tariffs gradually. 
During the course of the year the role played 
by State banks in the economy was scaled down 
significantly. In addition, a political consensus 
was reached on the issue of property rights, 
paving the way for the passage of a bill which is 
2. Economic policy 
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Figure 1 
NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
• Gross domestic product 
m Gross national income 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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expected to resolve pending claims and speed up 
the issuance of land titles. 
(a) Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy-makers sought to complement 
the objectives of monetary authorities by 
adopting measures to help strengthen saving and 
reduce the fiscal deficit. 
Midway through the year, tax reforms were 
introduced which are designed to rectify the tax 
system's structural shortcomings and broaden 
the tax base by eliminating certain discretionary 
powers and reducing the scope of others while at 
the same time establishing a number of tax 
exemptions. 
The central government's current revenues 
rose by 17.5% in real terms, thanks to a brisker 
pace of economic activity, the corrections 
introduced by means of tax reform measures, and 
improvements in tax administration, including 
customs procedures. The tax burden rose to 23% 
of GDP, which was nearly three percentage points 
higher than the year before, with revenues from 
excise taxes and customs duties registering the 
highest growth rates. Receipts of grants and 
donations fell by one third, however, and the 
central government's total revenues and total 
expenditure consequently slipped to 28.5% and 
29.6% of GDP respectively (versus 28.9% and 
30.4% in 1996). Current outlays were up by 6.3% 
in real terms, mainly due to a significant increase 
in interest payments on the foreign debt. 
Meanwhile, capital expenditure was down by 
6%, measured at constant prices, as a 
consequence of delay s in the execution of various 
investment projects caused by the change in 
Administration. As a result, the central 
government's fiscal deficit shrank from 1.5% of 
GDP in 1996 to 1.1% in 1997; the strength of this 
trend is much more apparent if grants and 
donations are excluded from the calculations, 
however, since in that case the decrease was from 
8.4% to 5.2% of GDP. 
Primary saving generated by the NFPS in 1997 
jumped to 12.7% of GDP (from the previous 
year's level of 8.7%). The rise in current saving 
was more modest (from 5.3% to 6.8% of 
GDP)owing to the heavier burden represented by 
interest payments. Thanks to the contraction of 
public-sector capital expenditure, in conjunction 
with the increase in its current surplus, the overall 
NFPS deficit -before grants and donations (14.2% 
of GDP in 1996)- was cut to less than half its 
former level in 1997 (7%), and the amount of 
external financing that was required was 
therefore reduced as well. 
(b) Monetary policy 
The fundamental goal of monetary policy in 
1997 was to ensure the stability of domestic 
prices and external payments. In its efforts to 
fulfill the goals of the country's financial 
programme, the Central Bank of Nicaragua (BCN) 
concentrated on open market operations and the 
management of the legal reserve requirement as 
means of controlling liquidity in the money 
market in the face of voluminous private-capital 
inflows from abroad. In the area of foreign 
exchange policy, the authorities maintained the 
existing crawling-peg regime of pre-announced 
devaluations at a set monthly rate of 1%. 
Total liquidity in the economy (M3) continued 
to soar (54%), primarily due to a striking 55% 
increase in foreign-currency deposits, which 
came to represent three fifths of the total money 
supply. Significant increases were also seen in 
fixed-term deposits denominated in the local 
currency, which doubled, and local-currency 
savings deposits, which grew by 51%. The BCN 
continued to sterilize additional liquidity via the 
sale of negotiable investment certificates known 
as CENis, which are dollar-indexed government 
securities having terms of up to one year. This 
policy also made it possible for the country to 
service its external debt and build up its 
international reserves. 
In mid-year the method of placing CENis on 
the market was changed. The direct sale of these 
securities at a pre-set price was replaced by an 
auction system under which the amount of such 
securities to be placed on the market is 
determined on the basis of the level of excess 
liquidity that needs to be sterilized in order to 
meet the requirements of the country's monetary 
programme. The interest rate is set in the course 
of the auction itself. 
In November the BCN standardized all legal 
reserve requirements, setting the ratio at 17% for 
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Table 1 
NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investmentb 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
National income 











Gross domestic investment 
National savings 
External savings 
Employment and wages 
Open unemployment rate 














































































































































































Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate e 
Real effective exchange rate 
for imports (index: 1990=100) ' 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
Gross debt 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of exports)8 
1689 13 490 866 3.5 19.5 14.4 11.1 12.1 





100.0 92.7 67.9 
689.96 4.27 5.00 
100.0 104.9 106.0 





































































































Money and credit 
Monetary balance 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates 
(annualized, % ) h ' 
Deposit rate (savings accounts) 
Lending rate (short-term) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
1989-1990: thousands of córdobas per dollar; 1991 on: gold córdobas per 
f, r 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. 
dollar, official exchange rate. e Official exchange rate. f Includes Errors and omissions. 8 Refers to net interest as 
h i shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. Interest rates are subject to a provision 
requiring the maintenance of dollar values; therefore, once the nominal interest rate has been adjusted by the index for 
the real effective exchange rate, it equals the real interest rate. For these purposes, the December-December variation 
in this index should be used. ' These figures represent a simple average of the floor and ceiling rates in the State and private 
banking systems. J Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
NICARAGUA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1995 1996 
III IV IV 
1997a 1998" 
II III IV 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 12.1 12.2 8.6 11.1 11.7 12.1 11.9 12.1 9.2 9.5 9.3 7.3 10.9 14.1 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 120.3 125.7 127.8 121.7 124.0 125.0 129.2 128.3 129.5 131.4 135.5 134.0 133.7 133.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Refers to the exchange rate for imports. 
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all claims held by the public, including deposits, 
repurchase agreements and bonds; the net result 
of this measure was a further tightening of the 
money supply. At the same time, the BCN also 
ceased paying interest on all local-currency legal 
reserves. 
Bank placements were apportioned on the 
basis of considerations of risk and rates of 
return; accordingly, portfolio investment in 
financial instruments accounted for the largest 
share of such funds, with 55% of the total. 
Another 30% was used for lending operations, 
which was 16 percentage points more than the 
year before. The balance took the form of 
liquid assets, such as cash holdings in 
commercial banks and finance companies. Net 
credit to the production sector totalled over 
1.15 billion córdobas; this was a rise of nearly 
40% in real terms and was primarily 
attributable to the expansion of net agricultural 
credit. 
(c) Trade policy 
The new Fairness in Taxation and 
Commerce Act passed in mid-1997 makes 
major changes in the foreign trade regime 
which have the effect of making Nicaragua's 
economy more open to the rest of the world. 
In July 1997 the stamp tax was merged with 
the temporary protection tariff (ATP), and the 
implementation of a schedule for the gradual 
reduction of both import duties and the ATP is 
to begin next January. In accordance with this 
timetable, in two years' time the ceiling tariff 
rate on final consumption goods will have 
been brought down to 10% and there will be 
a floor rate of 0% on raw materials, 
intermediate goods and capital goods not 
produced in Central America, with 
intermediate rates of 5% being levied on raw 
materials and intermediate and capital goods 
produced in the subregion. In the case of 
exports, the law provides for a system of 
drawbacks equivalent to 1.5% of f.o.b. 
values, as well as a streamlined scheme of tax 
credits for general value added taxes paid on 
the purchase of inputs and raw materials. 
In September 1997, Nicaragua signed a free 
trade agreement with Mexico. This treaty opens 
up the Mexican market to Nicaraguan exports, 
particularly agricultural goods. For its part, 
Nicaragua is lowering its tariffs on Mexican 
products under the provisions of the Fairness in 
Taxation and Commerce Act. In addition, 
Nicaraguan businessmen will now be able to take 
out loans with Mexican financial institutions, and 
direct investment of Mexican funds in Nicaragua 
will be made easier. 
(d) Structural reforms 
In addition to the implementation of tax and 
trade reforms during the year, the new 
Administration launched a programme to 
restructure and strengthen the financial system. 
In order to reduce the State's involvement in 
the banking sector, steps were taken to close 
down the largest State bank, the Banco 
Nacional de Desarrollo (BANADES), and to hand 
over control of the Banco Nicaragüense de 
Industria y Comercio (BANIC) to the private 
sector. 
In an effort to meet the borrowing 
requirements of small-scale farmers, the 
Government plans to set up a fund that will 
operate as a second-tier institution with the help 
of branch banks, credit unions and 
non-governmental organizations specializing in 
rural finance. 
Midway through the year the financial 
system was strengthened by the passage of a 
reform bill amending the omnibus act that 
governs banks and other financial institutions. 
The new law authorizes such institutions to 
engage in new financial activities, including 
mortgage finance, trust fund administration, 
factoring and leasing. 
As part of the civil service reform programme, 
measures were adopted to overhaul the 
institutional structure of the central government. 
To this end, in late 1997 the Government 
submitted a bill to the National Assembly which 
would, among other initiatives, reduce the 
number of ministries and agencies reporting 




(a) Level of activity 
In what constituted a consolidation of the 
recovery that had begun in 1994, GDP rose by 
5.5% in 1997. Its momentum was associated with 
more vigorous domestic demand, which in turn 
was the outcome of growth in consumption 
(7.6%) and private-sector investment (53.4%). 
This trend was bolstered by an increase in credit 
and a reduction in unemployment, as well as 
higher foreign direct investment and capital 
repatriation. Remittances sent home to family 
members by Nicaraguans living abroad were also 
higher, and these flows helped to strengthen 
domestic purchasing power, as did the substantial 
drop in domestic inflation. Unlike the situation in 
1996, the pace of growth in goods and services 
exports eased back to 4%, while import growth 
remained very strong (13%). 
GDP growth was driven by increases in the 
output of both goods (7.2%) and basic services 
(5.4%), whereas community and government 
services contracted. 
The agricultural sector, which generates 36% 
of GDP and is therefore the most important 
component of the production apparatus, boosted 
its growth rate from 6.6% to 8.5%. With the 
exceptions of sugar cane, bananas and tobacco, 
the production of exportable crops was down. 
Soybeans were the only crop intended for 
domestic consumption that suffered a setback, 
while the sorghum and rice harvests were much 
larger than before. 
The livestock and poultry industries posted 
good results, registering increases in their real 
levels of value added thanks to higher levels of 
output for beef, poultry meat, milk and eggs. 
Fishery activities were also on an upswing, 
chiefly as a consequence of an expansion of 
shrimp production (counting both shrimp caught 
by trawling and those cultivated in shrimp 
farms). Lobster and fish catches turned in 
satisfactory performances as a consequence of an 
increase in fishing fleets. 
Growth in the industrial sector firmed up 
(3.1%, compared with 2.4% the preceding year), 
but continued to lag behind the trend of overall 
GDP. The expansion of this sector was buttressed 
variables 
by upturns in it largest branches, including food 
products, beverages, tobacco, chemicals and 
non-metallic minerals. Taken together, these 
categories generated more than four fifths of the 
country's total industrial output. 
The favourable trends in the production of 
beef, chicken, sugar and fishery products made a 
major contribution to the performance of the food 
industry. The production of beverages slowed as 
a downturn in rum sales caused demand to slip. 
Other products in this category, such as 
carbonated beverages and beer, did well, 
however. 
A strengthening of demand for building 
materials made it possible to maintain the 
momentum of the non-metallic minerals 
industry. Construction receives the largest shares 
of both foreign investment and inflows of 
repatriated capital; a substantial portion of these 
funds are channeled into the construction of new 
hotels, which in turn helps to boost the tourism 
industry. 
The output and value added of mining 
activities (both of metal ores and of non-metallic 
minerals) were higher thanks to investments 
aimed at reactivating a number of mines and 
introducing technological changes. In the mining 
of metallic ores, gold and silver production 
posted substantial increases due to a higher level 
of gold output, which rose to 79,800 troy ounces. 
A 5.6% expansion in the total supply of 
electrical power was made possible by a 
significant increase in gross imports in response 
to an 8.2% reduction in power generation, whose 
most obvious cause was the irregular pattern of 
rainfall caused by El Niño. The sharpest 
increases in demand came from the commercial, 
industrial and residential sectors. 
(b) Prices, wages and employment 
The most outstanding economic policy 
achievement of the year was the reduction of 
inflation to single-digit levels. In 1997 the 
average rate of increase in price levels was 9.2% 
(versus 11.6% in 1996), with the December-
December increase dropping to 7.3% (versus 
12.1% the year before). The maintenance of the 
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existing foreign exchange policy, the efforts 
made to regulate primary liquidity, the 
ratification of the tariff reduction policy and 
plentiful basic grain harvests provided the 
foundations for this moderation of domestic 
prices. 
Average nominal wages kept pace with 
inflation and were thus virtually unchanged in 
real terms. The legal minimum wage, which had 
been frozen since 1991, was revised and updated 
on the basis of a new rate schedule; this schedule, 
which entered into force in November, sets 
wages at levels ranging from 300 to 700 córdobas 
per month. 
The number of employed persons rose by 
5.3%, which was comparable to GDP growth but 
higher than the rate of expansion of the 
economically active population (3%). 
Consequently, open unemployment fell by 
nearly 9%, although it was still quite high 
(13.2%). The 61,000 jobs that were created were 
primarily in agriculture, commerce, 
manufacturing and mining. 
(c) The external sector 
The merchandise trade deficit (f.o.b.) grew by 
45%, since imports expanded (24%) more than 
twice as fast as exports (11%). The trade gap 
widened from nearly 20% to 28% of GDP, but 
despite this deterioration, the current account 
deficit narrowed slightly (from 36% to 35% of 
GDP). However, when unrequited transfers are 
excluded, then the deficit rose from 40% of GDP 
1996 to 42% in 1997. 
Driven by an increase in non-traditional 
exports (24%), most of which are manufactures, 
merchandise exports approached US$ 750 
million. Sales of tobacco products, leather and 
leather products, wood and beverages were 
particularly buoyant. On the other hand, 
traditional exports, which account for around 
45% of the total, dropped back (-0.9%), chiefly 
as a result of a slump in sales of bananas, gold 
and sesame seeds. The value of coffee exports 
climbed by nearly 13% thanks to a rise of more 
than 30% in the average price on international 
markets. Sugar prices, on the other hand, fell by 
11%; nonetheless, a substantial increase in 
shipments (47%) drove up the value of these 
exports by more than 31%. 
Total imports were 22.5% higher than the 
previous year (US$ 1.421 billion in c.i.f. terms) 
owing to the economic upturn, a strengthening of 
private investment and tariff reductions. 
Although this was equivalent to nearly 70% of 
GDP, it is important to point out that the highest 
growth rates were recorded in the intermediate 
and capital goods categories, which form the 
basis for a reactivation of the economy. In 
addition, lower prices for crude oil and petroleum 
products on the international market resulted in a 
smaller import bill for oil, fuels and lubricants. 
In 1997 no significant new borrowing 
occurred, and the outstanding external debt 
balance was therefore kept in the range of US$ 6 
billion. The cost of servicing this debt came to 
about US$ 340 million, up by US$ 100 million. 
This increase in debt service was a result of 
commitments assumed as part of the debt 
rescheduling process carried out in previous 
years. The expiration of the grace period granted 
by the Paris Club in the 1995 renegotiation was 
an additional factor. 
The total cost of servicing the public sector's 
external debt was equivalent to 37% of the value 
of exports of goods and services, which was 
seven percentage points higher than the 
preceding year. However, when the service on 
the private external debt is added to this figure, 
then the coefficient for service payments verges 
on 50%. 
In 1997 the country reached an agreement 
with the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration (CABEI) for the reduction of its 
US$ 560 million outstanding balance with this 
institution. Under this agreement, US$ 100 
million is to be forgiven and another US$ 300 
million is to be retired via the placement of 
United States Treasury zero-coupon bonds; 
grants from the international community will be 
used to pay for these bonds. At the same time, the 
signing of this agreement has made it possible for 
CABEI to resume lending to the private sector. 
At year's end the Government reached an 
agreement with the IMF that will permit the 
signing of a second two-year enhanced structural 
adjustment facility (ESAF) accord. This new 
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programme will give the country access to 
significant amounts of balance-of-payments 
financing. At the same time, the approval of the 
ESAF will have a positive influence on meetings 
with grantor institutions in the run-up to the next 
Consultative Group meeting, at which Nicaragua 
will be seeking US$ 1.2 billion in financing for 
social projects, especially in rural areas, for the 
following three-year period. The new agreement 
with the IMF will also be helpful in the 
negotiations concerning the forgiveness of about 
NICARAGUA 
US$ 200 million in service over a three-year 
period on Nicaragua's bilateral debt with its Paris 
Club creditors. 
Along with the achievement of agreed targets, 
Nicaragua needs to sign the second ESAF in order 
to be eligible for the IMF/World Bank Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. This 
initiative will make it possible for Nicaragua to 
secure debt cancellations which would reduce its 
debt service to the equivalent of less than 20% of 




1. General trends 
The Panamanian economy picked up in 
1997, posting GDP growth of 4.3%. This 
performance, a marked improvement on 
the 2.4% growth recorded in the previous 
year, may be attributed to a number of 
factors: the recovery in re-exports from 
the Colón Free Zone, the upsurge in 
capital expenditure -directed essentially 
to the development of production 
infrastructure- and the expansion in 
private consumption following increases 
in employment, wages and credit. The 
inflation rate, traditionally among the 
lowest in Latin America, was close to zero. 
In general, the business climate improved 
appreciably. Practically all sectors showed an 
upturn compared with 1996. In particular, 
international services, especially trade and 
transport, expanded significantly, while tourist 
spending remained buoyant. The construction 
industry also rebounded owing to port and road 
In 1997, economic policy was directed, on the 
one hand, towards maintaining fiscal balance and 
improving the state of public finances and, on the 
other, towards proceeding with structural 
reforms designed to deepen the country's 
integration in international markets. The 
country's accession to the World Trade 
Organization entailed the adoption of trade 
works. Although the number of ships transiting 
through the Panama Canal was lower because of 
the decline in international trade in basic grains, 
toll rises resulted in higher revenues. On a less 
positive note, the severe drought associated with 
the El Niño phenomenon affected agricultural 
production for the domestic market, while lower 
European demand resulted in further cut-backs in 
banana production. Lack of rainfall also caused 
a reduction in hydroelectricity generation. 
An infrastructure programme was boosted by 
sounder public finances and the renegotiation of 
foreign debt; this programme helped to revitalize 
the economy and facilitated moves into 
international financial markets with the aim of 
restructuring the country's debt on more 
favourable terms. 
Current prospects for economic growth are 
much more promising, above all as a result of the 
positive effects of infrastructure projects in ports 
and on railway and highway systems and the 
concession of Panama Canal facilities and 
services that had reverted to Panamanian control. 
GDP is expected to grow by 5% to 5.5% in 1998, 
that is, at a faster rate than in the three-year period 
1995-1997. 
liberalization commitments and the 
strengthening of mechanisms for countering 
unfair trade practices. Privatization of 
State-owned enterprises led to the institutional 
strengthening of agencies in charge of regulating 
various industries and promoting competition in 
the domestic market. 
2. Economic policy 
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In December, the Government signed an 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) on an enhanced structural adjustment 
facility for the disbursement over a three-year 
period of 120 million special drawing rights 
(SDR), equivalent to approximately US$ 162 
million. The agreement entails economic policy 
commitments and structural reforms, including 
furthr privatizations, tariff cuts and a balanced 
fiscal budget. 
Special mention should be made of the 
activities undertaken to turn to productive use the 
Panama Canal assets transferred in compliance 
with the 1978 Torrijos-Carter Treaty, which 
provides for the return of the Canal to Panama in 
December 1999. In 1997, the Government of 
Panama received from the Government of the 
United States a number of properties, including 
the Albrook air base, the Gorgas hospital and the 
Balboa school. 
(a)Fiscal policy 
In 1997, efforts continued to put central 
government finances on a sound footing and to 
keep public-sector accounts in balance. Despite 
the increase in tax revenues, these accounts 
showed a deficit equivalent to 0.6% of GDP, a 
percentage similar to the average for the period 
1994-1996. 
Boosted by the strong performance of the 
economy, central government current revenue 
grew by 5.6% in nominal terms. Tax revenues 
increased by 10.2% following a sharp increase in 
income tax collections (16.8%). 
Indirect taxes increased in nominal terms as a 
result of an increase in the transfer tax on 
movables (ITBM) (7.9%) and increased receipts of 
import taxes (10.1 %) and excise taxes (5.7%). On 
the other hand, non-tax revenues decreased by 
3.2%, since recent privatizations meant a decline 
in State ownership of utility companies. 
Sales of State-owned enterprises in 1997 
brought in proceeds of approximately US$ 700 
million. The funds were deposited in the 
Development Trust Fund held by the 
Government in the National Bank of Panama. 
Central government outlays increased by 8% 
in 1997. Wage and salary expense rose by 8%, 
purchases of goods and services by 32%. Interest 
payments on public debt amounted to US$ 292 
million, 28% less than in 1996, when major 
foreign debt rescheduling had taken place. 
Outlays for the social sector -mainly for 
education, health, labour and housing- increased 
by 8.3%. 
Public capital expenditure increased 
substantially. Infrastructure works accounted for 
a 48% increase in construction outlays and 
included road works, expansion and 
modernization of hydroelectric installations, 
health and education centres and building of 
low-cost housing. 
Under the external debt renegotiation 
programme, the last instalment due to a United 
States bank was paid off in 1997. The private 
debt rescheduling in 1995-1996 under the Brady 
Plan reopened the country's access to 
international financial markets and improved 
foreign perception of country risk. In 1997, two 
important issues were placed on international 
markets on terms deemed favourable: a US$ 500 
million issue of five-year Eurobonds at a rate of 
7.875% and a US$ 700 million issue of 30-year 
"global bonds" at 8.875%. The proceeds from 
both placements were earmarked for the 
repurchase of Brady bonds, allowing for present 
value savings of just over US$ 100 million and 
an extension of the maturity schedule. 
The country's foreign debt stood at US$ 5,051 
million, US$ 18 million less than at the close of 
1996. As a result of the retirement operations, 
total debt repayments in 1997 increased by close 
to US$ 300 million to US$ 656 million, while 
interest payments totalled US$ 264 million. 
(b)Credit policy and the international 
banking centre 
Operations of the international banking centre 
expanded significantly in 1997 in contrast with 
the contraction recorded in the preceding year. 
The centre's total assets climbed by 7.9% to total 
US$ 36,202 million, owing mainly to an increase 
in the assets of the national banking system 
(9.1%), since those of the banks operating under 
international licence barely expanded by 3% to 
US$ 6,469 million. Deposit-taking in these banks 
was very sluggish (1.5%) and foreign credit 
operations declined (-13.1%). 
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Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100) b 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b Based on constant 1980 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. d Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the 
economically active population (EAP). Includes Errors and omissions. 8 Refers to the external debt contracted by the 
public sector; no adjustment has been made for currency fluctuations. h Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of 
payments, divided by exports of goods and services. 
Deposits taken in by the national banking 
system expanded by 12.6%. Demand deposits 
rose 10.5% and time and savings deposits by 
12.4% owing to attractive interest rates for these 
instruments and their relative liquidity. 
Credit showed greater buoyancy in 1997. 
Loans to the domestic market grew by 9.6%, 
compared with 5.8% in the preceding year. 
Commerce accounted for a larger proportion 
(12.8%), chiefly as a result of the increase in 
imports into the Colón Free Zone. Mortgage 
loans also expanded substantially (11.8%), 
bolstered partly by official housing programmes, 
while consumer loans increased by 15.7%. 
The Panama stock exchange set up in 1990 
maintained a strong bullish trend in 1997. The 
price index and quotations rose by 60%, 
following a 25% increase in 1996. On the other 
hand, the volume of transactions soared by 59%, 
totalling at year-end a market value of US$ 2.2 
billion/ 
A new banking bill was drafted in 1997 and 
submitted to the Legislative Assembly for 
approval in early 1998. This bill amends the 
previous law passed in 1970 and introduces 
major changes in the regulation and supervision 
of the sector to bring it in line with Basel 
standards. 
(c) Trade policy 
In 1997, Panama became a member of the 
World Trade Organization and changed its 
system of tariff and non-tariff protection. 
Specific taxes were replaced by ad valorem taxes 
and, at the same time, quantitative restrictions, 
i.e., prior import licences, quotas and other 
restrictions, such as health regulations and 
official reference prices, were removed. In July, 
certain tariffs were reduced to 10%, and this had 
an impact on bread production and the 
construction industry. Subsequently, in January 
1998, there was a general reduction in tariffs to 
10% or 15%, except for industrial inputs, which 
continued to be subject to a rate of 3%, and for 
products such as rice and some dairy products, 
1 Of the instruments traded on the Panama stock exchange in 1997, 45% were bonds, 22% government securities, 14% 
commercial paper and 8% shares. 
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for which exceptionally high rates of 50% and 
40% respectively were maintained for a 
predetermined period. The average tariff 
therefore remained at 8.6%. 
(d)Structural reform 
In 1997, a number of large State-owned 
enterprises were privatized, including the 
Atlantic and Pacific ports, a 49% stake in the 
national telecommunications company (INTEL), 
the President Remón racecourse, the land 
(a)Economic activity 
Gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 4.3%, 
corresponding to a per capita increase of 2.7%. 
The main boost came from the recovery in 
foreign trade, especially in the Colón Free Zone, 
following a sharp drop in 1996. Consumption 
grew by 6.8%, with similar rises in both the 
public and private components, reflecting 
increases in employment, wages and government 
spending. Capital formation recovered (15%) 
-after plummeting in 1996- thanks to port and 
road infrastructure projects. 
Apart from agriculture, which suffered a 
setback, practically all sectors of the economy 
performed better in 1997. International services 
-trade and transport- were the most buoyant, 
with government services close behind. The 
production sectors, on the other hand, recorded 
lower growth rates in 1997 due to the decline in 
agriculture. 
Panamanian service industries posted gains of 
4.6%, compared with 3.5% growth in 1996. 
Commerce in particular rebounded strongly 
(8.5%) from its downturn in 1995 and 1996. As 
indicated earlier, this trend was due in large 
measure to the strong upturn in activities in the 
Colón Free Zone (15.4%). Wholesale trade grew 
by 4.6% and retail trade by 3.4%, a marked 
improvement on the rates of 1.3% and 1.1% 
recorded a year earlier. 
Transport, storage and communications 
expanded by 4.5% compared with 2.7% in 1996. 
Financial intermediation, on the other hand, 
transport terminals and the Laguna Alta water 
purification plant. Important measures were 
also adopted to ensure that the privatization 
programme would continue in 1998. The 
articles of association of the State-owned water 
resources and electrification company (IRHE) 
were amended to allow for the creation of six 
separate companies, subsequently to be put up for 
sale. 
In addition to trade liberalization, steps were 
taken to prevent dumping, in accordance with the 
rules of the World Trade Organization. 
slowed down considerably, progressing by as 
little as 3.3% in value added compared with 10% 
in the preceding year. 
After three years of extraordinarily dynamic 
growth, total tonnage passing through the 
Panama Canal showed a 4.1% decline in the 
fiscal year ending September 1997, in 
comparison with the year ending September 
1996. Nevertheless, toll receipts grew by 1.4%, 
reflecting the rate increases that took effect in 
January 1997. Both bulk and specialized cargo 
shipments were down. In this connection, it 
should be noted that in 1997 a major 
administrative restructuring of the Panama Canal 
took place; it ceased to be a non-profit agency of 
the United States Government and became a 
market-based enterprise. This new approach is 
reflected in the medium-term plans for expansion 
of the waterway, entailing an investment of 
approximately US$ 1 billion. 
Government services expanded by 3.8%, 
compared with 1.8% in 1996, while the 
goods-producing sectors recorded an expansion 
of 2.1%, compared with a 0.2% drop in 1996. 
Agricultural activity fell by 1.2%, as adverse 
factors, in particular the drought, reduced the 
production of certain farming and livestock 
commodities. Products for domestic 
consumption slumped sharply, especially rice 
(-30%) and corn (-40%). In the former case, a 
reduction in the area under cultivation, combined 
with unfavourable weather conditions, yielded 
lower production figures. Bananas, the main 
export, also declined for the third consecutive 
3. The main variables 
268 
year (-5.6%). Production was adversely affected 
by high winds and drought, which came in the 
wake of weaker international demand due to 
import restrictions by the European Union on 
bananas of Latin American origin. These poor 
results were partly offset by the expansion in the 
production of other items: vegetables and 
legumes (11%), sugar cane (14%) and various 
fruit crops (2.4%). 
Manufacturing rallied (3.6%), after remaining 
virtually at a standstill for two years. In general, 
consumer goods improved their performance. 
Manufactures for the construction industry also 
grew substantially, in particular non-metallic 
minerals (8.8%) and metal products (32.7%). 
Paper and paper products were down by 6.9%, 
while petroleum refining expanded by a mere 
1.7% owing to technical problems at the refinery. 
The construction sector expanded by 5%, in 
contrast with a 4.1 % contraction in 1996. Growth 
was due largely to the dynamism of public 
investment since, according to preliminary 
estimates, there was a slight downturn in private 
construction. Various road development 
projects, including work on the northern corridor, 
interurban roads and improvements to urban road 
systems, together with education and health 
infrastructure projects, gave a strong impetus to 
the construction industry in 1997. 
Lastly, basic services were up 4.3%. In 
particular, net production of electrical energy 
increased by 6%, as a result of a substantial 
expansion in thermal energy, to which the new 
private electricity companies contributed 
significantly; on the other hand, there was a fall 
in hydroelectricity generation (-3.3%) due to the 
drought. On the demand side, consumption by the 
commercial sector increased by 13.4%, 
compared with 4.1% in 1996, as reflected in the 
brisker pace of economic activity. 
(b)Prices, wages and employment 
Consumer prices in Panama City declined 
by 0.5%. Clothing and footwear prices were 
down (-2%), while those of food and beverages 
rose by slightly less than the average (0.7%). The 
cost of a basket of staple foods declined as prices 
of various products fell: legumes -15.5%, rice 
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-3.8% and fresh vegetables including greens 
-0.1%. 
Wholesale prices declined by 1.7% in 
September compared with the same month of the 
preceding year. Imports and industrial products 
were cheaper (-3.4% and -0.4% respectively); on 
the other hand, prices of agricultural products 
rose by 0.6%. 
The upturn in economic activity led to a 
significant increase in employment. According to 
the information provided by household surveys, 
the employed population had grown by 5.1% in 
August compared with the same period a year 
earlier, while the open unemployment rate had 
declined from 14.3% to 13.2% during the same 
period. The sectors generating the most jobs were 
construction and wholesale trade. In this last 
sector, employment rose by 2.9% compared with 
1996. 
Wage increases were granted in various 
sectors, 5.2% in manufacturing and wholesale 
trade, 1.4%, in retail trade and 1.2% in hotels and 
restaurants. 
(c)The external sector 
After a sluggish performance in the previous 
year due to setbacks in the Colón Free Zone, 
Panama's trade picked up considerably in 1997. 
The balance-of-payments current account deficit 
widened to US$ 343 million. Nevertheless, the 
financial account yielded a surplus of US$ 821 
million, which was reflected in an increase in net 
international reserves of the order of US$ 575 
million. 
Total merchandise trade, including both 
locally manufactured goods and re-exports, 
expanded significantly, amounting to US$ 14 
billion, a complete reversal of the contraction in 
the previous year. Total merchandise exports 
were up 13% and imports expanded at a similar 
rate, leading to a deficit of US$ 701 million on 
the merchandise trade account. 
After two meagre years, re-exports from the 
Colón Free Zone bounced back, marking a 13.7% 
increase over the performance of the previous 
year to stand at US$ 5,832 million. This followed 
a recovery in the economic situation of its 
principal Latin America clients and the 
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reinstatement in late 1996 of the previous tax 
system applied to firms operating in the zone. 
Domestically-produced exports totalled 
US$ 657 million, a figure 15% higher than that 
of 1996. This was attributable to the increase in 
sales of shrimp (28%), coffee (19%) and sugar 
(27%), and to the substantial increase in exports 
offish meal (105%), fish oils and fats (474%) and 
beef (42.5%). On the other hand, banana sales 
declined by 2.3%. 
Goods imported on a c.i.f. basis (cost, 
insurance, freight) into the Colón Free Zone 
amounted to US$ 5,513 million, 18% higher than 
the 1996 figure, which had represented a 10% 
decrease. This upswing is attributable to the 
recovery in re-exports and restocking. Moreover, 
imports for the domestic market expanded by 
4.2% for a total of US$ 2,655 million. 
Services yielded a positive balance bordering 
on US$ 400 million (US$ 120 million less than 
in 1996) as a result of the rapid growth of imports 
(19%) and hence transport services. Factor 
income showed a negative balance of US$ 201 
million, compared with US$ 120 million in 1996. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) climbed from 
US$ 237 million in 1996 to US$ 1,030 million, 
largely as a result of proceeds from the 
privatization of the telephone company INTEL, 




1. Recent trends 
In 1997, the Paraguayan economy began 
to revive, recording 2.6% growth. 
However, per capita GDP remained at the 
same level as in the previous year. A 
recovery in the important agricultural 
sector sustained a moderate increase in 
domestic spending, although in a general 
context of financial instability and 
stagnant foreign trade. 
A much larger soybean harvest more than 
compensated for a further reduction in the cotton 
crop, affected by bad weather conditions, and 
resulted in the agricultural sector posting a 
satisfactory performance. This permitted a slight 
increase in private consumption and heavier 
government spending, in spite of which the 
public accounts again showed a surplus, although 
a smaller one than in 1996. 
The increased supply of agricultural products 
helped keep the rise in consumer prices to its 
lowest level in two decades. Also contributing to 
this result, which was better than expected, were 
the continuing relatively stable exchange rate and 
efficient sterilization of the increased liquidity 
injected into the system by the monetary 
authorities in order to rescue financial institutions 
in trouble. 
The main goal of economic policy was to make 
further progress in bringing down inflation. To 
The banking crisis which began in 1995 grew 
worse and the Government was obliged to 
intervene in the administration of the country's 
two largest banking institutions. The 
predicament of the banking sector, forthcoming 
controversial presidential elections and agents' 
lack of trust in the stability of the currency of 
Paraguay's main trading partner, Brazil, put 
downward pressure on the guaraní, especially 
towards the end of the year. Exchange operations 
and the heavy current account deficit of around 
7% of GDP, which was not offset by capital flows, 
eroded the international reserves, to the extent 
that the Central Bank decided to allow the 
exchange rate to depreciate as of December 1997. 
The financial and exchange rate situation 
deteriorated in the following months. At the end 
of May 1998, the guaraní had fallen in value by 
almost 20% compared with five months earlier, 
whereas the target set for the entire year was 9%. 
This led to a further round of inflation: the 
accumulated inflation rate had reached 12% by 
July, five percentage points higher than the 
official target for the whole of 1998. 
In the meantime, the monetary authorities 
announced the closure and liquidation of two 
banks in which they had intervened in 1996. On 
the other hand, there are encouraging prospects 
in the agricultural sector, which would allow the 
Paraguayan economy to continue to grow, in 
spite of the precarious situation of the banking 
sector. 
this end, the Government strove to narrow the 
fiscal deficit and the monetary authorities to keep 
2. Economic policy 
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the exchange rate stable and restrict the 
expansion of liquidity resulting from the 
aggravation of the 1995 financial crisis. 
These targets were met at the cost of eroding 
international reserves. At the end of 1997, they 
fell to their lowest level since 1994. Economic 
instability, the deteriorating international 
economic situation and political uncertainty 
associated with forthcoming confrontational 
presidential elections combined to make it 
impossible to maintain the value of the currency 
in the face of a wave of speculation. 
The situation grew worse during the first 
quarter of 1998 and the Central Bank therefore 
had to review its depreciation and inflation 
targets for the year. Half-way through the year, it 
became obvious that, unlike in 1997, monetary 
policy would not be propped up by fiscal policy, 
since the fiscal accounts of both the public sector 
and the central administration were, predictably, 
deteriorating, because of larger disbursements to 
implement investment plans. 
(a)Fiscal policy 
The central Government managed to reduce 
the size of its cash deficit from 0.8% of GDP in 
1996 to 0.2% in 1997,' mainly on the basis of an 
upturn in revenues. Government savings 
increased to 3% of GDP and the primary deficit 
recorded in 1996 (0.3%) became a small surplus. 
The increase in revenues of around half a 
percentage point of GDP was basically accounted 
for by non-tax income in the form of royalties 
from the Itaipu and Yacyretá binational 
hydroelectric plants. The moderate upswing in 
consumption and rises in the price and in taxes 
on the consumption of petroleum-based products 
resulted in increased indirect tax revenue. 
Expenditures decreased slightly because of a 
cut-back in current disbursements. This was 
achieved by setting quarterly spending quotas for 
the government agencies and was facilitated by 
integrated resource-management systems. 
Outlays on consumption declined, although 
wages, which constitute the bulk of this item, 
1 This figure does not include payments made in 1997 for 
included, the government deficit would increase to 1 % of 
would consequently show a slight deficit. 
increased as aresult of pay rises for civil servants. 
Capital investment, financed by bonds and 
external financing, recovered strength. 
The cash surplus for the public sector as a 
whole shrank to 0.5% of GDP, owing to a 
deterioration equivalent to two percentage points 
in the operating balance of State enterprises. 
Their revenues were below forecast levels, while 
implementation of their investment projects 
meant that their capital expenditure more than 
doubled. 
It is anticipated that, for the first time during 
the 1990s, the public sector will post a deficit in 
1998, owing to planned increased investments. 
The central administration also expects that its 
deficit will widen, because of higher personnel 
costs and investments and because tax rates will 
be maintained at their current level, after being 
adjusted the previous year. 
(b)Monetary and foreign exchange rate 
policy 
The delicate financial situation grew worse in 
1997 and dominated monetary policy. The 
expansionary effects of the increase in net 
domestic credit had to be offset by operations on 
the open and foreign exchange markets. 
The financial crisis entered into its third year 
and in mid-1997 became more acute. The 
monetary authorities managed to prevent the 
problem spreading to the system as a whole by 
means of direct intervention. The Central Bank 
had to implement a rescue plan for two banks and 
five financial institutions, including the largest 
national bank and the largest financial institution 
in the country. Loans to the banking system as a 
whole increased by more than 30% in 1997, 
amounting to the equivalent of 6% of GDP. The 
main reason for this was the increased number of 
loans made under the plan established for the 
rescue of financial institutions and the 
recapitalization of banks in trouble. There was 
also a 70% increase in loans by the banking 
security network to financial institutions with 
temporary liquidity problems. In addition, net 
to suppliers incurred in fiscal year 1996. If these payments were 
and the non-financial public sector's financial results for 1997 
273 
Table 1 
PARAGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997a 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National savings 
Externai savings 
Employment and wages 
Labour force participation rate ' 
Unemployment ratee 






Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(guaraníes per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
Gross debt 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 




























































Percentages of GDP 
22.9 24.3 22.3 
19.6 18.3 10.8 



















Millions of dollars 












































































































96.1 99.8 106.6 
1971 2 063 2 191 


















































































Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Money and credit 
Monetary balance of 
banking system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
Deposit rate 
Lending rate 
Equivalent interest rate 











1990 1991 1992 






























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. Based on constant 1980 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. d Percentages of the working-age population in Asunción. From 1994, urban 
population nationwide. e Percentages of the economically active population (EAP). Up to 1993, this figure refers to 
the Asunción metropolitan area. Figures for 1994 and the following years refer to urban areas nationwide. Includes 
Errors and omissions. 8 Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and 
services. Figures for 1990-1992 are December-December rates; figures for 1993-1994 are annual averages. ' Interest 
rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
PARAGUAY: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
Consumer prices (nationwide) 
(12-month variation, %) 
Registered exports 
(millions of dollars) 
Registered imports 
(millions of dollars) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 





1995 1996 1997a 
II III IV I n III IV i ii m IV 
1998a 
I II 
14.3 14.9 12.2 10.5 11.1 9.7 9.8 8.2 8.7 7.9 5.9 6.2 6.6 10.8 
176 272 282 190 214 357 279 199 207 393 296 192 218 366 
636 685 779 696 582 615 683 778 687 643 713 915 545 545 
95.6 95.8 93.2 92.2 89.9 89.4 90.3 90.8 88.2 87.2 88.1 90.7 97.4 102.2 
5.8 12.1 17.1 11.1 -0.9 14.1 12.1 14.0 -6.2 12.4 15.6 9.8 -26.7 
12.8 21.4 28.1 22.1 9.5 25.8 26.1 27.4 4.3 24.6 32.4 21.6 -18.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a b 
Preliminary figures. Refers to the rate of exchange for imports. 
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lending to the non-financial public sector grew, 
central government deposits being used to cover 
the deficit. And foreign currency debts expressed 
in local currency also increased, owing to the 
slight depreciation of the guaraní. 
The Central Bank had recourse to operations 
on the open market in order to sterilize excess 
liquidity. During the first six months of 1997, 
the terms of most placements varied between 
one week and three months, at slightly lower 
rates (around 11%) than in 1996, in order to 
avoid harmful effects on the economy. The 
financial situation deteriorated in the third 
quarter and the Bank started to float larger 
amounts of monetary regulation instruments 
for terms of up to 12 months and with higher 
average rates of up to 14%. At the end of 1997, 
these flotations declined, because the general 
uncertainty had repercussions on the exchange 
rate and gave rise to renewed demand for foreign 
currency. At the end of December, the balance of 
these flotations was 40% higher than one year 
earlier. 
Monetary regulation instrument issues with 
moderate yields proved unable to absorb all the 
liquidity injected into the system during the 
second and third quarters of 1997 or to restrain 
the rise in the exchange rate. The Central Bank 
therefore opted to intervene actively in exchange 
operations as a net seller of currency during the 
remaining quarters. As a result of this decision, 
by the end of 1997, the level of its international 
reserves had fallen to US$ 800 million, or the 
equivalent of just over two months of imports, a 
situation which led the Bank to relax its 
interventionist policy as of 9 December 1997. 
Economic agents reacted to this measure by 
increasing their demand for dollars, in view of the 
gloomy picture presented by the financial crisis 
and fears that the Brazilian real would be 
devalued. The interventions of 1997 resulted in 
an increase of some 6% in the nominal exchange 
rate and a slight real appreciation of the 
Paraguayan currency. 
These operations overall translated into a 
7.5% expansion of the monetary base in 1997, 
more than double the increase recorded the 
previous year. In turn, monetary supply, Ml, 
expanded by 14%. 
The increase in money meant that the cost 
of borrowing continued to fall. Effective rates 
for on-sight deposits in local currency dropped 
significantly. Yields on term deposits and 
savings certificates also declined, in line with 
the rates for monetary regulation instruments. 
Lending rates in local currency did not fall to 
the same extent. Nonetheless, the rate for 
personal loans was 20% lower on average than 
at the end of the previous year. Lending and 
borrowing rates in dollars went down only very 
slightly. 
Depositors' lack of confidence in the financial 
system and the decline in interest rates on guaraní 
operations meant that the rate of growth (6%) of 
M2, which includes quasi-money in local 
currency, lagged behind that of money supply. 
The preference for foreign currency was 
reflected in the 12% increase in the broad 
monetary aggregate, M3. 
The exchange and financial situation of 
Paraguay deteriorated during the first quarter of 
1998. The Central Bank began to sell foreign 
currency once again and as a result its reserves 
fell below US$ 750 million. In view of the extent 
of this erosion, the monetary authorities decided 
to raise the average rates on regulatory 
instruments to more than 20% and to issue these 
instruments on short terms, mostly of between 7 
and 45 days, as a measure to strengthen the 
weakened guaraní. However, at the end of the 
first quarter, the currency had depreciated 11% 
compared with its value at the end of 1997, 
whereas the target for the entire year had been 
only 9%. It was hoped that seasonal 
strengthening of exports during the second 
quarter would reverse this trend. At the end of the 
first quarter, the closure and liquidation of the 
two banks in which there had previously been 
intervention was decreed. 
(c) Trade policy 
Important progress was made in 1997 towards 
strengthening the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur) customs union. At the end of the year 
it was agreed to adopt measures to eliminate 
non-tariff barriers, a process which would now 
include the service sector, as well as merchandise 
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trade. Agreement was also reached on facilitating 
the participation of construction firms in member 
countries' public tenders. 
There was, however, a slight delay in the 
timetable for reducing tariffs. In order to 
address the possible effects of the Asian crisis 
on the trade balance of the Mercosur partners, 
it was agreed to raise the common external 
(a)Economic activity 
After a meagre 1 % increase the previous year, 
the economic growth rate quickened to 2.6% in 
1997, thanks to strengthened domestic demand 
as a result of the upturn in agricultural 
production. External demand for domestic 
goods again contracted, while imports remained 
stagnant. Gross national income recovered, 
assisted by considerably improved terms of 
trade. 
Private consumption expanded by a little more 
than two percentage points and served as the 
basis for the moderate recovery in absorption. 
The rate of expansion of government 
consumption slowed from 10% to 4%. Gross 
investment rebounded 3%, after a sharp fall in the 
previous fiscal year. 
After virtually stagnating in the previous 
season, the agricultural sector was the strongest 
in the whole economy. It grew by 4%, mainly 
because of the soybean crop, which for the third 
year in a row was unprecedentedly large, with 
similar prospects for a fourth year. The cotton 
crop, on the other hand, again gave very poor 
yields (-60%) because bad weather conditions 
resulted in a smaller area being sown. 
The production of other goods also recovered. 
Industrial output, chiefly of agroindustrial 
products, continued to grow slowly (2%). 
Construction expanded (3%) for the seventh 
consecutive year. 
The basic services sector, used to average 
annual growth rates of around 6%, was affected 
by a decline in potable water and sanitation 
services and by a marked slow-down in 
electricity supply, so that its total growth fell to 
only 2%. 
tariff; this resulted in an increase in the average 
tariff of Paraguay from 14% to 17%. However, 
the Government decided to exclude from this 
measure tariffs on capital goods and on 
telecommunication,computerandmotorvehicle 
products, as well as the 399 exceptions that will 
converge in the common external tariff by the 
year 2006. 
The remaining services also posted mediocre 
results (2% growth). Among them, trade 
advanced to some extent under the impetus of 
agricultural production, after declining in 1996. 
Preliminary figures for the 1998 cotton 
harvest suggest that it will be of a similar level to 
two seasons ago, thanks to improved yields and 
the larger areas sown. Soybean production is 
expected to perform well again and will help the 
economy grow by 3%, and thus meet government 
projections. 
(b)Prices and wages 
The moderate increase in consumption, a 
relatively stable exchange rate, the increased 
supply of agricultural products and a 
private-sector campaign to reduce supermarket 
and other retail shop prices combined to restrict 
the increase in the consumer price index to 6.2% 
in the 12 months ending in December 1997. This 
was two percentage points less than in the 
previous year and the lowest for two decades. 
Prices of the tradable items (food, clothing and 
footwear) comprising two thirds of the basic 
basket went up by between 3% and 4%, while 
those of other items (housing, health services, 
transport and education) increased from 9% to 
11%. 
However, inflation took off again at the 
beginning of 1998, so much so that the 
accumulated increase in the first seven months of 
the year was as high as 12.1% (12.8% in the 
previous 12 months), as a result of seasonal 
increases in the prices of food and educational 
services and because of exchange rate pressures. 
The Central Bank target had been for price 
increases not to exceed 7% for 1998 as a whole. 
3. The main variables 
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Real average wages decreased by half 
a percentage point in 1997 because wages 
in the manufacturing industry, transport, 
communications and services rose at a rate equal 
to or lower than the consumer price index. On the 
other hand, nominal wages in the construction, 
basic services and trade sectors increased by 
more than 9%. The minimum wage was 
readjusted 10% upwards in January 1997, 
resulting in a real improvement of 5% compared 
with the 1996 average, and 12% in March 1998, 
to just over US$ 232 a month at the prevailing 
exchange rate. 
(c)The external sector 
At the end of 1997, the balance-of-payments 
deficit amounted to more than US$ 200 million, 
five times that recorded in 1996. Larger capital 
flows did not compensate for the heavy 
imbalance in the current account, which caused 
a sharp reduction in the international reserves. 
The current account deficit widened to 7% of 
GDP as a result of a large increase in the trade 
deficit to the equivalent of 15% of GDP. Capital 
inflows went up by 12%, to the equivalent of 3% 
of GDP, thanks to a massive influx of direct 
foreign investment, mainly directed to the 
forestry and soybean sectors and the binational 
hydroelectric plants. The balance under the 
heading of errors and omissions, associated with 
short-term capital inflows, was halved, possibly 
in reaction to the fall in interest rates and the 
unstable financial situation. 
The total value of exports declined 5%, owing 
to fewer re-exports and a drop in unregistered 
exports, which together accounted for 60% of the 
total. This decline is explained by new 
restrictions on border trade with Brazil. 
Registered exports stayed at almost the same 
level as in the previous year, since the large 
increase (37%) in the value of soybean exports 
did not make up for the decline in cotton fibre 
exports to only one third of their value in 1996. 
The most important destination for cotton fibre 
exports, accounting for 50% of the total, was 
Mercosur, with Brazil importing by far the 
largest share. 
Imports also declined somewhat, with a 
reduction in unregistered imports intended for 
re-export, which represented 30% of the total. 
Registered imports especially of consumer 
goods, mostly non-durables, increased (4%). 
Imports of intermediate goods fell by 18%, 
because of reduced purchases of other products, 
not counting fuels. Capital goods imports 
remained at their previous level. The only import 
category which recorded an increase was 
transport equipment. Half of all imports were 
from the Mercosur countries, two thirds of that 
share from Brazil. Services also lost momentum, 
affected by the declining numbers of "tourists" 
involved in cross-border trade, interest having 
waned because of limits on purchases imposed 
by the Brazilian authorities. 
The external debt grew by 7%, to the 
equivalent of 15% of GDP. Almost all of it was 
accounted for by public-sector commitments, the 
central Government being the main debtor, with 
three fifths of the total, followed by State 
enterprises, with one quarter. The continuous 
increase in the size of the external debt over the 
past five years is giving rise to concern. It reflects 
larger public project commitments, and has been 
aggravated by the depreciation of the local 
currency. International bodies, especially the 
Inter-American Development Bank, continue to 
be the main creditors, accounting for 60% of the 




1. General trends 
The Peruvian economy's performance 
has been in keeping with the economic 
model being implemented since 1990, 
which has included major structural 
reforms anda stabilization policy that has 
remained in place since the model's 
inception. Over the past five years, the 
economy has grown at an average rate of 
7.5% per annum, while inflation has 
exhibited a downward trend, coming in at 
single-digit figures. The economy has 
continued to suffer from weaknesses in 
the external sector and on the 
employment front, however. Against 
this backdrop, the Peruvian economy in 
1997 exceeded initial expectations, 
posting growth of over 7%; this was 
an improvement upon the modest 
performance recorded the previous year, 
when the Government's adjustment 
policy had been a dominant factor. The 
trend in inflation was also very positive, 
with the annualized rate falling to 6.5% 
by December. 
The Asian crisis had virtually no impact on 
Peru's economy in 1997, but El Niño caused both 
fishery exports and agricultural production to 
drop sharply in the final quarter of the year, as 
well as being responsible for serious damage to 
infrastructure. The national employment rate 
rose on the strength of GDP growth; the period 
saw a continuation of the trend towards higher 
employment in commerce and services, but job 
growth in manufacturing remained sluggish. 
Macroeconomic policy played a somewhat 
contractionary role in terms of fiscal expenditure, 
while monetary policy was in step with the 
speed-up in the rate of GDP growth. The 
non-financial public sector recorded a surplus of 
close to 1% of GDP thanks to reductions in both 
current and capital expenditure. The fact that this 
surplus was lower than it had been the year before 
was attributable to the downturn in privatization 
revenues, which decreased by the equivalent of 
around 2.5% of GDP. 
The expansion in total liquidity was 
attributable to the marked increase in 
foreign-currency credit. In keeping with the pace 
of GDP growth (7%) and the slowdown in 
inflation, monetary policy, which influences 
local-currency monetization ratios, was used to 
sterilize part of the rise in international reserves. 
The expansion in demand did not translate into 
inflationary pressures thanks to the country's 
greater import capacity and the stability of the 
real exchange rate. Another influential force in 
terms of stabilization was the impact of 
supply-related factors, such as the decreases seen 
in fuel and import prices, which were especially 
marked in the case of foodstuffs. 
The balance of trade showed very positive 
results during the first six months, thanks to the 
upswing in fishery exports that was registered 
despite the effects of El Niño, and the trade deficit 
thus shrank by US$ 200 million. This drop, 
together with a slight decrease in financial 
servicing, made it possible to reduce the current 
account deficit to 5.2% of GDP. Quite apart from 
the privatization process, foreign direct 
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Figure 1 
PERU: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
• Gross domestic product 
m Gross national income 
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Ü Consumer prices 
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I Central government balance 
¡Current account balance 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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investment has continued to expand vigorously, 
and its role in financing the balance-of-payments 
current account has consequently grown 
significantly. 
In 1997, the successful renegotiation of the 
external debt with the Paris Club and the signing 
of an agreement with international banks under 
the Brady Plan enabled Peru to bring its external 
debt service into line with its economy's payment 
capacity and to regain access to external credit 
flows. This renegotiation was instrumental in 
lowering Peru's external debt by the equivalent 
of more than 10% of GDP. 
The devastating effects of El Niño carried 
over into the first quarter of 1998, sharply 
reducing the country ' s growth prospects for the 
year. As a consequence, the economy is 
expected to be sluggish during the first six 
Despite cutbacks in public spending, 
macroeconomic policy ultimately had an 
expansionary effect in 1997, since monetary 
policy-makers did not seek to sterilize the 
sharp increase registered in credit to the private 
sector; this expansion of credit was derived 
from the short-term capital flows generated by 
borrowing from the private international 
banking system. 
(a) Fiscal policy 
Judging from the net financial balance, fiscal 
policy was clearly contractionary until the third 
quarter. Quarterly figures for central government 
spending showed a major downturn in current 
expenditure (especially in the second quarter), 
which was down by 2.5% of GDP with respect to 
the preceding year. Current revenue held steady 
at 14% of GDP. 
Even though public spending was increased 
towards the end of the year in order to cope with 
the damage that El Niño was expected to cause, 
central government accounts (excluding 
privatization receipts) were nearly balanced 
(-0.8% compared to -1.5% in 1996). 
Unlike previous years, capital receipts from 
privatizations were quite meagre (0.9% of GDP 
months of the year, but should pick up in the 
second half. The urgent need to repair or 
replace damaged roadway infrastructure will 
boost public spending on investment. The 
steep decrease in fishery activities and the 
low prices that minerals (particularly copper) 
are expected to fetch have led forecasters to 
project slower export growth in 1998, which 
will hamper efforts to rein in the trade deficit. 
El Niño also had an impact on prices, 
especially of foodstuffs, which drove up the 
inflation rate. Thus, in April, cumulative 
inflation stood at 4%, twice the figure 
recorded the year before. 
The Asian crisis, for its part, led to the 
suspension of a number of large mining projects, 
thus raising doubts as to the medium-term 
outlook for mining exports. 
versus 3.5% in 1996), and this was the main 
reason why the surplus posted by the 
non-financial public sector was so much 
smaller in 1997 (0.8% of GDP, down from 
2.4%). 
(b)Monetary and foreign exchange policy 
Given the economy's high degree of 
dollarization (only 34% of total liquidity was 
in local currency), monetary policy had fairly 
little manoeuvring room. Nonetheless, 
government actions with respect to primary 
money creation have had a strong impact on 
nominal domestic demand, since wages and 
private consumption expenditure are both in 
local currency. 
In order to help offset the marked expansion 
in domestic credit fueled by foreign exchange 
inflows, during the first half of the year the 
authori t ies held the expansion of 
local-currency monetary aggregates to the 
slow rates of growth they had exhibited in 
1996. This trend was reversed in July, 
however, when the rate of primary money 
creation picked up, bringing the cumulative 
increase for the year to 16% (four percentage 
points higher than the year before). 
2. Economic policy 
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Table 1 
PERU: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
National income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National savings 
External savings 
Employment and wages 
Labour force participation rate 












































































































































































Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate E 
(new soles per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
for imports (index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
Gross debt (as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 





Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 




114.5 100.0 115.2 111.1 
Growth rates 







































































































































































































Table 1 (conclusion) 
PERU 
Money and credit 
Monetary balance of banking 
system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To non-financial public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 




Real interest rates (annualized) 
Deposit rate 
Lending rate 
Equivalent interest rate 















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Note: The growth rates given for 1990 under the heading "Money and credit" have been revised since the pubication of the 
Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, ¡994-1995, 
* Preliminary figures. Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each aggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of that same 
aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the economically active 
population (EAP). Up to 1994, refers to Lima. From 1995 on, refers to the nationwide urban total. Private-sector workers in 
Lima. 8 For 1989, the exchange rate is expressed in new soles per US$1000. Includes Errors and omissions. 'Refers 
to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. ' Up to 1990, these figures 
are expressed in thousands of new soles. Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
PERU: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1995 1996 1997" 1998a 
III IV III IV III IV 
Gross domestic product 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) b 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 
Real effective exchange ratec 
(index: 1990=100) 
Exports 
(millions of dollars) 
Imports 
(millions of dollars) 





(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 
Central government 
financial balance 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net international reserves 
(millions of dollars) 
12.8 8.7 6.8 1.2 0.3 2.5 2.1 4.9 5.7 9.0 7.4 6.5 
11.9 11.1 10.0 10.2 11.6 11.0 11.7 11.8 9.3 9.5 8.1 6.5 
87.6 90.6 86.7 85.9 85.3 85.2 86.2 89.0 88.5 88.1 85.5 85.6 
1293 1359 1498 1442 1427 1459 1494 1517 1602 1852 1770 1571 
1797 1907 2026 2031 1792 2010 2 040 2055 1930 2 133 2281 2217 
-3.1 -1.5 1.9 0.7 -6.8 1.4 -0.5 0.1 2.6 1.0 4.8 6.1 
22.2 22.5 26.2 23.4 12.7 20.9 18.0 18.9 21.9 20.2 23.9 25.8 
57.1 39.9 25.8 23.5 10.5 I5.Í 15.6 17.8 24.2 19.8 22.0 16.7 
-2.2 -1.3 -2.1 -1.0 -0.9 0.1 -1.0 -3.5 0.6 1.8 -1.3 -4.4 



















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on figures expressed in the local currency at constant prices. Refers to the exchange rate for imports. 
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The variation in money creation, which 
amounted to 1.4 billion new soles, was external 
in origin and was not completely sterilized by the 
securities issued by the Central Reserve Bank of 
Peru and the increase in public-sector and Banco 
de la Nación deposits. This made it possible for 
GDP to grow by 7% while inflation was held to a 
similar level. 
The monetization ratio (MI/GDP) remained 
unchanged at 3%, but total liquidity expanded by 
more than one point of GDP to 19%. The 
dollarization of the economy continued apace, 
with the share of local-currency monetary 
aggregates falling to one third. Credit to the 
private sector rose by 3% of GDP owing to an 
increase in short-term external capital flows. 
The interest rate spread between 
local-currency bank loans and deposits 
remained at a very high 20%, which was quite 
similar to the figure for the preceding year. The 
real local-currency lending rate reversed its 
downward trend of recent years, rising to 23%. 
Because the economy is so heavily dollarized, 
however, local-currency rates mainly 
influence consumption, while foreign-
currency rates are more relevant when 
evaluating corporate borrowing costs. At an 
average rate of 15.6% between September 
and December, the foreign-currency rate fell 
by one percentage point with respect to 1996. 
This provided a further indication that the 
Asian crisis has had no more than a limited 
impact on the country's commercial banking 
system. 
In the area of foreign exchange policy, the 
authorities continued to implement a managed 
float of the currency, and the exchange rate 
therefore kept in close step with inflation. The 
real exchange rate for the dollar held steady, 
while the real rate as measured on the basis of the 
price indices of Peru's seven main trading 
partners showed an abrupt decline of almost 3% 
compared to 1996. 
The positive performance of Peru's stock 
exchange ended in July with the onset of the crisis 
in Asia. The general index of the Lima Stock 
Exchange plunged by 18% in real terms, and the 
downswing was of a similar magnitude when 
expressed in dollar terms. The stock market 
began to rebound late in the first quarter of 1998, 
however. 
(c) Trade policy 
A policy package that had taken several years 
to develop and whose chief aim was to boost the 
competitiveness of Peru's exports was finally 
implemented in 1997. In April, the average tariff 
rate applying to most imported goods was 
lowered from 16% to 13%. This meant that the 
rates applying to some 97% of all import items 
under the country's two-tiered regime 
(previously rates were 15% and 25%) were 
reduced to 12%. In order to provide greater 
effective protection for some producers, in 1997 
a 5% surtax was levied on goods deemed to be 
"sensitive"; in addition, the specific duty 
introduced in 1991 on imports of 20 agricultural 
products was raised from 20% to 25%. The net 
result of these measures was a reduction in the 
average tariff rate. 
(d) Structural reforms 
There were no major developments in the area 
of structural reform in 1997. The privatization 
process has been losing momentum for several 
years now, and 1997 saw a continuation of this 
trend. The Government's privatization 
programme earned it just US$ 143 million in 
receipts from abroad, sharply down on the figure 
of US$ 1.7 billion posted for 1996. Sales of 
equity in public-sector enterprises tapered off 
primarily as a result of institutional and political 
problems. Among the latter, a heated public 
debate arose in 1997 regarding the impact on the 
population of steep hikes in electricity rates and 
fuel prices following privatization. In response, 
the Government introduced changes in the use of 
operating contracts as a form of privatization in 
the oil and gas sector, and Congress passed Act 
No. 26844, under which the State will hold 
"golden shares" in such companies that will give 
it a say in their administration. 
In the power sector, plans to auction off two 
generating plants -EGASA and EGESUR- were put 
on hold pending the enactment of new regulatory 
provisions concerning monopolies in power 
generation and distribution markets. The 
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programme under which infrastructure operating 
contracts were to be awarded was postponed as 
well, owing to a lack of consensus within 
government ranks. 
In an effort to enhance the benefits 
available to members of the civil service 
(40% of whom are now retired), as part of the 
The upturn in economic growth seen during 
1997 was spearheaded by construction, metallic 
mineral production and other non-primary 
processing industries, even though the pace of 
growth in the latter dropped off sharply during 
the second half of the year as a consequence of 
El Niño. Meanwhile, the downward trend in 
inflation firmed up, with a cumulative rate up to 
December 1997 of 6.5%, which was the lowest 
to be recorded in the past 25 years. At the 
beginning of 1997, the Government had set itself 
the goal of stabilizing the country's 
balance-of-payments current account position at 
5% of GDP, and it succeeded in reaching that 
target thanks to a marked upsurge in exports, 
particularly during the first six months of the 
year. 
(a)Economic activity 
The upswing in domestic demand that had 
begun in the second half of 1996 peaked at 
9.4% in the third quarter of 1997. This brought 
the overall expansion in demand for the year to 
8%, which exceeding initial expectations. 
More than four percentage points of this 
increase can be attributed to the trend in gross 
domestic investment, which was spurred on by 
the behaviour of private economic agents in 
particular. Consumption grew more slowly 
than GDP, which was in keeping with the fact 
that the increase in employment was 
concentrated in poorly-paid activities, while 
real wages stagnated. Aggregate demand 
jumped by 10%; three points of this increase 
were attributable to higher exports, with a 
further three points due, once again, to 
investment, whose share of GDP rose to 30%. As 
privatization process the Government put 
forward a proposal to create a Public Savings 
MutualFund(FMAP) using a block of shares in 
privatized companies that the State still owns. 
The first stage of the plan calls for 
transferring US$ 500 million, out of a 
possible total of US$ 1.3 billion, to the FMAP. 
a result, these two sectors took the lead in 
stimulating economic growth. 
With respect to the financing of investment, 
it is interesting to note that the public sector 
made the greatest saving effort, increasing its 
share of savings by 1.5% of GDP; consequently, 
the domestic savings ratio reached 23.0% of 
GDP, while the external savings ratio dropped 
to 5.9%. 
An analysis of the contribution made by the 
various sectors to GDP growth (7.7%) shows that 
construction was the best performer. This 
sector's 20% expansion was fuelled by a strong 
upturn in bank credit which spurred the 
construction of hotels, offices, large shopping 
centres and housing. Another major factor during 
the second half of the year, however, was 
government spending on infrastructure, which 
included the reinforcement of bridges and roads 
and the construction of drainage systems and 
floodwalls in an effort to mitigate the effects of 
El Niño. 
The boom in the construction sector, in turn, 
galvanized the industries that produce its inputs 
(basic metals, cement, paint, and the like), 
thereby contributing to the 8.7% growth rate 
posted by non-primary processing industries 
(agriculture-, fishing- and mining-based 
products). Commodity-producing industries, for 
their part, expanded by just over 1%. 
With mineral prices falling, the non-oil 
mining industry stepped up drilling in order 
to maintain the value of output, and volumes 
were consequently up 10% over 1996 levels. 
The Asian crisis hindered the implementation 
of new investment projects, however, and 
many therefore failed to progress beyond the 
financial assessment phase; this was 
3. The main variables 
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especially true of projects in the copper industry, 
whose growth prospects suffered as a result. 
(b)Prices, wages and employment 
In 1997 inflation not only resumed the 
downward path which had been interrupted the 
year before, but actually fell to a 25-year low 
of 6.5%. A variety of factors were at work here. 
In terms of the relationship between supply and 
demand, the economy was able to cope with the 
rise in income levels because of its high rate of 
idle capacity (32%) and its ability (thanks to 
the country's abundant flows of external 
resources) to divert domestic demand 
pressures to imports. 
Cost factors contributing to the slowdown in 
inflation included a stable nominal exchange 
rate, the relative absence of wage pressure (their 
nominal growth only amounted to 5.6%), and a 
downswing in the prices of basic services and 
fuels, which was especially visible because they 
are important components of the consumer 
basket (fuel prices fell by 9% over the preceding 
12 months). A further factor was the drop in the 
prices of imported foodstuffs. 
It is interesting to note that, according to the 
classification of prices of tradables and 
non-tradables prepared by the National Institute 
of Statistics and Informatics, non-tradables 
showed the largest increase; this was a reflection 
of rising prices for services, especially health 
care. Food prices and utility rates (most public 
utilities have been privatized) lagged behind 
inflation (4%). 
During 1997, both wages and salaries 
remained unchanged in real terms. The level of 
idle capacity in the economy undoubtedly helped 
to keep wage increases in check, especially in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Wage stability and the upturn in demand had 
a slight impact on employment in the formal 
sector, which grew by about 4%, according to the 
results of monthly surveys of firms having over 
100 employees (including those hired through 
workers' cooperatives or bureaus). Commerce 
and services accounted for virtually all of this 
increase. The growth of the economically active 
population (EAP) outpaced the modest increase in 
the number of jobs, and unemployment therefore 
rose. The annual rate climbed from 7.9% to 8.3% 
of the EAP, and the job situation for women 
worsened as well. Underemployment, whether 
measured by income or hours worked, remained 
at the preceding year's high levels. 
(c)The external sector 
In 1997, efforts were again made to bring the 
external gap under control, and the deficit on the 
balance-of-payments current account stabilized 
at 5.2% of GDP, which meant that the 
Government succeeded in reaching the target set 
in its agreements with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). This achievement was made possible 
by an improvement in the merchandise trade 
balance equivalent to US$ 200 million. Imports 
surged, but exports grew even faster, reaching 
US$ 6.75 billion, and as result the trade gap 
narrowed to US$ 1.814 billion. 
The first three quarters saw a steep rise in 
traditional exports, and this was especially true 
in the case of fishery and agricultural products, 
although sales of these goods declined towards 
the end of the year as a result of the poor 
weather conditions mentioned earlier. 
Wakening prices for metal ores, particularly 
copper (which was hard hit by the Asian crisis), 
did not significantly effect the value of exports, 
since volumes rose. 
Exports of virtually all non-traditional 
products continued to expand; all told, 
non-traditional external sales increased by 
approximately US$ 500 million to US$ 2.035 
billion. As a result, this category (which includes 
goods produced by the agricultural, textile, metal 
and machinery, chemical, and iron and steel 
sectors) increased its share from 27% to 30% of 
total exports. 
In keeping with the major role played by 
investment in GDP growth, capital goods 
accounted for 60% of the US$ 671 million 
increase in imports. Of the remainder, 30% was 
attributable to imports of inputs, and just 10% to 
consumer goods. 
On the services balance, the deficit in 
non-factor services rose by almost US$ 100 
million, but this was offset by a decrease of a 
similar amount in the deficit in factor income, 
which shrank to US$ 1.497 billion. As a result, 
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the current account closed out December with a 
deficit of US$ 3.415 billion. 
On the financial account of the balance of 
payments, direct investment (net of the foreign 
exchange earnings from privatizations) held to 
the preceding year's level of over US$ 1.8 billion. 
This, together with the fact that portfolio 
investment showed no decline either and that 
short- and long-term credit expanded, points to 
the conclusion that the Asian crisis has not had 
any financial impact on the Peruvian economy. 
The conclusion of bilateral negotiations 
with the Paris Club, the arrangements made 
under the Brady Plan and the renegotiation of 
debts with Russia all enabled Peru to reduce its 
external debt, as well as convincing 
international lending agencies to re-open their 
doors to the country. The resulting inflow of 
US$ 2.1 billion in short-term capital, combined 
with the inbound flow of US$ 2.753 billion in 
long-term funds, was more than enough to 
finance the current account deficit. 
Consequently, the net stock of international 
reserves rose by US$ 1.6 billion to US$ 10.169 
billion, which is the equivalent of more than a 




1. General trends 
In 1997, the Dominican Republic 
achieved its highest growth rate of the 
decade (8.2%), and this helped to ease the 
problem of unemployment, which fell 
below 16%. Monetary expansion, fuelled 
by abundant foreign currency inflows, 
formed the backdrop for economic 
activity, which was boosted by private 
investment, total consumption and 
exports in a context of exchange-rate 
stability. 
The ample liquidity of the financial system 
stimulated private spending and led to a steady 
decline in interest rates. The pattern of total 
The thrust of economic policy was to reconcile 
social objectives and an improvement in 
income distribution with the maintenance of 
existing macroeconomic balances and efforts 
to strengthen the Dominican Republic's 
competitiveness on international markets. 
The Government's social goals were pursued 
through increased spending in that sector. 
Exchange-rate stability and fiscal restraint were 
the pillars upon which the maintenance of 
macroeconomic equilibria rested, since 
monetary management was subordinated to the 
effort to check the appreciation of the local 
currency, which was being driven up by 
foreign-exchange inflows. The money creation 
deriving from this policy and the maintenance of 
consumption was also influenced by the 
reallocation of budgetary funds towards social 
spending, which was offset in the overall 
balancing of fiscal accounts by a corresponding 
cutback in capital outlays. 
In this context of greater liquidity, inflation 
rose to just over 8% due, in part, to the higher fuel 
prices resulting from the unification of the 
exchange rate the year before, while the stability 
of the exchange rate tended to have just the 
opposite effect. 
The current account deficit narrowed and was 
more than offset by capital inflows from abroad, 
which included a swiftly-growing stream of 
foreign direct investment. 
The outlook for 1998 pointed towards an 
economic growth rate of 6% and a level of 
inflation similar to the figure for 1997. 
a fiscal balance made it possible to reduce interest 
rates and discourage inflows of speculative 
capital. To this same end, additional measures 
were taken to curb short-term movements on the 
foreign exchange market. Meanwhile, in an 
effort to achieve their objective of strengthening 
the country's external competitiveness, the 
authorities continued to pursue an open trade 
policy. 
(a) Fiscal policy 
The central government closed out the 
year with a budget surplus equivalent to 0.8% 
of GDP thanks to an increase in the tax burden 
(from 13.2% of GDP in 1996 to 14.8% in 
2. Economic policy 
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Figure 1 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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1997) and to a major adjustment in public 
investment. 
Total expenditure grew by 14% in real terms; 
this was attributable to a 47% increase in current 
outlays, since capital expenditure declined 
sharply (-29%). 
The expansion of current expenditure was 
driven by spending on salaries and wages, 
which rose 49% in real terms as a result of 
salary adjustments awarded to civil servants 
in October 1996 and March 1997. A factor of 
only slightly less importance was the 
quantitative effect of the 54% increase in the 
volume of transfers to companies in financial 
straits; these transfer payments are expected 
to be lower in future, however, due to the 
recent passage of an omnibus act governing 
State-owned enterprises. Among the other 
items included in the current account, the 
most striking variation was the increase in 
social spending. On the other hand, the 
various items on the capital account, 
including the category of machinery and 
equipment, deteriorated considerably in real 
terms. 
Total revenues rose by 22% in real terms, a 
higher rate than at any other time in the 
preceding five years. Current income was up 
by 21%, reflecting a more than twenty-fold 
increase over the growth rate for 1996. Under 
this heading, income tax receipts, which 
account for 96% of direct tax collections, 
jumped 18%. The results for excise taxes were 
influenced by a 42% increase in the oil price 
differential, partly because under the system 
currently in force, this indicator is incorporated 
as a constant in the retail price to the public, 
expressed in Dominican pesos per gallon of 
fuel. 
Receipts from taxes on foreign trade showed 
a 47% improvement following the 
implementation of a prepayment system for 
clearing goods prior to their arrival in port and 
the computerization of the central office and of 
collection agencies located in ports and 
airports. The application of a zero tariff rate on 
imports of inputs and tools for the agricultural 
and textile sectors had a negative effect on tax 
receipts. 
For 1998, total central government revenues 
are expected to decline, partly as a result of the 
fall in oil prices and the adverse effect this will 
have on the new tax collection scheme. Should 
this prove to be the case, the decline could be 
counterbalanced by a corresponding 
adjustment in current expenditure and a 
reinforcement of the tax administration system 
based on the modification or elimination of 
low-yield items and the introduction of 
adjustments designed to make the tax structure 
a more neutral one. 
(b) Monetary policy 
Monetary policy was subordinated to the 
achievement of exchange-rate stability within an 
economic context marked by an abundant supply 
of foreign exchange. As a result, the monetary 
base grew more than originally planned (by 
20%), and liquidity expanded by a slightly higher 
percentage. The expansion of domestic credit 
also contributed to this increase in the monetary 
base. 
The build-up of international reserves was 
the result of Central Bank intervention aimed 
at stabilizing the exchange rate. Net issues of 
monetary participation certificates rose by a 
scant 6% and were thus not sufficient to 
counter the resulting expansion of the 
monetary base, which translated into fairly 
similar increases in the money supply and in 
commercial bank deposits with the Central 
Bank. 
Peso deposits in the commercial banking 
system rose by a slightly higher percentage, 
reflecting the high degree of liquidity in the 
financial system and the effects of the 
modification of the base used for calculating 
the legal reserve requirement, whose purpose 
was to release a portion of these funds and 
make them available to the commercial 
banking system. Consequently, the narrowly 
defined money supply (Ml) and the broad 
money aggregate (M2) grew by 23% and 24% 
respectively. 
The strong liquidity position of the 
commercial banking system pushed down 
lending rates from a weighted average of 23% 
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Table 1 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
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Employment and wages 
Real minimum wage 






100.0 97.0 118.0 
Growth rates 
79.9 7.9 5.2 
112.1 
2.8 
119.3 119.9 120.6 119.3 
14.3 9.2 4.0 
External sector 
Terms of trade 
8.4 
(index: 1990=100) " 
Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990 = 100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
Gross debt 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 


























































































































Money and credit 
Monetary balances of 
banking system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 











1990 1991 1992 







































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Includes Errors and omissions. e Refers to net interest as shown on the 
balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. 
Table 2 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1995 1996 1997 s 1998" 
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II 
Gross domestic product 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 4.5 8.2 7.0 9.3 5.Í 7.5 10.6 5.9 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 14.2 11.8 11.8 9.2 6.5 6.2 3.8 3.9 6.7 7.5 9.9 8.4 5.3 4.6 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 100.0 107.5 107.0 100.5 97.3 96.2 97.1 97.3 98.9 99.7 98.1 100.5 102.9 107.2 
Money (MI) 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 5.3 8.7 19.8 16.8 22.7 22.5 24.4 25.3 19.8 21.0 16.6 25.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
" Preliminary figures. Refers to the exchange rate for imports. 
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in January to 21% ins reduction in the cost of 
money and the release of excess commercial 
bank reserves, banks were able to meet a higher 
percentage of the demand for credit, mostly to the 
benefit of the private sector, in particular 
construction, commercial activities and 
manufacturing. 
Projections for 1988 point to an 8%-9% 
expansion of the monetary base and of the money 
supply in line with the target rates for GDP growth 
and inflation. A more intensive use of 
open-market operations will be required, using 
short-term interest rates as a frame of reference, 
if these targets are to be met. 
(c) Foreign-exchange and trade 
policies 
The monetary authorit ies ' efforts to 
maintain the stability of the exchange rate 
formed the cornerstone of the Dominican 
Republic's trade policy. They were aided in 
this undertaking by the achievement of a fiscal 
balance, which neutralized any upward 
pressure on interest rates. 
The official exchange rate at the beginning 
of the year was 13.91 pesos to the dollar but 
rose to 14.02 pesos to the dollar in March, 
which implies a nominal variation of 0.8% and 
an appreciation in real terms. Following the 
unification of the exchange rate in December 
1996, which eliminated the gap between the 
rates on the official and private markets, the 
rate began to be set every week on the basis of 
the peso's performance on banking markets. 
The nominal exchange rates on the private and 
non-bank markets accordingly rose from 14.12 
and 14.21 pesos to the dollar, respectively, in 
January, to 14.35 and 14.33 in December, for a 
depreciation of just 2% and 1%. 
Within this framework, the country's 
trade policy focused on consolidating its 
formal integration into Central America and 
the Caribbean and on the promotion of free 
trade. 
In November 1997, the second special session 
of Central American Heads of State was held in 
Santo Domingo. At the close of this meeting, 
the Heads of State signed the Santo Domingo 
Declaration, in which they recognized the 
imperative need to incorporate the Dominican 
RepublicintotheCentralAmericanintegration 
process and, more specifically, for it to join the 
CentralAmericanlntegrationSystem(SlCA). In 
April 1998, a free trade treaty was signed with 
a view to promoting the formation of a wider 
market for reciprocal trade in goods and 
services . It is also expected that the 
Dominican Republic will take steps to phase 
out its non-tariff barriers, including permits 
and licenses for merchandise imports and 
exports. 
Trade relations between the Dominican 
Republic and the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) remained at a standstill following the 
signature, in October 1996, of a letter of intent 
concerning the initiation of formal trade 
negotiations between the parties. 
As part of the steps being taken by the 
country to open up its economy to the outside 
world, import duties on inputs, equipment and 
machinery for the agricultural and textile 
sectors were eliminated. In addition, a bill 
designed to bring the new customs regime 
more closely into line with international trade 
regula t ions was sent to Congress . 
Implementation of a standard Spanish version 
of the harmonized system will be an 
important step towards the count ry ' s 
integration into world markets. Promotion of 
export sectors has been reflected in the 
introduction of a standard export registration 
form, but the proposed one-stop export 
window has not yet been set up. 
(d) Structural reforms 
Structural reforms implemented in 1997 
included the adoption of the State Enterprises 
Omnibus Reform Act, which promotes the 
capitalization of entities belonging to the 
Dominican Corporation for State Enterprises 
(CORDE), the Dominican Electricity Corporation 
(CDE), the State Sugar Council and hotels 
belonging to the Hotel and Tourism Industry 




(a) Economic activity 
Total demand grew by 12%, thanks to the 
boost received from private investment and, to a 
less extent, from private and public consumption. 
In turn, exports of goods and services gathered 
momentum. These factors all helped to stimulate 
economic activity, thus bringing GDP growth to 
over 7%; imports also expanded. 
Fuelled by a 43% increase in private 
investment, fixed investment climbed 25%. The 
upswing in private investment was attributable to 
the higher level of liquidity in the banking 
system, which was reflected in declining interest 
rates on loans and a favourable outlook for the 
economy. Public investment, meanwhile, 
dropped sharply (-24%). 
Government consumption was up by 10%, 
while private consumption -bolstered by wage 
increases and a 14% rise in remittances from 
family members- rose by 5%. 
The 15% increase in exports (including 
external sales by firms in the customs-free zone) 
was made possible by the expansion of the 
manufacturing sector's production capacity. The 
stability of the real exchange rate also helped to 
generate confidence in the future of 
export-related activities. Against the backdrop of 
this stable exchange rate, imports of goods and 
services continued to soar, this time by 17%, with 
capital goods accounting for a large proportion 
of the total, mainly as a result of the dynamism 
of the economy as a whole. 
Growth in the agricultural sector slowed to 3% 
in 1997 (down from 10% the year before) due to 
adverse weather conditions and pest infestations 
in the last quarter of the year. With the exception 
of cocoa, export crops did the best (with an 
increase of 15%, on average). Almost all crops 
for domestic consumption suffered setbacks. 
Following a trend that was just the reverse of 
the agricultural sector's, gross industrial output 
posted an 8% expansion in 1997, up from 4% in 
1996. This performance was attributable to both 
domestic and exogenous factors. The domestic 
factors included the buoyancy of the construction 
sector, which stimulated demand for some of the 
variables 
inputs produced by the manufacturing sector. 
One of the main exogenous factors was the 
strength of external demand, which boosted 
production of some local inputs and of others 
produced in the country's export processing 
zones (EPZs). 
The EPZs recorded the highest level of value 
added (11%) in the last four years, partly as a 
result of the Government's policies on 
investment promotion, construction and 
expansion of the country's industrial parks and 
of the diversification of production activity by 
businesses operating under this system. Another 
contributing factor was the upsurge in sales 
posted by the tobacco companies in these zones, 
which accounted for 21% of the total. 
The mining sector expanded by 3% thanks to 
an upturn in nickel and gypsum production and 
more robust demand for some of the main inputs 
used by the construction industry. The 
construction boom (18%) was spurred by higher 
expenditure by private businesses, a substantial 
increase in lending (25% in real terms) to that 
sector and longer repayment periods. 
Notwithstanding the electrical power sector's 
vigorous expansion (11%), supply was not able 
to meet the growing demand. Dynamic sectors 
such as transport and telecommunications made 
further gains (13%) and, bolstered by a hotel 
occupancy rate of 76%, the growth of the tourism 
industry accelerated to 17% (compared with 11% 
in 1996). 
(b) Prices, wages and employment 
Inflation rebounded in 1997, with consumer 
prices rising by 8.4% as compared to the 
preceding year's level of 4%. This surge was 
attributable, on the supply side, to adverse 
weather conditions that hurt agricultural output 
and to the effects of the introduction of a single 
exchange rate in 1996, which included higher 
fuel prices. On the demand side, wage hikes and 
increased lending stimulated consumption. On 
the other hand, the reduction in tariffs on imports 
of some essential agricultural inputs and the shift 
in the pattern of consumption towards tradable 
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goods, whose prices were held down by the 
stability of the nominal exchange rate, helped to 
contain inflationary pressures. 
Real minimum wages improved in both 
State-owned enterprises (37%) and the private 
sector (11%). According to a survey conducted 
between October 1996 and April 1997, the 
overall unemployment rate was 15.9% (16.5% at 
the beginning of the period). Job creation was 
strongest in the business, transport and 
telecommunications sectors. 
According to official projections, inflation 
should remain virtually the same in 1998 as in 
1997, i.e., at around 8%. 
(c) The external sector 
In 1997, the balance of payments posted an 
overall surplus of US$ 233 million as the net 
result of a positive balance on the capital and 
financial accounts that was more than enough 
to offset the current account deficit. This 
deficit was slightly lower than in 1996, since 
the deterioration in the trade balance was 
counterbalanced by higher earnings from 
tourism and, to a lesser extent, by higher 
current transfers. 
Despite the surplus recorded in the EPZs 
(US$ 1.332 billion), whose exports increased 
by 17%; to over US$ 3.8 billion, the 
merchandise trade balance showed a deficit of 
US$ 1.806 billion (0.8% of GDP). Exports of 
goods (not including those from the EPZs) 
were up by 14%, which was almost as much as 
the growth rate for imports (15%). The 
upswing in merchandise exports was in part 
attributable to the expansion of the 
manufacturing sector's production capacity, 
the increase in the volume of exports of sugar 
and sugar products (16%) and the incentives 
for tobacco exports provided by high 
international prices (110%). 
Import figures reflect the economy's 
dynamism and the strong performance of the 
country's EPZs. The implementation of a nominal 
tariff rate of zero on machinery and equipment 
used in the agricultural sector, which contributed 
to a 43% jump in imports of capital goods, was 
also a factor. 
The non-factor service account yielded a 
surplus of US$ 1.43 billion, primarily as a 
consequence of the tourism sector's robust 
growth. 
Net investment flows showed a negative 
balance of US$ 1.193 billion which was directly 
attributable to the repatriation of profits by 
foreign companies. Unrequited private transfers 
swelled by 18%, totalling US$ 1.27 billion. 
However, the inflow of these transfers and the 
positive balance on the non-factor services 
account proved insufficient to cover the deficits 
on the trade balance and in net investment 
income. Thus, at year's end, the current account 
showed a deficit of US$ 225 million. 
The positive balance on the capital and 
financial account (US$ 757 million, not 
including errors and omissions) was mainly the 
result of foreign direct investment inflows 
(US$ 405 million), half of which consisted of 
reinvested earnings. 
Medium- and long-term capital inflows 
were in the vicinity of US$ 150 million, 15% 
below the previous year's figure. On the other 
hand, official capital flows showed a net 
negative balance, part of which was 
accounted for by the settlement of US$ 98 
million of government debt with foreign 
companies. This helped to bring the external 
public debt down to US$ 3.502 million by the 
end of 1997, a decline of almost 8% from its 
the level registered 12 months before. Debt 
servicing amounted to US$ 431 million, or 
6% of the value of exports of goods and 
services. 
In 1998, it is expected that medium- and 
long-term debt service payments will amount to 
US$ 421 million and that a modest surplus of 
US$ 67 million will be posted on the balance of 
payments as the net result of a slightly larger 
current account deficit than in 1997 (US$ 330 
million) and a US$ 263 million surplus on the 
capital and financial account (including errors 
and omissions). 
This projection takes into account the 
potential repercussions of the Asian crisis on the 
Dominican economy. These impacts are likely to 
be quite limited, however, since although EPZ 
exports not subject to the quota system may be 
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affected, trade between the Asian countries hit by 
the crisis and the Dominican Republic is 
negligible. 
It is possible, however, that the inflow of 
foreign-exchange earnings from tourism could 
decrease, which would have a negative impact on 
GDP. This will only occur, however, if the crisis 
causes a slowdown in the growth of the 
economies where the bulk of demand for tourist 
services originates, such as those of the United 




1. General trends 
The Uruguayan economy again made 
significant strides in 1997. Aggregate 
demand expanded vigorously, bringing 
GDP growth to more than 5%, while 
inflation, which continued to fall, 
reached 15%, its lowest level in 30 
years. The unemployment rate was 
slow to react, however, and only in the 
last few months of the year did it 
decline to something on the order of 
10%. 
All the components of final demand picked 
up strongly. Favourable external conditions 
fuelled an expansion of over 12% in the 
Curbing inflation continued to be the primary 
objective of economic policy. The policy tools 
used in this effort were much the same as before: 
the limitations of the public-sector financial 
deficit to an amount consistent with the available 
supply of external financing and the target figure 
for money creation; and the slowing of the pace 
of monthly devaluations to a rate close to that of 
the inflation target. 
The Government proposed to cut back 
inflation to 14%-17%in 1997, based on projected 
GDP growth of 3% and on the assumption that 
external trends would hold firm. In order to meet 
these goals, the authorities sought to limit the 
public-sector financial deficit to 1.7% of GDP and 
physical volume of exports. This, in turn, 
contributed to an 8% increase in fixed investment 
which was also associated with the productive 
restructuring of the majority of the country's 
business enterprises. Higher personal income and 
the increased availability of credit to Uruguayan 
households buoyed domestic consumption. 
Stronger demand also continued to boost 
imports, which expanded by 14%. Trade with 
other members of the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur) continued to play an important role 
in the dynamism of foreign trade. 
In the first half of 1998, the economy grew at 
a brisk pace, and the ascent of consumer prices 
moderated to 10% in the 12 months ending in 
June. The heavy rainfall experienced in the 
second quarter could, however, affect some crops 
in the forthcoming harvest. 
to reduce the rate of devaluation to levels within 
a range similar to the targeted rate of inflation. 
Externally, the aim of the government 
programme was to maintain the balance-of-
payments current account deficit at around 1.5% 
of GDP. On the basis of this programme, a 
precautionary credit arrangement was signed 
midway through the year with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for the period April 1997 to 
December 1998. In addition, steps were taken in 
1997 to reduce the degree of indexation of wages 
and of price controls on public-sector goods and 
services. 
Having met the goals set for 1997, the 
Government intensified its stabilization policy in 
2. Economic policy 
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1998 in an effort to bring inflation down to no 
more than 7%-9% per year, a range not achieved 
at any time in the past four decades. With this in 
view, it will seek to reduce the public-sector 
deficit to 1.2% of GDP, or the equivalent of the 
estimated cost of administrative and social 
security reforms, and to bring the rate of 
devaluation into step with the projected rate of 
inflation. 
(a)Fiscal policy 
The prudent policy adopted for the 1997 
budget, which did not allow for any increases in 
real spending or any changes in the tax system, 
was a signal of the Government's determination 
to consolidate the public-sector adjustment. The 
authorities had calculated that the freeze on real 
spending, coupled with an expansion of income 
due to increased economic activity, would 
eliminate the sector's financial deficit (excluding 
the cost of administrative and social security 
reforms). The outlays for these reform measures 
were considered to be of a transitional nature and 
were to be financed through special external 
loans. 
The result was beyond expectations. The 
increase in income, which was chiefly 
attributable to brisker activity than had been 
forecast, was sufficient to offset the additional 
expenditure required by the reforms, and the 
non-financial public-sector deficit was therefore 
similar in size to that of the previous year ( 1% of 
GDP). The trend in GDP contributed to the rise in 
tax receipts, which are closely linked to the 
business cycle, and to the increase in sales by 
State-owned enterprises. Other factors 
influencing the real increase in tax revenues were 
the decline in inflation (thanks to the 
Olivera-Tanzi effect) and more efficient tax 
collection mechanisms. The value-added tax 
(VAT), which yielded 10% more in real terms, 
continued to be the principal source of tax 
receipts, accounting for close to 9% of GDP and 
44% of income. The decisions taken the previous 
year to raise the tax on bank assets and to extend 
the coverage of the tax on net worth to 
State-owned enterprises also helped to 
strengthen tax revenues. Public-sector 
URUGUAY 
enterprises benefited from the fall in the price of 
petroleum. 
On the expenditure side, the retirement 
incentive offered to civil servants represented 
half a percentage point of GDP. Social security 
transfers under the new mixed pay-as-you-
go/capitalization system absorbed almost 
another point of GDP. If the cost of these two 
reforms were not included, then the non-financial 
public sector would show a modest surplus of 
about 0.3% of GDP. This is the sum of the 
surpluses posted by the central government 
(5.9% of GDP) and by State-owned enterprises 
(1.3% of GDP) anda social security deficit (before 
transfers) of approximately 7% of GDP. 
The authorities sought to limit the increase in 
the public-sector debt to 1.8% of GDP and, at the 
same time, to improve its profile by replacing 
short-term debt with longer-term obligations. 
Both objectives were considered feasible in view 
of the ready availability of low-interest loans on 
the international market; this situation improved 
further midway through the year, when the 
country was upgraded to investment-grade status 
by four major credit rating firms. Total 
public-sector borrowing requirements, including 
the quasi-fiscal deficit of the Central Bank, 
amounted to 1.5% of GDP, and more than half of 
this amount was covered through expansion of 
the monetary base. Given the ready availability 
of international financing, the public sector 
contracted foreign loans equivalent to 2.3% of 
GDP and obtained financing from domestic 
sources amounting to another 0.2% of GDP. The 
amount in excess of the public-sector financial 
deficit was used to build up international 
reserves. 
(b)Foreign exchange policy 
The exchange-rate system, which is based 
on a 7% flotation band for the peso against the 
dollar and periodic devaluations of the band's 
floor, remained in force in 1997. In the first half 
of the year, the rate of exchange remained close 
to the bottom of the band, but early in the 
second half, it began to hover about one 
percentage point above the minimum rate. The 
Central Bank attributed this trend to the 
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Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National savings 
External savings 
Employment and wages 
Labour force participation rate 





















































































































































Real average wage 





Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100) 
Nominal bank exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar), annual average 
Real effective exchange 
rate for imports 
(index: 1990 = 100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 134 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
Gross debt (as a percentage of GDP) 
Net debt (as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of exports) 10.9 9.3 
100.0 103.8 106.1 
Growth rates 
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Money and credit 
Monetary balance of 
banking system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
Deposit rate 
Lending rate 
Equivalent interest rate 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population; urban areas. e Percentages 
of the economically active population (EAP); urban areas. 
deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Includes Errors and omissions. e Interest rate on deposits, 
Table 2 




III IV III IV III IV 
Gross domestic product 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 
Consumer prices (nationwide) 
(12-month variation, %) 
Real exchange ratec 
(index: 1990=100) 
Exports, f.o.b. 
(millions of dollars) 
Imports, c.i.f. 
(millions of dollars) 
Real interest rates 
(annualized, %) 
Deposit rate 
Lending rate (not prime) 
Money (Ml) 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 
2.7 -1.0 -6.2 -2.8 1.7 0.8 10.3 1.5 3.3 8.4 4.4 4.6 
45.3 44.9 42.2 35.4 31.4 28.2 26.3 24.3 23.8 21.2 17.1 15.2 
71.9 70.5 69.0 69.5 69.6 69.3 70.3 69.1 68.2 68.3 68.2 68.0 
555 537 534 481 550 580 632 636 513 726 730 691 
665 747 670 785 698 769 928 929 872 873 946 1 055 
0.7 -2.0 1.2 
43.7 43.5 47.8 
8.7 3.1 0.3 -1.4 6.7 0.2 2.4 6.0 7.1 








40.6 34.1 33.7 32.7 33.5 36.5 35.0 28.4 24.8 21.4 17.3 17.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. On the basis of seasonally adjusted figures at constant domestic prices. c Refers to the exchange rate for imports. 
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increasing use of an export prefinancing 
mechanism,whichincludedpromotionalinterest 
rates and a regulation whereby foreign currency 
earnings had to be sold directly to the B ank. This 
system forced down the supply of foreign 
exchange on the interbank market. In 
mid-September the authorities therefore 
decided to allow exporters using the 
prefinancing mechanism to dispose of their 
foreign exchange earnings as they saw fit. 
With the resulting expansion in supply on the 
interbank market, the rate of exchange was 
driven down to the floor of the band. It soon 
rose again, however, owing to the uncertainty 
caused by the repercussions of the Asian 
crisis in Brazil, only to return to the floor of 
the flotation band following the adoption of 
corrective measures by Brazilian authorities. 
Consequently, the rate of exchange rose 15% 
in the course of the year, in line with the 
Government's financial guidelines. Given the 
dollar's appreciation against the European 
currencies and the yen, the real exchange rate, 
calculated on the basis of a basket of the 
currencies of Uruguay's principal trading 
partners, slipped slightly. 
Inflation continued to decline steadily 
throughout the first half of 1998. In order to 
reinforce this tendency and curb expectations of 
exchange-rate fluctuations, in April the width of 
the flotation band was narrowed to 3% and the 
rate of devaluation was lowered to 0.6% per 
month. 
(c) Monetary policy 
Since the exchange-rate regime is based on the 
use of a flotation band, there is limited scope for 
action by monetary policy-makers. At the floor 
and ceiling of the band, the Central Bank expands 
or tightens liquidity on the basis of the public's 
demand for money; the monetary policy action 
conducted within the margins of the flotation 
band remains confined to controlling short-term 
liquidity. 
The main instrument for regulating the level 
of liquidity was the interest rate, including both 
the rate paid by the Central Bank on very 
short-term deposits made by private banks and 
the rates paid on interest-bearing cash reserves 
and on Monetary Regulation Notes. The nominal 
annual interest rates offered by the Central Bank 
declined from 27% at the beginning of the year 
to 19% by the end of 1997, for a real average 
annual rate of 3%. 
The growth of the money supply kept pace 
with the expansion of nominal GDP, climbing by 
5% in real terms. Broad money (M2) grew 
somewhat less, as fixed-term deposits contracted 
slightly in real terms. In contrast, savings 
deposits increased substantially (26% in real 
terms) following the introduction of 
technological improvements in the banking 
system in order to permit the use of automated 
teller machines (ATMs) for the payment of wages. 
A 10% increase was registered in 1997 in the 
dollar value of foreign-currency deposits, which 
once again accounted for the bulk (82%) of 
currency liabilities within the banking system 
(M3). 
Deposits rates in the two currencies tended 
to converge. On the one hand, interest on 
deposits in Uruguayan pesos declined more 
slowly than inflation, so the real annual rate 
of return increased slightly, bordering on 4%. 
Interest rates on dollar accounts, meanwhile, 
matched the downward trend observed on the 
international market and by the end of the 
year had consequently slipped into the same 
range. 
Greater price stability and the favourable 
business and income expectations among 
economic agents spurred credit supply and 
demand, and bank credit to the private sector 
expanded by 17% in real terms. A significant 
trend in private banking was the shift in credit 
away from industry and towards the service 
sectors and household loans. The availability of 
credit for housing, following the elimination of 
the monopoly formerly held by the Mortgage 
Bank of Uruguay over this type of operation, was 
part of this new trend. By year-end, real annual 
interest rates on loans in local currency, which 
fluctuated between 17% and 48%, were 
significantly higher than the rates on 
foreign-currency loans (7% to 10% in current 




Expansion of the financial system's offshore 
activity slowed. At the end of 1997, total deposits 
held by non-residents in the banning system and 
in foreign financial institutions stood at US$ 4.1 
billion (20% of GDP), around 7% above the 
balance at the end of the preceding year. 
Approximately one third of this sum was used for 
loans to non-residents and the balance was held 
as international reserves. 
The country's nascent capital market received 
a strong boost with the entry into force of 
legislation approved the previous year. These 
statutes govern the issuance of negotiable 
securities by private companies and the 
management of investment funds. In 1997, the 
trading of negotiable securities more than 
doubled to stand at US$ 226 million, a figure 
equivalent to one third of the total trading volume 
of the country's stock market, which was 
(a)Economic activity 
Uruguay recorded 5% GDP growth for the 
second consecutive year in 1997; as in the case 
of per capita national income, the figure attained 
was almost one third higher than the 1990 level. 
When measured in dollars, the increase in the 
purchasing power of per capita income was even 
greater on account of the appreciation of the peso 
against the dollar. 
All the components of aggregate demand 
expanded in 1997. The most outstanding increase 
was in exports (12%), followed by that of fixed 
investment (8%). Although growth in 
consumption was slower (5.5%), it accounted for 
half of the overall figure owing to its significant 
weight in total demand. 
The contraction that came in the wake of the 
Mexican currency crisis of late 1994 was 
followed by a period of sustained growth in 
Uruguay. As of the fourth quarter 1997, 
economic activity had progressed by almost 18% 
compared with the third quarter of 1995. With the 
sole exception of the agricultural sector, 1997 
saw an across-the-board increase, and the 
expansion was especially notable in commerce, 
restaurants and hotels; electricity, gas and water; 
equivalent to 3.5% of GDP. The pension fund 
management boards created under the social 
security reform law had handled approximately 
US$ 250 million by the middle of 1998. 
(d)Trade policy 
At the end of 1997 Mercosur member 
countries agreed to a temporary three-
percentage-point increase in the common 
external tariff (Mercosur) until 31 December 
2000. The application of this agreement has been 
monitored with special interest by Uruguayan 
authorities. In particular, some provisions 
adopted by Brazil that tended to restrict 
short-term external financing led to a series of 
negotiations which resulted in special treatment 
for the parties to the agreement. 
and the manufacturing sector. Manufacturing 
was back up to its level of 10 years earlier; this 
points to a consolidation of the retooling process 
undertaken by companies of the sector in 
anticipation of the entry into force of the 
Mercosur treaty. 
Boosted by public-sector activity, 
construction picked up by 3%. Meanwhile, the 
slowdown in construction in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay's main tourist resort, was offset by an 
expansion in the rest of the country, and private 
construction therefore remained stable. 
Agricultural production, on the other hand, 
slackened by over 1%; since this followed a 
record high in the preceding year, however, 
production figures were still a third higher than 
in the early 1990s. This decline occurred mainly 
in the last few months of the year, when heavy 
rains ravaged wheat and barley crops. The 
livestock industry remained strong, with beef and 
milk production increasing; wool production 
slipped, however, following reductions in the 
sheep herd in response to a slump in international 
prices. 
Services accounted for almost three quarters 
of total GDP growth. Basic services continued to 
expand steadily; electricity output increased by 
3. The main variables 
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6% following a reduction in the supply of water 
available for use in power generation in the first 
two quarters, while transport and commu-
nications grew by almost 5%. Commerce picked 
up by over 8%, buoyed by robust domestic 
demand and an abundant supply of domestic and 
imported items, while hotels and restaurants 
enjoyed a strong recovery, due largely to the 
influence of external demand. 
(b)Prices, wages and employment 
The greater than expected surge in domestic 
demand did not thwart efforts to achieve the main 
target of the economic programme, since 
inflation behaved as projected. Consumer prices 
rose 15% in 1997, the lowest rate in almost 30 
years and one which, when compared with the 
rate of 129% recorded in 1990, attests to the huge 
strides made by the Uruguayan economy towards 
achieving greater stability. Nevertheless, prices 
have followed markedly different trends 
depending on the sector. While prices for 
clothing and footwear rose by only 7% in 1997 
in the face of strong competition from abroad, the 
cost of housing increased by 19% and the cost of 
education by 27%. Among the factors 
contributing to this significant decline in 
inflation were the authorities' success in 
controlling the public-sector deficit and the 
reduction in the rate of devaluation in response 
to the country's favourable external accounts 
position. 
Despite the sharp increase in activity, towards 
the end of the year unemployment proved to be 
quite intractable in the face of downward 
pressure. After remaining at the levels registered 
at the end of the previous year (11.6%), the rate 
in Montevideo started to rebound to over 12% in 
the second quarter. However, in the fourth 
quarter, it began to recede to around 10% due 
mainly to a decline in the labour supply; in 1997, 
the labour participation rate in Montevideo was 
approximately 61.2% of the working-age 
population, compared with 62.8% at the end of 
1996. In the interior of the country, 
unemployment was lower. 
Real wages weakened slightly in the first 
nine months of the year, picking up in the last 
quarter. Even though the average annual level 
increased somewhat, the purchasing power of 
wages remained lower than at the end of 1994. 
In order to moderate the inertial effect of 
widespread indexation based on past price 
movements, a law was enacted at the end of 1997 
which provides for changes in the adjustment 
mechanism for the salaries of central government 
civil servants, public rates and charges, and loan 
payments to the government-owned mortgage 
bank (Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay). 
Adjustments will be made once every six months 
if the annual variation in the consumer price 
index (CPI) falls between 10% and 23%, once per 
year if it falls below 10%, and once every four 
months if it exceeds 23%. In January 1998, the 
Government started to implement wage 
adjustments under the new half-yearly 
adjustment system at a rate of 85% of the 
inflation rate recorded in the preceding period. 
(c)The external sector 
Soaring domestic demand and a favourable 
international climate for the country were 
accompanied by a moderate balance-of-
payments current account deficit, equivalent to 
approximately 1.6% of GDP (1.2% in 1996). 
Capital inflows were more than sufficient to 
finance the deficit and helped to bolster the 
international reserves of the Central Bank. 
The merchandise trade deficit widened to 
just over US$ 720 million, although, in terms 
of value, exports grew faster (14%) than 
imports (12%). The only items that did not 
benefit from the export boom were textiles and 
dairy products. Exports of food and forestry 
products posted significant increases, as did 
paper and printing and electrical equipment 
and appliances. 
Brisk purchases of consumer goods 
contributed to a sharp increase in merchandise 
imports. There was a surge in imports of capital 
goods as well (14%), while intermediate goods 
increased by only 7% owing to the decline in 
international oil prices. 
On the other hand, services posted a clearly 
positive balance (2.6% of GDP). The better part 
of these earnings came from net income from 
tourism, mainly by Argentine nationals, although 
in 1997 travel expenditure by Uruguayans abroad 
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increased more significantly than spending by 
incoming tourists. 
Almost half of Uruguay's merchandise trade 
was with its Mercosur partners. Over one third of 
total Uruguayan exports were destined for Brazil 
and 13% for Argentina. As regards imports into 
Uruguay, these two countries have a more 
balanced market share, i.e., around 21% each of 
total foreign merchandise purchases. 
With international capital readily available, 
the external gap was easily closed. The increase 
in external borrowing by the public sector was 
channeled through the placement of government 
securities and loans from multilateral agencies to 
finance administrative and social security 
reforms. Short-term debt was reduced through 
the prompt placement of a US$ 300 million 
long-term global bond. The interest rate was 
7,875% (135 basis points above United States 
bonds) thanks to the good international credit 
rating assigned to the country's debt. The private 
sector, for its part, secured external funding 
amounting to US$ 440 million, including 
US$ 160 million of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). 
At the end of 1997, public-sector external debt 
stood at US$ 5.6 billion, or the equivalent of 28% 
of GDP, while the international reserves held by 





1. General trends 
The Venezuelan economy grew at a rate 
of 5.6% in 1997, climbing out of the 
previous year's recession. This result was 
once again influenced by a notable 
(nearly 9%) expansion in the oil sector, 
although the other sectors also stepped up 
their activity levels, availing themselves of 
an improved macroeconomic climate and 
the favourable expectations generated by 
the implementation of the "Agenda 
Venezuela" adjustment programme in 
1996. Thus the upward trend of 
unemployment was halted, and in the 
second half of the year the jobless total fell 
below 11%. 
As is normal in Venezuela, the economy's 
performance was heavily dependent on the 
situation in the oil market, which in 1997 
remained favourable. This contributed to the 
maintenance of a large current account surplus 
and a year-end fiscal surplus, despite significant 
public expenditure growth. The increased public 
spending, together with the monetization of 
currency inflows from other sources and an 
expansion of bank credit, kept inflation bordering 
on 38%, still quite high, although much lower 
In 1997 the economic authorities planned to 
consolidate the macroeconomic stabilization 
process initiated in the framework of the Agenda 
than the previous year. The moderation in price 
rises was helped by nominal exchange rate 
stability, based on the foreign exchange policy of 
the Central Bank of Venezuela and an abundance 
of foreign currency, which enabled US$ 2.6 
billion in international reserves to be 
accumulated during the year, thereby financing a 
significant rebound in imports. 
The opening up of the oil sector to private 
capital, in association with the State-owned firm 
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), continued 
successfully in 1997. The privatization 
programme also went ahead, although the main 
scheduled sale was postponed until 1998. Both 
these processes gave rise to a significant inflow 
of foreign direct investment. During the year the 
foundations were also laid for an in-depth reform 
of the social security system. 
The performance of the economy, along with 
expectations, were profoundly altered towards 
the end of the year when the situation in the 
international oil market deteriorated. The drop in 
crude oil prices forced the Government to 
undertake a severe fiscal adjustment and reversed 
the situation in the foreign exchange market, 
where the demand for dollars came to exceed 
supply in the early months of 1998. The fiscal 
contraction, together with cuts in oil production 
decided on in an attempt to prop up prices, eroded 
expectations of GDP growth for 1998, which 
turned negative. 
Venezuela programme adopted the year before 
and to move ahead with the structural reform 
timetable contemplated in the programme. The 
2. Economic policy 
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Figure 1 
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degree to which these goals were fulfilled was 
moderate and was strongly affected by the 
favourable conjuncture in the oil market -the 
main source of revenue for the public sector. The 
monetary authorities found it difficult to contain 
the increased liquidity arising from abundant 
foreign currency inflows, but the influx kept the 
depreciation of the bolivar much smaller than 
anticipated, so that the exchange rate became the 
main counter-inflationary instrument. 
The decisive effect of the immediate situation 
in the oil market was revealed at the end of the 
year, when the phase of high oil prices came to 
an end. As prices deteriorated, especially during 
1998, the efforts of economic policy makers 
turned towards defending domestic and external 
equilibria and trying to neutralize the negative 
effect of this situation on public-sector accounts. 
While taking action the Government also sought 
an agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to back the measures adopted, 
although the solidity of the country's foreign 
currency position made it unnecessary for IMF to 
provide financing. 
(a) Fiscal policy 
The Government faced fiscal 1997 with a 
balanced budget, thanks to the fiscal measures in 
the economic programme of 1996 and the 
favourable trend in the international oil market. 
The latter persisted well into the year and 
contributed to a considerable rise in current fiscal 
revenues, making it possible to increase 
expenditure and at the same time generate a 
surplus on public accounts equivalent to 1.6% of 
GDP for central government and 2.3% for the 
public sector as a whole. These figures do not 
include extraordinary revenue received by the 
Government in the form of privatization 
proceeds equivalent to approximately half a 
percentage point of GDP. 
Central government current revenue as a 
percentage of GDP, which was below 16% in 
1995 but had topped 20% in 1996, rose further in 
1997 to its highest level since 1991 (23.4%). Oil 
revenues went up from less than 12% in 1996 to 
13.5% in 1997. This increase came from the 
proceeds of bidding on oil field rights and higher 
sales by Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., which 
made it possible to increase tax revenues and pay 
dividends to the State for the second year 
running, this time amounting to one billion 
bolívares. 
Owing to greater consumption among the 
population and the upturn in the economy, 
domestic tax revenue also strengthened to 
approach 10% of GDP. The increase here was 
above all due to the tax on wholesale sales and 
luxury consumption, which, following arate hike 
in 1996, contributed almost half of total revenues 
from domestic sources. The buoyancy in imports 
and the rise in the national fuel price decreed a 
year earlier caused the corresponding tax 
revenues to go up. 
Fiscal expenditure was greater than budgeted, 
as a result of wage increases granted to 
public-sector workers and the payment of 
accrued labour liabilities, as well as higher 
transfers to regional and local governments. 
These increases were partially offset by lower 
interest payments, which dropped in line with 
national interest rates. In the final analysis, the 
effects of the expenditure moderation policy fell 
on public investment, which stagnated at a level 
equivalent to 0.4% of GDP. The ratio of total 
public spending to GDP thus rose from 19.5% to 
21.8% between 1996 and 1997. 
Despite the fiscal surplus, a small portion of 
expenditure was financed via domestic and 
foreign borrowing in accordance with the laws on 
public-sector borrowing and the programmes of 
multilateral financial organizations. The 
Government also issued domestic public debt 
bonds to a value of around US$ 1 billion in order 
to pay off part of its accumulated debt with the 
Central Bank of Venezuela. In addition, it issued 
global bonds on the international market to a 
value of US$ 4 billion to be swapped for Brady 
bonds valued at US$ 4, 441 million, thereby 
freeing up some US$ 1.5 billion in collateral. The 
Government remained active in the eurobond 
market, where it took in US$ 315 million. 
Public-sector accounts as a whole were 
considerably affected by a contraction in 
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. operating profits, 
caused by a combination of high domestic 
inflation and a relatively stable exchange rate. 
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Table 1 
VENEZUELA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National savings 
External savings 
Employment and wages 
Labour force participation rate d 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 





Terms of trade 
(index: 1990=100)b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(bolívares per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial account 8 
Overall balance 
Variation in reserve assets 
(- indicates an increase) 
External debt 
Gross debt 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 














































































































































































































































































































Table 1 (conclusion) 
VENEZUELA 
Central government 
Current income ' 
Current revenue 
Saving 
Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Money and credit 
Monetary balance of banking system 
Net international, reserves 
Domestic creditJ 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 
M2 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
Deposit rate 
Lending rate 
Equivalent interest rate 

















1990 1991 1992 
































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the 
economically active population (EAP). From June 1992 on, includes food and transport allowances. g Includes Errors and 
omissions. Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. ' Includes 
as expenditure net loans granted, extrabudgetary expenditure and Central Bank losses, which in 1995 were equivalent to 2.8% 
of GDP. ^ Apart from loans to the public and private sectors, includes the net amount of "other accounts". Interest rate 
on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
VENEZUELA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1995 1996 1997" 1998" 
1 II III IV I II 111 IV I II III IV 1 II 
Gross domestic product 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 70.4 61.3 51.7 56.6 78.2 108.1 115.5 103.5 74.9 43.6 39.2 37.6 38.2 39.1 
3.1 0.9 6.7 4.0 -0.9 -1.6 -1.1 1.7 0.5 7.5 7.4 4.9 6.3 
Real effective exchange rate 
(index: 1990=100) 79.3 72.6 66.3 67.3 80.4 94.2 87.3 78.4 72.2 68.6 64.5 59.3 56.5 55.3 
International reserves 
(millions of dollars) 11174 10547 9207 9723 9 983 10907 12 684 15 229 15 976 16 655 18 330 17 818 15 796 15 499 
Ml 
(change from same quarter 
of preceding year) 104.3 72.0 33.8 34.2 41.9 50.0 57.5 83.5 66.5 90.5 109.6 58.4 69.1 
Real interest rates 
(annualized, %) 
Deposit rate -12.3 -21.4 -8.8 -28.5 -43.8 -51.0 -23.9 -19.5 -12.2 -13.9 -19.9 -18.4 -4.4 1.2 
Lending rate 3.9 -10.4 4.6 -19.0 -35.6 -42.3 -15.8 -13.2 -5.8 -6.9 -13.3 -12.5 4.1 8.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Refers to the exchange rate for imports. 
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Consequently, the ratio of public-sector revenues 
to GDP fell to 32%, whereas expenditure edged 
up by one percentage point to nearly 30%. 
The fall in the price of crude oil from the end 
of 1997 upset central government fiscal planning 
for 1998, which had projected a balanced budget 
based on an average price of US$ 15.50 per barrel 
of oil exported. As the price on the international 
market weakened, the budget projection was 
adjusted downwards. In order to compensate for 
the anticipated reduction in revenues, equivalent 
to several percentage points of GDP, the 
Government introduced public spending cuts in 
the first half of 1998 and approved measures to 
boost revenues. These included a rise in the tax 
rate on wholesale sales and luxury consumption 
from 16.5% to 18%, a widening of the tax base 
and other proposals aimed at enhancing fiscal 
efficiency and control, which were sent to 
Congress for approval. 
(b) Monetary policy 
The financing of greater public spending 
with funds from abroad contributed to an 
expansion in the primary money supply, and 
this was accompanied by considerable increase 
in bank loans, due to greater demand for credit 
in the context of economic recovery. In 
response to the threat this posed to the inflation 
target, the Central Bank of Venezuela 
maintained its policy of keeping a tight grip on 
liquidity. 
This policy was implemented chiefly by 
raising the legal reserve ratio, which was put up 
from 12% to 15% in July and 17% in August in 
response to the surge in lending to the private 
sector. The Central Bank also continued selling 
monetary stabilization bonds (TEMs), which were 
temporarily replaced by national public debt 
bonds (DPNs) at the end of 1997 and by 
non-negotiable certificates of deposit in 1998, 
but these operations had a barely contractionary 
result. The monetary base therefore expanded by 
nearly 80% in 1997. This is explained by a 
build-up of international reserves, only partially 
offset by a reduction in the public sector's debit 
position with the Central Bank resulting from the 
above-mentioned transfer of public debt bonds 
and the deposit of part of the extraordinary 
revenues coming from the oil sector and 
privatization. 
Ml money supply growth (84%) was 
somewhat greater than the expansion in the 
monetary base, due to the increase in 
private-sector credit mentioned earlier. Ml 
growth reflected the public's greater liquidity 
preference, with savings and time deposits 
expanding less than demand deposits. The 
increase in broad money (M2) was limited to 
45%, in a context of negative real interest rates. 
Nominal interest rates did not change much in 
1997, after dropping from the high levels reached 
in the first half of the previous year. Annual 
average rates on deposits and loans were 16% and 
24% respectively, half of those recorded in 1996. 
Since the rate of inflation fell more than interest 
rates, yields became less negative. 
Negative real interest rates stimulated stock 
market investment, which was also fueled by 
foreign capital inflows. During the first three 
quarters of 1997, prices on the Caracas stock 
exchange climbed steadily, although from 
September onwards they began to lose ground as 
a result of the financial crisis affecting a number 
of Asian countries. Measured in dollar terms, in 
November 1997 stock prices fell below the level 
at which they had ended 1996, but began to 
recover again the following February. 
The reduction in foreign currency earnings 
from oil, together with less confidence in the 
currency leading to a stronger demand for 
dollars, forced the Central Bank to defend the 
desired level of the exchange rate in 1998 by 
supplying foreign currency to the market and 
intensifying its policy of mopping up liquidity. 
Net reserves held by the Bank fell significantly 
in the first quarter, and the monetary base shrank 
by nearly 9%. Money supply growth during the 
quarter was restricted to less than 7%, and broad 
money contracted by nearly 3%, while interest 
rates responded by moving sharply upwards from 
February onward: at the beginning of May loan 
and deposit rates were above 40% and 31% 
respectively. 
(c) Foreign exchange policy 
The value of the bolivar was strongly affected 
by the inflow of foreign currency from oil 
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revenues. Tie Central Bank of Venezuela 
maintained the system instituted in July 1996 
involving an exchange rate band pegged to the 
United States dollar, but adapted it operationally 
to conditions in the currency market. 
In early 1997, in response to the strength of 
the external sector, which had forced the 
bolivar-dollar price gradually towards the floor 
of the band, the Central Bank proceeded to adjust 
the central paiity downwards and slow its rate of 
crawl from l.:>0% to 1.32% per month. In July a 
further adjustment was made, the monthly rate of 
crawl being lowered to 1.16%. The nominal 
dollar price ir the market thus rose from 476 to 
504 bolívares over the course of 1997, 
representing £ nominal depreciation of the local 
currency of ju st 6%. Consequently, in real terms, 
the bolivar ap] >reciated by 24% during the period. 
In the face of the turnaround in dollar supply 
and demand conditions on the foreign exchange 
market, in January 1998 the Central Bank again 
corrected the central parity of the exchange-rate 
band, this time upwards, and raised the pre-set 
rate of crawl back up to 1.28%. As a result, 
bolivar depreciation accelerated over the course 
of 1998. At the beginning of May the dollar price 
passed the central parity for the first time to settle 
in the upper half of the band, and by the end of 
the first semester the dollar was being quoted at 
550 bolívares 
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plementi tion of Agenda Venezuela special 
given to the structural changes it 
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provided for. Towards the end of the first half of 
1997 amendments were passed to the labour 
code, which laid the foundations for an in-depth 
reform of social security involving a 
recapitalization of the Venezuelan Social 
Security Institute (IVSS) and the eventual creation 
of private pension funds. The amendments 
require the Government to recognize labour 
liabilities equivalent to US$ 8 billion, to be paid 
over a five-year period, and a further US$ 6 
billion will be needed to recapitalize the social 
security system. 
The 1997 privatization programme included 
selling the important aluminum complex of the 
Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (CVG), but 
various difficulties that arose during the bidding 
period caused it to be postponed to 1998. On the 
other hand, in addition to other smaller 
privatizations carried out during the year, the iron 
and steel firm Sidor was successfully auctioned 
off at the end of 1997. The sale of 70% of Sidor 
shares raised US$ 1.2 million for the State. 
Moreover, the process continued of opening 
up the oil sector to private capital. In June a third 
round of operating agreements were signed with 
the company Petróleos de Venezuela, which thus 
raised US$ 2,172 million from rights granted to 
18 national and foreign consortiums for the 
exploitation of marginal petroleum deposits. In 
November private firms were authorized to 
participate in supplying oil and gas to the 
domestic market, a change that began to take 
effect in February 1998. Petróleos de Venezuela, 
meanwhile, undertook a significant internal 
restructuring programme in 1998 aimed at 
enhancing its efficiency and increasing 
profitability. 
3. The main variables 
In 1997 Venezuela began to reap the fruits of 
the adjustment programme implemented the 
previous year, and the economy posted better 
results: growth with lower inflation, although 
the latter fell by less than expected, with 
external accounts remaining in surplus in the 
context of a still favourable situation in the oil 
market. When oil prices dropped in 1998, the 
overall performance of the economy began to 
deteriorate. 
(a) Economic activity 
Gross domestic product grew by 5.6% and per 
capita output by 3.4% in 1997. This result was 
assisted both by the external market and by the 
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climate of greater domestic macroeconomic 
stability. Production for export expanded by 
13%, accounting for nearly half of the increase 
in aggregate supply in the economy. Crude oil 
production played a decisive part, with output 
rising from 2.94 to 3.21 million barrels per day 
to generate growth of nearly 9% in the oil 
sector. 
Greater macroeconomic stability, along with 
improved expectations, fostered a recovery in 
domestic investment, which grew by one third to 
rise above the depressed levels of the two 
previous years. Owing largely to the Petróleos de 
Venezuela investment programme, public-sector 
investment expanded by 11%. Its contribution to 
the strengthening of domestic demand was also 
substantial, as it continued to account for the bulk 
of total investment, which, despite the recent 
upsurge, still barely equalled one sixth of the 
country's GDP. Gross domestic saving as a 
percentage of GDP (36%) was much higher, as it 
needed to be to offset net capital outflows 
amounting to 10% of GDP, an unfavourable 
terms-of-trade effect (-6%), a deficit on factor 
services (3%) and a small net private-sector 
transfer abroad. 
Consumption rebounded by nearly 5% and 
was a significant stimulus to output, accounting 
for nearly two thirds of its growth. Recovery here 
was rooted in the private sector, in response to a 
rise in purchasing power, a favourable 
employment trend and an expansion of bank 
credit. 
Apart from public services, all activity sectors 
participated in the economic recovery, albeit 
unequally. The greatest relative growth was in 
construction (13%), which began to climb out of 
the trough into which it had fallen during 1993. 
Manufacturing grew by 4%, while agriculture, 
not very sensitive to the immediate cycle, kept up 
its steady expansionary trend, which, with 3% 
growth in 1997, meant an 11% accumulated rise 
since 1990. 
GDP growth prospects for 1998 worsened as 
oil prices tumbled and the Government decided 
to cut oil output and exports under agreements 
with other producer countries. In addition, the 
fiscal measures taken by the public sector to face 
down the fall in oil revenues and the rise in 
interest rates arising from deteriorating 
exchange-market conditions have had a 
restraining effect on growth. 
(b) Prices, wages and employment 
The rise in the consumer price index during 
1997 was less than the record triple-digit high 
recorded in 1996 and the 1995 figure, but prices 
nonetheless rose by 37.6%, above the official 
target. Thus, expectations generated since the 
monthly inflation rate started to fall in November 
1996 were cut short: the disinflationary process 
only lasted until March, when the monthly rate 
was the lowest in several years (1.6%). The 
subsequent upturn coincided with a rebound in 
consumption and economic activity from the 
second quarter onward in a climate of abundant 
liquidity. 
The resurgence of inflation was even more 
worrying in view of the relative stability of the 
exchange rate during the year. The trend was 
particularly driven by administrative increases in 
fuel prices and some utility rates, as is shown by 
the much more moderate course of producer price 
indices (19%) and wholesale price indices (15%), 
which exclude services. At the end of July 1998, 
year-on-year inflation remained around 38% and 
was resisting falling in line with the target rate 
despite the slowdown in demand. 
Purchasing power among both manual and 
non-manual workers went up by 26%, rising for 
the first time in several years to almost regain its 
1995 level. This rise was the outcome of lower 
inflation in 1997, as well as wage increases 
granted and the payment of accrued labour 
liabilities under the new labour code. 
Public-sector workers received larger increases 
than those in the private sector. In mid-1997 the 
minimum wage was raised and various existing 
supplementary allowances that had not been 
counted for pension purposes were added in; the 
minimum wage thus rose from 32,000 to 75,000 
bolívares. In 1998 it was raised again, effective 1 
May, to 100,000 bolívares. 
The recovery of economic activity enabled 
more than half a million jobs to be created and 
reversed the rising trend of joblessness since 
1994 that had culminated in the second half of 
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1996 with one worker in eight out of a job. The 
unemployment rate dropped back to 10.6% in the 
second half of 1997, and the size of the informal 
sector shrank, although continuing to account for 
nearly 48% of the workforce. 
(c) The external sector 
The persistence of favourable conditions in 
the world oil market almost throughout 1997 
allowed Venezuela to increase slightly the 
already high value of its goods exports, which 
verged on US$ 24 billion. A slight cheapening of 
oil exported by Venezuela -the average price 
slipped from US$ 18.3 per barrel in 1996 to 16.5 
in 1997- was offset by an expansion of volumes 
shipped from 2.75 to 3.05 million barrels per day. 
Other merchandise exports, which contribute 
22% of the foreign currency earned from sales 
abroad, recovered from the setback suffered in 
the previous year to grow by 17%. 
Goods imports surged in the context of real 
exchange-rate appreciation and greater 
economic activity, rising by 25% in value terms 
(27% in volume) compared to the low levels of 
the preceding year. In keeping with the 
considerable upturn in investment, purchases of 
capital goods were the category that grew most 
(nearly 50%), making up for nearly all the 
previous year's decline. 
These trends in visible imports caused a 
reduction in Venezuela's large trade and current 
account surpluses, which shrank to US$ 8 billion 
and US$ 6 billion respectively. This made it 
possible to finance a net capital outflow and still 
generate an overall surplus of US$ 3.2 billion 
-still large, but far from the previous year's 
US$ 7 billion. As a result, international reserves 
continued to rise from their most recent low 
in April 1996, increasing during 1997 from 
US$ 15.2 billion to US$ 17.8 billion. 
The capital account deficit was smaller than 
in 1996, owing mainly to large amounts of 
foreign direct investment (around US$ 5 
billion) associated with the opening up of the 
oil sector and privatization. However, these 
inflows were less than the sum total of net 
resources transferred abroad by the non-bank 
private sector and amortization payments on 
the public sector's external debt. The latter 
meant that the country's total external debt was 
reduced once more to below US$ 33 billion by 
the end of 1997, despite increased borrowing 
by the private sector. 
The first semester of 1998 saw a drastic 
change in trends in the external accounts. Export 
earnings plummeted owing to a drop in prices and 
volumes of oil shipments. Prices fell to an 
average of US$ 10.4 by the end of July; volumes 
were reduced because of the agreements reached 
between several producer countries in March and 
June to restrict supplies to the world market in an 
effort to halt the downward slide in prices. This 
situation, and the currency outflow it engendered 
among economic agents, was reflected in 
international reserves, which, having shed US$ 1 
billion in December 1997, dropped below 
US$ 14.5 billion in mid-May, a level that was 




ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN 
1. Introduction and synthesis 
Overall, economic expansion was slightly less 
vigorous in 1997 than in the preceding year, 
although the rate of growth showed greater 
divergence between the countries surveyed than 
in 1996. The sectors recording the strongest 
performance were tourism, construction and the 
distributive trades. Agriculture had a mixed 
performance with declining output in Barbados, 
Jamaica and the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS) countries. The 
traditional agricultural exports suffered from 
lower prices, while output in the sector as a whole 
was adversely affected by unfavourable climatic 
conditions. The manufacturing sector showed 
heterogeneous behaviour, declining in Jamaica 
and the OECS countries but with moderate 
increases elsewhere. 
In general, faster increases in the money 
supply and easier credit were observed in 1997. 
Exceptions to this were to be found in Guyana 
and Jamaica, where money growth slowed. In 
Jamaica, however, the rate of increase of the 
stock of liquid assets (M2) remained at the upper 
level of the range for Caribbean countries. 
Barbados represented another particular case, 
with banks accumulating excess liquidity over 
the first six months, although the demand for 
loans strengthened later in the year. In the 
Caribbean as a whole, the increased volume of 
credit probably contributed to generating larger 
trade deficits. 
There was a widespread deterioration of the 
public accounts. Exceptions to this trend were the 
improved fiscal results in Barbados and Trinidad 
and Tobago. In OECS countries, the government 
current accounts showed higher surpluses. 
However, information on capital spending for 
these countries is incomplete, so that inferences 
regarding overall balances for them as a group 
are inconclusive. For all other countries, there 
was deterioration in the current account, with 
increases in recurrent spending outstripping new 
revenues. The overall account was further eroded 
by the fact that, in most instances, capital 
spending was augmented greatly. 
Price inflation remained moderate. The 
notable exception was Jamaica, where the rate of 
price growth diminished to near 10% (down from 
26% in 1996). In general, such price increases as 
were experienced resulted from domestic 
conditions, since international inflation remained 
subdued. In Barbados, prices rose as a 
consequence of the new value added tax (VAT), 
while in Suriname economic imbalances sparked 
renewed inflation after its virtual disappearance 
in 1996. 
Unemployment fell, on average, by less than 
0.5% in 1997. Jamaica and the Netherlands 
Antilles recorded increased unemployment, 
however, as a result of depressed economic 
conditions. In most Caribbean countries the rate 
of unemployment exceeded 12%, while in all of 
them female and youth unemployment rates were 
much higher than those for adult males. 
Construction and the building trades were among 
the main sources of job creation in 1997. 
Asa general feature, the current account of the 
balance of payments showed smaller surpluses or 
larger deficits. This reflected the weakness of 
export performance and the effects of easy credit, 
which were not compensated for by the modest 
growth in tourism earnings. Most merchandise 
exports performed poorly. This was the case of 
bananas (with export revenues down by 15%), 
sugar (-7%) and bauxite (-1.3%); foreign sales of 
fuels from Trinidad fell by 3.1%. However, 
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alumina earnings in Jamaica increased by 7%, 
while tourism arrivals rose by 4% for the 
subregion as a whole. 
In several cases, such as in the Bahamas, 
Guyana and the OECS countries, the negative 
developments in the current accounts were 
matched by increased capital inflows, allowing 
for improvements in the balance of payments. 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago showed 
increases in international reserves, but of lesser 
amounts than in the previous year. The decline in 
the surplus of the overall balance of payments 
was substantial in Belize, while Jamaica reported 
a deficit. The external liabilities of the subregion 
contracted by 4%. 
The economy of Aruba is estimated to have 
grown in 1997 by around 4%, with continued 
buoyancy being provided by the tourist sector. 
However, the expansion was accompanied by 
severely deteriorating fiscal and external 
accounts. The most recent data indicate a 
fourfold increase in the fiscal deficit over that for 
1996, with government revenue, which rose by 
3%, being outstripped by spending, which grew 
by 20%. Higher public sector wages were the 
main source of increased spending. Rising 
domestic expenditures acted on the balance of 
payments, foreign reserves falling by US$ 67 
million. Payment arrears also accumulated. 
Failure to address the macroeconomic 
imbalances was evident in the run-up to the 
election, which became necessary when the 
ruling coalition collapsed. However, the election 
results were such that the impasse continued into 
1998. 
In the Bahamas the economic growth which 
had resumed in 1996 after two years of relative 
stagnation continued in 1997. However, the rate 
of expansion was more moderate, at 3% 
compared to 4.2% in 1996. Slower growth was 
observed in the tourism sector, in part as a result 
of refurbishing and upgrading of facilities. 
Simultaneously, this activity pushed up 
construction, with building starts more than 
doubling in value in 1997. The fiscal accounts 
deteriorated, with recurrent expenditure 
outstripping recurrent revenues, while capital 
spending increased by more than 60%, capital 
formation rising by 85%. 
In the financial sector, the picture was one of 
buoyant liquidity. Growth in domestic credit was 
strong and this contributed to a widening of the 
deficit on the current account of the balance of 
payments. Capital inflows, mainly for tourism 
investment, redressed the balance and 
augmented the reserves by US$ 56 million. At the 
same time, the total external debt increased, by 
US$ 3.9 million, or just over 1%. Inflation 
remained moderate, falling from 1.4% in 1996 to 
0.5% in the current survey year. 
The economy of Barbados, maintaining its 
steady growth since 1992, expanded by 3% in 
1997. Economic activity was stimulated by 
strong performance in the construction sector, 
which benefited from increased public and 
private investment, and by an expansion in the 
wholesale and retail trades. Manufacturing also 
recorded higher levels of output, while tourism 
growth was modest. Despite the increase in sugar 
production, the agricultural sector declined in the 
aggregate. The rise in job creation was reflected 
in a lower unemployment rate (12.2% at the end 
of the year), mainly because of increased labour 
demand in construction activities and the 
distributive trades. Inflation increased markedly, 
the average annual rate of price growth shooting 
up to 7.7%, as a one-time response to the value 
added tax. However, inflationary pressures 
subsided by the end of the year. The balance of 
payments recorded a reduced surplus, primarily 
because of much higher volume of imports, while 
the fiscal accounts strengthened, greatly 
augmented revenues from VAT making possible 
increased capital spending and a smaller deficit. 
Economic activity in Belize picked up in 1997 
with a growth rate of 4.5%. This was due to a 
large extent to the performance of agriculture, led 
by citrus production and fishing. Government 
activities also expanded, with increases in 
recurrent and capital spending. The fiscal deficit 
rose from 0.4% of GDP to nearly 2%. 
Performance on the balance of payments was not 
as strong as in the previous year. The reserves 
increased but at a much slower rate than in 1996. 
Inflation declined substantially, following the 
jump experienced in 1996 with the introduction 
of VAT, while unemployment fell slightly, from 
13.8% to 12.7%. 
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The rate of economic growth in Guyana 
slowed in 1997. However, despite adverse 
weather and the uncertainties of an election 
year, expansion remained strong at 6.3%, 
benefiting from buoyancy in minerals, 
manufacturing, construction activities and 
transport and communications. Credit to the 
private sector slowed, primarily because of the 
malaise in agriculture, but government 
borrowing increased. The public finances 
deteriorated and there was a much larger fiscal 
deficit. Government revenues languished, but 
recurrent expenditures rose by 24%, with 
increases in payments to public officials and in 
interest payments. Capital spending also grew. 
Overall, the balance of payments showed a 
modest surplus, although the current account 
deficit expanded as a result of deterioration in 
both the goods and services accounts. 
However, public and private capital inflows 
increased. Inflation moderated slightly 
compared with 1996. 
Output in Jamaica contracted for the second 
successive year, while unemployment increased 
slightly. Most productive sectors had a negative 
performance, with the exception of mining and 
quarrying and basic services. Severe drought 
throughout 1997 reduced the contribution of 
agriculture, while manufacturing activities felt 
the effects of the continued opening up and 
restructuring of the sector. Construction was hit 
by reduced aggregate demand and by tight credit. 
Monetary policies continued to be aimed at 
containing the growth in the supply of liquidity. 
The monetary aggregate M2 expanded by 13.4% 
as opposed to 14.5% in 1996 and 46% on average 
from 1993 to 1995. The inflation rate dropped 
substantially, from 26.4% in 1996 to 10% in 
1997. However, depressed output and very high 
loan rates affected the profitability of enterprises. 
This had repercussions on banks, some of which 
faced insolvency. 
Public accounts for the calendar year 1997 
also deteriorated significantly, as a consequence 
of public funding to support the failing financial 
institutions and the cost of servicing the greatly 
augmented domestic debt. The balance of 
payments reflected the sluggish performance of 
the economy, export earnings remaining flat, 
while imports increased modestly. The net 
services balance also contracted, while the high 
level of capital inflows witnessed in recent years 
was also greatly reduced so that the balance of 
payments recorded a deficit equivalent to 2.5% 
of GDP. 
In the Netherlands Antilles the annualized 
real GDP to the third quarter of 1997 is estimated 
to have declined by 2.5%. At that time, real 
output had contracted for seven consecutive 
quarters as a result of reduced purchasing power, 
sluggish investment and low levels of confidence 
among domestic economic actors. External 
performance was also weaker, mainly because of 
reduced transactions by the transportation sector, 
petroleum refining and international financial 
and business services. However, tourism 
performed well, mainly as a result of increased 
activity in Saint Marten. Despite the effort 
expended so far, the fiscal account continued to 
cause concern, the deficit being double that 
projected for the year, while debt arrears 
accumulated. Policy management has been 
hampered by the complex network of 12 political 
parties which share 22 seats in the national 
legislature, resulting in potentially unstable 
coalitions. 
Overall, the OECS member countries 
experienced somewhat faster economic growth, 
with a 3% increase in GDP in 1997, compared to 
2.5% in 1996. The expansion was evident in 
most services activities, while agriculture and 
manufacturing had reduced output. Performance 
was strong in the tourism sector, construction, 
communications and transportation. The decline 
in agricultural production was particularly 
substantial, the rate of contraction increasing in 
1997. This was explained by a 28% reduction in 
the volume of bananas exported; a 47% fall in 
cocoa exports also contributed to this decline. 
The money supply rose moderately in 1997, 
1 This evaluation is based on data provided by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) which covers all members of the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), namely, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as Anguilla. 
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compared with the contraction in 1996; credit to 
private households registered the most notable 
increase over the previous year. The fiscal 
accounts strengthened, with a slightly increased 
recurrent surplus. The current account of the 
balance of payments deteriorated, but capital 
inflows were sufficient to redress the deficit and 
allow for increased reserves. The inflation rate 
remained low in the group of countries, falling 
slightly in comparison with the 1996 figures. 
The rate of economic expansion quickened in 
Suriname in 1997 (5.6%, up from 3% in the 
previous year). The leading sector was mining, 
which grew by 16%, with strong performances in 
aluminum and gold production. Miscellaneous 
services including trade, restaurants and hotels 
also expanded rapidly. Inflation started to move 
upward once again, the average annual rate rising 
to 7%. Year end inflation increased to a level of 
over 16%. The fiscal accounts were put under 
renewed pressure because of weak tax collection 
and wage increases in the public sector. Total 
government revenues dropped by 1.3%. Receipts 
from indirect taxes fell by 9%, in part because 
import tariffs were removed from products 
bought within the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) and also because duties on raw 
materials and semi-processed goods were 
eliminated in March 1997. Moreover, taxes fell 
behind target because the sales tax scheduled for 
introduction in July 1997 was not introduced 
until February 1998 and then at half the 15% rate 
originally proposed. 
The external current account deteriorated 
from a surplus in recent years to a deficit of 
US$ 44 million in 1997. Imports increased by 
2. Economic policies: 
structural 
Two factors loom large in the design of 
Caribbean macroeconomic policies. The first is 
the set of criteria agreed upon by the Council of 
Central Bank Governors of the CARICOM 
2 These issues were dealt with in greater depth in a report of t 
Spain, entitled "Review of Caribbean economic performance, 
(LC/CAR/G.512), 29 December 1997. 
9.6%, owing to higher consumption demand and 
to large imports of capital goods by the 
bauxite/alumina industry. Export earnings 
declined by 5%, lower metals prices being the 
main cause, while sales of shrimp, oil, rice and 
bananas had strong performances. Foreign 
investment and loan inflows offset the current 
account deficit but the reserves excluding gold 
fell, in part because of continued gold 
purchases, so that import cover fell from 4 to 
3.2 months. 
In Trinidad and Tobago production 
expanded in 1997 for the fourth consecutive year, 
by about 4%. The increased output in the non-oil 
sector (at 4.1% in the aggregate), which applied 
to all activities with the exception of government, 
was sufficient to compensate for the decline of 
just over 1% observed in the oil sector. 
Unemployment fell to its lowest level in 12 years, 
although it remained high (15%). Despite the 
expansion in output, inflation stayed below 4%, 
slightly up on the 3.3% recorded for the previous 
year. Given the rapid build-up of liquidity in the 
financial system, the Central Bank intervened 
actively in the market but found it necessary to 
reimpose reserve requirements for commercial 
banks and non-bank financial institutions by the 
end of the year in order to contain money growth. 
Both the fiscal and external accounts recorded 
surpluses, the latter bringing about a 19% 
increase in international reserves. Current 
accounts (government and balance of payments) 
deteriorated, but this was offset by the receipts 
derived from the divestment of a methanol 
installation and inflows intended to finance new 
investments in the gas sector. 
general outlook and 
reforms2 
countries for qualification for the CARICOM 
single economy. The so-called "3-12-36-15 
criteria", targets three months' foreign exchange 
cover for a period of 12 months, 36 months of 
he regional headquarters of ECLAC for the Caribbean, Port of 
1997: based on data for the period January to June 1997" 
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exchange rate stability and a debt service ratio of 
under 15% of export. The ultimate objective of 
this exercise is to create a Caribbean monetary 
union, modeled closely on that of the European 
Union and potential member countries have been 
influenced by the incentive to demonstrate their 
ability to qualify in the first tier of entrants. 
The second factor is a growing conviction that 
in these open economies exchange rate 
depreciations result very quickly in higher prices. 
Accordingly, it is increasingly believed that 
flexible exchange rates have costly effects. This 
position has traditionally been maintained by the 
smaller economies in the Caribbean, the 
members of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 
(ECCB), Belize, the Bahamas, Barbados and the 
Dutch-speaking territories, Aruba and the 
Netherlands Antilles. The most vocal proponent 
of this argument, Barbados, is the only one of the 
so-called More Developed Countries (MDCs) of 
CARICOM to have used the exchange rate as a 
strict policy implement. Guyana, Jamaica and 
Suriname have experienced greater surges 
instability and accordingly more rapidly 
depreciating exchange rates. Trinidad and 
Tobago has adopted an intermediate course, 
with moderate rates of devaluation 
systematically managed by the central bank 
over time. 
Recently Jamaica seems to have shifted its 
position, after experimenting with various 
foreign exchange rate regimes, ranging from 
a free float to a central bank managed foreign 
exchange auction. The current approach 
seems to be more closely akin to that of the 
majority, which is that of using other 
macroeconomic tools to sustain the level of 
reserves necessary for a stable exchange rate. 
While the Jamaican authorities insist that the 
focus is not on the exchange rate per se, but 
rather on inflation, the two are seen as 
integrally related in the Caribbean. Whether 
the Jamaican experiment can be sustained is 
being watched with a great deal of interest: 
the outcome is far from clear as, in the face of 
huge fiscal deficits, the policy is only possible 
with punitive interest rates. 
Throughout the subregion structural reforms 
continued, notably in the area of fiscal policy, to 
make tax regimes more transparent and to 
substitute consumption taxes for declining trade 
taxes, to improve tax compliance and tax 
collection mechanisms and to remove loss 
making and other business operations from the 
public accounts, through privatization. Reforms 
were also evident in the continuing liberalization 
in several areas, especially in the trade and 
financial sectors. 
In Aruba, the proposed anti-inflationary 
policy was based on restraint in public spending, 
which was also meant to reduce pressure on 
domestic credit and husband the international 
reserves. The attitude of fiscal restraint came 
after public sector wage indexation was 
introduced in 1996, resulting in increasing wages 
and salaries and related social security costs. 
Guidelines were therefore issued to streamline 
both policy and administration of the tax system, 
increase revenue by strengthening collection and 
billing procedures and liberate excess 
employment in the public sector by adjusting its 
size and composition so as to ease the manpower 
constraints faced by the rest of the economy. By 
the end of the year, much of the policy was in 
disarray, since uncertainty arising from the 
inability to maintain a stable coalition 
government diverted attention from fiscal 
consolidation. 
In Barbados, several policy challenges were 
identified for attention in 1997. Chief among 
them was the need to concentrate efforts on the 
poorest segments of the population, given the fact 
that the economy had been stabilized and had 
regained its forward momentum. At the same 
time, implementation of the policy reform 
agenda was accelerated with respect to the trade 
and payments regimes and the development of 
financial markets. Other areas of focus were debt 
management and policies to insure against 
overheating of the economy, in order to contain 
excess liquidity. 
In Guyana, policy statements made when the 
budget was presented for 1997, an election year, 
sought to reassure the private sector and 
reiterated the importance of private sector 
growth, especially as government continued to 
divest itself of productive enterprises. In fact, 
privatizations accelerated in 1997. In addition, 
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an investment guide and investment code were to 
be prepared which would provide basic 
guarantees for investors and consolidate the 
various incentive regimes currently in operation. 
The institution GO-Invest was to incorporate and 
consolidate the functions of the Export 
Promotion Council in order to perform activities 
more efficiently and better promote investment 
in Guyana. A merchant bank had also been 
licenced which was expected to provide a range 
of services previously unavailable to the private 
sector. 
Particular emphasis was to be placed on the 
contribution of manufacturing, especially 
agro-industry and wood processing, to economic 
growth. Accordingly, the Government undertook 
to seek special financing from international 
sources to provide venture capital and other 
related business and financial services to 
stimulate these activities. Support would also 
continue to be given to the tourism sector and 
particularly eco-tourism by rehabilitating 
hinterland airstrips, protecting the 
environment and developing collaborative 
links with other Governments in the Caribbean 
active in this field. 
Tax reform was also under review. The aim 
was to make the tax regime send appropriate 
signals to the private sector, specifically to 
reward initiative and penalize tax evasion. The 
application of a value added tax was also to be 
considered in view of the steady erosion of trade 
taxes as the CARICOM common external tariff was 
lowered. The debt reduction efforts were also to 
be continued. 
In Jamaica, the authorities gave high priority 
to the objectives of stabilizing prices and the 
exchange rate. The target set at the beginning of 
the year was to reduce inflation to 9%. Money 
supply growth was to be contained to no more 
than 11% per annum while the fiscal deficit was 
to be reduced to 2% of GDP. The Government 
expected that reduced inflation would contribute 
to decreasing interest rates, and GDP was targeted 
to grow at between 2% and 3%. 
In 1997 the Government of Jamaica embarked 
on the second phase of its national industrial 
policy. In this phase, fiscal policy was expected 
to contribute by helping to reduce inflation and 
interest rates and by liberating resources for 
investment. Fiscal consolidation was to be 
achieved by increasing receipts and reducing 
recurrent spending. In the former category, the 
authorities planned to focus the ongoing 
programme of tax administration reform on 
improving compliance. In the latter category, 
recurrent spending was expected to fall as a result 
of better debt management and lower interest 
rates, which would also reduce the cost of debt 
servicing. Attention was also to be given to 
public sector wages to limit increases in line with 
inflation. 
As the year evolved, however, it became 
evident that efforts to reduce interest rates were 
premature, domestic investors judging the policy 
unsustainable in the context of growing fiscal and 
balance of payments deficits. They responded by 
shifting away from domestic to foreign currency 
deposits. In order to support the objective of price 
stability, which was predicated on a stable 
exchange rate, the central bank increased 
interest rates once again and intervened in the 
foreign exchange market, reducing the net 
international reserves by US$ 153 million in the 
second quarter. The reserves stabilized 
temporarily, but came under pressure in the 
fourth quarter in the run-up to the general 
elections which were held in December. By the 
end of 1997, the reserves stood at US$ 542 
million, sufficient for nearly three months of 
import cover. Capital inflows resumed 
thereafter, with foreign assets increasing slowly 
into 1998. 
On the policy front, the Netherlands Antilles 
initiated a structural adjustment programme at 
the commencement of 1997, the main elements 
of which were a fiscal consolidation package, 
wage restraint and a tight credit policy. It was 
underpinned by a precautionary line of credit of 
Dfl 100 million from the Central Bank of the 
Netherlands, refinancing of outstanding debt and 
grants to support the social component of 
policies. The programme also contemplated 
measures of reform in the government sector, to 
streamline the public administration, adopt a 
market-oriented wage structure and improve 
public accounting; the authorities planned to 
implement divestment of several public 
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enterprises, including the loss-making 
national airline. Monetary targets defined a 
limit of 3.5% credit growth for the private 
sector, while credit to the Government was 
not to exceed the amount outstanding at 31 
October 1996. These targets would be 
monitored quarterly and penalties levied for 
non-compliance. By the end of the year the 
fiscal consolidation programme had not met 
its objectives, as the deficit seemed likely to 
have doubled. These negative fiscal results 
were in large measure due to the fact that 
unstable political coalitions were unable to 
provide the necessary policy focus either 
before or after the elections held in 1997. 
In the OECS countries, policy-making was 
shaped by the evolution of the market for 
bananas. The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
ruling which found against the European Union 
banana licencing arrangements has reduced the 
chances of survival of the current trade regime of 
the good. For the banana producing countries of 
the Windward Islands -Dominica, Grenada, 
Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines- the main policy problem was to find 
the wherewithal to cope with the loss of 
preferential access to the United Kingdom 
market. This would require diversification of 
output to offset the contraction of the banana 
industry, as well as measures to improve 
productivity and fruit quality, so as to preserve 
that portion of the sector which could be made 
viable under the new non-preferential regime. 
The issue for the OECS countries as a whole was 
to manage the strains which could appear within 
the grouping caused by the slowing economic 
tempo of the Windward Islands vis-à-vis the 
other members. 
Further questions were posed by the 
proposed accession of Barbados to OECS. A 
task force has been established to prepare 
proposals for eventual Barbadian membership, 
which is expected to have currency unification 
as one of its early steps. The fixing of a 
common rate will have significant policy 
implications for all members, especially as a 
3 The OECS countries operate a loose integration 
ECCB covers all the OECS countries and Anguilla. 
common CARICOM currency is mooted for early 
in the next decade. 
In Trinidad and Tobago, policy emphasis 
was placed on maintaining macroeconomic 
stability, slowing the rate of depreciation of the 
exchange rate and providing incentives to 
increase local and foreign investment. Persistent 
concerns were reducing the rate of 
unemployment and diversifying the economy, 
that is inducing the expansion of the non-oil 
sector. Policy reforms related to lowering trade 
protection in line with the requirements of the 
CARICOM Common External Tariff (CET) and 
simplifying and rationalizing the tax regime by 
reducing the number and scope of tax credits and 
exemptions. At the end of the year, exchange rate 
pressures remained, driven by high government 
spending and reflected in a moderate 
depreciation of the currency from TT$ 6 to 
TT$ 6.3 to the United States dollar, while the rate 
of inflation inched up from 3.3% to 3.8%. The 
non-oil sector outperformed the oil sector, 
mainly because of weak performance in the 
latter. 
(a)Public finance 
Fiscal performance weakened in the 
Bahamas, with the deficit increasing from an 
estimated 1.9% of product in calendar year 1996 
to 3.3% of product in 1997. Total government 
debt was up by 11 %, moving from the equivalent 
of 33% of product in 1996 to 34.6%. 
Recurrent revenues increased by 6%, with a 
mixed performance of different taxes. Selected 
taxes on services provided reduced revenues, as 
did returns from business and professional fees; 
both categories were down, by 1.8% and 12.1%, 
respectively. On the other hand, taxes on 
international trade (which account for 60% of 
overall revenue) were up by nearly 6%. That 
outcome was, however, less than targeted 
because of lower than expected import duty 
collections. 
Total spending, including net lending to 
public entities, increased by 15%. Recurrent 
with common monetary arrangements under the ECCB. The 
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expenditures, up by 7.5%, increased faster than 
recurrent revenues. Wages and salaries rose by 
10%, while interest payments increased by just 
over 11%. The recurrent surplus declined from 
1.1 % of estimated product to 0.8%. 
Capital spending was up quite significantly, 
from 1.9% of product in 1996 to 3.3% in 1997. 
The increase, relating mainly to investments in 
public works and water supply projects, was 
greater than budgeted, in part because of the 
early completion of some projects. 
In Barbados, the fiscal deficit fell from the 
equivalent of 3.8% of product in 1996 to 0.8% 
in 1997. Increased revenues and a moderate 
growth in spending augmented the recurrent 
surplus to 5.3% of product, up from 1.5%. This 
liberated resources for capital expenditures, 
which rose to 6.1% of product, up from 5.3% 
the year before. 
Recurrent revenues increased by 19%; 
revenues from indirect taxes grew by 36%. This 
strong performance was mainly due to the 
imposition of VAT on all goods and services in 
1997 and to the resumption of imports (after 
initial consumer insecurity), which strengthened 
revenue from taxes on foreign trade. Receipts 
from direct taxes grew more modestly, by just 
over 8%, personal income taxes and corporate 
profit taxes growing by 5.2% and 11.5%, 
respectively. Property taxes showed growth of 
15.2%. 
Recurrent spending rose moderately, by just 
under 5%. Government finances benefited from 
a 12% reduction in interest payments. Public 
service wages increased slowly, by 2.2%, in part 
because of a delay in negotiating new 
arrangements after the old contract expired at the 
end of the first quarter of 1997. Transfers and 
subsidies grew by 14%. In contrast to recurrent 
spending, capital outlays increased significantly, 
by 43%. 
The reduced fiscal deficit was financed 
entirely from domestic sources, primarily 
commercial banks and the National Insurance 
Scheme, while central bank lending fell by a 
further B$ 5.7 million. Net foreign financing 
declined as a result of reduced project funds and 
increased amortization payments, since no debt 
was sold on the international financial markets. 
The Government's indebtedness fell in 1997, 
to 64.6% of product as compared to 70.3% in 
1996. Of this total, the foreign component 
continued to fall, accounting for 26% of the total 
in 1997 as compared to 38% in 1992. Domestic 
debt grew by B$ 18.4 million, all of which 
consisted of long-term instruments. At the end of 
the survey year, 69% of the debt was held on a 
long-term basis, as compared to 37% in 1992. 
The public accounts deteriorated in Belize, 
with the deficit increasing from 0.4% of product 
in 1996 to an estimated 1.9% in 1997. This 
performance was to be explained by increased 
spending, a 7.5% rise in recurrent expenditure 
leading to a diminished recurrent surplus, down 
from 3.4% to 2.4% of product. Capital 
expenditures increased by 7.6%. Total 
government spending represented about 26.4% 
of product, up by one percentage point over the 
previous year. 
By comparison, total revenues and grants 
grew more slowly, by 2.7%, actually declining as 
a percentage of product from 27.2% to 26%. Tax 
revenues increased slightly in the aggregate. The 
effects of the imposition of VAT (which was 
applied for the second year) were felt in revenues 
from taxes on goods and services, which rose by 
over 16%. At the same time, income and profit 
taxes fell by 9%, while taxes from international 
trade dropped by 6.6%, as Belize implemented 
the second phase of the CARICOM external tariff. 
Non-tax revenues increased by over 20% coming 
from higher property income and transfers from 
non-financial public enterprises. 
Total government debt increased by 4.2%, 
falling from the equivalent of 53% of product to 
51% in 1997. Domestic debt, which represented 
about 27% of the total, remained substantially 
unchanged. Over the year the external debt 
increased by almost 6%, with funds coming 
primarily from multilateral sources, up by 13%, 
and private banks, up by 57%, while bilateral 
debt and suppliers' credit fell by 5.7% and 3.6%, 
respectively. 
The fiscal deficit rose significantly in 
Guyana, from 1.7% of product in 1996 to 6% in 
1997. Most tax revenues were below target, 
notably taxes from companies and the 
self-employed. Recurrent receipts declined by 
326 
about 1 %, going from 34% of product to 31 %. At 
the same time, recurrent expenses increased by 
24%, from 23% of product to 26.4%. The main 
increases were in the public sector wage bill, 
which showed a growth of over 38%, while 
interest payments increased by 18.6 %. 
Accordingly, the recurrent surplus declined from 
10.7% of product in 1996 to 6%. Capital 
expenditure increased by 7 %; the overall 
relationship between capital spending and 
product remained about the same, at 15%. 
Financing came from external loans and 
balance-of-payments grants, the latter equivalent 
to 2.8% of product. The stock of external debt fell 
in 1997, benefiting from relief granted to the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and from 
schemes intended to support economic reforms. 
Overall, Guyana is estimated to have received 
debt reduction equivalent to about US$ 253 
million. At the end of 1997, 63% of the debt 
which remained outstanding was owed to 
multilateral financial institutions, 30% to 
bilateral creditors and 7% to private creditors. 
In Jamaica, the objective of fiscal policy, 
which was to contribute to economic 
stabilization, was not realized. The fiscal deficit 
widened from 4.8% of product in calendar year 
1996 to over 15% in 1997.4 The primary reason 
for the deteriorating performance was the 
extraordinary expenditure necessary in order to 
establish the Financial Sector Adjustment 
Company (FINCÃO) in January 1997 to administer 
the restructuring of financial institutions facing 
insolvency. The other fiscal targets also remained 
unmet, with tax receipts increasing by a scant 3% 
in nominal terms, and recurrent revenue scarcely 
more, by 4.8%. The failure to meet revenue 
projections derived from a contracting economy 
and declining company profits, on the one hand, 
and delays in legislation relating to the tax 
administration reform, on the other. 
Simultaneously, recurrent expenditure 
increased by 12.7%. Initial moderation in interest 
rates and debt management measures reduced 
spending on interest payments by almost 6% but 
the savings were below projections since the 
4 The fiscal year in Jamaica normally runs from April to Ma 
these costs are excluded, the fiscal balance for 1996 was 4.1% 
initial reduction in interest rates could not be 
sustained. Interest payments still absorbed over 
40% of recurrent spending. Expenditure on 
wages and salaries increased noticeably, by 
almost 20%. While the wage payments made 
during the year actually included back pay for as 
far as the fiscal year 1993/1994, increases 
negotiated for 1997 exceeded the rate of 
inflation. The stronger demands were the result 
of workers seeking to restore real wages to 
previous levels and expectations of future 
inflation, despite the performance in 1997. The 
high level of fiscal rigidity was indicated by the 
fact that personnel costs and interest payments 
accounted for 86% of recurrent spending. 
The deficit on the recurrent account went up 
from 1.7% of product in 1996 to 3.8%. Further 
deterioration originated in the capital account, as 
proceeds from capital revenue, the bauxite levy 
and grants fell by 3.6%, while capital spending 
increased by 171%. Under the latter heading, 
there were increases in gross investment and debt 
amortization. Gross investment increased by 
153%, mainly as a result of the funding necessary 
for FINSAC, the cost of which as of April 1998 
amounted to an estimated 33% of product. Of 
this total, part was financed by cash transfers 
from the Consolidated Fund and the remainder 
by paper. The public sector acquired assets 
including shares, real estate, hotels and other 
property, and the loan portfolios of the 
institutions taken over. Debt amortization 
outlays increased by 59%, given the debt 
management strategy meant to reduce 
high-interest domestic liabilities and the 
repayment of some maturing short-term loans. 
The magnitude of debt servicing can be seen 
from the fact that in 1997 it accounted for 82% 
of total revenue and grants, up from 71% in 
1996. 
The stock of internal debt increased by almost 
17% in 1997, mainly in the form of a J$ 5.6 billion 
advance to the central bank for liquidity support. 
Since fiscal year 1991/1992 the stock of domestic 
debt has risen by J$ 73 billion, to around 45% of 
product. A good portion of this increase was used 
i. Computation of the deficit includes debt amortization costs. If 
product and in 1997 it was -2.4% of product. 
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for liquidity management; significant amounts 
were also utilized for budgetary purposes and to 
fund parastatal debts and central bank losses. 
The external public and public-guaranteed 
debt stood at US$ 3.3 billion representing an 
increase compared with the end of 1996. The 
foreign debt had been falling in recent years; the 
slight growth observed in 1997 was due in part to 
the policy of seeking credit at the lower costs 
attendant on external funds. The first foray into 
the international bond market was initially meant 
to obtain US$ 100 million, but in fact raised 
US$ 200 million of the US$ 300 million of 
foreign financing required for the fiscal year 
1997/1998. A second issue in the Eurobond 
market planned for October was deferred 
following developments in Asia; instead, the 
Government sought bridging finance of US$ 100 
million from a consortium of foreign banks. 
The current account surplus of Governments 
increased in the OECS countries. All member 
countries recorded such surpluses, except 
Montserrat and Saint Kitts and Nevis. In the 
former case, economic activity came almost to a 
halt as a result of a volcano eruption, resulting in 
collapsing revenues and increased welfare and 
other demands on the State. In Saint Kitts and 
Nevis the current account deficit contracted from 
0.9% of product in 1996 to 0.5% in 1997, 
following a concentrated effort to increase 
revenues. 
Recurrent revenues, which amounted in the 
subregion to 24.5% of product in 1997, 
increased by 4.6%. Above average 
performances were evident in taxes derived 
from the sale of domestic goods and services, 
which were up by 8%, and in taxes on 
international trade, which increased by 6.2%. 
Revenues rose in most OECS countries, ranging 
from the 13% increase recorded in Saint Kitts 
and Nevis to a 2.5% increase in Antigua. They 
remained substantially unchanged in Saint 
Lucia, but contracted in Montserrat. 
Recurrent spending, amounting to 23.3% of 
product in 1997, also grew by 4.8%. More rapid 
increases were observed in the purchase of goods 
and services (9.7%), interest payments (up by 
7.9%) and transfers and subsidies (8.2%). 
Aggregate increases varied between the various 
member countries, from just over 1% in Antigua 
to 27% in Montserrat. 
Data on capital spending are incomplete, but 
fiscal balances weakened in Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines and for Antigua and Barbuda. In 
the case of the first of these countries, there was 
a change from a small surplus in 1996 to a deficit 
equivalent to 4.6% of product, as a result of a 
sharp rise (145%) in capital expenditure. In 
Antigua and Barbuda, the deficit grew from 1.6% 
of product in 1996 to 3.1% in 1997, consequent 
on a 37% increase in capital spending. In other 
instances the deficit contracted. In Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, it remained the same in nominal terms, 
equivalent to 4.2% of product in 1997. In Saint 
Lucia, the deficit declined from 1.6% of product 
in 1996 to 0.8% of product in 1997. 
The external debt for the OECS countries, 
which amounted to 31% of product in 1997 
increased by 2.8%. The performance varied 
between the members. The greatest increase 
(69%) was in Saint Kitts and Nevis. This 
reflected the weight of large projects in a small 
economy, though the external debt to product 
ratio remained below 40%. Saint Lucia also 
increased its external debt, by 7.4%. By contrast, 
other countries reduced their debts, in 
proportions ranging from 13% in Dominica to 
under 1% in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. 
The fiscal accounts in Trinidad and Tobago 
showed an improvement over 1996, with a 
surplus equivalent to 0.9% of product being 
achieved as compared with a deficit of 0.5% in 
1996. The recurrent surplus, equivalent to 1.7% 
of product, was also slightly better than in 1996 
and resulted from a 7% reduction in recurrent 
expenditures, since revenues fell. Capital 
spending, however, rose by 77%, the increase 
being made possible by greatly augmented 
capital revenues in the form of divestment 
proceeds from the Trinidad and Tobago 
Methanol Company. 
Recurrent revenues fell by over 4%, with oil 
receipts dropping by over 34% and property 
taxes declining by 2.4%. Nevertheless, VAT 
and international trade taxes each increased by 
14%, reflecting high levels of consumption and 
imports. Among the items of recurrent 
spending, the wage bill fell by 5% even though 
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it included salary arrears and payments under 
the unemployment relief programme. Other 
notable savings were effected by the 5% 
reduction in transfers and subsidies, which 
currently account for 34% of recurrent 
spending. These savings came about 
primarily as a result of subventions to State 
enterprises being reduced by 80%. 
Domestic debt rose by 19.2%, to the 
equivalent of 22.4% of GDP. Part of the increase 
consisted of non-interest bearing emolument 
bonds to settle arrears of remuneration owed to 
public sector employees. These bonds are issued 
in five annual trances with a maturity of two 
years. 
The external debt has declined steadily since 
1990, moving from 34% of product in 1996 to 
26.4% in 1997. The stock of debt declined by 
18.6%, despite an upward adjustment of US$ 11 
million as a result of United States dollar 
movements against other currencies. 
(b)Monetary developments 
Strong foreign currency inflows from private 
direct investment and government borrowing 
helped to increase the stock of money in the 
Bahamas. The growth of the overall money 
supply as measured by M3 accelerated, from 
5.6% in 1996 to 11.1% in 1997. Narrow money 
(Ml) expanded by 16.4%, with demand deposits 
increasing by 17%. Fixed deposits grew slightly 
more quickly in the survey year, by 8.9% 
compared with 8.3% in the previous period. As a 
result, the aggregate (M2) grew by almost 10.7%. 
Residents' foreign currency deposits expanded 
by around 44%. 
Domestic credit rose by 10%, as compared to 
8% in 1996; credit to the private sector grew by 
almost 13% with that to government remaining 
stable. Personal loans accounted for 62% of 
private sector credit, the bulk of which was 
consumer lending. Residential mortgages also 
showed strong expansion. Sectors receiving 
increased credit were construction, distribution, 
professional and other services and tourism. 
Interest rates rose slightly, loan and overdraft 
rates by 22 basis points and deposit rates by 24 
basis points. 
The financial sector in Barbados experienced 
a rapid build-up in liquidity in the first semester 
of 1997. Strong deposit growth coupled with 
weak credit demand, the result of tourism 
earnings inflows in the first quarter and consumer 
caution after the imposition of VAT, caused the 
excess liquidity ratio to surge to almost 22% by 
the end of June. Nevertheless, this build-
up was reversed to 14.8% by the end of the 
year as consumer confidence returned. By the 
end of the year domestic credit had expanded 
by 19%, with credit to the public sector, 
comprising one third of the total, increasing 
by 13%. Credit to the private sector rose by 
21 %. At the end of the year the narrow money 
supply Ml had increased by 22.6% (against 
15.2% for the corresponding period of 1996). 
Savings deposits grew by 7.5%, though time 
deposits and foreign currency deposits fell by 
almost 18% and 26%, respectively. 
Accordingly, the broad money supply M2 
increased by 11% in 1997, compared with 
19.4% in 1996. 
Money supply (Ml) grew at a slower rate in 
Belize (4.7%) than was the case in 1996 (7.6%). 
Broad money, M2, however, expanded more 
quickly, by almost 10%, as compared with a 
6% increase in 1996. The higher growth rate 
was caused largely by the rising volume of 
credit to the private sector. Credit went to the 
expanding citrus production in the primary 
sector, to building construction and 
manufacturing and to mortgage lending, 
transport and tourism. About 25% of lending 
went to the central government. Over the same 
period, currency with the public and demand 
and time deposits grew by almost BZ$ 62 
million. The net foreign assets of the 
commercial banks declined by BZ$ 15 million, 
in response to demands for foreign exchange to 
pay for imports, travel and private sector loan 
repayments. Net foreign assets of the central 
bank remained nearly unchanged. 
Monetary policy in Guyana set as its 
objectives price stability, a competitive exchange 
rate and a viable balance of payments. The 
growth of monetary aggregates and credit to the 
private sector decelerated, although credit to the 
Government increased and the international 
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reserve position deteriorated. Total monetary 
liabilities increased by 12%, but narrow money 
(Ml) grew by 8.5% on account of the slow 
growth in demand deposits. Time and savings 
deposits increased by 13%, reflecting a shift from 
demand to interest-bearing deposits. 
Credit to the private sector rose by 23.6%, a 
lower rate than in 1996 when it was 31%. 
Credit to the agricultural sector, debilitated by 
adverse weather conditions, fell by 8.6%. 
Loans to the mining sector also declined, 
reflecting the slump in gold prices. By contrast, 
there was an expansion in the volume of 
financing to households and to the distributive 
trades. 
Monetary policy in Jamaica in 1997 was 
intended to continue lowering the rate of money 
supply growth, to maintain a stable currency and 
to reduce interest rates in line with inflation. The 
rate of increase in the monetary base slowed in 
1997 to 14.5% (compared with 16.4% in the 
previous year) and was significantly lower than 
the annual average of 30.4% for the period 
1990-1995. Broad money (M2) grew by 13.4%, 
at a slightly slower rate than in 1996. Savings 
deposits increased considerably (by 31%), 
whereas time deposits contracted by 4.4%. This 
decline was the first in 10 years and suggested 
that depositors chose to hold more liquid assets 
given the drop in interest rates and flagging 
confidence in the financial system. The 22% 
increase in foreign currency accounts suggested 
uncertainty that the currency would maintain its 
value. Narrow money (Ml) remained 
substantially unchanged with growth of 0.5% but 
its composition changed, with currency in the 
hands of the public increasing by 16% and 
demand deposits falling by 9%. 
Open market operations and direct controls in 
the form of reserve requirements were the main 
instruments of monetary control, the former 
amounting to J$ 4.7 billion, barely 50% of the 
value of interventions undertaken in 1996. In 
1997 the central bank did not act to sterilize 
capital inflows; rather, it released reserves to the 
interbank market in order to influence the 
exchange rate. Reserve requirements remained at 
47%, with cash reserve ratios of 25% for 
commercial banks. Interest rates did not fall as 
inflation declined, given the deteriorating 
external and fiscal accounts and the erosion in 
confidence in the financial system. Accordingly, 
benchmark rates returned to 29% at the end of 
1997, two percentage points above those 
prevailing at the end of 1996. 
In the OECS countries, total monetary 
liabilities increased more rapidly in 1997, by 
9.6%, compared with 1.9% in 1996. Narrow 
money supply (Ml), grew by 8.0%, whereas it 
had contracted by just over 1% in the previous 
year. Currency with the public and demand 
deposits grew by 5% and 11%, respectively, 
whereas they had contracted by 4% and 2.8%, in 
1996. Quasi-money increased by 6.9%, while 
broad money (M2) rose by 8.5%. 
Domestic credit expanded slightly faster, by 
13.2% (12.9% in 1996). The greatest growth was 
observed in credit to households, up by 20%, and 
earmarked mainly for home construction and 
improvement. Lending for durable goods and for 
other personal consumption also increased 
significantly. The rate of lending to the business 
sector fell, mainly in the area of agriculture. Net 
foreign assets of the commercial banks continued 
to drop, by 6.2% following a decline of 25% in 
1996. Partially offsetting this contraction, the 
central bank net reserves increased by 7.5% with 
an increase in foreign assets and a sharp fall in 
foreign liabilities. The liquidity position of banks 
tightened as loans and advances, which increased 
by 12.2%, out paced deposits, which grew by 
close to 10%. 
In Trinidad and Tobago, the Government 
started 1997 with the policy decision to reduce 
reserve requirements in the hope of increasing the 
efficiency of the banking system. Accordingly, 
those requirements fell by one percentage point 
at the beginning of the year for commercial banks 
and non-bank financial institutions and by a 
further point at the commencement of the second 
quarter. The banking system accumulated 
liquidity, and interest rates fell, with the prime 
lending rate averaging 15.3% over the year. This 
downward shift in interest rates was also evident 
for other instruments. Commercial bank credit 
rose by 23%. Credit to the private sector, which 
accounted for just over two thirds of incremental 
credit in 1997, increased by 19.4%, with 38% of 
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loans and advances being allocated to consumer 
credit, mainly for the purchase of motor vehicles. 
There was a significant expansion in the 
volume of demand deposits, up by 21%, while 
currency in circulation rose by 13.5%, so that 
narrow money (Ml) increased by 17.4% as 
compared with a scant 0.3% in 1996. While time 
deposits declined, savings deposits increased by 
11%, leaving the broad money supply (M2) to 
(a)Economic activity 
Slowing economic expansion in the Bahamas 
was explained by the performance in the main 
sector, tourism. Overall, the number of 
visitors increased by 1%. However, while the 
number of visitor nights rose by 1.8%, in part 
owing to a higher average length of stay, the 
number of stopover tourists declined by 
almost 1%. This followed a 5.5% increase in 
total visitors and a 2.2% increase in the 
(higher spending) stopover visitor total in 
1996. Tourism expenditures also grew more 
slowly. Stopover expenditures rose only 1.2% 
compared to 3.7% in 1996, while the increase 
in cruiseship spending fell from 6.4% in 1996 
to 2.7%. Decreased arrivals were to be 
explained in part by reduced accommodation 
in New Providence as hotels were upgraded, 
and by the termination of cruiseship arrivals 
into Grand Bahama Island. The number of 
arrivals from the United States which 
accounts for more than 80% of the total, fell 
by 2.3%. 
Construction activity continued to be brisk in 
1997. The number of building starts increased, 
their value moving from US$ 180 million to 
US$ 458 million in 1997. The higher value of 
building starts was bolstered by activity in the 
business/commercial sector, which was up in 
value from US$ 62 million to US$ 346 
million. Future building activity, as indicated 
by building approvals, is expected to remain 
buoyant in 1998, although the pace of 
expansion is expected to slacken from that 
achieved in 1997. 
grow by almost 10% as compared to a contraction 
of 0.8% in the previous year. Foreign currency 
deposits grew in 1997 by 10.6%, half the pace of 
the previous year. The high levels of liquidity 
prevailed despite an active policy by the central 
bank to withdraw funds from the system; these 
measures were judged insufficient and higher 
reserve requirements were reimposed by the end 
of the year. 
Output in agriculture increased marginally by 
0.6%. Crop production declined by 16% in value, 
both prices and volumes contributing to reduced 
earnings. This was offset by increases in poultry 
and meat production, which rose by 4.4% and 
6.3% respectively. 
In Barbados, the expansion reached both 
tradable and non-tradable sectors. In the former, 
growth was apparent in tourism, sugar 
production and manufacturing; in the 
non-tradable sectors, construction and the 
distributive trades also rose. Tourism grew by a 
modest 2% for, although the number of stopover 
visitors increased by 5.6%, the average time 
spent by guests decreased. Cruiseship tourism 
continued to expand, but growth was modest 
at 1.6%, compared with 5.2% in 1996. The 
agricultural sector as a whole contracted by 
7.6% as compared with a moderate expansion 
in 1996. Adverse weather conditions affected 
some crops and fish production, but sugar 
output increased by over 9%, the second 
successive year of growth after a long period 
of decline. Nevertheless, sugar earnings fell 
slightly because of adverse price movements. 
Manufacturing expanded, by 4.4%, driven by 
greater demand for processed foods, 
chemicals and beverages. 
Among the non-tradable, construction 
continued its expansion, at an increased rate of 
6.7% in 1997, as compared to the average growth 
of 4.4% achieved since 1992. Increased 
construction was visible in the public and private 
sectors. In the former, road improvement and 
maintenance works and a major sewerage project 
were the main activities, while in the private 
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sector tourism-related, commercial ventures and 
private residential construction were all 
highlighted. The wholesale and retail trades, 
which expanded by 4.9%, were boosted by 
construction activities and by the 21% increase 
in consumer goods imports. The sector including 
transport, storage and communications also 
increased by 2.9%, while that relating to business 
and other services rose by 3.5%. 
In Belize, the economy expanded by 4.5% in 
1997, one percentage point more than the 
increase recorded for 1996. The main growth 
came from primary activities, which expanded by 
10%, led by agriculture, up 12.5%, stimulated by 
a 38% rise in citrus output. Fishing showed a 10% 
increase, because of larger catches of shrimp, 
lobster and conch. Secondary activities had a 
more modest expansion, at 1.3%. Here the 
driving force came from manufacturing, which 
expanded by 3% benefiting, from increased 
citrus processing. Electricity and water 
distribution also increased. Services recorded 
barely 1% growth, derived from increases in the 
transportation and communications sector, since 
tourism and public administration stagnated. 
Sugar production and exports increased 
because of favourable growing conditions and 
improved production efficiency. Export volumes 
rose by 15%, but unit values declined owing to 
the appreciation of sterling, a 2% fall in the price 
of sugar shipped to the United States and a 
reduction in the quota to that market. This 
resulted in more sugar being sold at the lower 
world market price and helped to explain the 
2.5% fall in earnings from sugar. 
Consolidation of the banana industry 
commenced in Belize, with a 20% reduction in 
land under cultivation. This behaviour responded 
to the fact that local producers were unable to 
make a profit on fruit sold over the existing 
preferential quotas, but the process was also 
timely since the existing banana regime has been 
ruled illegal under WTO norms. The full impact 
of such developments was not seen in 1997, 
however, for the volume of fruit shipped and the 
earnings derived declined by just under 9% in 
each instance. 
Overall, tourism arrivals rose by under 4%, 
with a similar growth in earnings being 
estimated. Increased arrivals came mainly from 
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the cruiseship sector, which competes strongly 
with established hotels. Hotel occupancy rates 
were consequently being put under pressure, 
since the number of rooms has been increasing 
faster than stopover visitors, while live-aboard, 
cruise and dive-ship accommodation became 
more popular. 
The economy of Guyana continued its robust 
expansion in 1997 and, despite adverse weather 
conditions and declining terms of trade, recorded 
growth of 6.2%. While the rate of increase in 
1997 did not match that achieved in 1996, 
expansion was spread widely throughout the 
economy. The most notable slowdown was 
evident in the agricultural sector, which rose by 
3.1%, compared with 7.6% in 1996. This 
deceleration was brought about by declining 
sugar production and stagnant rice output. While 
the latter increased by 1.9%, the volume of the 
crop was way below the 11% increase that had 
been projected. Moreover, the preferential access 
to the European Union from which Guyanese rice 
benefited was reduced in 1997, so that greater 
production efficiency would be necessary in the 
future if the good was to continue to have access 
to that market. Forestry output rose by 20%, 
while the fish catch increased by 8%. 
Non-traditional agriculture recorded modest 
growth. 
Gold output increased strongly, by 16%, while 
bauxite production remained approximately 
unchanged. Gold mining, though still expanding 
rapidly, was being threatened by reduced 
international prices, which affected the 
profitabiliy of smaller producers. The 
manufacturing sector recorded a 4.5% increase, 
as compared to 2.9% in the previous year, driven 
by higher production of processed rice, 
beverages and building materials. The 
construction sector recorded a 13% growth, 
impelled by the public sector investment 
programme and increased activities in private 
housing. Service activities expanded in the 
aggregate by 5.2%. 
In Jamaica output fell by 2.3% following a 
decline of 1.4% in 1996. Goods producing 
sectors contracted by 4% and services by 2.7%. 
Agricultural output contracted by 14.6%. The 
decline included both export crops (down by 
11.5%) and agriculture for the domestic market 
(with a 20% fall). Severe drought conditions 
were the main cause of agricultural contraction, 
which affected planting activities as well as plant 
growth and development. 
Manufacturing recorded a 2.5% decline, with 
a very sharp fall (26%) in the sectors producing 
textiles, apparel and footwear. The contraction 
also reached other activities, such as furniture, 
petroleum refining, chemicals and metal 
products. In general, manufacturing industries 
were affected by tight monetary conditions and 
lagging capital investment; in cases like that of 
textiles, in addition, local production was placed 
at a disadvantage because of stronger 
competition from Asia and the real appreciation 
of the domestic currency. 
Mining and quarrying activities turned in a 
mixed performance, with an aggregate increase 
of 3.3%. Crude bauxite production declined by 
7.1%, though alumina production rose by 6%. 
Construction recorded a 2.7% drop. The high cost 
of credit severely affected all building activities 
and reduced the demand for private and 
commercial accommodation. Public sector 
construction increased, however. 
Basic services expanded by 5.7%, given the 
larger supply of electricity (up by 8%), though 
water and sewerage services contracted by 5%. 
Transport and communications also increased 
output 5.8%. Within the group of other services 
(which showed a decline of 5.3%), financial 
intermediation fell abruptly, by 22%, while 
insurance contracted by 2.7%. This behaviour 
reflected the conditions of severe financial 
instability. 
The increased rate of expansion evident in the 
OECS countries came from higher levels of 
activity in services. Agriculture and 
manufacturing output contracted. The decrease 
in agriculture was most striking, from -1.2% in 
1996 to -8.7% in 1997. Bananas, the main 
agricultural export crop, provided the 
explanation, with exports declining by 28% 
overall. Performance varied in the individual 
member countries, from a 12.6% contraction in 
Dominica, to an almost cessation of foreign sales 
in Grenada, because of poor fruit quality. Exports 
from Saint Lucia, the largest producer, fell by 
333 
32%. Cacao production in Grenada was also low, 
the 47% decrease being explained by the cyclical 
nature of the activity and by crop infestation. 
Other agricultural goods performed well, 
however, sugar output increasing by 50% in Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, while nutmeg and mace 
production in Grenada rose by 15% and 69% 
respectively. 
Manufacturing output dropped slightly (by 
0.3%), but performance in the component 
sectors was mixed. The sugar industry, 
centred in Saint Kitts and Nevis, increased 
production by 52%. However, other 
manufacturing activities were weak, with 
soap output in Dominica falling by 13% and 
flour and rice milling in Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines declining by 3.6% and 15.7% 
respectively. Production of garments in Saint 
Lucia experienced some expansion, although 
this was insufficient to offset the 4% decline 
in its manufacturing sector, which was also 
hit by the reduced output of paper and 
packaging products destined for the banana 
industry. 
Construction activities, which showed 
strength for the past three years, were again 
buoyant in 1997, with over 5% growth being 
recorded. Expansion was to be explained by 
strong private residential construction. High 
public sector investment was also evident in 
Anguilla, Grenada and in Saint Kitts and 
Nevis. 
The bulk of increased activity was, however, 
observed in the services sectors. The product 
generated in hotels and restaurants expanded by 
7%, twice as fast as the rate of growth recorded 
in 1996. This was associated with tourist 
expenditures increasing by 5%, stopover arrivals 
by 4.4% and cruiseship arrivals by almost 12%. 
Notable growth was evident in Saint Lucia, 
where the sector expanded by almost 11%. In 
Antigua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, it expanded by about 5%. 
However, tourism contracted in Grenada. 
Among the expanding services throughout the 
region were transport, communications and 
government services. 
In Trinidad and Tobago, the non-oil 
component of the economy accounted for the 
aggregate growth in 1997. Expansion was broad 
based, being evident in all these sectors except 
government services. Greatest expansion was 
observed in non-exportable activities, notably 
construction and distribution, with 
transportation, electricity and water also showing 
gains. Sectors which produce exportables, such 
as agriculture and manufacturing, achieved more 
moderate expansion, while the oil sector 
contracted. 
The decline in the oil industry was 
attributed to the maturing of existing oil 
wells, with crude oil production, refining and 
exports all falling. Refinery output 
contracted by 15%. Natural gas production, 
increased however, as did exports of liquid 
gas, fertilizers and methanol. In the 
non-petroleum sector, special buoyancy was 
evident in construction, which was up 15%, 
the growth coming from expansion in the 
natural gas facilities, and in road construction 
and rehabilitation. Distribution was also up 
by 17.6%, propelled by imports of consumer 
durables, food and beverages and tobacco 
products. Agricultural output slowed from a 
3.9% growth in 1996 to 1.8% in 1997, 
declines being evident in sugar, cocoa and 
citrus production, although domestic 
agriculture showed a stronger performance. 
Manufacturing returned to growth after 
contracting in 1996. Buoyancy was evident in 
the production of beverages and tobacco, 
assembly type industries and food processing. 
Gross domestic expenditure increased 
rapidly, even more than in 1996. 
Consumption spending, facilitated by easy 
liquidity and credit conditions, grew at twice 
the rate of 1996. The bulk of spending was 
for private consumption, which increased 
substantially more than the rate of growth of 
GDP; gross national savings accordingly 
declined for the fourth consecutive year. 
Government spending rose by less than 3%. 
Gross capital formation increased at a high 
rate, over twice as fast as in the previous year, 
with the bulk of investment going to the 
energy and related sectors. The high level of 
domestic spending was reflected in the 
current account of the balance of payments, 
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which registered a deficit equivalent to 12% of 
product, as compared with modest surpluses for 
the three previous years. 
(b)Prices 
Consumer prices increased significantly in 
Barbados in 1997. Whereas average annual 
price increases had averaged 1.4% since 
1992, in the current survey year they jumped 
to 7.7%. The imposition of VAT in January 
was a major cause of the growth in inflation. 
Increases were especially sizeable for food 
items, prices of which rose by 13.5% in 1997, 
as compared to 3.9% in the previous year. By 
October, however, VAT had been removed on 
36 food items, which helped to reduce 
inflation towards the end of the year. Inflation 
for the period December 1996-December 
1997 was 3.6% as compared to 1.8% for the 
preceding year. 
The average annual rate of inflation in 
Jamaica moderated to 10% from 26.4% in 
1996 and a peak of 77% in 1992. The figure for 
1997 was the lowest in almost a decade and was 
attained through tight monetary policy, a stable 
exchange rate and increased competition as a 
result of market opening. Nevertheless, some 
inflationary impulses arose domestically, 
notably the severe drought which reduced the 
supply of domestic foodstuffs. The price of 
meals taken away from home increased by 13% 
as did starchy locally grown foods. Rents 
increased by 35%, reflecting the high cost of 
credit to the housing sector. 
Price pressures increased slightly in Trinidad 
and Tobago in 1997. However, the rate of 
inflation remained subdued, and stabilized on 
average at 3.8%, as compared with 3.3% in 1996. 
Food prices, up by 9.9%, once again provided the 
major impetus for increases in 1997. Other 
significant items were beverages and tobacco, up 
by 4.7%, and education, which increased by 
3.3%. 
(c) Employment 
Unemployment in Barbados stood at 12.2% 
at the end of December, 2.1 percentage points 
below that in the corresponding period of 1996. 
The average for the year was 14.5%, compared 
to 15.8% in 1996. The unemployment rate for 
females fell by 1.1% to 17.8%, while that for 
males dropped by 0.9 percentage points to 
11.3%. New jobs were created in construction 
and in the retail and wholesale trades. 
The annual average unemployment rate in 
Jamaica rose slightly in 1997 to 16.5%, as 
compared to 16% for 1996. Males, with a 
participation rate of 74.6% showed an 
unemployment rate of 10.6%, while females, 
with a participation rate of 59% experienced an 
unemployment rate of 23.5%. While youth 
unemployment remained above the average at 
51 %, it was noticeably lower than the year before 
(56%). The increase in aggregate unemployment 
took place in the context of a declining labour 
force, with approximately 9,000 persons 
withdrawing from the job market, mainly to 
pursue further education. Accordingly, there was 
aloss of about 13,000 jobs in 1997. All categories 
of employment reported fewer workers, with the 
exception of white collar occupations, which 
showed an increase of 13%. The greatest decline 
was evident in the low-skilled category of 
craftsmen. 
Higher levels of domestic activity in Trinidad 
and Tobago were reflected in a fall in the 
unemployment rate, to 15%. Youth 
unemployment declined substantially, but 
remained near 35%. Female unemployment was 
17.2% and male unemployment 11.2%. Job 
creation was particularly notable in construction, 
followed by finance insurance and real estate 
services. Agriculture showed only modest 
increases in employment, in part because of poor 
weather and crop infestation problems. Real 
wages rose by around 1%. 
(d)International trade and payments 
The deficit in the external current account in 
the Bahamas widened significantly in 1997, 
from 6.3% of product in 1996 to 10.5% in 1997. 
However, capital inflows also rose sharply, so 
that the balance of payments showed a surplus 
equivalent to 1.4% of product (compared with a 
0.2% deficit in 1996). There was a smaller 
negative balance of merchandise trade, because 
of an 8% increase in exports, while imports grew 
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by a modest 1.2%. Strong demand for consumer 
and investment goods for the construction sector 
boosted imports, while reduced petroleum prices 
just offset the increased volume of petroleum 
products consumed. 
The surplus on the services account declined 
by 20%. Most noticeable was the sixfold increase 
in spending for construction services. Outflows 
for transportation services rose by 17%. The 
travel account surplus remained almost 
unchanged, as increased earnings were offset by 
higher travel spending by Bahamians. Offshore 
companies' local expenditures fell by 17%. The 
deficit on the income account increased by just 
over 9%; external remittances were up by 9%, 
while net labour income outflows fell by 7%. 
The capital and financial account showed a 
substantial surplus, with inflows rising from an 
estimated 4.2% of product in 1996 to 9.4% in 
1997. Net private foreign direct investment 
doubled to US$ 196 million, mainly directed to 
the modernization and expansion of hotel 
properties. Net inflows to the public sector 
increased by US$ 17 million. Following a decline 
of US$ 7.6 million in 1996, the external reserves 
grew by US$ 56.5 million in 1997 to the 
equivalent of three months of imports. 
In Barbados, the balance of payments 
showed a surplus in 1997, equivalent to 1.6% of 
product, a significant decline from the figure 
observed in 1996 (7.1%). This was to be 
explained by the smaller current account surplus, 
336 
which fell from 5.2% of product in 1996 to 1% 
in 1997. The deficit of merchandise trade 
widened by 26%; total exports declined by 3%, 
while imports increased by almost 18%. Earnings 
from services were up by 12%, with a similar rate 
of growth in capital inflows. 
While overall exports declined, exports of 
domestically produced goods were up by 
3.7% compared to increases of around 25% in 
the previous two years. Earnings from sugar, 
the main merchandise export, were flat 
despite increased volumes, while sales of 
food and beverages, which had grown rapidly 
in the previous two years, fell by 2.3%. 
Receipts from electronic components also 
fell, although sales of chemicals increased. 
The main markets for Barbados exports were 
within CARICOM, which purchased 33% of the 
total, followed by the United Kingdom ( 18%) 
and the United States (15%). 
The ratio of imports to product rose by 
almost 3 percentage points, to over 43%. 
Consumer goods imports, after growing by 
less than 1% in 1996, showed a rapid increase 
(21%). The growth in imports of intermediate 
and capi ta l goods (14% and 2 3 % , 
respectively) was similar to that recorded the 
previous year. 
Net earnings from services were up by 12.5%. 
The increase was due to the 11% increase in 
tourist earnings and higher transportation 
receipts. The capital account recorded a 12.6% 
higher surplus. There were smaller long term 
private capital inflows but project funds and 
borrowing by other public entities redressed that 
decline. 
The surplus in the balance of payments of 
Belize decreased from the equivalent of 3.4% of 
product in 1996 to a scant 0.2% of product in 
1997. The current account explained the decline: 
it moved from a deficit of 0.4% of product in 
1996 to one of 6.6% of product (or US$ 42 
million). The merchandise trade deficit rose from 
US$ 54.2 million to US$ 81 million. Exports 
grew by a modest 3.2%, the main increases being 
in citrus and fishing products while earnings from 
sugar and bananas declined. Imports were up by 
over 14%, notably of fuels. 
The surplus on services, which contracted by 
30%, was unable to offset the deterioration in the 
goods account. Spending on travel increased by 
29%, while earnings only rose by 2%. Transfers, 
both to government and to private individuals 
were down slightly. Net financial flows 
diminished by 22%, or from the equivalent of 
6.1% of product to 4.4%. The decline was 
notable in foreign direct investment flows, which 
fell by 28%. The gross official reserves increased 
by about 2%, to a level representing 2.5 months 
of import cover. 
In Guyana, the current account of the balance 
of payments weakened in 1997. The deficit 
reached US$ 105 million, as compared to US$ 70 
million in 1996. However, this performance was 
offset by larger capital and financial flows. They 
doubled, moving from the equivalent of 8.4% of 
product to 16.3%. Accordingly, the balance of 
payments shifted from a deficit equivalent to 
0.2% of product in 1996 to a surplus of 0.5% in 
1997. 
The merchandise trade deficit widened from 
US$ 20 million to US$ 48 million, with spending 
on imports growing faster, at 7.8%, than earnings 
from exports, which increased by 3%. Rising 
imports were fueled by high public spending and 
by adjustments in public sector salaries. Earnings 
from traditional agricultural exports fell, mainly 
as a result of eroding terms of trade. Sugar 
receipts fell by 11.5% (with a 1.8% decline in 
export volumes), while the value of rice exports 
fell by 9.6%. By contrast, earnings from minerals 
increased, bauxite by 4% and gold by almost 
32%. 
The net services deficit rose by 30%. This was 
primarily due to higher interest payments, both 
from the private and the public sectors; the 
Government regularized its debt service, which 
returned to schedule. Private transfers declined. 
The capital account surplus rose from 
US$ 59.5 million to US$ 125.7 million. Both 
public and private flows increased. 
Disbursements to the public sector amounted to 
US$ 67 million, with repayments amounting to 
US$ 29 million for a net total of US$ 38 million. 
Net private capital flows attained US$ 64 million, 
an increase of US$ 11 million over 1996 and 
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Table 4 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a Preliminary figures. 
directed mainly to the exploitation of raw 
materials. 
In Jamaica, the balance of payments 
deteriorated in 1997, from a surplus equivalent 
to 5% of product in 1996 to a deficit of 2.5% 
of product in 1997. The deficit resulted in a 
decline in the net international reserves of 
US$ 152 million. This performance reflected 
uncertainty about the sustainability of 
macroeconomic policy in the face of weak 
financial institutions and the impending 
election. The current account deficit rose from 
2.5% of product to 5.3%, owing to a 14% 
increase in the deficit on visible trade and a 
12% reduction in the surplus on services. 
Capital inflows declined by 57% (with private 
inflows diminishing by 72%), so that the 
capital and financial account surplus fell from 
7.5% of product to 2.9%. 
Merchandise exports remained substantially 
unchanged over 1996, while imports increased 
by 6%. Export performance was sustained 
mainly by sales of traditional goods, which 
grew in value by over 4%, while 
non-traditional items decreased by almost 7%. 
In the former category, earnings from the 
export of alumina, gypsum, bananas, coffee 
and rum increased, but those derived from 
bauxite, sugar, citrus and citrus products, cocoa 
and cocoa products and from pimento were 
smaller than the year before. Drought affected 
the performance of several agricultural crops and 
even where earnings from bananas increased this 
was to be explained by improved prices, for the 
volume of fruit harvested and exported 
diminished. In the non-traditional export 
category, the chief source of decline was a 10% 
decrease in earnings from the main item, 
wearing apparel. The sector continues to 
contract in Jamaica as it is unable to meet the 
competition of Mexico and Asian countries 
after their devaluations. The second major 
non-traditional export, food, showed a 5% 
decline in foreign sales, mainly because 
production fell following the drought. 
Beverages and tobacco products recorded 
strong growth, however, with a gain of 24%. 
Imports increased by 6.2%, in line with the 
growth rates observed in recent years. Consumer 
goods imports rose by 24%, with those of capital 
goods increasing by 20%. In the former group, all 
categories recorded increases, the most notable 
being in the import of food and motor cars. 
Higher food imports compensated for poor 
domestic production, and came mainly from 
within the CARICOM region. Motor car purchases 
were up by over 30%, in part because of 
restocking after strict demand compression in 
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CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: EXTERNAL DEBT 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
1996 and because of inventory build-ups sparked 
by insecurities in the foreign exchange market 
and new regulations which would have an impact 
on the importation of older used vehicles. The 
increase in capital goods imports was most 
notable in industrial transport equipment and 
construction materials. The former related 
mainly to the purchase of aircraft, for industrial 
activity was otherwise flat. This sluggishness 
was also illustrated by the 6% decline in imports 
of raw materials and intermediate goods and the 
10% fall in industrial supplies. 
The services account continued to record a 
surplus but it was reduced by 12% in 1996. The 
travel account recorded a scant 1% growth with 
increases in receipts being eroded by growing 
outflows. Earnings from high-profit stopover 
guests especially showed deceleration. Higher 
payments for freight and insurance were 
recorded, while profit remittances increased, 
particularly from bauxite companies. 
Net capital flows declined by 57% compared 
with 1996. The fall would have been greater but 
for significant increases in official flows, as the 
Government obtained US$ 200 million on the 
international market. Smaller private inflows 
reflected reduced interest rates in the first half of 
the year, and uncertainty about the sustainability 
of the exchange rate, as well as precautionary 
attitudes given the closeness of the general 
election and instability in the commercial sector. 
In Trinidad and Tobago, the external 
accounts shifted from a surplus of 3.8% of 
product in 1996 to one of 2.7%. This resulted 
mainly from the performance of merchandise 
trade: exports fell by 3% while imports, fueled by 
major capital investments and easy credit, 
increased by over 40%. 
The drop in total exports was influenced by 
a US$ 100 million reduction in the value of 
sales of mineral fuels and lubricants. The 
decline was to be explained by lower oil prices 
and by reduced volumes shipped. The export 
evolution of the chemicals sector was mixed, 
but overall earnings were up by 7%, while 
receipts from steel increased by 5.5%. Sales of 
food products, which represent about 6% of 
exports, were up by 30%. 
The bulk of the increase in imports was to be 
explained by a sharp growth ( 111 %) in purchases 
of machinery and equipment for new projects in 
the energy sector. Imports of transport equipment 
also increased by 22%, while the value of 
manufactured goods rose by 21% following a 
decline in 1996. Overall, capital goods imports 
more than doubled, while those of consumer 
goods increased by 10% and raw materials 
imports were up by almost 8%. 
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The services balance showed a smaller 
surplus, with a 12.5% fall. Earnings from 
transportation and communications declined but 
the surplus on the travel account increased. The 
number of visitors to Trinidad and Tobago rose 
by 22% in 1997, while earnings improved by 
17.3%. Earnings from insurance were also up. 
Income accruing to foreigners for investments in 
Trinidad diminished by almost 40%, and interest 
payments by about 28%. Given these 
developments, the current balance moved from a 
surplus equivalent to 1.2% of product to a large 
deficit, of 12.2% of product. 
Notwithstanding the big negative shift in the 
current account, the overall balance was retrieved 
by capital inflows, which rose from US$ 43 
millionin 1996 to US$597.7 in 1997 and allowed 
for a 31% build-up in reserves. Official capital 
flows moved from a slight surplus in 1996 to a 
deficit in 1997, caused by the repayment of 
various outstanding government obligations. 
Direct investment flows, reflecting divestment 
proceeds and capital injections to various energy 
projects, grew from US$ 356 million in 1996 to 
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FIFTY YEARS OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 
1. Introduction 
At its first session, the Economic Commission 
for Latin America of the United Nations 
requested the Executive Secretary, within the 
possibilities and facilities at his disposal, to 
undertake an economic survey of Latin 
America. The survey prepared in fulfilment of 
this request was the first step in what it was 
felt would be a long and difficult task: that of 
providing a complete and fully documented 
analysis of the economic situation in the 
region. 
This task proved not only to be lengthy, but 
to be ongoing, since ECLAC has now been 
examining the economic situation of the 
countries of the region in its Economic Survey 
for an uninterrupted 50 years. The Survey was 
the new Economic Commission 's first 
contribution to creating awareness and 
understanding of this situation. In so doing, 
ECLAC was meeting one of the two specific 
objectives for which it was established, that 
of undertaking "the collection, evaluation and 
dissemination of ... economic, technological 
and statistical information" on the region, 
which, since their independence, has also 
included the Caribbean countries. 
As had been foreseen, the task also proved to 
be a difficult one. A letter to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 
13 September 1949, transmitting the first 
Economic Survey testifies to the various 
problems encountered in its preparation, 
including the scarcity of statistics in some of 
the countries, the difficulty of obtaining recent 
information and the impossibil i ty of 
comparing the figures obtained because of the 
different data-gathering techniques used and 
because the periods for which figures were 
provided did not coincide from country to 
country. It was hoped that this situation would 
become better as Latin American government 
statistical services improved, with assistance 
from the United Nations and its specialized 
bodies. 
This hope was fulfilled and in the 50 years 
since then there has been a notable advance in 
Governmen t s ' capaci ty to e labora te 
comprehens ive and t imely economic 
statistics, a task more necessary than ever in 
the current environment of globalization and 
integration of the world economy. During 
these years, ECLAC, for its part, has had to 
devise methodologies to compare disparate 
national statistics and so permit an analysis of 
the situation in Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a whole, providing a study of 
more overall value than the sum of its 
constituent countries. 
The Economic Survey has thus been a 
permanent witness to the phenomenon of 
economic development in general and that of the 
rich and complex region that is Latin America in 
1 Economic and Social Council, resolution 106 (VI), 25 February 1948. 
2 For this reason, the title of the Survey, which since the first issue in 1948 had been Economic Survey of Latin America, was 
changed in 1982 to Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, although, even before that date, it had contained 
references to certain Caribbean countries. In the present chapter, it is referred to as the Economic Survey or simply as the Survey. 
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particular: a heterogeneous region certainly, but 
one that has its own undeniable characteristics. 
But the Survey has not been a mute witness. In 
addition to describing economic trends, it has 
provided an interpretation of the facts that has 
made it possible to evaluate them in the light 
of the background historical developments 
that give them meaning. Thus, through 
observation of the economic reality, a theory 
of economic development in the region 
evolved which, in its turn, was empirically 
substantiated. 
This capacity of interpretation has been a 
consistent feature of the Economic Survey, 
although the interpretation has been more or less 
explicit depending on the period. In its early days, 
the Survey was the main ECLAC publication and 
contained, in addition to analysis of recent 
economic developments, the economic policy 
proposals the secretariat presented at the biennial 
Commission meetings. Later, those proposals 
came to be developed in detail in other 
specialized documents, although they continued 
to inspire the interpretation of economic events 
found in the Survey. This explains the differences 
between recent editions of the Economic Survey 
and those that saw the light 50 years ago, 
although they have important features in 
common. 
During the 1940s and 1950s, the issue of 
economic development was being debated in 
the context of a long-term approach aimed at 
promoting supply, in accordance with the 
current underlying economic theories. The 
industrialized countries, for their part, were 
also giving priority to policies for 
reconstruction after the Second World War, 
diverting their attention for the moment from 
the management of economic cycles. Much 
greater priority was attached to such 
management subsequently and it spread to 
developing countries as a result of trends in a 
world economy in which internationalization 
had exposed them to the vicissitudes of 
economic fluctuations. In recent years, therefore, 
greater attention has been paid in the Economic 
Survey than in its earliest days to macroeconomic 
policies and equilibria and to short-term trends, 
although without neglecting analysis of the 
long-term economic situation, trends and 
structural factors that was a feature of the early 
editions. 
The chequered development of international 
consensus on development policy has been 
reflected in the pages of the Economic Survey. 
Inward-looking industrialization developed as an 
unquestioned necessity in the post-war period, 
while the central role of the State constituted a 
pillar of consensus up until the 1960s. This 
consensus was broken in the 1970s in the face 
of global economic disequilibria and the 
feeling that the previous policy options were 
exhausted, just before the debt crisis abruptly 
imposed the need for a change of direction. 
From this crisis there emerged the new 
paradigm current in the 1990s. 
In these developments, certain common 
features central to Latin American performance 
can be observed: the need to incorporate 
technical progress in order to raise productivity 
(nowadays a requirement for improving 
competitiveness); the need to overcome critical 
constraints deriving from inadequate domestic 
saving and external factors; and the need to 
assign priority to improving the living conditions 
of the entire population. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to retrace 
the history of the Economic Survey, outlining the 
particular view of the economic situation 
presented in successive editions and avoiding 
interpreting the economic history of the region 
from a present-day perspective. It will be seen 
how the Survey combined explanation of the 
facts in the light of the trends with a critical 
evaluation of the economic policies and 
exogenous factors that determined the region's 
economic development in each of the periods 
into which the past half century can be divided. 
3 This overall view of Latin America as the subject of study corresponded, according to the Economic Survey of Latin America, 
1975, to a reality and a need, because political, institutional, cultural and economic conditions had evolved beyond any doubt 
towards a closer association, in spite of a parallel intensification of the differences between countries and groups of countries 
(p. 42). 
344 
2. The early post-war years 
The foundations of the conceptual approach 
adopted by ECLAC were laid in the early editions 
of the Economic Survey. The second edition, 
corresponding to 1949, was in its time considered 
as "the Latin American manifesto". This period 
placed its stamp on the subsequent intellectual 
development of the institution. At this early date 
were sown the seeds of concepts relating to 
critical variables that are still completely 
applicable today, for example investment, 
domestic saving, technical progress and the 
balance of payments, as well as others which, 
although they have lost some support, have not 
ceded importance, such as that relating to the 
development of the manufacturing sector. 
In the early 1940s, ECLAC was interested in 
long-term economic issues and only later, as it 
began to have to consider economic fluctuations 
occurring from year to year, did it start to pay 
more attention to short-term economic equilibria. 
Its initial concern, rooted in its interest in the 
development process, was with trends in 
investment and the structural and cyclical factors 
influencing it. 
As a result, the first editions of the Economic 
Survey dealt with major issues relating to 
concrete aspects of the economy, especially 
product growth and linkages of the Latin 
American countries with the global economy; for 
ECLAC, the two issues were closely connected. 
This interpretive approach has been a constant 
feature of ECLAC analysis throughout its 
existence and has lasted into our own times, when 
the interdependence of economies in a global 
context is no longer a novelty for anyone. 
(a) Industrialization and development 
The observation by ECLAC of the Latin 
American development process originated in the 
need to improve the living standards of the great 
mass of the population, who were still living in 
very poor conditions compared with the 
population in more developed countries. From 
4 Albert Hirshman's description. 
5 Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949, p. 4. 
this standpoint, product and income growth 
constituted the central economic variable. 
The sectoral distribution of product was of 
particular relevance. The experience of the 
developed economies at that time showed that 
economic growth was accompanied, at least in 
the initial phase, by a transfer of the factors of 
production from primary activities, especially 
agriculture, to industry. Hence, economic 
development was essentially equated with 
industrialization. 
Industrialization, in turn, was tied to the 
spread of technical progress, which originated in 
the countries that had first experienced the 
industrial revolution. As modern techniques 
increased the productivity of agriculture, the 
dominant sector, a labour surplus was created 
that could only be productively absorbed by 
industry. This was why, in 1945, the Economic 
Survey noted: "agricultural improvement and 
industrial development are two aspects of the 
problem of economic development. One need 
only consider the large number of people 
engaged in agriculture in Latin America, with the 
exception of a few countries, to realize the 
magnitude of this problem and the vast effort 
which will be necessary to solve it". The fact that 
the developing countries, situated at the margin 
in terms of the spread of technical progress, were 
far from benefiting fully from it, except in restricted 
sectors producing low-cost foods and com-
modities, explained why they lagged behind. 
It was therefore appropriate to examine the 
region 's performance in the area of 
industrialization, and the factors that influenced 
this performance. In doing so, ECLAC arrived at 
the conclusion that Latin America had entered a 
new phase of incorporating technical progress. In 
the decade between 1937 and 1947, the period 
examined in the first edition of the Economic 
Survey, industrialization had accelerated. The 
explanation for this lay in background 
circumstances: serious problems of supply 
caused by the great economic depression of the 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
1930s and then by the Second World War obliged 
the Latin American countries to attempt to make 
up for the shortfall in imported articles by 
producing them domestically. These problems of 
supply persisted in the first post-war years, when 
the productive capacity of the main supplier 
countries, suffering from the after-effects of the 
war, was very depleted. Industrial development 
thus permitted partial substitution of missing 
imports. 
This development was made possible by the 
use of copious foreign exchange reserves 
accumulated during the war. This explains the 
central role played by the public sector. As was 
pointed out in the 1953 issue of the Economic 
Survey, "during and after the Second World War 
the Governments of many Latin American 
countries embarked upon vast development 
programmes assisted by accumulated foreign 
exchange reserves and by investment projects 
prepared by the newly-formed development 
institutions". In 1945, public investment 
accounted for more than 40% of overall 
investment in the region and in the period 
1945-1953 for one third on average. 
"Governments pursued a policy of rapid 
industrialization and economic development, not 
only through direct public investment, but also 
by means of other important fiscal and economic 
measures", including currency exchange 
subsidies and credit policy. "Linked with the 
improvement in the terms of trade, this permitted 
a rise in the level of real income in the 
wage-earning sector, which resulted in the 
acceleration of economic development through 
the additional stimulus of growing demand." 
Industrial expansion also enabled part of the 
increased population that could no longer be 
absorbed in primary production and related 
activities to be gradually employed in urban 
sectors, once exports lost the momentum they 
had exhibited before the great depression. The 
6 Economic Survey of Latin America, ¡953, p. 5. 
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contraction of markets and restrictions on 
imports into those markets during the depression 
drastically slowed down the development of the 
export sector. The Second World War had a 
similar effect. During the 10 years ending in 
1947, the volume of exports only increased by 
some 16%, compared with an increase in the 
population of 23%. 
Industry thus became the driving force behind 
the development of economies, such as those of 
Latin American, that were still predominantly 
agricultural and suppliers of low value-added 
commodities to more developed countries. For 
ECLAC, already in 1948, the dilemma was not 
whether or not there should be industrialization, 
but "whether the increase in industry, resulting 
from the extension of technical progress, should 
take place in the existing industrial centres or in 
the new centres which are appearing", 
particularly in the Latin American countries. 
(b)External factors affecting economic 
development 
Thus, external circumstances played a 
determining role in the rapid growth of industry 
and output in some countries during the early 
post-war years. This growth was stimulated by 
trade difficulties and helped by favourable terms 
of trade and the large reserves accumulated 
during the Second World War. The change of 
direction of the regional economy that became 
apparent in the mid-1950s confirmed the crucial 
importance of external factors linked to 
investment, which, together with productivity 
(influenced by technical progress), determined 
the rate of growth. 
From the beginning, ECLAC drew attention to 
the low investment rates in South America, 
noting that the domestic saving vital in order to 
accumulate necessary fixed capital was in very 
serious trouble in most of the countries, because 
of low wages and distorted consumption patterns. 
ECLAC was aware of the need for foreign capital 
in these conditions, and pointed out the wide 
scope for external investors in countries whose 
transport systems, energy sources and other 
sectors essential for growth were 
undercapitalized. However, in the first years after 
the war, capital flows were minimal. The foreign 
capital invested in Latin America between 1945 
and 1952 accounted for scarcely 3% of total 
investment, although it had increased to around 
10% by the end of the 1950s. 
To the lack of saving, was added another, no 
less important handicap: insufficient exports to 
transform saving into imports of capital goods. 
Although the value of exports increased 
significantly in the immediate post-war period, 
because of improved prices, it soon became 
obvious that this was a temporary stimulus and 
that exports were encountering the stumbling 
block of limited absorption of Latin American 
products in the international market, a 
consequence of the low income-elasticity of 
demand for commodities. 
Moreover, analysis of the trends in the terms 
of trade led to the formulation, in the Economic 
Survey for 1949, of the theory of deterioration in 
the terms of trade over the long run because the 
fruits of technical progress were asymmetrically 
distributed between producers of commodities 
and producers of manufactures. Given the 
different nature of supply and demand for the two 
groups of products, technical progress was 
causing the price of commodities to fall, the 
benefits being transferred to the consumer, 
whereas in the case of manufactures, it was 
leading to a decrease in costs, to the benefit of the 
producers. 
As was repeatedly pointed out in the 
Economic Survey during the 1950s, the 
above-mentioned factors were restricting the 
long-term growth rate of regional exports, which 
were mainly commodities. On the other hand, it 
was noted, imports were tending to grow much 
more rapidly. The high growth rate of imports 
was in response to the great need for capital 
goods, inputs and fuels from abroad, as well as 
7 Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949, p. 13. 
8 This argument has been the subject of ongoing controversy and contradictory empirical demonstrations. The Economic Survey 
for 1969 contains a study of the evolution of the terms of trade. 
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the high income-elasticity of demand for 
manufactured consumer goods, mainly durables. 
Faced with this need, import capacity, crucially 
dependent on exports since net capital inflows 
were scarce, proved insufficient. This gave rise 
to a phenomenon that ECLAC considered to be of 
major importance: the trend towards a persistent 
balance-of-payments disequilibrium. 
This phenomenon turned the external 
sector of Latin American countries into the 
main focus of analysis. It has remained so, to 
differing degrees and for varying reasons, 
throughout the 50-year history of the Economic 
Survey. In an environment such as that 
prevailing in the 1950s, the concept of import 
capacity, determined by the purchasing power 
of exports (which responds to the terms of 
trade and export volumes), assumes particular 
importance; on it depends not only the 
balance-of-payments equilibrium, but also 
the level of investment, a determining factor 
in growth and, over the long run, wage levels. 
(c)Macroeconomic equilibria 
The central role attributed to the external 
sector in output growth relegated other factors, in 
particular internal macroeconomic equilibrium, 
to a secondary level. This does not mean, 
however, that those factors were ignored. 
Starting with its first analyses, ECLAC noted the 
inflation in Latin America with concern. This 
concern was because policies to restrict public 
spending and domestic credit that were necessary 
to fight inflation were holding up economic 
growth and could have counterproductive social 
repercussions. It was also thought that inflation 
itself discouraged saving. 
The inflation was due to monetary expansion, 
induced in the post-war years by the 
accumulation of international reserves during the 
Second World War and by government spending 
exceeding government revenue. Devaluations to 
cope with the external disequilibrium in turn 
caused prices to rise. All of this was related in the 
last analysis to the lack of domestic saving. 
That is to say, the two problems of external 
and internal equilibrium were considered to be 
interdependent, both linked to the two deficits, 
the savings deficit and the external deficit, that 
were restricting growth. The 1958 edition of the 
Economic Survey pointed out that inflation was 
as much a problem of demand as of supply. On 
the one hand, the scarcity of imports had 
provoked sharp increases in domestic prices 
during the 1950s, either because of currency 
devaluations or because government measures to 
restrict imports (including large prior deposits, 
increased tariffs and exchange premiums) made 
them more expensive for the purchaser, while 
expansive economic policies fed demand. On the 
other hand, structural factors were perceived as 
worsening inflation by producing bottlenecks in 
the economy: "the violence and intractability of 
these inflations can be largely attributed to the 
unbalanced processes of development discussed 
above. Some economic sectors, especially food 
farming, are incapable of raising output in full 
response to demand pressures, which therefore 
induce rises in price levels". 
3. The 1960s and action for development 
By the end of the first decade of the post-war 
period, the map of the world was being reshaped, 
with a profound impact on perceptions and on 
development in Latin America. The 
consolidation of two ideological options in open 
competition with each other and the access to full 
sovereignty of several formerly colonized 
countries established a system of coordinates 
which divided the planet between East and 
West, North and South. Against this backdrop, 
the phenomenon of development assumed a 
political dimension at the international level 
and became a favoured objective of 
cooperation among the world community, as 
attested to by the designation of the 1960s as 
the United Nations Development Decade. 
9 Economic Survey of Latin America, 1958, p. 7. 
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Figure 1 
REGIONAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN THE 1950s 
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ECLAC played an active part in this process and 
the Economic Survey assumed the role of critical 
observer of the aspirations and accomplishments 
of the period. 
Various institutional arrangements 
established at the beginning of the decade were 
manifestations of the international community's 
awareness of the importance of cooperation for 
development. At the level of the Americas, these 
included the establishment of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) in 1959 and the change 
in the economic and social policy of the United 
States towards Latin America, as symbolized in 
the Alliance for Progress enshrined in the Charter 
of Punta del Este in 1961. This awareness found 
an echo in the sense of greater responsibility on 
the part of the Governments of the Latin 
American countries for addressing the 
development needs of their peoples. 
Accordingly, the issues of the Economic Survey 
that appeared in the 1960s reflected this reality 
through critical assessments of these policies in 
the light of the progress achieved and difficulties 
identified. 
(a)The Latin American consensus for the 
decade 
The 1963 edition of the Economic Survey lists 
the new fundamental concepts that were taking 
shape in Latin America while this climate of 
world opinion was unfolding. These concepts, 
which shaped a new stage in the interpretation of 
development problems and in defining policy at 
the level of the continent, included the following: 
(i) The conviction that development was an 
economic and social problem and that these two 
aspects were closely related. The heightened 
consciousness of the social dimension of 
economic issues emerged against a background 
of popular and political turmoil fueled by the 
sharp disparities in income distribution in 
countries of a region where world ideological 
confrontation had become deeply entrenched 
349 
Table 2 



































































— ii i i iduun — 
































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
following the Cuban revolution of 1959. Hence, 
in the Survey, income distribution and political 
instability, factors that had an adverse effect on 
key variables such as productivity, consumption 
patterns, saving and the necessary climate for 
productive long-term investment, were identified 
as two of the main obstacles to development. 
(ii) The need for a comprehensive 
well-planned policy, the main outcome of which 
would be the elaboration of development plans in 
almost all the Latin American countries, many of 
which were analysed by the organizations 
established by the Alliance for Progress and were 
the target of initiatives to cover their external 
borrowing requirements. 
(iii) The acceptance that development 
demanded institutional reforms for social and 
economic organization, such as agrarian reform, 
restructuring of tax systems, programmes for 
improving income distribution, effective access 
to education and equality of opportunities for all, 
and that such reforms required steps that would 
go beyond the limited management of the 
traditional economic policy instruments. Many 
countries promoted national programmes 
consistent with these requisites. 
(iv) The promotion of regional economic 
integration as a means of overcoming the severe 
constraints on expansion of exports and on the 
scale of import substitution, thus increasing 
market access for national industries. In this 
regard, the movement for economic cooperation 
among Central American countries, initiated in 
1951, became a step towards a subregional 
common market as of 1960. On a more ambitious 
scale was the attempt to integrate all Latin 
American countries, the initial step towards 
which was the Treaty of Montevideo (1960) 
establishing the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA). 
(v) The efforts to influence market regulation 
and international trade in order to establish a 
trade structure and a trading relationship with the 
rest of the world which would obviate 
longstanding difficulties arising from trade 
dominated by exports of commodities. The most 
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notable outcome of efforts in this area was the 
establishment of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, in which Latin 
America and ECLAC played a leading role. 
(b)External constraints: new dimensions 
In the 1960s, external constraints affecting 
Latin American countries took on a new 
dimension, arising from the gradual expansion of 
trade and international capital flows. 
As described in the Economic Survey for 
1970, world trade in the 1960s, and particularly 
in the latter half of the decade, expanded to an 
extraordinary degree, and this benefited regional 
exports. However, the products showing the 
greatest dynamism on international markets were 
manufactures, so that growth of Latin American 
exports was slower than the global rate. Between 
1960 and 1969, world exports grew at a rate of 
8.8% per year, compared with 5.5% in Latin 
America. Moreover, as regional exports grew 
more slowly than imports, huge trade imbalances 
accrued. 
In addition, interest payments and remittances 
abroad of returns on capital inflows in the form 
of loans and foreign direct investment increased 
sharply. These payments increased at such a rate 
that during this decade they amounted to double 
the totals recorded in the 1950s and accounted for 
as much as 35% of overall regional exports of 
goods and services; in most countries, they 
represented over half of the current account 
deficit. Consequently, it was increasingly 
necessary to resort to external financing in order 
to facilitate the necessary expansion in import 
capacity, especially at the end of the decade, 
propelling the region into a vicious circle of 
indebtedness and current account deficit. 
(c) Performance and the role of economic policy 
The results achieved by the region in the 
decade were analysed and evaluated in the 1969 
and 1970 editions of the Economic Survey. The 
overall assessment was positive but qualified: 
"The rate of expansion of the Latin American 
10 Economic Survey of Latin America, 1970, p. 29. 
economy during the 1960s slightly exceeded the 
figure for the preceding decade and was about the 
same as that of the world economy, although not 
so high as those of more dynamic regions and 
countries". This growth, which like that of the 
1950s was above 5%, was concentrated in the 
industrial sector, the most vibrant and stable, and 
was based on domestic demand, in particular 
government spending. Moreover, it took place in 
a climate of relative stability. In 1970, as few as 
four out of 23 countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean experienced double digit inflation; the 
highest level, in Chile, was less than 33%, and in 
approximately half the countries, inflation was 
below 4%. 
Towards the end of the decade, most countries 
had managed to increase the rate of investment, 
which was of the order of 20% of GDP. Given the 
increasing rate of public investment, the 
availability of public services in the areas of 
health and education had improved. 
These results, which, according to current 
criteria would be considered favourable, were the 
subject then of extensive discussion regarding 
the true picture concealed by these 
macroeconomic figures. Basically, ECLAC was 
concerned about low productivity, in particular 
in agriculture, services and traditional sectors, 
which was accentuating "structural 
heterogeneity", as it was termed. The internal 
contrasts also affected social issues, starting with 
unemployment, which remained high with a 
slight tendency to rise and was one of the factors 
that contributed to sharp inequalities in income 
distribution. 
Thus, a great deal of ground remained to be 
covered along the path to development. And, in 
keeping with the new consensus, it was the 
State's responsibility to take the necessary action 
to accelerate the pace. The State was, indeed, the 
legitimate entity which could ensure that social 
justice and the general interest prevailed with 
respect to ownership, it was the architect of 
planning and coordination of all economic 
agents, the protagonist of integrationist efforts, 
the rightful interlocutor in relations with 
international organizations -including ECLAC-
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and in providing support for development 
projects. It was natural that ECLAC should deepen 
its analysis and evaluation of the policies adopted 
to achieve these ends, all the more so in view of 
the preparations for a second development 
decade envisaged for the 1970s. 
Whereas ECLAC recognized the achievements 
of economic policies, as well as the internal and 
external structural limitations which they were 
coming up against, it was no less certain that the 
deficiencies of those policies contributed to the 
lack of economic dynamism and the existing 
social imbalance. As indicated in the assessments 
carried out in successive editions of the 
Economic Survey, progress in development 
policy was tediously slow and the results not 
far-reaching enough. 
National planning failed to achieve the 
desired degree of effectiveness, owing to the 
need for reform of the political and social 
decision-making structure. Agrarian reform 
programmes limped along, suffering from 
indecision and meeting with resistance; as a 
result agricultural production stagnated, slowing 
growth, encouraging inflation and leading to a 
deterioration in the external deficit. The 
necessary banking and financial reforms were 
not adopted, nor were tax systems modified 
substantially. The measures taken to cut back 
excessively high public administration costs, put 
finances on a sound footing and improve the 
output of State-owned enterprises were not 
thoroughgoing enough. There were no national 
policies on foreign investment to ensure that such 
investment benefited the recipient countries. 
Economic integration did not proceed as 
expected. 
In view of the structural causes of inflation in 
Latin America, as outlined by ECLAC, such 
deficiencies limited the effectiveness of 
anti-inflationary policies referred to as 
"stabilization policies". In turn, these policies 
placed limits on growth. To achieve long-term 
stability, countries which had done their utmost 
to enforce anti-inflationary policies, aimed 
primarily at curbing demand, needed to combine 
them with appropriate measures to prevent a 
decline in economic growth; in this regard, a 
great deal of importance was attached to the 
development of a sound domestic investment 
policy. In light of its direct link with growth, 
efforts to curb inflation were continued. 
During the decade, ECLAC paid increasing 
attention to cyclical factors and economic 
fluctuations, and to short-term policies adopted 
in response to these phenomena. These were 
added to the Commission's traditional concern 
with development, which had led it to give 
priority to long-term analysis. However, ECLAC 
did not lose sight of what should be the essential 
policy goal, namely the improvement of the 
living conditions of the population, nor did it 
abandon its characteristic structuralist approach. 
(d) Criticism of import substitution 
The import substitution strategy applied by 
Latin American countries was critically 
appraised in the Economic Survey. This appraisal 
coincided with changes in the external context 
and deserves special attention since it remains 
closely associated in the popular perception with 
ECLAC thinking "par excellence". 
This appraisal was based on the recognition 
that, formerly, the policy of import substitution 
had been the main stimulus for growth and had 
provided experience and industrial training, so 
that, by the end of the 1960s, the countries of 
Latin America had more solid foundations on 
which to sustain a more efficient economic and 
social development policy. As pointed out in the 
1969 edition of the Economic Survey, this 
recognition was no less necessary when this 
process became the target of criticism from 
various quarters, many of which ECLAC deemed 
justified in view of the obvious failings of 
industrialization in Latin America. 
Since the late 1950s, it had been recognized 
that import substitution did little to alleviate 
pressures on the balance of payments; on the 
11 An analysis of Latin American experience in planning is presented in the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1972. 
12 An initial analysis of short-run fluctuations between 1948 and 1959 is to be found in the Economic Survey for Latin America, 
1960. 
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contrary, it exacerbated them. The hope 
subsisted, nevertheless, that in the long term, as 
industrialization proceeded, it would bring 
foreign currency savings. However, already in 
1961, it was admitted that protectionist 
measures used to stimulate local industry 
"sometimes tend to over-extend themselves 
13 and to outlast the need", thereby weakening 
incentives and, hence, the competitiveness of 
certain industries, despite the tendency to view 
regional integration as a palliative to this 
serious shortcoming. 
The validity of this assessment was borne 
out by experience; indeed, the 1966 edition of 
the Survey echoed the concern that Latin 
American Governments should "seek a new 
policy which will enable them to ... free their 
economies from the stranglehold of a policy 
focused on indiscriminate import substitution 
designed solely to supply domestic 
markets".14 And in 1969, the Survey added that 
"indiscriminate import substitution under the 
shelter of much too high tariff walls has led 
to an extensive industrialization which, at its 
present stage, is characterized by a distorted 
structure of production that is both costly and 
inefficient in some vital aspects ... The 
establishment of a large number of plants of 
unsuitable sizes has meant a squandering of 
capital and low productivity. Where 
economies of scale could be meaningful, they 
have not been achieved, and much of 
the capacity is under-utilized. Lack of 
specialization in industrial plants helps to 
keep costs up". 
Moreover, the external barriers which initially 
were an incentive for the local manufacture of 
items previously imported had, for the most part, 
disappeared. Goods were readily available on 
world markets, so that, as already indicated, 
imports tended to grow at a very fast rate. The 
problem then was the lack of dynamism of 
exports, which grew at a slower rate not only than 
imports but also than world trade. The Economic 
Survey for 1969 stated: "the only sound and 
lasting remedy for the external bottleneck is 
essentially to develop exports". Policy based 
exclusively on import substitution kept those 
countries dependent on primary products and 
subject to constraints imposed by the 
economic policy of the major centres overseas, 
by technological advances that brought in 
new substitutes and by the low elasticity of 
demand. 
In short, ECLAC attributed the deficiencies in 
the existing industrial structure to "the lack of an 
industrial policy with clear-cut development 
goals and ... production purely for national 
markets". This diagnosis led to the conclusion 
that: "in a development strategy, two things are 
clearly essential: to strengthen national markets 
and to make industry export-oriented. The 
absorption of surplus labour in productive 
activities, a policy of income redistribution and a 
programme of land reform will immediately help 
to do the former. Integration and the sale of 
industrial goods outside the region will bring 
with them the advantages of a broader market and 
the incentives for continuing the process of 
industrialization in a more efficient way". 
4. Furthering international integration 
in the 1970s 
The shift in emphasis in the Commission's 
approach from import substitution to exports 
went hand in hand with the developing countries' 
new demands in the area of international trade. 
With reference to the cardinal divides that split 
the world in the 1960s and 1970s, whereas the 
hallmark of the 1960s for the region seemed to 
be the ideological rivalry between East and West, 
13 Economic Survey for Latin America, 1961, p. 351. 
14 Economic Survey for Latin America, 1966, p. 4. 
15 Economic Survey for Latin America, 1969, p. 10. 
16 Ibid. p. 11. 
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in the 1970s, Latín America found itself caught 
up in the uncertainties of the North-South 
17 confrontation. 
The international consensus on development 
that reigned in the 1960s was succeeded by 
confrontation in the 1970s, the result of a sense 
of frustration at the lack of progress achieved by 
the Third World, and also of a crisis in the world 
order established by the developed countries 
following the Second World War. The first 
manifestation of this crisis came in August 1971, 
when the United States devalued its currency 
ending the convertibility of dollars into gold and 
bringing about the definitive collapse of the 
monetary and financial system which had been 
instituted at Bretton Woods. This marked the end 
of the gold standard in a world beset by inflation 
and a dollar glut. 
The time had apparently come to replace the 
old order by a new international economic order 
which, among other things, would take into 
account the new developing countries and the 
major issues confronting them. In this context, 
the event of greatest import was the agreement 
among petroleum-exporting countries, which 
culminated in sharp rises in energy prices and 
thrust the world into a dizzying spiral of 
stagnation and inflation. 
Whereas, up to this point, it had been difficult 
to speak of Latin America as a whole, these 
events led to the emergence of a new economic 
geography within the region. On the one hand, 
the energy crisis set a minority of oil-exporting 
countries (in the first instance, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, 
subsequently joined by Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru) apart from the other countries. On the other 
hand, during this decade, the way was paved for 
a new economic policy option, which took the 
form of an opening-up to the outside world, 
epitomized most dramatically in the case of 
Chile. ECLAC analysis had to take heed of this 
situation and also of the indirect, but by no means 
irrelevant consequences, which the energy crisis 
had for all the countries of the region, owing to 
the massive financial transfers it engendered 
worldwide. 
(a)The "internationalization" of the Latin 
American economy 
As highlighted in the analyses contained in 
various editions of the Economic Survey 
published in the course of the decade, exports 
accelerated in the late 1960s, contributing to a 
strong revival in economic activity, a situation 
which lasted throughout the first half of the 
1970s. Between 1968 and 1974, Latin America 
achieved spectacular GDP growth rates, of the 
order of 7%, and an investment ratio which 
soared to close to 24% of GDP. 
Strictly speaking, as ECLAC noted, these 
results were chiefly attributable to the strength of 
domestic demand, since the value of exports as a 
percentage of GDP did not vary significantly. 
However, as was also pointed out, exogenous 
factors assumed a leading role in Latin America 
owing to the combination of robust demand for 
primary products and a clear improvement in the 
terms of trade between 1971 and 1973, the 
increasing involvement of transnational 
corporations, staggering financial flows and even 
an increasingly large share of manufactures in 
exports from the larger countries of the region. 
This prompted ECLAC to state in 1975 that "if 
account is taken only of the external factors, it 
could well be argued that the stage which ended 
was merely equivalent to a new and more 
complex version of 'outward-oriented' 
18 growth", reminiscent of the growth experience 
in the region prior to the crisis of the 1930s. This 
accounts for the description of the period as one 
17 It should be recalled that ECLAC did not subscribe to the most extreme arguments of the centre/periphery theory. While it 
did recognize the "transparent truth of the subordination and unequal relationships between centre and periphery", it did not, as 
pointed out in the Economic Survey for 1975, consider "that all the great problems of the periphery stem from this circumstance; 
still less does it mean, as has been maintained on occasion, that the underdevelopment of the majority has been at once the 
determinant cause and effect of the progress of the fortunate nucleus" (p. 39). 
18 Economic Survey for Latin America, 1975, p. 44. It will be recalled that "internationalization" of the world economy was a 
common theme in the 1960s, in much the same way and with the same connotations as the term "globalization" today. For a 
comprehensive report and discussion on the issue, see Economic Survey of Latin America, 1978, Part three: "Latin America and 
the internationalization of the world economy: significance and options", pp. 519-589. 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN INDICATORS, 1970-1979 
(In percentages) 
Country 

























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
of "internationalization" of the Latin American 
economy. 
From the mid-1970s, however, this process 
took a different turn. As described in the 
Economic Survey, trade, which had previously 
played a predominant role in the Latin American 
economies, was eclipsed by external financing. 
The relative decline in trade was due to a 
weakening of economic activity in the developed 
countries and was exacerbated by the resulting 
resurgence of protectionist practices. Moreover, 
inflation was a chronic problem in these countries 
so that, in addition to price rises for petroleum 
products, Latin America also had to contend with 
higher prices for other imports. While the decline 
in trade reduced the revenues of the countries of 
the region, costly imports resulted in increased 
payments and their combined effect was to push 
up borrowing requirements. 
These borrowing requirements were covered 
by rechannelling the financial surpluses of the 
petroleum-exporting countries. In the course of 
the decade, the net inflow of capital into the 
region increased more than five-fold, from 
US$ 4.9 billion in 1970 to close to US$ 26.5 
billion in 1979. This was a basic factor in Latin 
America's relatively quick recovery from the 
effects of stagnation in the industrialized world 
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in the second half of the 1970s, and in the 
maintenance of high import growth rates, which, 
in conjunction with the huge increase in outflows 
in the form of interest payments and profits, 
contributed to an astronomical increase in the 
current account deficits. 
Furthermore, debt servicing was made more 
difficult by the commercial terms on which loans 
were obtained, since the main instruments for 
rechannelling funds were private international 
banks. The Latin American countries were 
excluded, by virtue of their position as 
middle-income developing countries, from 
benefiting from official loans at concessionary 
rates, which were intended basically to respond 
to the more pressing financial needs of the 
poorest countries of Africa and Asia. At an early 
stage, in 1975, ECLAC warned that "given the 
already heavy burden of external debt for many 
developing countries, the taking out of loans on 
commercial terms -at least on the scale of recent 
years- may not be a viable means of financing 
future current account deficits". The problem 
did not abate; on the contrary, debt servicing as 
a percentage of exports of goods and services, 
increased steadily from less than 10% in the 
middle of the decade, to 20% at the end of the 
1970s, before rocketing to almost 40% in 1982. 
anti-inflationary policy, which, up to then, had, 
in practice, been assigned low priority. 
The growing interest of ECLAC in the 
phenomenon of inflation was reflected in the 
Economic Survey for 1974, which contained 
exhaustive information on inflation in Latin 
America and the world. When the role of external 
factors in the acceleration of inflation was 
brought home more forcefully, in 1973-1974, 
most of the countries were in the throes of 
inflation in which exogenous causes played a 
predominant role, although price rises were 
relatively moderate, fluctuating between 10% 
and 20%. Roughly similar influences from 
internal factors and "imported inflation" affected 
another group of countries, where price rises 
varied between 30% and 40% in 1974. In these 
countries, conditions were ripe for foreign-bred 
inflation to spread. Only in two countries (Chile 
and Uruguay) did inflation from abroad 
exacerbate an already volatile domestic situation, 
leading to chronic and acute triple-digit 
inflation. 
In 1974, inflation in Latin America averaged 
40%, compared with 12% in 1970. It rose above 
60% in 1976. However, these levels were still 
low compared with those that would be recorded 
in the following decade. 
(b) Imported inflation 
The Economic Survey also analysed the links 
between the international context described 
above and another crucial factor: the emergence 
of galloping inflation, which was to plague the 
region in the following decade. In fact, the spark 
that hit the inflationary bonfire came from 
outside the region: world inflation following the 
dollar issues in the 1960s, the monetary and 
financial upheavals of the early 1970s and the 
backward linkage effect of the oil price rise 
which unleashed an upward spiral of costs and 
prices. This external influence, passed on through 
prices for tradable goods, found fertile ground in 
Latin America, given the lack of resolve of 
(c) Towards a new model of external linkages 
Given the grave and well-nigh unsustainable 
risks to which the external sector was being 
exposed, ECLAC suggested in its Economic 
Survey for 1975, that internationalization of the 
economy of Latin America had gone "beyond the 
limit permitted by its place in the system of 
international division of labour as an exporter of 
primary products". The Commission could see 
springing up once more the latent contradiction 
which had hung heavily over the previous 
decades, i.e., the asymmetry between the demand 
for imports generated by a certain type of growth 
pattern and the capacity of such growth to 
generate sufficient foreign exchange to finance 
19 Economic Survey of Latin America, 1975, p. 6. 
20 Economic Survey of Latin America, 1974,pp. 180 and 181 and table 152. 
21 Economic Survey of Latin America, 1975, p. 47. 
356 
Figure 2 
RISE AND FALL OF INFLATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
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those imports. The new circumstances abroad 
heightened that contradiction. 
This problem compounded the difficulties and 
shortcomings of import substitution, to which 
ECLAC had drawn attention, mainly because of 
the limitations of domestic markets. This 
combination of factors highlighted the need to 
adopt appropriate policies for strengthening 
linkages with external markets in order to take 
more advantage of the opportunities provided by 
the international division of labour, treating 
export promotion as the top priority so as to 
sustain the high level of imports and act as "the 
engine of growth". 
This approach, which was termed 
"opening-up" to the outside world, was applied 
in varying degrees in different countries. 
However, as applied in the countries of the 
Southern Cone, especially Chile, it involved a 
drastic change, a sudden break with policies 
applied up to that point. This extreme 
liberalization, analysed in detail in the Economic 
Survey, was part of a readjustment which covered 
practically every dimension of economic and 
social life and which was governed by the logic 
of comparative advantage, market mechanisms 
and external competition. In other countries, a 
combination of selective protectionism and 
export promotion measures gave rise to policies 
reminiscent of those successfully applied in Asia 
by the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Taiwan, Province of China. 
In response to this situation, ECLAC pointed to 
the risks implicit in radical liberalization. It 
would have adverse effects on the existing 
industrial structure, which was geared to the 
domestic market. The logic of external 
competitiveness was consistent with the 
maintenance of low wages in productive 
activities, whereas a strategy centred on the 
domestic market demanded, as a priority, 
simultaneous measures to boost demand for local 
goods and services, and this was contingent on 
appropriate wage levels. Radical liberalization 
seemed to be incompatible with the principles 
that had inspired regional integration. 
Within these countries, the changes heralded 
in by that strategy in the pricing system and in the 
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form of greater availability of products targeted 
at higher income groups (which, by regional 
consensus, had previously been subject to tighter 
import restrictions) were fraught with 
consequences and prompted ECLAC to issue the 
following emphatic warning: "an unfettered 
opening-up of the economy runs the risk of 
reestablishing, creating or deepening economic 
and social features which have long been 
22 criticized in Latin America". 
For ECLAC, export promotion was 
fundamental, in particular exports of 
manufactures, since these combined two 
essential functions: allowing industrialization to 
proceed and permitting another form of linkage 
to the world economy which provided better 
prospects than that based on the export of 
commodities. But ECLAC saw no contradiction 
between inward-looking and outward-looking 
industrialization strategies. 
Import substitution had played an important 
role in the initial phase of industrialization, which 
was geared to the domestic market. This phase 
had the potential to serve as a springboard for 
access to external markets. In this regard, the 
regional experience was compared with that of 
late industrializing countries, headed by Japan, a 
country that had started by importing 
manufactured products from more developed 
countries, which it subsequently replaced by 
Japanese products, and, ultimately, became an 
exporter of these same items. This ECLAC 
approach was based on the adoption of a more 
dynamic and more long-term view of 
5. The 
Between 1980 and 1990, the average annual 
growth rate in Latin America and the Caribbean 
was barely more than 1 %. In the words of ECLAC, 
this period was marked by the "crisis which had 
begun in 1981 and which by 1982 had attained 
dimensions unrecorded since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s".24 At the end of the 
22 Economic Survey of Latin America, 1978, p. 568. 
23 Ibid. p. 571. 
24 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
comparative advantages, embodied in the 
concept of "acquired" comparative advantages. 
The central issue of the debate, for ECLAC, was 
"confined to weighing up the respective roles 
of planning (or the deliberateness of economic 
policy) and of the market, to the relationship 
between these two determinants of the 
allocation of resources and, above all, to the 
nature of the economic and social objectives 
pursued". The necessary policies had to be 
directed, at inter alia, developing regional 
links, negotiating with transnational 
corporations the best contribution that they 
could make as key agents of internatio-
nalization and ensuring that the State played a 
role as "guide and guardian". 
Some of the key elements of external 
opening-up would be the basis for the proposal 
subsequently put forward by ECLAC for 
"changing production patterns with social 
equity". But the preparation of these policy 
guidelines was peremptorily cut short by 
economic circumstances. At the end of the 
decade, Latin American countries were on the 
verge of economic and financial collapse; a mere 
puff, in the form of a rise in international interest 
rates, was to be sufficient to push them over the 
brink. Thus a debt crisis was building up which 
would abruptly awaken countries to the urgent 
demands of the economic situation, would mark 
the 1980s as the lost decade for Latin American 
development and would eventually shift the 
balance decisively in favour of economic 
liberalization. 
decade 
decade, per capita product was 9% lower than in 
1980. The situation with respect to national 
income was even more disheartening, given the 
deterioration in the terms of trade. This period 
represented a big step backwards in the economic 
development of the region: a lost decade as it has 
been aptly termed. 
',p.3. 
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The root cause of this disastrous performance 
was the situation of the external sector during the 
second half of the 1970s, referred to above. 
ECLAC analysis with respect to this situation 
centred on a new concept that summed up and 
characterized the set of disequilibria with which 
the economies of the region were confronted in 
the following decade. If the purchasing power of 
exports was the key variable for external 
restriction of Latin American development in the 
three decades after the Second World War, the 
net transfer of resources abroad played this 
pivotal role during the 1980s. 
Starting in 1982, the countries of Latin 
America became net exporters of vast amounts 
of financial resources to the developed countries, 
which, as ECLAC pointed out, "thwarts the 
aspirations of its peoples and confutes the 
principles of development and international 
cooperation". 
Linked to this phenomenon, which reflected 
the drying up of voluntary external financing 
during this decade, the countries' high level of 
indebtedness and their debt-service payment 
difficulties, was serious internal disequilibrium 
which gave rise to hyperinflation and plunged 
States into extremely grave crisis, causing them 
to abandon their previous proactive stance. In 
these conditions, structural development issues 
took second place to Governments' need to 
adopt stringent adjustment programmes that 
would enable them to negotiate the rescheduling 
of their debt obligations with their external 
creditors. These adjustment programmes, 
implemented by Governments with the financial 
support of the International Monetary Fund, 
initiated the process of structural market reform 
that was becoming generalized by the 
mid-1980s. 
During this period the Economic Survey 
provided an account of these changes and they 
were reflected in its own approach and the new 
tone of its analysis, mainly focusing on the harsh 
conditions in the region, now extended by the 
official inclusion of the English-speaking 
countries of the Caribbean. 
25 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
26 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
(a) Net transfer of resources abroad 
Between 1982 and 1990 there was a new 
phenomenon in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: the massive transfer of financial 
resources abroad, in contrast to the copious 
inflows of a decade earlier. This phenomenon 
had two interrelated causes. They were flagged 
by ECLAC in an account of the start of the crisis: 
"The sharp drop in the net inflow of loans and 
investments and the sharp rise in payments for 
profits and interest also meant that in 1982, 
instead of receiving a net transfer of real 
resources/rom abroad, Latin America was forced 
to transfer to the exterior real resources 
amounting to over US$ 14.3 billion".26 
As the editions of the Economic Survey for 
this period make clear, the unsustainable increase 
in net payments of profits and interest, which 
more than quadrupled between 1977 and 1982, 
from US$ 8.2 billion to US$ 36.9 billion, was the 
direct consequence of two successive 
phenomena. The first of these was the massive 
accumulated indebtedness of the Latin American 
countries, referred to above, especially in the 
latter half of the 1970s. In 1981, net short- and 
long-term capital inflows were at a record high, 
equivalent to 40% of the value of exports, 
compared to around 14% in 1960. The second 
phenomenon was the sharp rise in international 
interest rates, which had an affect on interest 
payments on loans that had been agreed at 
floating rates. This rise followed the 
liberalization at the end of the 1970s of the 
interest rate used in the United States as an 
instrument of monetary policy and the adoption 
by that country of a restrictive monetary policy 
in a context of major fiscal disequilibria and high 
inflation. 
The contraction in net income from loans and 
investments occurred when Mexico's suspension 
of its debt servicing payments in 1982, combined 
with high interest rates in the United States, 
abruptly diverted international flows of private 
capital away from Latin America. Having lost 
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to generate trade surpluses in order to service its 
accumulated debt. This was achieved by means 
of a sharp contraction in domestic demand, which 
reduced imports, especially from 1983 on, 
generated exportable surpluses and slowed down 
economic activity. 
The net transfer of resources, corresponding 
to net capital inflows minus net factor payments, 
had been positive since 1968, after being slightly 
negative for two decades following the war. As a 
proportion of GDP, this positive transfer had 
reached its maximum level in 1978, when it was 
equivalent to 3.2% of product. As ECLAC noted, 
"up to 1981 the region had received capital of 
which the gross amount substantially exceeded 
the sum total of amortization payments, 
investment abroad and remittances of interest 
and profits ... In these circumstances, Latin 
America was able to pay amortization and 
interest payments on its external debt and the 
profits accruing on foreign capital by means of 
the new loans and investment received year by 
year. As from 1979, however, the size of this net 
transfer of resources began to diminish, since the 
increases in the net inflow of capital were more 
than offset by the still greater increases in 
payments of interest and profits." 
The mobilization of greater resources to cope 
with increasing payments started an 
unsustainable spiral. From 1982, when this spiral 
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finally collapsed, the transfer became negative 
and very large: "Between 1982 and 1986, this 
transfer was equivalent to 4% of the region's GDP, 
which was even higher than the transfers that 
Germany had to make in the form of reparations 
to the allies following the First World War".28 
Moreover, it rose to the equivalent of almost a 
quarter of export revenue, from 16% between 
1973 and 1981. 
This financial outflow had serious 
repercussions for the domestic saving and 
external sector deficits, and hobbled Latin 
American development. As the statistics 
elaborated by ECLAC at the end of the decade 
show, the resources transferred abroad absorbed 
a large share of domestic saving, which remained 
at a high level, 24% of GDP, in spite of the 
contraction in the per capita level of activity. 
Another substantial share of this saving served to 
offset the decline in the real terms of trade, which 
was equivalent to 3% of GDP between 1982 and 
1989. As a result, investment in this period 
represented only 17% of regional product, a 
much lower percentage than in the previous 
decades: it had held at between 21% and 22% in 
the 1950s and 1960s and at 24% in the period 
1974-1981. 
The transfer of resources abroad also severely 
restricted import capacity, which declined 
sharply after having stagnated until the 
mid-1960s and increasing thereafter until 1980. 
After 1982, import capacity fell by 25% 
compared with before the crisis and remained 
around the level recorded in the region 10 years 
earlier. 
(b)The trauma of hyperinflation 
The phenomenon of accelerating inflation 
which began in the previous decade reached its 
peak in the 1980s. As ECLAC explained on many 
occasions during this decade, the stepping up 
of inflationary pressures was in large measure a 
response to the inability of the fiscal structure to 
carry out its basic functions and at the same time 
undertake the transfer of resources abroad 
required for debt payments, 80% of which came 
to be underwritten or guaranteed by the State 
after successive rounds of renegotiation. Faced 
with obligatory limits on public expenditure 
which inhibited its management capacity, the 
State was unable to collect sufficient revenue 
through taxation and external financing or 
through domestic debt issues, so that a significant 
part of resources were derived from inflationary 
financing. 
This explains why the average regional 
year-end inflation rate of 56% in 1980 rose 
steeply to an extraordinary 1,200% in 1989. 
However, this average had little meaning in view 
of the runaway price rises recorded in several 
countries in the second half of the decade. One of 
the most extreme cases, and the first in which 
inflation reached four or more digits, was Bolivia 
in 1984, with an inter-annual rate that peaked at 
23,500% the following year. In Nicaragua 
inflation soared to 43,000% in 1989, and in 1990, 
Argentina recorded 20,300%, Brazil 6,500% and 
Peru 12,400%. 
The type of measures initially adopted by 
several countries to stem the vertiginous rise in 
prices, prominent among them being price and 
wage controls, had only short-lived results. As 
ECLAC noted, for example, in 1986, "in Argentina, 
Brazil and Peru the sharp reductions in the annual 
variation of consumer prices brought about by the 
application of unorthodox stabilization program-
mes were not accompanied by a comparable 
slackening of basic inflationary pressures. As a 
result, the second half of the year saw a reversal 
in the downward trend followed by the annual 
rate of inflation since the third quarter of 1985 in 
Argentina and Peru, and much the same thine 
occurred in Brazil towards the end of the year." 
The countries therefore went on to apply a 
combination of both orthodox measures, in the 
27 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1983, pp. 5 and 7. 
28 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1992, vol. 1, Part Two: "External capital movements in Latin America 
and the Caribbean", p. 258. This section provides a detailed analysis of capital movements from a historical perspective. 
29 See, for example, the analysis of the relationship between the transfer of resources and inflation in Economic Survey of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 1988, pp. 99-106. 
30 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1986, p. 11. 
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Figure 3 
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framework of orthodox macroeconomic adjust-
ment programmes, and heterodox measures such 
as certain deindexation processes or tripartite 
social compacts between Government, trade 
unions and employers. In some cases also, 
exchange rates were used as an anchor. 
(c)From macroeconomic adjustment to 
market reforms 
ECLAC was aware that the urgent problems 
engendered by the crisis of the 1980s drastically 
limited the scope for manoeuvre of economic 
policy and made it much more difficult than in 
the past. As economic problems grew more 
pressing, it became increasingly difficult, in the 
words of ECLAC at the end of the decade, "to 
tackle long-standing structural obstacles to 
development such as outmoded systems of 
education, inefficient agrarian structures, very 
limited application of new technology in 
production, and outdated financial and taxation 
32 
systems". This was reflected in public policies, 
as well as in the Economic Survey. In view of the 
above, it was also pointed out that "in order to 
overcome the deep and prolonged recession 
suffered by the vast majority of the countries 
during this decade, three things are required: 
greater import capacity, improved internal 
economic management, and structural 
transformations to overcome long-standing 
obstacles to both greater growth and greater 
equity."33 
Because of the scarcity of foreign currency, 
adjustment policies had been adopted in the 
external sector that granted a major role to 
exchange rate measures. The depreciation of 
national currencies served to promote exports 
and reduce imports. But these measures were not 
sufficient to generate surpluses for debt 
servicing, so that a general debt moratorium 
followed (with the notable exception of 
31 For a retrospective analysis of inflation in Latin America, see Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
1996-1997, chapter V, "Inflation", pp. 71-81. 
32 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1988, p. 12. 
33 Ibid. 
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Colombia) and debt amortization and later even 
interest payments were suspended. This situation 
led to difficult negotiations with creditors, 
conducted in various phases or rounds. ECLAC 
became one of the main sources of statistical data 
and analysis on these processes. 
Although initially it was considered that the 
financial difficulties were confined to liquidity, 
it was later admitted that excessive indebtedness 
also led to structural problems. In parallel, after 
the initial phases in which the official sector 
stayed in the background, at the end of the 
decade, with the adoption of the Brady Plan, the 
international debt management strategy involved 
the public sector in implementing debt reduction 
measures. 
To sum up, the negotiations with the 
international financial institutions, in addition to 
achieving significant debt reduction, made 
Governments responsible for adopting 
deep-seated structural reforms and macro-
economic adjustment programmes, made 
unavoidable by the serious internal and external 
disequilibria. These policies, which countries 
began to implement in the mid-1980s, were based 
on the need to maintain the basic macroeconomic 
equilibria by means of rigorous monetary and 
fiscal policies, to redefine the role of a State 
overwhelmed by the debt crisis and, 
consequently, to assign to the market the function 
of allocating resources, which was achieved 
through trade and financial liberalization and the 
privation of public enterprises. 
The introduction of these reforms, which were 
backed and inspired by the financial institutions, 
in particular the International Monetary Fund, led 
ECLAC to observe in 1990: "In the midst of great 
difficulties, Latin America and the Caribbean are 
still trying to overcome, once and for all, the 
crisis that has burdened them for almost a decade 
now. They base their hopes on the results of the 
sweeping and irreversible structural changes 
taking place in the countries of the region." 
Although there were similarities between the 
reforms introduced in the various countries, they 
did not conform to a single pattern. There were 
great differences in the context and sequence in 
which measures were implemented, in the 
political orientation of the Governments and 
sectors responsible for implementing them, in the 
extent to which they were applied, in the reaction 
they encountered among the population and in 
the progress achieved, and the setbacks and 
interruptions encountered. 
6. Macroeconomics and the withdrawal of the 
State in the 1990s 
Thus it was that by the start of the 1990s, the 
majority of the economies in the region were 
functioning on a new basis, with new policy 
orientations, centred on acceptance of the 
principle of a free market and on according 
priority to maintaining macroeconomic 
equilibria. These two issues are among the main 
issues to have marked the decade, in contrast to 
the environment in the postwar period addressed 
in the earliest editions of the Economic Survey. 
The Survey now reflects this macroeconomic 
trend, which is very different from the more 
structural view it took in the 1950s. But the events 
of the current decade also show that the initial 
ECLAC analyses regarding the external 
conditionalities of Latin American development 
remain valid. The risks of external 
desequilibrium are as present now as they ever 
were. During the post-war period they were seen 
as limiting economic development over the long 
term; today, their possible destabilizing effects 
on macroeconomic variables over the short term 
are also giving rise to concern. 
All this is taking place in a global economic 
context that is very different from 50 years ago. 
The internationalization of the economy has 
taken on enormous proportions since it began to 
pick up speed at the end of the 1960s. Trade 
exchanges have increased more and more 
relative to world output and, especially during the 
34 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1990, p. 9. 
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present decade, the ratio between their respective 
rates of growth has increased. The international 
financial markets have expanded to an 
extraordinary degree, as has the volume of capital 
crossing frontiers every day. Global production 
has acquired a hitherto unprecedented 
transnational character. Technological progress, 
above all in the field of communications, is the 
underlying factor in this process. In reference to 
these changes, the term "globalization" has 
invaded everyday vocabulary. 
(a)The new bases on which economies 
function 
As has been amply described in the Economic 
Survey, the policies and reforms introduced in 
many countries in the second half of the 1980s 
laid new foundations for their economies, 
generally more export-oriented and also 
incorporating trade liberalization, fiscal 
austerity, more prudential management of 
monetary policy and a greater reluctance to resort 
to public regulation of economic activity. All this 
has inspired greater confidence in the 
35 permanence of the rules guiding public policy. 
This confidence, strengthened by 
Governments' commitment to achieving 
macroeconomic stability and progress towards 
solving the debt problem, made a decisive 
contribution to the return of external capital to the 
region. In this climate, there was a positive 
transfer of resources to the region in 1991, which 
resulted in an easing of currency restrictions, the 
need for which had been indicated by the 
Economic Survey in 1988. Around the same time, 
there began to be signs of a lifting of the grim 
panorama of stagnation, recession and inflation 
that had engulfed most of the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
The Economic Survey provided testimony to 
the progress in structural reform and 
macroeconomic adjustment made during the first 
half of the 1990s. Reforms continued apace, 
although with great variations from country to 
35 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1 
36 Chapter V of the Economic Survey for 1996-1997 (pp. 71 -! 
and of stabilization policies. 
country. Significant privatization activity and the 
adoption of measures to improve regulatory 
systems in the sectors concerned, among others 
public utilities, were of special note among these 
reforms. Mechanisms were established to 
regulate the functioning of the financial system. 
Several countries made progress in reforming 
their social security systems, developing 
capitalization schemes for employees' 
contributions. 
The cornerstone of progress towards 
macroeconomic stability was drastic fiscal 
adjustment, backed by restrictive monetary 
policies and the use of the exchange rate as an 
anchor, and based on structural and institutional 
changes, such as tax reforms to increase and 
guarantee fiscal revenues, administrative and 
public spending policy reforms to reduce costs 
and make State administration more efficient and 
reforms of the monetary institutions to provide 
them with more autonomy in their task of 
controlling inflation. This resulted in a 
spectacular curb in price rises : the rate of increase 
was progressively reduced from 888% in 1993 to 
26% in 1993 and to less than 11% in 1997, the 
lowest rate in almost half a century. 
The change of direction taken by economic 
policy led to new developments in another area 
to which ECLAC had paid particular attention 
since the 1960s, that of regional integration. The 
opportunities offered by the regional and 
subregional markets as a result of economic 
integration ceased to be seen as a means of 
overcoming the shortcomings of inward-looking 
industrialization and instead began to be used to 
support the new export-oriented approach, 
calling to mind the suggestions formulated by 
ECLAC at the end of the 1970s. The concept of 
open regionalism refers to this new principle 
which has inspired integration efforts. 
Concrete progress towards integration has 
been achieved through, among other things: the 
establishment of Mercosur in 1991; the 
revitalization of the Andean Pact; the signing of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
1, vol. 1, p. 9. 
provides a detailed account of the historical evolution of inflation 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
which provided for trade integration of Mexico 
with its northern neighbours as of 1994; the 
movement to create a continental free trade zone 
(the "Free Trade Area of the Americas"); and a 
proliferation of bilateral agreements. All of these 
developments were only possible in the new 
climate of greater macroeconomic stability and, 
as ECLAC noted in 1993, pointed up the need to 
coordinate the relevant countries' 
macroeconomic policies in order to continue 
37 strengthening their trade links. 
(b)Financial vulnerability and external 
shocks 
In providing an account of the establishment 
of the economies' new bases for operation, 
ECLAC warned of difficulties being encountered 
which revealed the countries' financial 
vulnerability, domestically and externally, and 
which for some commentators called to mind the 
serious situation at the beginning of the 1980s. At 
the domestic level, for example, the banking 
crises that plagued the region in the mid-1990s, 
analysed in the Economic Survey for 1995-1996, 
37 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1992, p. 21. 
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revealed discrepancies between policies and 
reforms, as well as microeconomic and 
institutional deficiencies. ECLAC noted the risks 
of all-out liberalization or financial deregulation 
in conditions where there was insufficient saving 
and before macroeconomic disequilibria had 
been controlled and the corresponding 
institutional improvements consolidated, 
including more effective supervision. In such 
conditions, financial instability in the largest 
economies in the region (Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico) had been aggravated by drastic 
macroeconomic adjustments. 
External restrictions now, in the view of 
ECLAC, presented a contrast compared with a 
decade earlier. The opening up of the capital 
account and the return of massive capital flows 
to Latin America in the 1990s had brought with 
them the risk of external shocks provoked by 
sudden withdrawal of this capital by foreign 
investors at any sign of trouble, especially a large 
current account deficit. 
Such deficits are mainly brought about by the 
gap between exports and imports, which tend to 
increase at different rates. So far in the present 
decade, exports have been expanding at high 
rates (11% annually on average), but imports 
have been increasing at an even greater rate 
(16%). A problem noted many times in the past 
is arising once again in relation to the tendency 
of imports to grow more rapidly than exports. It 
is a problem that the new economic model has 
not so far been able to solve. In the current 
situation, capital of external origin, in addition to 
amply covering the trade deficit, has contributed 
to widening it because of the increase in 
expenditure that it allows and because of the real 
currency appreciation that it induces in the 
recipient countries. These factors, combined with 
others, such as fiscal and monetary management 
and the composition of external financing, cause 
uncertainty, to which the financial markets are 
very sensitive. 
The problem is particularly significant in view 
of the volatility of these markets, which are 
closely integrated at the global level thanks to 
widespread communications technology, and in 
view of the private nature of the funds invested. 
This is why the evaluation by specialized 
international institutions of the degree of risk that 
different economies present for foreign investors 
has acquired great importance. So, too, has the 
provision of reliable, timely, widely available 
information on the key economic variables; 
ECLAC assists the Governments in this task 
through its work of compiling and analysing data. 
Experience so far in this decade serves as an 
example in this respect. Since 1991, the year in 
which net financial flows to the region resumed, 
successive editions of the Economic Survey have 
contained warnings of these risks. In the 1994 
edition, it was pointed out that this state of affairs 
"increases the vulnerability of many of the 
region's economies to any new external impacts 
that may arise". A few months later, investors' 
abrupt withdrawal from the Mexican market led 
to a severe crisis which spread to the rest of Latin 
America. The region had barely recovered from 
this crisis when in 1997 it suffered the 
consequences of another shock, this time 
originating outside the region in the financial 
events that affected various Asian economies. 
The effects of this latest crisis, the one that 
began in Asia, are still making themselves felt, 
but the Latin American region has faced it in 
better conditions than in 1994, when the gravity 
of the situation caused ECLAC to reiterate its 
warning regarding "the dangers of a growing 
trade deficit, excessive dependence on inflows of 
short-term foreign capital and a low national 
saving rate and ... the need for greater 
coordination in economic policy". It was the 
38 See Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1995-1996, chapter IV: "The fragility of Latin America's financial 
system", pp. 55-65. 
39 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1993, p. 13. The warning continued: "A large share of this capital is 
of a short-term nature or has been brought into the region for purposes of speculation in the form of long-term instruments. A 
portion of this type of investment may be particularly sensitive to any increase in international interest rates or to the normalization 
of initial returns even in the absence of any abrupt changes in economic policy. Furthermore, foreign investors also monitor the 
size of each country's trade deficit, since it serves as an indicator of the sustainability of the basic process by which investment, 
growth and imports are linked with capital inflows." 
40 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1995-1996, p. 13. 
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view of ECLAC that overcoming this state of 
affairs in the medium term essentially depended 
on an accelerated and sustained expansion of 
exports, which required consistent efforts to 
change the region's production patterns and to 
invest more in tradables-producing sectors. 
Furthermore, throughout the many years in 
which the export structure was being diversified, 
ECLAC considered it essential that the necessary 
external conditions should be created for a 
harmonious expansion of global trade, both in 
the area of macroeconomic management of the 
main developed economies and that of the 
institutional structure governing trade in goods 
and services. At the same time, it was 
necessary to promote interregional trade in the 
framework of economic integration. It was no 
less important to adopt measures to help 
modify the composition of capital flows to 
make them more stable. 
Some of these conditions have been met 
and the region's financial vulnerability has 
been diminishing as internal financial 
systems have been strengthened after 
surviving the banking crises, privatizations 
have attracted huge amounts of direct foreign 
investment and short-term capital flows have 
been reduced somewhat relative to long-term 
loans and funds captured through bond issues 
and other more stable sources of financing. 
But there is still a need to review the arsenal 
of economic policies countries have at their 
disposal to deal successfully with external 
disruptions, as well as to strengthen national 
saving -another issue to which ECLAC has 
attached primary importance throughout its 
history- in order to dampen the demand for 
external capital to buttress investment and cover 
the trade deficit. 
(c) Equity: the unmet challenge 
One of the shadows cast by the new economic 
schemes is the continuing serious deterioration in 
the living conditions of large sectors of the 
population; it is a source of great concern. As 
ECLAC pointed out at the beginning of the 
present decade, there is no doubt that the new 
methods of operation are built on even greater 
income inequalities than in the past, more 
insecurity with respect to employment, a 
contraction of fiscal resources and a more 
limited field of action for economic policy. 
All of this implies diminished capacity to 
effect transfers between economic sectors or 
social strata. Thus, despite the progress of the 
macroeconomic variables, the majority of the 
countries have not yet managed to remedy to 
any great extent the social backwardness 
inherited from the past. 
Employment is one of the most relevant 
variables in this respect. Throughout the decade, 
ECLAC has stressed that insufficient productive 
employment was being created to absorb the 
increase in the workforce. In some countries, 
economic restructuring and efforts to improve 
competitiveness have had unfavourable 
short-term effects on demand for labour; as a 
result, by the mid-1990s it was apparent that 
growth rates in the order of 4% were not enough 
to allow for major progress in the fight against 
poverty or to prevent unemployment and 
underemployment from reaching unacceptable 
levels. 
As was recalled in the Economic Survey for 
1996-1997, ECLAC has pointed out on numerous 
occasions that in order to reduce unemployment 
and eradicate extreme poverty it was essential for 
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
to speed up growth. However, the experience of 
some countries suggests that growth is a 
prerequisite for achieving these ends, but is not 
enough in itself. In some cases, the cause of 
unemployment was the slow growth of output. In 
others, restructuring in the initial phases of the 
reform process had become the main cause of the 
extremely high unemployment rates observed. 
Thus, it was deduced that, given the nature of the 
reforms under way in the region, dealing with the 
employment problem w as likely to require labour 
41 See Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1992, p. 11 and ibid. 1993, p. 13. 
42 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1996-1997, p. 24. 
43 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1994-1995, p. 15. 
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policies specifically designed to help workers Survey in its early days. This was possible 
adapt to changing conditions. once the most urgent requirements of the 
In any event, the increased attention that is economies of the region had been addressed 
once again being given to the issue of equity and once their level of stability and the 
and the related issues of productivity, changes introduced permitted attention to be 
investment and domestic saving signals a focused on the more defining aspects of 
return to the basic concerns of the Economic economic development. 




ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN 
Casilla 179-D Santiago, Chile 
PERIODIC PUBLICATIONS 
C E P A L Review 
CEPAL Review first appeared in 1976 as part of the 
Publications Programme of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean, its aim being to make 
a contribution to the study of the economic and social 
development problems of the region. The views 
expressed in signed articles, including those by Secretariat 
staff members, are those of the authors and therefore 
do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the 
Organization. 
CEPAL Review is published in Spanish and English 
versions three times a year. 
Annual subscription costs for 1998 are US$ 30 for the 
Spanish version and US$ 35 for the English version. The 
price of single issues is US$ 15 in both cases. 
The cost of a two-year subscription (1998-1999) is 
US$ 50 for Spanish-language version and US$ 60 for 
English. 
Estudio Económico de 
América Latina y el 
Caribe 
1980, 664 pp. 1980, 
1981, 863 pp. 1981, 
1982, vol.1 693 pp. 1982, 
1982, vol.11 199 pp. 1982, 
1983, vol.1 694 pp. 1983, 
1983, vol.11 179 pp. 1983, 
1984, vol.1 702 pp. 1984, 
1984, vol.11 233 pp. 1984, 
1985, 672 pp. 1985, 
Economic Survey of 












































































(Issues for previous years also available) 
Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe / 
Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (bilingual) 
1980, 617 pp. 
1981, 727 pp. 
1982/1983, 749 pp. 
1984, 761 pp. 
1985, 792 pp. 
1986, 782 pp. 
1987. 714 pp. 

















(Issues for previous years also available) 
Libros d e l a C E P A L 
1 Manual de proyectos de desarrollo económico, 1958, 
5th. ed. 1980,264 pp. 
1 Manual on economic development projects, 1958, 
2nd. ed. 1972,242 pp. 
2 América Latina en el umbral de los años ochenta, 
1979,2nd. ed. 1980,203 pp. 
3 Agua, desarrollo y medio ambiente en América Latina, 
1980,443 pp. 
4 Los bancos transnacionales y el fmanciamiento 
extemo de América Latina. La experiencia del Perú, 
629 Pp- 1980,265 pp. 
837 pp. 4 Transnational banks and the external finance 
658 pp. of Latin America: the experience of Peru, 1985, 
186 pp. 342 pp. 
686 pp. 5 La dimensión ambiental en los estilos de desarrollo 
166 pp. de América Latina, Osvaldo Sunkel, 1981, 2nd. ed. 
685 pp. 1984,136 pp. 
216 pp. 6 La mujer y el desarrollo: guía para la planificación de 
660 pp. programas y proyectos, 1984,115 pp. 
6 Women and development: guidelines for 
programme and project planning, 1982, 3rd. ed. 
1984,123 pp. 
7 Africa y América Latina: perspectivas de la 
cooperación interregional, 1983,286 pp. 
8 Sobrevivencia campesina en ecosistemas de altura, 
vols. I y II, 1983,720 pp. 
9 La mujer en el sector popular urbano. América Latina y 
el Caribe, 1984,349 pp. 
10 Avances en la interpretación ambiental del desarrollo 
agrícola de América Latina, 1985,236 pp. 
11 El decenio de la mujer en el escenario latino-
americano, 1986, 216 pp. 
11 The decade for women in Latín America and 
the Caribbean: background and prospects, 1988, 
215 pp. 
12 América Latina: sistema monetario internacional y 
financiamiento extemo, 1986,416 pp. 
12 Latin America: international monetary system and 
external financing, 1986,405 pp. 
13 Raúl Prebisch: Un aporte al estudio de su 
pensamiento, 1987,146 pp. 
14 Cooperativismo latinoamericano: antecedentes y 
perspectivas, 1989,371 pp. 
15 CEP AL, 40 años (1948-1988), 1988,85 pp. 
15 ECLAC 40 Years (1948-1988), 1989,83 pp. 
16 América Latina en la economía mundial, 1988,321 pp. 
17 Gestión para el desarrollo de cuencas de alta montaña 
en la zona andina, 1988,187 pp. 
18 Políticas macroeconómicas y brecha extema: América 
Latina en los años ochenta, 1989,201 pp. 
19 CEP AL, Bibliografía, 1948-1988,1989,648 pp. 
20 Desarrollo agrícola y participación campesina, 1989, 
404 pp. 
21 Planificación y gestión del desarrollo en áreas de 
expansión de la frontera agropecuaria en América 
Latina, 1989,113 pp. 
22 Transformación ocupacional y crisis social en América 
Latina, 1989,243 pp. 
23 La crisis urbana en América Latina y el Caribe: 
reflexiones sobre alternativas de solución, 1990, 
197 pp. 
24 The environmental dimension in development 
planning I, 1991, 302 pp. 
25 Transformación productiva con equidad, 1990,3rd. ed. 
1991,185 pp. 
25 Changing production patterns with social equity, 
1990, 3rd. ed. 1991,177 pp. 
26 América Latina y el Caribe: opciones para reducir el 
peso de la deuda, 1990,118 pp. 
26 Latin America and the Caribbean: options to 
reduce the debt burden, 1990,110 pp. 
27 Los grandes cambios y la crisis. Impacto sobre la 
mujer en América Latina y el Caribe, 1991, 271 pp. 
27 Major changes and crisis. The impact on women in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 1992, 279 pp. 
28 A collection of documents on economic relations 
between the United States and Central America, 
f906-f956,1991,398 pp. 
29 Inventarios y cuentas del patrimonio natural en 
América Latina y el Caribe, 1991,335 pp. 
30 Evaluaciones del impacto ambiental en América Latina 
y el Caribe, 1991,232 pp. 
31 El desarrollo sustentable: transformación productiva, 
equidad y medio ambiente, 1991,146 pp. 
31 Sustainable development: changing production 
patterns, social equity and the environment, 
1991,146 pp. 
32 Equidad y transformación productiva: un enfoque 
integrado, 1993, 254 pp. 
33 Educación y conocimiento: eje de la transformación 
productiva con equidad, 1992, 269 pp. 
33 Education and knowledge: basic pillars of 
changing production patterns with social equity, 
1993, 257 pp. 
34 Ensayos sobre coordinación de políticas macro-
económicas, 1992, 249 pp. 
35 Población, equidad y transformación productiva, 
1993, 2nd. ed. 1995,158 pp. 
35 Population, social equity and changing production 
patterns, 1993, 153 pp. 
36 Cambios en el perfil de las familias. La experiencia 
regional, 1993, 434 pp. 
37 Familia y futuro: un programa regional en América 
Latina y el Caribe, 1994, 137 pp. 
37 Family and future. A regional programme in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 1995,123 pp. 
38 Imágenes sociales de la modernización y la 
transformación tecnológica, 1995, 198 pp. 
39 El regionalismo abierto en América Latina y el Caribe, 
1994, 109 pp. 
39 Open regionalism in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 1994, 103 pp. 
40 Políticas para mejorar la inserción en la economía 
mundial, 1995, 314 pp. 
40 Policies to improve linkages with the global 
economy, 1995,308 pp. 
41 Las relaciones económicas entre América Latina y la 
Unión Europea: el papel de los servicios exteriores, 
1996,300 pp. 
42 Fortalecer el desarrollo. Interacciones entre macro y 
microeconomia, 1996,116 pp. 
42 Strengthening development The interplay of 
macro-and microeconomics, 1996,116 pp. 
43 Quince años de desempeño económico. América 
Latina y el Caribe, 1980-1995,1996,120 pp. 
43 The economic experience of the last fifteen years. 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 1980-1995,1996, 
120 pp. 
44 La brecha de la equidad. América Latina, el Caribe y la 
cumbre social, 1997,218 pp. 
44 The equity gap. Latín America, the Caribbean and 
the social summit, 1997, 219 pp. 
45 La grieta de las drogas, 1997, 218 pp. 
MONOGRAPH SERIES 
Cuadernos de la C E P A L 
1 América Latina: el nuevo escenario regional y 
mundial/Latin America: the new regional and 
world setting, (bilingual), 1975,2nd. éd. 1985,103 pp. 
2 Las evoluciones regionales de la estrategia Inter-
nacional del desarrollo, 1975,2nd. éd. 1984,73 pp. 
2 Regional appraisals of the international 
development strategy, 1975, 2nd. ed. 1985,82 pp. 
3 Desarrollo humano, cambio social y crecimiento en 
América Latina, 1975, 2nd. ed. 1984,103 pp. 
4 Relaciones comerciales, crisis monetaria e integración 
económica en América Latina, 1975,85 pp. 
5 Síntesis de la segunda evaluación regional dela 
estrategia internacional del desarrollo, 1975,72 pp. 
6 Dinero de valor constante. Concepto, problemas y 
experiencias, Jorge Rose, 1975,2nd. ed. 1984,43 pp. 
7 La coyuntura internacional y el sector extemo, 1975, 
2nd. ed. 1983, 106 pp. 
8 La industrialización latinoamericana en los años 
setenta, 1975,2nd. ed. 1984,116 pp. 
9 Dos estudios sobre inflación 1972-1974. La inflación 
en los países centrales. América Latina y la inflación 
importada, 1975,2nd. ed. 1984,57 pp. 
s/n Canada and the foreign firm, D. Pollock, 1976,43 pp. 
10 Reactivación del mercado común centroamericano, 
1976,2nd. ed. 1984,149 pp. 
11 Integración y cooperación entre países en desarrollo 
en el ámbito agrícola, Germánico Salgado, 1976, 
2nd. ed. 1985,62 pp. 
12 Temas del nuevo orden económico internacional, 
1976,2nd. ed. 1984,85 pp. 
13 En torno a las ideas de la CEP AL: desarrollo, 
industrialización y comercio exterior, 1977, 2nd. ed. 
1985,57 pp. 
14 En tomo a las ideas de la CEP AL: problemas de la 
industrialización en América Latina, 1977, 2nd. ed. 
1984,46 pp. 
15 Los recursos hidráulicos de América Latina. Informe 
regional, 1977,2nd. ed. 1984,75 pp. 
15 The water resources of Latín America. Regional 
report, 1977,2nd. ed. 1985,79 pp. 
16 Desarrollo y cambio social en América Latina, 1977, 
2nd. ed. 1984,59 pp. 
17 Estrategia internacional de desarrollo y estableci-
miento de un nuevo orden económico internacional, 
1977, 3rd.ed. 1984,61pp. 
17 International development strategy and 
establishment of a new international economic 
order, 1977,3rd. ed. 1985, 59 pp. 
18 Raíces históricas de las estructuras distributivas de 
América Latina, A. di Filippo, 1977, 2nd. ed. 1983, 
64 pp. 
19 Dos estudios sobre endeudamiento extemo, C. 
Massad and R.Zahler, 1977, 2nd.ed. 1986,66 pp. 
s/n United States - Latín American trade and 
financial relations: some policy recommendations, 
S. Weintraub, 1977,44 pp. 
20 Tendencias y proyecciones a largo plazo del 
desarrollo económico de América Latina, 1978, 
3rd. ed. 1985,134 pp. 
21 25 años en la agricultura de América Latina: rasgos 
principales 1950-1975,1978,2nd. ed. 1983,124 pp. 
22 Notas sobre la familia como unidad socioeconómica, 
Carlos A. Borsotti, 1978,2nd. ed. 1984,60 pp. 
23 La organización de la información para la evaluación 
del desarrollo, Juan Sourrouille, 1978,2nd. ed. 1984, 
61 pp. 
24 Contabilidad nacional a precios constantes en América 
Latina, 1978,2nd. ed. 1983,60 pp. 
s/n Energy in Latín America: The Historical Record, 
J. Mullen, 1978,66 pp. 
25 Ecuador, desafíos y logros de la política económica en 
la fase de expansión petrolera, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1984, 
153 pp. 
26 Las transformaciones rurales en América Latina: 
¿desarrollo social o marginación?, 1979, 2nd. ed. 
1984,160 pp. 
27 La dimensión de la pobreza en América Latina, Osear 
Altimir, 1979,2nd. ed. 1983,89 pp. 
28 Organización institucional para el control y manejo de 
la deuda externa. El caso chileno, Rodolfo Hoffman, 
1979,35 pp. 
29 La política monetaria y el ajuste de la balanza de 
pagos: tres estudios, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1984,61 pp. 
29 Monetary policy and balance of payments 
adjustment: three studies, 1979,60 pp. 
30 América Latina: las evaluaciones regionales de la 
estrategia internacional del desarrollo en los años 
setenta, 1979,2nd. ed. 1982,237 pp. 
31 Educación, imágenes y estilos de desarrollo, G. 
Rama, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1982,72 pp. 
32 Movimientos internacionales de capitales, R. H. 
Arriazu, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1984,90 pp. 
33 Informe sobre las inversiones directas extranjeras en 
América Latina, A. E. Calcagno, 1980,2nd. ed. 1982, 
114 pp. 
34 Las fluctuaciones de la industria manufacturera 
argentina, 1950-1978, D. Heymann, 1980, 2nd. ed. 
1984,234 pp. 
35 Perspectivas de reajuste industrial: la Comunidad 
Económica Europea y los países en desarrollo, 
B. Evers, G. de Groot and W. Wagenmans, 1980, 
2nd. ed. 1984,69 pp. 
36 Un análisis sobre la posibilidad de evaluar la solvencia 
crediticia de los países en desarrollo, A. Saieh, 
1980,2nd. ed. 1984,82 pp. 
37 Hacia los censos latinoamericanos de los años 
ochenía, 1981,146 pp. 
s/n The economic relations of Latín America with 
Europe, 1980, 2nd. ed. 1983,156 pp. 
38 Desarrollo regional argentino: la agricultura, J. Martin, 
1981,2nd. ed. 1984,111pp. 
39 Estratificación y movilidad ocupacional en América 
Latina, C. Filgueíra and C. Geneletti, 1981, 2nd. ed. 
1985,162 pp. 
40 Programa de acción regional para América Latina en 
los años ochenta, 1981,2nd. ed. 1984,62 pp. 
40 Regional programme of action for Latin America in 
the 1980s, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1984, 57 pp. 
41 El desarrollo de América Latina y sus repercusiones 
en la educación. Alfabetismo y escolaridad básica, 
1982, 246 pp. 
42 América Latina y la economía mundial del café, 1982, 
95 pp. 
43 El ciclo ganadero y la economía argentina, 1983, 
160 pp. 
44 Las encuestas de hogares en América Latina, 1983, 
122 pp. 
45 Las cuentas nacionales en América Latina y el Caribe, 
1983,100 pp. 
45 National accounts In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 1983,97 pp. 
46 Demanda de equipos para generación, transmisión y 
transformación eléctrica en América Latina, 1983, 
193 pp. 
47 La economía de América Latina en 1982: evolución 
general, política cambiaria y renegoc/ac/ón de la deuda 
extema, 1984,104 pp. 
48 Políticas de ajuste y renegociación de la deuda extema 
en América Latina, 1984,102 pp. 
49 La economía de América Latina y el Caribe en 1983: 
evolución general, crisis y procesos de ajuste, 
1985,95 pp. 
49 The economy of Latin America and the Caribbean 
in 1983: main trends, the impact of the crisis and 
the adjustment processes, 1985,93 pp. 
50 La CEPAL, encamación de una esperanza de América 
Latina, Hernán Santa Cruz, 1985,77 pp. 
51 Hacia nuevas modalidades de cooperación económica 
entre América Latina y el Japón, 1986,233 pp. 
51 Towards new forms of economic co-operation 
between Latin America and Japan, 1987,245 pp. 
52 Los conceptos básicos del transporte marítimo y la 
situación de la actividad en América Latina, 1986, 
112 pp. 
52 Basic concepts of maritime transport and Us 
present status in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
1987,114 pp. 
53 Encuestas de ingresos y gastos. Conceptos y métodos 
en la experiencia latinoamericana. 1986,128 pp. 
54 Crisis económica y políticas de ajuste, estabilización y 
crecimiento, 1986,123 pp. 
54 The economic crisis: policies for adjustment, 
stabilization and growth, 1986,125 pp. 
55 El desarrollo de América Latina y el Caribe: escollos, 
requisitos y opciones, 1987,184 pp. 
55 Latin American and Caribbean development: 
obstacles, requirements and options, 1987,184 pp. 
56 Los bancos transnacionales y el endeudamiento 
extemo on la Argentina, 1987,112 pp. 
57 El proceso de desarrollo de la pequeña y mediana 
empresa y su papel en el sistema industrial: el caso de 
Italia, 1988,112 pp. 
58 La evolución de la economía de América Latina en 
1986,1988,99 pp. 
58 The evolution of the Latin American Economy in 
1986, 1988,95 pp. 
59 Protectionism: regional negotiation and defence 
strategies, 1988,261 pp. 
60 Industrialización en América Latina: de la "caja negra" 
al "casillero vacio", F. Fajnzylber, 1989, 2nd. ed. 
1990,176 pp. 
60 Industrialization in Latin America: from the 
"Black Box" to the "Empty Box", F. Fajnzylber, 
1990,172 pp. 
61 Hacia un desarrollo sostenido en América Latina y el 
Caribe: restricciones y requisitos, 1989,94 pp. 
61 Towards sustained development in Latin America 
and the Caribbean: restrictions and requisites, 
1989,93 pp. 
62 La evolución de la economía de América Latina en 
1987,1989,87 pp. 
62 The evolution of the Latin American economy in 
1987,1989,84 pp. 
63 Elementos para el diseño de políticas industriales 
y tecnológicas en América Latina, 1990, 2nd. ed. 
1991,172 pp. 
64 La industria de transporte regular internacbnal y la 
competitividad del comercio exterior de los países de 
América Latina y el Caribe, 1989,132 pp. 
64 The international common-carrier transportation 
industry and the competitiveness of the foreign 
trade of the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 1989,116 pp. 
65 Cambios estructurales en los puertos y la compe-
titividad del comercio exterior de América Latina y el 
Caribe, 1991, 141 pp. 
65 Structural Changes in Ports and the 
Competitiveness of Latin American and Caribbean 
Foreign Trade, 1990,126 pp. 
66 The Caribbean: one and divisible, 1993, 207 pp. 
67 La transferencia de recursos externos de América 
Latina en la posguenra, 1991, 92 pp. 
67 Postwar transfer of resources abroad by Latin 
America, 1992,90 pp. 
68 La reestructuración de empresas públicas: el caso 
de los puertos de América Latina y el Caribe, 1992, 
148 pp. 
68 The restructuring of public-sector enterprises: 
the case of Latin American and Caribbean ports, 
1992, 129 pp. 
69 Las finanzas públicas de América Latina en la década 
de 1980,1993,100 pp. 
69 Public Finances in Latin America in the 1980s, 
1993, 96 pp. 
70 Canales, cadenas, corredores y competividad: un 
enfoque sistémico y su aplicación a seis productos 
latinoamericanos de exportación, 1993, 183 pp. 
71 Focalización y pobreza, 1995,249 pp. 
72 Productividad de los pobres rurales y urbanos, 1995, 
318 pp. 
73 El gasto social en América Latina: un examen 
cuantitativo y cualitativo, 1995,167 pp. 
74 América Latina y el Caribe: dinámica de la población y 
desarrollo, 1995, 151 pp. 
75 Crecimiento de la población y desarrolto, 1995,95 pp. 
76 Dinámica de la población y desarrollo económico, 
1995, (en prensa). 
77 La reforma laboral y /a participación privada en tos 
puertos del sector público, 1996, (en prensa). 
77 Labour reform ancf prívate participation in 
public-sector ports, 1996,160 pp. 
78 Cenfroamérica y el TLC: efectos inmediatos e impli-
caciones futuras, 1996,164 pp. 
79 Ciudadanía y derechos humanos desde /a perspectiva 
de las políticas públicas, 1997,124 pp. 
82 A dinámica do Setor Saúde no Brasil, 1997,220 pp. 
Cuadernos Estadísticos de la C E P A L 
1 América Latina: relación de precios del intercambio, 
1976,2nd. ed. 1984,66 pp. 
2 Indicadores del desarrollo económico y social en 
América Latina, 1976,2nd. ed. 1984,179 pp. 
3 Series históricas del crecimiento de América Latina, 
1978,2nd. ed. 1984,206 pp. 
4 Estadísticas sobre la estructura del gasto de consumo 
de los hogares según finalidad del gasto, por grupos 
de ingreso, 1978,110 pp. (Out of print; replaced by 
No. 8 below) 
5 El balance de pagos de América Latina, 1950-1977, 
1979,2nd. ed. 1984,164 pp. 
6 Distribución regional del producto interno bruto 
sectorial en los países de América Latina, 1981, 
2nd. ed. 1985,68 pp. 
7 Tablas de insumo-producto en América Latina, 1983, 
383 pp. 
8 Estructura del gasto de consumo de los hogares 
según finalidad del gasto, por grupos de ingreso, 
1984,146 pp. 
9 Origen y destino del comercio exterior de los países de 
la Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración y del 
Mercado Común Centroamericano, 1985,546 pp. 
10 América Latina: balance de pagos, 1950-1984,1986, 
357 pp. 
11 El comercio exterior de bienes de capital en América 
Latina, 1986,288 pp. 
12 América Latina: índices del comercio exterior, 
1970-1984,1987,355 pp. 
13 América Latina: comercio exterior según la clasi-
ficación industrial internacional uniforme de todas 
las actividades económicas, 1987, Vol. I, 675 pp; 
Vol. II, 675 pp. 
14 La distribución del ingreso en Colombia. Antecedentes 
estadísticos y características socioeconómicas de tos 
receptores, 1988,156 pp. 
15 América Latina y el Caribe: series regionales de 
cuentas nacionales a precios constantes de 1980, 
1991, 245 pp. 
16 Origen y destino del comercio exterior de los países de 
la Asocición Latinoamericana de Integración, 1991, 
190 pp. 
17 Comercio intrazonal de los países de la Asociación 
de Integración, según capítulos de la clasificación 
uniforme para el comercio internacional, revisión 2, 
1992, 299 pp. 
18 Clasificaciones estadísticas internacionales incorpo-
radas en el Banco de Datos del Comercio Exterior de 
América Latina y el Caribe de la CEPAL, 1993, 313 pp. 
19 América Latina: comercio exterior según la clasi-
ficación industrial internacional uniforme de todas 
las actividades económicas (CIIU) - Volumen I 
-Exportaciones, 1993, 285 pp. 
19 América Latina: comercio exterior según la 
clasificación industrial internacional uniforme de todas 
las actividades económicas (CIIU) - Volumen II 
-Importaciones, 1993, 291 pp. 
20 Dirección del comercio exterior de América Latina y el 
Caribe según principales productos y grupos de 
productos, 1970-1992,1994,483 pp. 
21 Estructura del gasto de consumo de los hogares en 
América Latina, 1995, 274 pp. 
22 América Latina y el Caribe: dirección del comercio 
exterior de tos principales productos alimenticios y 
agrícolas según países de destino y procedencia, 
1979-1993,224 pp. 
23 América Latina y el Caribe: series regionales y oficiales 
de cuentas nacionales, 1950-1994,1996,130 pp. 
24 Chile: comercio exterior según grupos de la Clasi-
ficación Uniforme para el Comercio Internacional, 
Rev. 3, y países de destino y procedencia, 1990-1995, 
1996,480 pp. 
Estudios e Informes de la C E P A L 
1 Nicaragua: el impacto de la mutación política, 1981, 
2nd. ed. 1982,126 pp. 
2 Perú 1968-1977: la política económica en un proceso 
de cambio global, 1981,2nd. ed. 1982,166 pp. 
3 La industrialización de América Latina y la cooperación 
internacional, 1981, 170 pp. (Out of print, will not be 
reprinted.) 
4 Estilos de desarrollo, modernización y medio ambiente 
en la agricultura latinoamericana, 1981,4th. ed. 1984, 
130 pp. 
5 El desarrollo de América Latina en los años ochenta, 
1981,2nd. ed. 1982,153 pp. 
5 Latin American development in the 1980s, 1981, 
2nd. ed. 1982,134 pp. 
6 Proyecciones del desarrollo latinoamericano en los 
años ochenta, 1981, 3rd. ed. 1985,96 pp. 
6 Latín American development projections for the 
1980s, 1982,2nd. ed. 1983,89 pp. 
7 Las relaciones económicas extemas de América 
Latina en los años ochenta, 1981,2nd. ed. 1982,180 pp. 
8 Integración y cooperación regionales en los años 
ochenta, 1982,2nd. ed. 1982,174 pp. 
9 Estrategias de desarrollo sectorial para los años 
ochenta: industria y agricultura, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1985, 
100 pp. 
10 Dinámica del subempleo en América Latina. PREALC, 
1981,2nd. ed. 1985,101pp. 
11 Estilos de desarrollo de la industria manufacturera y 
medio ambiente en América Latina, 1982, 2nd. ed. 
1984, 178 pp. 
12 Relaciones económicas de América Latina con los 
países miembros del "Consejo de Asistencia Mutua 
Económica", 1982,154 pp. 
13 Campesinado y desarrollo agrícola en Bolivia, 1982, 
175 pp. 
14 El sector extemo: indicadores y análisis de sus 
fluctuaciones. El caso argentino, 1982,2nd. ed. 1985, 
216 pp. 
15 Ingeniería y consultoria en Brasil y el Grupo Andino, 
1982,320 pp. 
16 Cinco estudios sobre la situación de la mujer en 
América Latina, 1982,2nd. ed. 1985,178 pp. 
16 Five studies on the situation of women in Latin 
America, 1983,2nd. ed. 1984,188 pp. 
17 Cuentas nacionales y producto material en América 
Latina, 1982,129 pp. 
18 El financiamíento de las exportaciones en América 
Latina, 1983,212 pp. 
19 Medición del empleo y de los ingresos rurales, 1982, 
2nd. ed. 1983,173 pp. 
19 Measurement of employment and income in rural 
areas, 1983,184 pp. 
20 Efectos macroeconómicos de cambios en las barreras 
al comercio y al movimiento de capitales: un modelo de 
simulación, 1982,68 pp. 
21 La empresa pública en la economía: la experiencia 
argentina, 1982,2nd. ed. 1985,134 pp. 
22 Las empresas transnacionales en la economía de 
Chile, 1974-1980,1983,178 pp. 
23 La gestión y la informática en las empresas ferroviarias 
de América Latina y España, 1983,195 pp. 
24 Establecimiento de empresas de reparación y 
mantenimiento de contenedores en América Latina y el 
Caribe, 1983,314 pp. 
24 Establishing container repair and maintenance 
enterprises in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
1983,236 pp. 
25 Agua potable y saneamiento ambiental en América 
Latina, 1981-1990/Drinking water supply and 
sanitation in Latin America, 1981-1990 (bilingual), 
1983,140 pp. 
26 Los bancos transnacionales, el estado y el 
endeudamiento extemo en Bolivia, 1983,282 pp. 
27 Política económica y procesos de desarrollo. La 
experiencia argentina entre 1976 y 1981, 1983, 
157 pp. 
28 Estilos de desarrollo, energía y medio ambiente: un 
estudio de caso exploratorio, 1983,129 pp. 
29 Empresas transnacionales en la industria de 
alimentos. El caso argentino: cereales y carne, 1983, 
93 pp. 
30 Industriáización en Centroaméríca, 1960-1980, 1983, 
168 pp. 
31 Dos estudios sobre empresas transnacionales en 
Brasil, 1983,141 pp. 
32 La crisis económica internacional y su repercusión en 
América Latina, 1983,81 pp. 
33 La agricultura campesina en sus relaciones con la 
industria, 1984, 120 pp. 
34 Cooperación económica entre Brasil y el Grupo 
Andino: el caso de tos minerales y metales no ferrosos, 
1983,148 pp. 
35 La agricultura campes/na y el mercado de alimentos: la 
dependencia externa y sus efectos en una economía 
abierta, 1984,201pp. 
36 El capital extranjero en la economía peruana, 1984, 
178 pp. 
37 Dos estudios sobre política arancelaria, 1984,96 pp. 
38 Estabilización y liberalization económica en el Cono 
Sur, 1984,193 pp. 
39 La agricultura campesina y el mercado de alimentos: el 
caso de Haití y el de la República Dominicana, 1984, 
255 pp. 
40 La industria siderúrgica latinoamericana: tendencias y 
potencial, 1984,280 pp. 
41 La presencia de las empresas transnacionales en la 
economía ecuatoriana, 1984,77 pp. 
42 Precios, salarios y empleo en la Argentina: estadís-
ticas económicas de corto plazo, 1984,378 pp. 
43 El desarrollo de la seguridad social en América Latina, 
1985,348 pp. 
44 Market structure, firm size and Brazilian exports, 
1985, 104 pp. 
45 La planificación del transporte en países de América 
Latina, 1985,247 pp. 
46 La crisis en América Latina: su evaluación y 
perspectivas, 1985,119 pp. 
47 La juventud en América Latina y el Caribe, 1985, 
181 pp. 
48 Desarrollo de los recursos mineros de América Latina, 
1985,145 pp. 
48 Development of the mining resources of Latin 
America, 1989,160 pp. 
49 Las relaciones económicas internacionales de América 
Latina y la cooperación regional, 1985,224 pp. 
50 América Latina y la economía mundial del algodón, 
1985,122 pp. 
51 Comercio y cooperación entre países de América 
Latina y países miembros del CAME, 1985,90 pp. 
52 Trade relations between Brazil and the United 
States, 1985,148 pp. 
53 Los recursos hídricos de América Latina y el Caribe y 
su aprovechamiento, 1985,138 pp. 
53 The water resources of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and their utilization, 1985,135 pp. 
54 La pobreza en América Latina: dimensiones y 
políticas, 1985,155 pp. 
55 Políticas de promoción de exportaciones en algunos 
países de América Latina, 1985,207 pp. 
56 Las empresas transnacionales en la Argentina, 1986, 
222 pp. 
57 El desarrollo frutícola y forestal en Chile y sus 
derivaciones sociales, 1986,227 pp. 
58 El cultivo del algodón y la soya en el Paraguay y sus 
derivaciones sociales, 1986,141 pp. 
59 Expansión del cultivo de la caña de azúcar y de la 
ganadería en el nordeste del Brasil: un examen del 
papel de la política pública y de sus derivaciones 
económicas y sociales, 1986,164 pp. 
60 Las empresas transnacionales en el desarrollo 
colombiano, 1986,212 pp. 
61 Las empresas transnacionales en la economía del 
Paraguay, 1987,115 pp. 
62 Problemas de la industria latinoamericana en la fase 
críf/ca, 1986,113 pp. 
63 Relaciones económicas internacionales y cooperación 
regional de América Latina y el Caribe, 1987,272 pp. 
63 International economic relations and regional 
co-operation in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
1987,267 pp. 
64 Tres ensayos sobre inflación y políticas de 
estabilización, 1986,201 pp. 
65 La industria farmacéutica y farmoquímica: desarrollo 
histórico y posibilidades futuras. Argentina, Brasil y 
México, 1987, 177 pp. 
66 Dos estudios sobre América Latina y el Caribe y la 
economía internacional, 1987,125 pp. 
67 Reestructuración de la industria automotriz mundial y 
perspectivas para América Latina, 1987,232 pp. 
68 Cooperación latinoamericana en servicios: ante-
cedentes y perspectivas, 1988,155 pp. 
69 Desarrollo y transformación: estrategia para superar la 
pobreza, 1988,114 pp. 
69 Development and change: strategies for 
vanquishing poverty, 1988,114 pp. 
70 La evolución económica del Japón y su impacto en 
América Latina, 1988,88 pp. 
70 The economic evolution of Japan and its 
impact on Latin America, 1990,79 pp. 
71 La gestión de los recursos hídricos en América Latina 
y el Caribe, 1989,256 pp. 
72 La evolución del problema de la deuda extema en 
América Latina y el Caribe, 1988,77 pp. 
72 The evolution of the external debt problem in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 1988,69 pp. 
73 Agricultura, comercio exterior y cooperación 
internacional, 1988,83 pp. 
73 Agriculture, external trade and international 
co-operation, 1989,79 pp. 
74 Reestructuración industrial y cambio tecnológico: 
consecuencias para América Latina, 1989,105 pp. 
75 El medio ambiente como factor de desarrollo, 1989, 
2nd.ed. 1991,123 pp. 
76 El comportamiento de los bancos transnacionales y 
la crisis internacional de endeudamiento, 1989, 
214 pp. 
76 Transnational bank behaviour and the international 
debt crisis, 1989,198 pp. 
77 Los recursos hídricos de América Latina y del Caribe: 
planificación, desastres naturales y contaminación, 
1990,266 pp. 
77 The water resources of Latin America and the 
Caribbean • Planning hazards and pollution, 1990, 
252 pp. 
78 La apertura financiera en Chile y el comportamiento de 
los bancos transnacbnales, 1990,132 pp. 
79 La industria de bienes de capital en Amérca Latina y el 
Caribe: su desarrollo en un marco de cooperación 
regional, 1991,235 pp. 
80 Impacto ambiental de la contaminación hídrica 
producida por la Refinería Estatal Esmeraldas: análisis 
técnico-económico, 1991,189 pp. 
81 Magnitud de la pobreza en América Latina en los años 
ochenta, 1991,177 pp. 
82 América Latina y el Caribe: el manejo de la escasez de 
agua, 1991, 148 pp. 
83 Reestructuración y desarrollo de la industria 
automotriz mexicana en los años ochenta: evolución y 
perspectivas, 1992,191pp. 
84 La transformación de la producción en Chile: cuatro 
ensayos de interpretación, 1993, 372 pp. 
85 Inversión extranjera y empresas transnacionales en 
la economía de Chile (1974-1989). Proyectos de 
inversión y estrategias de las empresas transna-
tionales, 1992, 257 pp. 
86 Inversión extranjera y empresas transnacbnales en la 
economia de Chile (1974-1989). El papel del capital 
extranjero y la estrategia nacional de desarrollo, 
1992, 163 pp. 
87 Análisis de cadenas agroindustriales en Ecuador y 
Perú, 1993, 294 pp. 
88 El comercio de manufacturas de América Latina. 
Evolución y estructura 1962-1989,1993,150, pp. 
89 El impacto económico y social de las migraciones en 
Centroamérica, 1993,78 pp. 
90 El papel de las empresas transnacionales en la 
reestructuración industrial de Colombia: una síntesis, 
1993,131 pp. 
91 Las empresas transnacionales de una economía en 
transición: La experiencia argentina en los años 
ochenta, 1995,193 pp. 
92 Reestructuración y desarrollo productivo: desafío y 
potencial para los años noventa, 1994, 108 pp. 
93 Comercio internacional y med'io ambiente. La 
discusión actual, 1995, 112 pp. 
94 Innovación en tecnologías y sistemas de gestión 
ambientales en empresas líderes latinoamericanas, 
1995,206 pp. 
95 México: la industria maquiladora, 1996,237 pp. 
Serie INFOPLAN: Temas Especiales del Desarrollo 
1 Resúmenes de documentos sobre deuda extema, 
1986,324 pp. 
2 Resúmenes de documentos sobre cooperación entre 
países en desarrollo, 1986,189 pp. 
3 Resúmenes de documentos sobre recursos hídricos, 
1987,290 pp. 
4 Resúmenes de documentos sobre planificación y 
medio ambiente, 1987,111 pp. 
5 Resúmenes de documentos sobre integración 
económica en América Latina y el Caribe, 1987, 
273 pp. 
6 Resúmenes de documentos sobre cooperación entre 
países en desarrollo, II parte, 1988,146 pp. 
7 Documentos sobre privatización con énfasis en 
América Latina, 1991, 82 pp. 
8 Reseñas de documentos sobre desarrollo ambien-
talmente sustentable, 1992, 217 pp. 
9 MERCOSUR: resúmenes de documentos, 1993, 
119 pp. 
10 Políticas sociales: resúmenes de documentos, 1995, 
95 pp. 
11 Modernización del Estado: resúmenes de docu-
mentos, 1995, 73 pp. 
12 Gestión de la información: reseñas de documentos, 
1996,152 pp. 
13 Políticas sociales: resúmenes de documentos II, 1997, 
80 pp. 
*•- > » - ** Ve-» ,/» V». ,^.1 . ,JUi -tel e—. ^ f J / * «.< -UL» ^ ¿¿_» , . * _!,,!_ j, J,—» „fc, 
Kftuia«a)«tciis«n«ia«itffitt*«««. «*««i«MawaH?inanrt«j"«»BNa«!i. 
HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS 
United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors 
throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to:. United Nations, Sales 
Section, New York or Geneva. 
COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES 
Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies ci les agences 
dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez, -vous 
à: Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève. 
KAK no/Ij"IMTh M3AANKII OrrANMlAVNM o n U N H E H M M X NAUMR 
H i n m i i Opraaaiauaa 0 » u i » t « i i u i HauaA a m i a «jraar». a U W M U I amr»-
>•»•« a ar«MTCTMa ao acta paftoaas aupa. HaaoAara cnpaaaa o4 aiaaaaaa a 
aauiaai aaamaoai awraaaa* tut» nauiara no aApacy: Opraaaaauaa O t M i m a t a u i 
Kaua*. Caauaa no npoaaja* uaaaaa. Kwo-Kopa aaa MCaaaaa. 
COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS 
Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están a la venta en librerías y casas 
distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones 
Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra. 
Las publicaciones de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) y las del 
Instituto Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Planificación Económica y Social (ILPES) se pueden 
adquirir a los distribuidores locales o directamente a través de: 
Publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas 
Sección de Ventas - DC-2-0853 
Fax (212)963-3489 
E-mail: publications@un.org 
Nueva York, NY. 10017 
Estados Unidos de América 
Publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas. 
Sección de Ventas, Fax: (22)917-0027 
Palais des Nations 
1211 Ginebra 10, Suiza 
Unidad de Distribución 
CEPAL - Casilla 179-D 
Fax (562)208-1946 
E-mail: publications©eclac.cl 
Santiago de Chile 
Publications of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and those 
of the Latin American and the Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) can be 
ordered from your local distributor or directly through: 
United Nations Publications 
Sales Section, DC-2-0853 
Fax (212)963-3489 
E-mail: publications@un.org 
New York, NY, 10017 
USA 
United Nations Publications 
Sales Section. Fax (22)917-0027 
Palais des Nations 
1211 Geneve 10, Switzerland 
Distribution Unit 





Santa Elena 1955 
